McMillan v. Pennsylvania - 477 U.S. 79 (1986)
U.S. Supreme Court
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)
McMillan v. Pennsylvania
Argued March 4, 1986
Decided June 19, 1986
477 U.S. 79
Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act (Act) provides that anyone convicted of certain enumerated felonies is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment if the sentencing judge -- upon considering the evidence introduced at the trial and any additional evidence offered by either the defendant or the Commonwealth at the sentencing hearing -- finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the offense. The Act, which also provides that visible possession shall not be an element of the crime, operates to divest the judge of discretion to impose any sentence of less than five years for the underlying felony, but does not authorize a sentence in excess of that otherwise allowed for the offense. Each of the petitioners was convicted of one of the Act's enumerated felonies, and in each case the Commonwealth gave notice that at sentencing it would seek to proceed under the Act. However, each of the sentencing judges found the Act unconstitutional and imposed a lesser sentence than that required by the Act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court consolidated the Commonwealth's appeals, vacated petitioners' sentences, and remanded for sentencing pursuant to the Act. The court held that the Act was consistent with due process, rejecting petitioners' principal argument that visible possession of a firearm was an element of the crimes for which they were sentenced, and thus must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt under In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684.
1. A State may properly treat visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing consideration rather than an element of a particular offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This case is controlled by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, which rejected a claim that, whenever a State links the "severity of punishment" to the "presence or absence of an identified fact" the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. While there are constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard, the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard is usually dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case. Here, the Pennsylvania Legislature has made visible possession of a firearm a sentencing factor that comes into play only after the defendant has been found guilty of one of the
enumerated crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and the constitutional limits to a State's power are not exceeded by the Act, which only raises the minimum sentence that may be imposed and neither alters the maximum sentence nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605, distinguished. Pp. 447 U. S. 84-91.
2. There is no merit to petitioners' contention that, even though States may treat visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing consideration, rather than an element of a particular offense, due process nonetheless requires that visible possession be proved by at least clear and convincing evidence. The preponderance standard satisfies due process. Sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all. Nothing in Pennsylvania's scheme warrants constitutionalizing burdens of proof at sentencing. Pp. 477 U. S. 91-93.
3. Nor is there merit to petitioners' claim that the Act denies them their Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. There is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact. P. 477 U. S. 93.
508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 93. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 477 U. S. 96.