United States v. Calandra - 414 U.S. 338 (1974)
U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)
United States v. Calandra
Argued October 11, 1973
Decided January 8, 1974
414 U.S. 338
When respondent's place of business was being searched by federal agents under a warrant issued in connection with a gambling investigation and specifying that the object of the search was to discover and seize bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia, one agent, knowing of a pending federal investigation of loansharking activities, discovered and seized a suspected loansharking record. Subsequently, a grand jury investigating loansharking activities subpoenaed respondent to query him on the seized evidence, but he refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds. After the Government then requested transactional immunity for respondent, the District Court granted respondent's suppression motion on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant, and further ordered that respondent need not answer any of the grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: A witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. Pp. 414 U. S. 342-355.
(a) The exclusionary rule, under which evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the fruits of such evidence cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure, is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect on future unlawful police conduct, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Pp. 414 U. S. 347-348.
(b) Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the rule does not proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons, and its application has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. P. 414 U. S. 348.
(c) Allowing a grand jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the effective and expeditious discharge
of the grand jury's duties, and extending the rule to grand jury proceedings would achieve only a speculative and minimal advance in deterring police misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the grand jury's role. Pp. 414 U. S. 349-352.
(d) Grand jury questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure involve no independent governmental invasion of privacy, but rather the usual abridgment thereof common to all grand jury questioning. Such questions are only a derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search and seizure, and work no new Fourth Amendment wrong. Pp. 414 U. S. 353-355.
465 F.2d 1218, reversed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 414 U. S. 356.