Acting on information indicating that respondent Greenwood might
be engaged in narcotics trafficking, police twice obtained from his
regular trash collector garbage bags left on the curb in front of
his house. On the basis of items in the bags which were indicative
of narcotics use, the police obtained warrants to search the house,
discovered controlled substances during the searches, and arrested
respondents on felony narcotics charges. Finding that probable
cause to search the house would not have existed without the
evidence obtained from the trash searches, the State Superior Court
dismissed the charges under
People v.
Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357,
486 P.2d 1262, which held that warrantless trash searches violate
the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution. Although
noting a post-
Krivda state constitutional amendment
eliminating the exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation
of state, but not federal, law, the State Court of Appeal affirmed
on the ground that
Krivda was based on federal, as well as
state, law.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search
and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of
a home. Pp.
486 U. S.
39-44.
(a) Since respondents voluntarily left their trash for
collection in an area particularly suited for public inspection,
their claimed expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items they
discarded was not objectively reasonable. It is common knowledge
that plastic garbage bags left along a public street are readily
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at
the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party,
the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through it or
permitted others, such as the police, to do so. The police cannot
reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of
criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of
the public. Pp.
486 U. S.
43-44.
(b) Greenwood's alternative argument that his expectation of
privacy in his garbage should be deemed reasonable as a matter of
federal constitutional law because the warrantless search and
seizure of his garbage was impermissible as a matter of California
law under
Krivda,
Page 486 U. S. 36
which he contends survived the state constitutional amendment,
is without merit. The reasonableness of a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes does not depend upon privacy concepts embodied
in the law of the particular State in which the search occurred;
rather, it turns upon the understanding of society as a whole that
certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from
government invasion. There is no such understanding with respect to
garbage left for collection at the side of a public street. Pp.
486 U. S.
43-44.
2. Also without merit is Greenwood's contention that the
California constitutional amendment violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Just as this Court's Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule decisions have not required suppression where the
benefits of deterring minor police misconduct were overbalanced by
the societal costs of exclusion, California was not foreclosed by
the Due Process Clause from concluding that the benefits of
excluding relevant evidence of criminal activity do not outweigh
the costs when the police conduct at issue does not violate federal
law. Pp.
486 U. S.
44-45.
182 Cal. App.
3d 729,
227 Cal. Rptr.
539, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ.,
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL,
J., joined,
post, p.
486 U. S. 45.
KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Page 486 U. S. 37
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue here is whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the
warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection
outside the curtilage of a home. We conclude, in accordance with
the vast majority of lower courts that have addressed the issue,
that it does not.
I
In early 1984, Investigator Jenny Stracner of the Laguna Beach
Police Department received information indicating that respondent
Greenwood might be engaged in narcotics trafficking. Stracner
learned that a criminal suspect had informed a federal drug
enforcement agent in February, 1984, that a truck filled with
illegal drugs was en route to the Laguna Beach address at which
Greenwood resided. In addition, a neighbor complained of heavy
vehicular traffic late at night in front of Greenwood's
single-family home. The neighbor reported that the vehicles
remained at Greenwood's house for only a few minutes.
Stracner sought to investigate this information by conducting a
surveillance of Greenwood's home. She observed several vehicles
make brief stops at the house during the late-night and
early-morning hours, and she followed a truck from the house to a
residence that had previously been under investigation as a
narcotics trafficking location.
On April 6, 1984, Stracner asked the neighborhood's regular
trash collector to pick up the plastic garbage bags that Greenwood
had left on the curb in front of his house and to turn the bags
over to her without mixing their contents with garbage from other
houses. The trash collector cleaned his truck bin of other refuse,
collected the garbage bags from the street in front of Greenwood's
house, and turned the bags over to Stracner. The officer searched
through the rubbish
Page 486 U. S. 38
and found items indicative of narcotics use. She recited the
information that she had gleaned from the trash search in an
affidavit in support of a warrant to search Greenwood's home.
Police officers encountered both respondents at the house later
that day when they arrived to execute the warrant. The police
discovered quantities of cocaine and hashish during their search of
the house. Respondents were arrested on felony narcotics charges.
They subsequently posted bail.
The police continued to receive reports of many late-night
visitors to the Greenwood house. On May 4, Investigator Robert
Rahaeuser obtained Greenwood's garbage from the regular trash
collector in the same manner as had Stracner. The garbage again
contained evidence of narcotics use.
