Appellee, who had been exempted from military service as a Class
I-O conscientious objector but who performed required alternative
civilian service, after being denied educational benefits under the
Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, brought this class
action for a declaratory judgment that the provisions of the Act
making him and his class ineligible for such benefits violated the
First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom and the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. After
denying appellants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
because of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), which prohibits judicial review of
decisions of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs on any question
of law or fact under laws administered by the Veterans'
Administration providing for veterans' benefits, the District Court
rejected appellee's First Amendment claim but sustained the Fifth
Amendment claim.
Held:
1. Section 211(a) does not extend to actions challenging the
constitutionality of veterans' benefits legislation, but is aimed
at prohibiting review only of those decisions of law or fact
arising in the administration of a statute providing for veterans'
benefits, and hence is inapplicable to this action, neither the
text of the statute nor its legislative history showing a contrary
intent. Pp.
415 U. S.
366-374
2. The challenged sections of the Act do not create an arbitrary
classification in violation of appellee's right to equal protection
of the laws. Pp.
415 U. S.
374-383.
(a) The quantitative and qualitative distinctions between the
disruption caused by military service and that caused by
alternative civilian service -- military service involving a
six-year commitment and far greater loss of personal freedom, and
alternative civilian service involving only a two-year obligation
and no requirement to leave civilian life -- form a rational basis
for Congress' classification limiting educational benefits to
military service veterans
Page 415 U. S. 362
as a means of helping them to readjust to civilian life. Pp.
415 U. S.
378-382.
(b) The statutory classification also bears a rational
relationship to the Act's objective of making military service more
attractive. P.
415 U. S.
382.
3. The Act does not violate appellee's right of free exercise of
religion.
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.
S. 437. Pp.
415 U. S.
383-386.
(a) The withholding of educational benefits to appellee and his
class involves only an incidental burden, if any burden at all,
upon their free exercise of religion. P.
415 U. S.
385.
(b) Appellee and his class were not included as beneficiaries
not because of any legislative design to interfere with their free
exercise of religion, but because to include them would not
rationally promote the Act's purposes. P.
415 U. S.
385.
(c) The Government's substantial interest in raising and
supporting armies, Art. I, § 8, is of "a kind and weight" clearly
sufficient to sustain the challenged legislation. Pp.
415 U. S.
385-386.
352 F.
Supp. 848, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, .MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
415 U.S.
386.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
A draftee accorded Class I-O conscientious objector status and
completing performance of required alternative
Page 415 U. S. 363
civilian service [
Footnote
1] does not qualify under 38 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(1) as a "veteran
who . . . served on active duty" (defined in 38 U.S.C. § 101(21) as
"full-time duty in the Armed Forces"), and is therefore not an
"eligible veteran" entitled under 38 U.S.C. § 1661(a) to veterans'
educational benefits provided by the Veterans' Readjustment
Benefits Act of 1966. [
Footnote
2] Appellants, the Veterans'
Page 415 U. S. 364
Administration and the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, for
that reason, denied the application for educational assistance of
appellee Robison, a conscientious objector who filed his
application after he satisfactorily completed two years of
alternative civilian service at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital,
Boston. Robison thereafter commenced this class action [
Footnote 3] in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking a
declaratory judgment that 38 U.S.C. §§ 101 (21), 1652(a)(1), and
1661(a), read together, violated the First Amendment's guarantee of
religious freedom and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. [
Footnote
4] Appellants moved to dismiss the action on the
Page 415 U. S. 365
ground, among others, that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction because of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), which prohibits
judicial review of decisions of the Administrator. [
Footnote 5] The District Court denied the
motion, and, on the merits, rejected appellee's First Amendment
claim, but sustained the equal protection claim and entered a
judgment declaring
"that 38 U.S.C. §§ 1652(a)(1) and 1661(a), defining 'eligible
veteran' and providing for entitlement to educational assistance
are unconstitutional and that 38 U.S.C. 101(21), defining 'active
duty' is unconstitutional with respect to chapter 34 of Title 38,
United States Code, 38 U.S.C. § 1651-1697, conferring Veterans'
Educational Assistance, for the reason that said sections deny
plaintiff and members of his class due process of law in violation
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. .
. ."
352 F.
Supp. 848, 862 (1973). [
Footnote 6] We postponed
Page 415 U. S. 366
consideration of the question of jurisdiction in light of §
211(a) to the hearing on the merits, and set the case for oral
argument with No. 72-700,
Hernandez v. Veterans'
Administration, post, p.
415 U. S. 391. 411
U.S. 981 (1973). [
Footnote 7]
We hold, in agreement with the District Court, that § 211(a) is
inapplicable to this action, and therefore that appellants' motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter was
properly denied. On the merits, we agree that appellee's First
Amendment claim is without merit, but disagree that §§ 1652(a)(1),
1661(a), and 101(21) violate the Fifth Amendment, and therefore
reverse the judgment of the District Court.