Rahaeuser secured another search warrant for Greenwood's home
based on the information from the second trash search. The police
found more narcotics and evidence of narcotics trafficking when
they executed the warrant. Greenwood was again arrested.
The Superior Court dismissed the charges against respondents on
the authority of
People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357,
486 P.2d 1262 (1971), which held that warrantless trash searches
violate the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution. The
court found that the police would not have had probable cause to
search the Greenwood home without the evidence obtained from the
trash searches.
The Court of Appeal affirmed.
182 Cal. App.
3d 729,
227 Cal. Rptr.
539 (1986). The court noted at the outset that the fruits of
warrantless trash searches could no longer be suppressed if
Krivda were based only on the California Constitution,
because, since 1982, the State has barred the suppression of
evidence seized in violation of California law but not federal law.
See Cal.Const., Art. I, § 28(d);
In re Lance
W., 37 Cal. 3d
873,
694 P.2d 744
(1985). But
Krivda, a decision binding on the Court of
Appeal, also held that the fruits of warrantless trash searches
were to be excluded under federal
Page 486 U. S. 39
law. Hence, the Superior Court was correct in dismissing the
charges against respondents. 182 Cal. App. 3d at 735, 227 Cal.Rptr,
at 542. [
Footnote 1]
The California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for
review of the Court of Appeal's decision. We granted certiorari,
483 U.S. 1019, and now reverse.
II
The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at
the curb outside the Greenwood house would violate the Fourth
Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively
reasonable.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.
S. 709,
480 U. S. 715
(1987);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.
S. 207,
476 U. S. 211
(1986);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.
S. 170,
466 U. S. 177
(1984);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347,
389 U. S. 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Respondents do not disagree with
this standard.
They assert, however, that they had, and exhibited, an
expectation of privacy with respect to the trash that was searched
by the police: the trash, which was placed on the street for
collection at a fixed time, was contained in opaque plastic bags,
which the garbage collector was expected to pick up, mingle with
the trash of others, and deposit at the garbage dump. The trash was
only temporarily on the street, and there was little likelihood
that it would be inspected by anyone.
It may well be that respondents did not expect that the contents
of their garbage bags would become known to the police or other
members of the public. An expectation of privacy does not give rise
to Fourth Amendment protection,
Page 486 U. S. 40
however, unless society is prepared to accept that expectation
as objectively reasonable.
Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the
public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment
protection. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left
on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to
animals, [
Footnote 2] children,
scavengers, [
Footnote 3]
snoops, [
Footnote 4] and other
members of the public.
See Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d at 367, 486
P.2d at 1269. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb
for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash
collector, who might himself have sorted through respondents' trash
or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly,
having deposited their garbage
"in an area particularly suited for
Page 486 U. S. 41
public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take
it,"
United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (CA3
1981), respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.
Furthermore, as we have held, the police cannot reasonably be
expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity
that could have been observed by any member of the public. Hence,
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."
Katz v. United States, supra, at
389 U. S. 351.
We held in
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.
S. 735 (1979), for example, that the police did not
violate the Fourth Amendment by causing a pen register to be
installed at the telephone company's offices to record the
telephone numbers dialed by a criminal suspect. An individual has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on his
telephone, we reasoned, because he voluntarily conveys those
numbers to the telephone company when he uses the telephone. Again,
we observed that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."
Id. at
442 U. S.
743-744.
Similarly, we held in
California v. Ciraolo, supra,
that the police were not required by the Fourth Amendment to obtain
a warrant before conducting surveillance of the respondent's fenced
backyard from a private plane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet.
We concluded that the respondent's expectation that his yard was
protected from such surveillance was unreasonable, because "[a]ny
member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could
have seen everything that these officers observed."
Id. at
476 U. S.
213-214.
Our conclusion that society would not accept as reasonable
respondents' claim to an expectation of privacy in trash left for
collection in an area accessible to the public is reinforced by the
unanimous rejection of similar claims by the Federal Courts of
Appeals.
See United States v. Dela Espriella,
Page 486 U. S. 42
781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (CA9 1986);
United States v.
O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-1534 (CA11 1985);
United
States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1312-1313 (CA8),
cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984);
United States v. Kramer,
711 F.2d 789, 791-794 (CA7),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962
(1983);
United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 308-309
(CA2),
cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. United States,
461 U.S. 931 (1983);
United States v. Reicherter, supra,
at 399;
United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-101
(CA5 1979) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081
(1980);
United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025 (CA4
1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979);
Magda v.
Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112-113 (CA6 1976) (per curiam);
United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972-974 (CA1
1972). In
United States v. Thornton, 241 U.S.App.D.C. 46,
56, and n. 11, 746 F.2d 39, 49, and n. 11 (1984), the court
observed that
"the overwhelming weight of authority rejects the proposition
that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to
trash discarded outside the home and the curtilege [
sic]
thereof."
In addition, of those state appellate courts that have
considered the issue, the vast majority have held that the police
may conduct warrantless searches and seizures of garbage discarded
in public areas.
See Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397 Mass.
508, 512-513,
492
N.E.2d 719, 721-722 (1986);
Cooks v.
State, 699 P.2d
653, 656 (Okla. Crim.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935
(1985);
State v. Stevens, 123 Wis.2d 303, 314-317,
367 N.W.2d
788, 794-797,
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985);
State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d
224, 228-230 (N.D.1985);
State v. Brown, 20 Ohio
App.3d 36, 37-38, 484 N.E.2d 215, 217-218 (1984);
State v.
Oquist, 327 N.W.2d
587 (Minn.1982);
People v. Whotte, 113 Mich.App. 12,
317 N.W.2d 266 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Minton, 288
Pa.Super. 381, 391,
432
A.2d 212, 217 (1981);
State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d
1326 (Fla.App.1980);
People v. Huddleston, 38 Ill.App.3d
277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976);
Willis v. State, 518
S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex.Crim.App.1975);
Smith v.
State, 510 P.2d 793
(Alaska),
cert. denied,
Page 486 U. S. 43
414 U.S. 1086 (1973);
State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586,
592-593,
503 P.2d 807,
813-814 (1972);
Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122,
125-126 (Wyo.1970);
State v. Purvis, 249 Ore. 404, 411,
438 P.2d
1002, 1005 (1968).
But see State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw.
658,
701 P.2d 1274
(1985);
People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 729, 486 P.2d 1262
(1971). [
Footnote 5]
III
We reject respondent Greenwood's alternative argument for
affirmance: that his expectation of privacy in his garbage should
be deemed reasonable as a matter of federal constitutional law
because the warrantless search and seizure of his garbage was
impermissible as a matter of California law. He urges that the
state law right of Californians to privacy in their garbage,
announced by the California Supreme Court in
Krivda,
supra, survived the subsequent state constitutional amendment
eliminating the suppression remedy as a means of enforcing that
right.
See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 886-887, 694 P.2d
at 752-753. Hence, he argues that the Fourth Amendment should
itself vindicate that right.
Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the
Federal Constitution. We have never intimated, however, that
whether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in
which the search occurs. We have emphasized instead that the Fourth
Amendment analysis must turn on such factors as "our
societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most
scrupulous protection from government invasion."
Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. at
466 U. S. 178
(emphasis added).
See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.
S. 128,
439 U. S.
143-144, n. 12 (1978). We have already concluded that
society as a whole possesses no such understanding
Page 486 U. S. 44
with regard to garbage left for collection at the side of a
public street. Respondent's argument is no less than a suggestion
that concepts of privacy under the laws of each State are to
determine the reach of the Fourth Amendment. We do not accept this
submission.
IV
Greenwood finally urges as an additional ground for affirmance
that the California constitutional amendment eliminating the
exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of state but not
federal law violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In his view, having recognized a state law right to be
free from warrantless searches of garbage, California may not under
the Due Process Clause deprive its citizens of what he describes as
"the only effective deterrent" to violations of this right.
Greenwood concedes that no direct support for his position can be
found in the decisions of this Court. He relies instead on cases
holding that individuals are entitled to certain procedural
protections before they can be deprived of a liberty or property
interest created by state law.
See Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U. S. 460
(1983);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480
(1980).
We see no merit in Greenwood's position. California could amend
its Constitution to negate the holding in
Krivda that
state law forbids warrantless searches of trash. We are convinced
that the State may likewise eliminate the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for violations of that right. At the federal level, we have
not required that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment be suppressed in all circumstances.
See, e.g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897
(1984);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.
S. 433 (1976);
United States v. Calandra,
414 U. S. 338
(1974). Rather, our decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule have balanced the benefits of deterring
police misconduct against the costs of excluding reliable evidence
of criminal activity.
See Leon, 468 U.S. at
468 U. S.
908-913. We
Page 486 U. S. 45
have declined to apply the exclusionary rule indiscriminately
"when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith
or their transgressions have been minor," because
"the magnitude of the benefit conferred on . . . guilty
defendants [in such circumstances] offends basic concepts of the
criminal justice system."