I
We consider first appellants' contention that § 211(a) bars
federal courts from deciding the constitutionality of veterans'
benefits legislation. Such a construction would, of course, raise
serious questions concerning the constitutionality of § 211(a),
[
Footnote 8] and, in such
case,
"it is a
Page 415 U. S. 367
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
[constitutional] question[s] may be avoided."
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.
S. 363,
402 U. S. 369
(1971).
Plainly, no explicit provision of § 211(a) bars judicial
consideration of appellee's constitutional claims. That section
provides that
"the
decisions of the Administrator on any question of
law or fact
under any law administered by the Veterans'
Administration providing benefits for veterans . . . shall be final
and conclusive and no . . . court of the United States shall have
power or jurisdiction to review any such decision. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) The prohibitions would appear to be aimed at
review only of those decisions of law or fact that arise in the
administration by the Veterans' Administration of a
statute providing benefits for veterans. A decision of law
or fact "under" a statute is made by the Administrator in the
interpretation or application of a particular provision of the
statute to a particular set of facts. Appellee's constitutional
challenge is not to any such decision of the
Administrator, but rather to a decision of
Congress to create a statutory class entitled to benefits
that does not include I-O conscientious objectors who performed
alternative civilian service. Thus, as the District Court stated:
"The questions of law presented in these proceedings arise under
the Constitution, not under the statute whose validity is
challenged." 352 F. Supp. at 853.
This construction is also supported by the administrative
practice of the Veterans' Administration.
"When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court
shows great deference to the interpretation given the
Page 415 U. S. 368
statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration."
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1,
380 U. S. 16
(1965). The Board of Veterans' Appeals expressly disclaimed
authority to decide constitutional questions in
Appeal of
Sly, C-27 593 725 (May 10, 1972). There, the Board, denying a
claim for educational assistance by a I-O conscientious objector,
held that "[t]his decision does not reach the issue of the
constitutionality of the pertinent laws, as this matter is not
within the jurisdiction of this Board."
Sly thus accepts
and follows the principle that
"[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional
enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of
administrative agencies.
See Public Utilities Comm'n v. United
States, 355 U. S. 534,
355 U. S.
539 (1958);
Engineers Public Service Co. v.
SEC, 78 U.S.App.D.C.199, 215-216, 138 F.2d 936, 952-953
(1943),
dismissed as moot, 332 U.S. 788."
Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 393 U.
S. 233,
393 U. S. 242
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in result);
see Jaffe,
Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 239, 271-275
(1955).
Nor does the legislative history accompanying the 1970 amendment
of § 211(a) demonstrate a congressional intention to bar judicial
review even of constitutional questions. No-review clauses similar
to § 211(a) have been a part of veterans' benefits legislation
since 1933. [
Footnote 9]
While
Page 415 U. S. 369
the legislative history accompanying these precursor no-review
clauses is almost nonexistent, [
Footnote 10] the Administrator, in a letter written in
1952 in connection with a revision
Page 415 U. S. 370
of the clause under consideration by the Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, comprehensively explained the
policies necessitating the no review clause and identified two
primary purposes: (1) to insure that veterans' benefits claims will
not burden the courts and the Veterans' Administration with
expensive and time-consuming litigation, [
Footnote 11] and (2) to insure that the technical and
complex determinations and applications of Veterans' Administration
policy connected with veterans' benefits decision will be
adequately and uniformly made. [
Footnote 12]
Page 415 U. S. 371
The legislative history of the 1970 amendment indicates nothing
more than a congressional intent to preserve these two primary
purposes. Before amendment, the no-review clause made final
"the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or
fact
concerning a claim for benefits or payments under
[certain] law[s] administered by the Veterans' Administration"
(emphasis added), 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964 ed.), 71 Stat. 92. In
a series of decisions,
e.g., Wellman v. Whittier, 104
U.S.App.D.C. 6, 259 F.2d 163 (1958);
Thompson v. Gleason,
115 U.S.App.D.C. 201, 317 F.2d 901 (1962); and
Tracy v.
Gleason, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 379 F.2d 469 (1967), the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the
term "claim" as a limitation upon the reach of § 211(a) and, as a
consequence, held that judicial review of actions by the
Administrator subsequent to an original grant of benefits was not
barred. Congress perceived this judicial interpretation as a threat
to the dual purposes of the no-review clause. First, the
interpretation would lead to an inevitable increase in litigation,
with consequent burdens upon the courts and the Veterans'
Administration. In its House Report, the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs stated that,
"[s]ince the decision in the
Tracy case -- and as the
result of that decision and the
Wellman and
Thompson decisions -- suits in constantly increasing
numbers have been filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia by plaintiffs seeking a resumption of terminated
benefits."
H.R.Rep. No. 91-1166, p. 10 (1970). This same concern over the
rising number of court cases was expressed by the Administrator in
a letter to the Committee:
"The
Wellman, Thompson, and
Tracy decisions
have not been followed in any of the other 10 Federal judicial
circuits throughout the country.
Page 415 U. S. 372
Nevertheless, soon after the
Tracy decision, suits in
the nature of mandamus or for declaratory judgment commenced to be
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in
constantly increasing numbers by plaintiffs seeking resumption of
terminated benefits. As of March 8, 1970, 353 suits of this type
had been filed in the District of Columbia circuit."