Id. at
468 U. S. 908
(citing
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
428 U. S. 490
(1976)).
The States are not foreclosed by the Due Process Clause from
using a similar balancing approach to delineate the scope of their
own exclusionary rules. Hence, the people of California could
permissibly conclude that the benefits of excluding relevant
evidence of criminal activity do not outweigh the costs when the
police conduct at issue does not violate federal law.
V
The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is therefore
reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The Court of Appeal also held that respondent Van Houten had
standing to seek the suppression of evidence discovered during the
April 4 search of Greenwood's home. 182 Cal. App. 3d at 735, 227
Cal. Rptr. at 542-543.
[
Footnote 2]
For example,
State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d
224 (N. D.1985), involved the search of a garbage bag that a
dog, acting "at the behest of no one,"
id. at 228, had
dragged from the defendants' yard into the yard of a neighbor. The
neighbor deposited the bag in his own trash can, which he later
permitted the police to search. The North Dakota Supreme Court held
that the search of the garbage bag did not violate the defendants'
Fourth Amendment rights.
[
Footnote 3]
It is not only the homeless of the Nation's cities who make use
of others' refuse. For example, a nationally syndicated consumer
columnist has suggested that apartment dwellers obtain cents-off
coupons by "mak[ing] friends with the fellow who handles the trash"
in their buildings, and has recounted the tale of
"the 'Rich lady' from Westmont who, once a week, puts on rubber
gloves and hip boots and wades into the town garbage dump looking
for labels and other proofs of purchase"
needed to obtain manufacturers' refunds. M. Sloane, "The
Supermarket Shopper's" 1980 Guide to Coupons and Refunds 74, 161
(1980).
[
Footnote 4]
Even the refuse of prominent Americans has not been
invulnerable. In 1975, for example, a reporter for a weekly tabloid
seized five bags of garbage from the sidewalk outside the home of
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Washington Post, July 9, 1975,
p. A1, col. 8. A newspaper editorial criticizing this journalistic
"trash-picking" observed that "[e]vidently . . .
everybody does
it.'" Washington Post, July 10, 1975, p. A18, col. 1. We of course
do not, as the dissent implies, "bas[e] [our] conclusion" that
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
garbage on this "sole incident." Post at 486 U. S.
51.
[
Footnote 5]
Given that the dissenters are among the tiny minority of judges
whose views are contrary to ours, we are distinctly unimpressed
with the dissent's prediction that "society will be shocked to
learn" of today's decision.
Post at
486 U. S.
46.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
Every week for two months, and at least once more a month later,
the Laguna Beach police clawed through the trash that respondent
Greenwood left in opaque, sealed bags on the curb outside his home.
Record 113. Complete strangers minutely scrutinized their bounty,
undoubtedly dredging up intimate details of Greenwood's private
life and habits. The intrusions proceeded without a warrant, and no
court before or since has concluded that the police acted on
probable cause to believe Greenwood was engaged in any criminal
activity.
Scrutiny of another's trash is contrary to commonly accepted
notions of civilized behavior. I suspect, therefore,
Page 486 U. S. 46
that members of our society will be shocked to learn that the
Court, the ultimate guarantor of liberty, deems unreasonable our
expectation that the aspects of our private lives that are
concealed safely in a trash bag will not become public.
I
"A container which can support a reasonable expectation of
privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, without a
warrant."
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.
S. 109, 120, n.
466 U. S. 17 (1984) (citations omitted). Thus, as the
Court observes, if Greenwood had a reasonable expectatlon that the
contents of the bags that he placed on the curb would remain
private, the warrantless search of those bags violated the Fourth
Amendment.
Ante at
486 U. S.
39.
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment understood that
"unreasonable searches" of "paper[s] and effects" -- no less than
"unreasonable searches" of "person[s] and houses" -- infringe
privacy. As early as 1878, this Court acknowledged that the
contents of
"[l]etters and sealed packages . . . in the mail are as fully
guarded from examination and inspection . . . as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own
domiciles."
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727,
96 U. S. 733.
In short, so long as a package is "closed against inspection," the
Fourth Amendment protects its contents, "wherever they may be," and
the police must obtain a warrant to search it just "as is required
when papers are subjected to search in one's own household."
Ibid. Accord, United States v. Van Leeuwen,
397 U. S. 249
(1970).
With the emergence of the reasonable-expectation-o-privacy
analysis,
see Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347,
389 U. S. 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Smith v. Maryland,
442 U. S. 735,
442 U. S. 740
(1979), we have reaffirmed this fundamental principle. In
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420
(1981), for example, Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality of
four, pronounced that,
"unless the container is such that its contents may be said to
be in plain view, those contents are fully
Page 486 U. S. 47
protected by the Fourth Amendment,"
id. at
453 U. S. 427,
and soundly rejected any distinction for Fourth Amendment purposes
among various opaque, sealed containers:
"[E]ven if one wished to import such a distinction into the
Fourth Amendment, it is difficult if not impossible to perceive any
objective criteria by which that task might be accomplished. What
one person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper
bag. . . . And . . . no court, no constable, no citizen, can
sensibly be asked to distinguish the relative 'privacy interests'
in a closed suitcase, briefcase, portfolio, duffelbag, or box."
Id. at
453 U. S.
426-427.
See also id. at
453 U. S. 428
(expectation of privacy attaches to any container unless it "so
clearly announce[s] its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents
are obvious to an observer"). With only one exception, every
Justice who wrote in that case eschewed any attempt to distinguish
"worthy" from "unworthy" containers. [
Footnote 2/1]
More recently, in
United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 (1982), the Court, relying on the
"virtually unanimous agreement
Page 486 U. S. 48
in
Robbins . . . that a constitutional distinction
between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would be improper,"
held that a distinction among "paper bags, locked trunks, lunch
buckets, and orange crates" would be inconsistent with
"the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment. . . . [A] traveler
who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper
bag or knotted scarf [may] claim an equal right to conceal his
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive
with the locked attache case."
"As Justice Stewart stated in
Robbins, the Fourth
Amendment provides protection to the owner of
every container
that conceals its contents from plain view."
Id. at
456 U. S.
822-823 (emphasis added; footnote and citation omitted).
See also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at
466 U. S. 129
(opinion of WHITE, J.).
Accordingly, we have found a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of a 200-pound "double-locked footlocker,"
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1,
433 U. S. 11
(1977); a "comparatively small, unlocked suitcase,"
Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753,
442 U. S. 762,
n. 9 (1979); a "totebag,"
Robbins, 453 U.S. at
453 U. S. 422;
and "packages wrapped in green opaque plastic,"
ibid.
See also Ross, supra, at
456 U. S. 801,
456 U. S.
822-823 (suggesting that a warrant would have been
required to search a "
lunchtype' brown paper bag" and a
"zippered red leather pouch" had they not been found in an
automobile); Jacobsen, supra, at 466 U. S. 111,
466 U. S.
114-115 (suggesting that a warrantless search of an
"ordinary cardboard box wrapped in brown paper" would have violated
the Fourth Amendment had a private party not already opened
it).
Our precedent, therefore, leaves no room to doubt that, had
respondents been carrying their personal effects in opaque, sealed
plastic bags -- identical to the ones they placed on the curb --
their privacy would have been protected from warrantless police
intrusion. So far as Fourth Amendment protection is concerned,
opaque plastic bags are every bit as
Page 486 U. S. 49
worthy as "packages wrapped in green opaque plastic" and
"double-locked footlocker[s]."
Cf. Robbins, supra, at
453 U. S. 441
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court's discovery of
reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of "two plastic
garbage bags").
II
Respondents deserve no less protection just because Greenwood
used the bags to discard, rather than to transport, his personal
effects. Their contents are not inherently any less private, and
Greenwood's decision to discard them, at least in the manner in
which he did, does not diminish his expectation of privacy.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Page 486 U. S. 50
A trash bag, like any of the above-mentioned containers, "is a
common repository for one's personal effects" and, even more than
many of them, is "therefore . . . inevitably associated with the
expectation of privacy."
Sanders, supra, at
442 U. S. 762
(citing
Chadwick, supra, at
433 U. S. 13).
"[A]lmost every human activity ultimately manifests itself in waste
products. . . ."
Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793,
798 (Alaska),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973).
See
California v. Rooney, 483 U. S. 307,
483 U. S.
320-321, n. 3 (1987) (WHITE, J., dissenting) (renowned
archaeologist Emil Haury once said, "[i]f you want to know what is
really going on in a community, look at its garbage") (quoted by W.
Rathje, Archaeological Ethnography . . . Because Sometimes It Is
Better to Give Than to Receive, in Explorations in Ethnoarchaeology
49, 54 (R. Gould ed.1978)); Weberman, The Art of Garbage Analysis:
You Are What You Throw Away, 76 Esquire 113 (1971) (analyzing trash
of various celebrities and drawing conclusions about their private
lives). A single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating,
reading, and recreational habits of the person who produced it. A
search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate intimate
details about sexual practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like
rifling through desk drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging
through trash can divulge the target's financial and professional
status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts,
personal relationships, and romantic interests. It cannot be
doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors telling evidence of the
"intimate activity associated with the
sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life,'" which the Fourth Amendment is
designed
Page 486 U. S.
51
to protect. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.
S. 170, 466 U. S. 180
(1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616, 116 U. S. 630
(1886)). See also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.
S. 294, 480 U. S. 300
(1987).
The Court properly rejects the State's attempt to distinguish
trash searches from other searches on the theory that trash is
abandoned, and therefore not entitled to an expectation of privacy.
As the author of the Court's opinion observed last Term, a
defendant's
"property interest [in trash] does not settle the matter for
Fourth Amendment purposes, for the reach of the Fourth Amendment is
not determined by state property law."
Rooney, supra, at
483 U. S. 320
(WHITE, J., dissenting). In evaluating the reasonableness of
Greenwood's expectation that his sealed trash bags would not be
invaded, the Court has held that we must look to "understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society." [
Footnote 2/3] Most of us, I believe, would be
incensed to discover a meddler -- whether a neighbor, a reporter,
or a detective -- scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to
discover some detail of our personal lives.
See State v.
Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1331 (Fla. App.1980) (Anstead, J.,
dissenting). That was, quite naturally, the reaction to the sole
incident on which the Court bases its conclusion that "snoops" and
the like defeat the expectation of privacy in trash.
Ante
at
486 U. S. 40,
and n. 4. When a tabloid reporter examined then-Secretary of
State
Page 486 U. S. 52
Henry Kissinger's trash and published his findings, Kissinger
was "really revolted" by the intrusion, and his wife suffered
"grave anguish." N.Y. Times, July 9, 1975, p. A1, col. 8. The
public response roundly condemning the reporter demonstrates that
society not only recognized those reactions as reasonable, but
shared them as well. Commentators variously characterized his
conduct as "a disgusting invasion of personal privacy," Flieger,
Investigative Trash, U.S. News & World Report, July 28, 1975,
p. 72 (editor's page); "indefensible . . . as civilized behavior,"
Washington Post, July 10, 1975, p. A18, col. 1 (editorial); and
contrary to "the way decent people behave in relation to each
other,"
ibid.
Beyond a generalized expectation of privacy, many
municipalities, whether for reasons of privacy, sanitation, or
both, reinforce confidence in the integrity of sealed trash
containers by
"prohibit[ing] anyone, except authorized employees of the Town .
. . to rummage into, pick up, collect, move or otherwise interfere
with articles or materials placed on . . . any public street for
collection."
United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 215 (CA2 1971)
(paraphrasing ordinance for town of Cheektowaga, New York).
See
also United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100 (CA5 1979)
(per curiam);
Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112 (CA6
1976) (per curiam);
People v. Rooney, 175 Cal. App.
3d 634, 645,
221 Cal. Rptr.
49, 56 (1985),
cert. dism'd, 483 U.
S. 307 (1987);
People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357,
366, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (1971),
vacated and remanded,
409 U. S. 33
(1972);
State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App.3d 36, 38, n. 3, 484
N.E.2d 215, 218, n. 3 (1984). In fact, the California Constitution,
as interpreted by the State's highest court, guarantees a right of
privacy in trash
vis-a-vis government officials.2
See
Krivda, supra, (recognizing right);
In re Lance
W., 37 Cal. 3d
873, 886-887,
694 P.2d 744,
752-753 (1985) (later constitutional amendment abolished
exclusionary remedy, but left intact the substance of the
right).
Page 486 U. S. 53
That is not to deny that isolated intrusions into opaque, sealed
trash containers occur. When, acting on their own, "animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, [or] other members of the public,"
ante at
486 U. S. 40
(footnotes omitted),
actually rummage through a bag of
trash and expose its contents to plain view,
"police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any
member of the public,"
ante at
486 U. S. 41.
That much follows from cases like
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at
466 U. S. 117,
120, n. 17 (emphasis added), which held that police may
constitutionally inspect a package whose "integrity" a private
carrier has
already "compromised," because
"[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities
use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy
has not
already been frustrated,"
and
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.
S. 207,
476 U. S.
213-214 (1986) (emphasis added), which held that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police from observing what
"[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced
down
could have seen."
Had Greenwood flaunted his intimate activity by strewing his
trash all over the curb for all to see, or had some nongovernmental
intruder invaded his privacy and done the same, I could accept the
Court's conclusion that an expectation of privacy would have been
unreasonable. Similarly, had police searching the city dump run
across incriminating evidence that, despite commingling with the
trash of others, still retained its identity as Greenwood's, we
would have a different case. But all that Greenwood "exposed . . .
to the public,"
ante at
486 U. S. 40,
were the exteriors of several opaque, sealed containers. Until the
bags were opened by police, they hid their contents from the
public's view every bit as much as did Chadwick's double-locked
footlocker and Robbins' green plastic wrapping. Faithful
application of the warrant requirement does not require police to
"avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could
have been observed by any member of the public." Rather, it only
requires them
Page 486 U. S. 54
to adhere to norms of privacy that members of the public plainly
acknowledge.
The mere
possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open
and rummage through the containers does not negate the expectation
of privacy in their contents any more than the possibility of a
burglary negates an expectation of privacy in the home; or the
possibility of a private intrusion negates an expectation of
privacy in an unopened package; or the possibility that an operator
will listen in on a telephone conversation negates an expectation
of privacy in the words spoken on the telephone. "What a person . .
. seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area aceessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected."
Katz,
389 U.S. at
389 U. S.
351-352. We have therefore repeatedly rejected attempts
to justify a State's invasion of privacy on the ground that the
privacy is not absolute.
See Chapman v. United States,
365 U. S. 610,
365 U. S.
616-617 (1961) (search of a house invaded tenant's
Fourth Amendment rights even though landlord had authority to enter
house for some purposes);
Stoner v. California,
376 U. S. 483,
376 U. S.
487-490 (1964) (implicit consent to janitorial personnel
to enter motel room does not amount to consent to police search of
room);
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.
S. 709,
480 U. S. 717
(1987) (a government employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office, even though "it is the nature of government
offices that others -- such as fellow employees, supervisors,
consensual visitors, and the general public -- may have frequent
access to an individual's office"). As JUSTICE SCALIA aptly put it,
the Fourth Amendment protects "privacy . . . not solitude."
O'Connor, supra, at
480 U. S. 730
(opinion concurring in judgment).
Nor is it dispositive that
"respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express
purpose of conveying it to a third party, . . . who might himself
have sorted through respondents' trash or permitted others, such as
the police, to do so."
Ante at
486 U. S. 40. In
the first place, Greenwood can hardly be faulted for leaving trash
on his curb when a county ordinance
Page 486 U. S. 55
commanded him to do so, Orange County Code § 4-3-45(a) (1986)
(must "remov[e] from the premises at least once each week" all
"solid waste created, produced or accumulated in or about [his]
dwelling house"), and prohibited him from disposing of it in any
other way,
see Orange County Code § 3-3-85 (1988) (burning
trash is unlawful). Unlike in other circumstances where privacy is
compromised, Greenwood could not "avoid exposing personal
belongings . . . by simply leaving them at home."
O'Connor,
supra, at
480 U. S. 725.
More importantly, even the voluntary relinquishment of possession
or control over an effect does not necessarily amount to a
relinquishment of a privacy expectation in it. Were it otherwise, a
letter or package would lose all Fourth Amendment protection when
placed in a mailbox or other depository with the "express purpose"
of entrusting it to the postal officer or a private carrier; those
bailees are just as likely as trash collectors (and certainly have
greater incentive) to "sor[t] through" the personal effects
entrusted to them, "or permi[t] others, such as police to do so."
Yet it has been clear for at least 110 years that the possibility
of such an intrusion does not justify a warrantless search by
police in the first instance.
See Ex parte Jackson,
96 U. S. 727
(1878);
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.
S. 249 (1970);
United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U. S. 109
(1984). [
Footnote 2/4]
III
In holding that the warrantless search of Greenwood's trash was
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the Court paints a grim
picture of our society. It depicts a society in which local
authorities may command their citizens to dispose of their personal
effects in the manner least protective of the
Page 486 U. S. 56
"sanctity of [the] home and the privacies of life,"
Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. at
116 U. S. 630,
and then monitor them arbitrarily and without judicial oversight --
a society that is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an
individual's expectation of privacy in the most private of personal
effects sealed in an opaque container and disposed of in a manner
designed to commingle it imminently and inextricably with the trash
of others.
Ante at
486 U. S. 39.
The American society with which I am familiar "chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance,"
Johnson v.
United States, 333 U. S. 10,
333 U. S. 14
(1948), and is more dedicated to individual liberty and more
sensitive to intrusions on the sanctity of the home than the Court
is willing to acknowledge.
I dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See 453 U.S. at
453 U. S. 436
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id. at 437 (REHNQUIST, J.,
dissenting);
id. at 444 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
But
see id. at
436 U. S.
433-434 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (rejecting
position that all containers, even "the most trivial," like "a
cigar box or a Dixie cup," are entitled to the same Fourth
Amendment protection).
Cf. New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454,
453 U. S.
460-461, n. 4 (1981) (defining "container," for purposes
of search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, as "any object
capable of holding another object," including "luggage, boxes,
bags, clothing, and the like").
In addition to finding that Robbins had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his duffelbag and plastic-wrapped packages, the Court
also held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,
see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132,
267 U. S. 153
(1925), did not apply to packages found in an automobile. The Court
overruled the latter determination in
United States v.
Ross, 456 U. S. 798
(1982), but reaffirmed that where, as here, the automobile
exception is inapplicable, police may not conduct a warrantless
search of any container that conceals its contents.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Both to support its position that society recognizes no
reasonable privacy interest in sealed, opaque trash bags and to
refute the prediction that "society will be shocked to learn" of
that conclusion,
supra, at 46, the Court relies heavily
upon a collection of lower court cases finding no Fourth Amendment
bar to trash searches. But the authority that leads the Court to be
"distinctly unimpressed" with our position,
ante at
486 U. S. 43, n.
5, is itself impressively undistinguished. Of 11 Federal Court of
Appeals cases cited by the Court, at least 2 are factually or
legally distinguishable,
see United States v. O'Bryant,
775 F.2d 1528, 1533-1534 (CA11 1985) (police may search an
apparently valuable briefcase "discarded next to an overflowing
trash bin on a busy city street");
United States v.
Thornton, 241 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 56, 746 F.2d 39, 49 (1984)
(reasonable federal agents could believe in good faith that a trash
search is legal), and 7 rely entirely or almost entirely on an
abandonment theory that, as noted
infra at
486 U. S. 51,
the Court has discredited,
see United States v. Dela
Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (CA9 1986) ("The question,
then, becomes whether placing garbage for collection constitutes
abandonment of property");
United States v. Terry, 702
F.2d 299, 308-309 (CA2) ("[T]he circumstances in this case clearly
evidence abandonment by Williams of his trash"),
cert. denied
sub nom. Williams v. United States, 461 U.S. 931 (1983);
United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (CA3 1981)
("[T]he placing of trash in garbage cans at a time and place for
anticipated collection by public employees for hauling to a public
dump signifies abandonment");
United States v. Vahalik,
606 F.2d 99, 100-101 (CA5 1979) (per curiam) ("[T]he act of placing
garbage for collection is an act of abandonment which terminates
any fourth amendment protection"),
cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1081 (1980);
United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025
(CA4 1978) ("The act of placing [garbage] for collection is an act
of abandonment and what happens to it thereafter is not within the
protection of the fourth amendment"),
cert. denied, 440
U.S. 959 (1979);
Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112 (CA6
1976) (per curiam) ("[F]ederal case law . . . holds that garbage .
. . is abandoned and no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment");
United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (CA1 1972)
(when defendant "deposited the bags on the sidewalk, he abandoned
them"). A reading of the Court's collection of state court cases
reveals an equally unimpressive pattern.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128,
439 U. S.
143-144, n. 12 (1978).
See ante at
486 U. S. 43
("[T]he Fourth Amendment analysis must turn on such factors as
our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most
scrupulous protection from government invasion'") (quoting
Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170,
466 U. S. 178
(1984)); Robbins v. California, 453 U.
S. 420, 453 U. S. 428
(1981) (plurality opinion) ("Expectations of privacy are
established by general social norms"); Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 476 U. S. 227,
476 U. S. 248
(1986) (opinion of Powell, J.); Bush & Bly, Expectation of
Privacy Analysis and Warrantless Trash Reconnaissance after
Katz v. United States, 23 Ariz.L.Rev. 283, 293 (1981)
("[S]ocial custom . . . serves as the most basic foundation of a
great many legitimate privacy expectations") (citation
omitted).
[
Footnote 2/4]
To be sure, statutes criminalizing interference with the mails
might reinforce the expectation of privacy in mail,
see,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1705, 1708, but the expectation of
privacy in no way depends on statutory protection. In fact, none of
the cases cited in the text even mention such statutes in finding
Fourth Amendment protection in materials handed over to public or
private carriers for delivery.