"
* * * *"
"The scope of the
Tracy decision and the decisions upon
which it is based is so broad that it could well afford a basis for
judicial review of millions of decisions terminating or reducing
many types of benefits provided under laws administered by the
Veterans' Administration. Such review might even extend to the
decisions of predecessor agencies made many years ago."
Id. at 21, 24.
Second, Congress was concerned that the judicial interpretation
of § 211(a) would involve the courts in day-to-day determination
and interpretation of Veterans' Administration policy. The House
Report states that the cases already filed in the courts in
response to
Wellman, Thompson, and
Tracy
"involve a large variety of matters -- a 1930's termination of a
widow's pension payments under a statute then extant, because of
her open and notorious adulterous cohabitation; invalid marriage to
a veteran; severance of a veteran's service connection for
disability compensation; reduction of such compensation because of
lessened disability . . . [and] suits . . . brought by [Filipino]
widows of World War II servicemen seeking restoration of death
compensation or pension benefits terminated after the Administrator
raised a presumption of their remarriage on the basis of evidence
gathered through
Page 415 U. S. 373
field examination. Notwithstanding the 1962 endorsement by the
Congress of the Veterans' Administrations [
sic]
administrative presumption of remarriage rule, most of [the suits
brought by Filipino widows] have resulted in judgments adverse to
the Government."
Id. at 10.
The Administrator voiced similar concerns, stating that
"it seems obvious that suits similar to the several hundred
already filed can -- and undoubtedly will -- subject nearly every
aspect of our benefit determinations to judicial review, including
rating decisions, related Veterans' Administration regulations,
Administrator's decisions, and various adjudication
procedures."
Letter to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs 23-24.
Thus, the 1970 amendment was enacted to overrule the
interpretation of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, and thereby restore vitality to the two primary purposes
to be served by the no-review clause. Nothing whatever in the
legislative history of the 1970 amendment, or predecessor no-review
clauses, suggests any congressional intent to preclude judicial
cognizance of constitutional challenges to veterans' benefits
legislation. Such challenges obviously do not contravene the
purposes of the no-review clause, for they cannot be expected to
burden the courts by their volume, nor do they involve technical
considerations of Veterans' Administration policy. We therefore
conclude, in agreement with the District Court, that a construction
of § 211(a) that does not extend the prohibitions of that section
to actions challenging the constitutionality of laws providing
benefits for veterans is not only "fairly possible," but is the
most reasonable construction, for neither the text nor the scant
legislative history of § 211(a) provides the "clear and convincing"
evidence of congressional intent required by this Court before
a
Page 415 U. S. 374
statute will be construed to restrict access to judicial review.
See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.
S. 136,
387 U. S. 141
(1967).
II
Turning to the merits, the District Court held that, by not
including appellee and his class, the challenged sections of the
Act create an arbitrary classification in violation of appellee's
right to equal protection of the laws. In determining whether, in
limiting the class of draftees entitled to benefits to those who
serve their country on active duty in the Armed Forces, Congress
denied equal protection of the laws to Selective Service
registrants who perform alternative civilian service as
conscientious objectors, [
Footnote 13] our analysis of the classification proceeds
on the basis that, although an individual's right to equal
protection of the laws
"does not deny . . . the power to treat different classes of
persons in different ways[;] . . . [it denies] the power to
legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by
a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification"
"must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
Page 415 U. S. 375
circumstanced shall be treated alike."
"
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S.
412,
253 U. S. 415 (1920)."
Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71,
404 U. S. 75-76
(1971). [
Footnote 14]
Page 415 U. S. 376
Unlike many state and federal statutes that come before us,
Congress in this statute has responsibly revealed its express
legislative objectives in § 1651 of the Act, and no other objective
is claimed:
"The Congress of the United States hereby declares that the
education program created by this chapter is for the purpose of (1)
enhancing and making more attractive service in the Armed Forces of
the United States, (2) extending the benefits of a higher education
to qualified and deserving young persons who might not otherwise be
able to afford such an education, (3) providing vocational
readjustment and restoring lost educational opportunities to those
service men and women whose careers have been interrupted or
impeded by reason of active duty after January 31, 1955, and (4)
aiding such persons in attaining the vocational and educational
status which they might normally have aspired to and obtained had
they not served their country."
Legislation to further these objectives is plainly within
Congress' Art. I, § 8, power "to raise and support Armies." Our
task is therefore narrowed to the determination of whether there is
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
at least one of the stated purposes justifying the different
treatment accorded veterans who served on active duty in the Armed
Forces, and conscientious objectors who performed alternative
civilian service.
The District Court reasoned that objectives (2), (3), and (4) of
§ 1651 are basically variations on a single theme, reflecting a
congressional purpose to "eliminate the educational gaps between
persons who served their country and those who did not." 352 F.
Supp. at 858. Therefore,
Page 415 U. S. 377
"[t]he exclusion from eligibility of [appellee] and his class
would be justified if they do not suffer the same disruption in
educational careers as do military veterans, and thus are not
similarly situated with respect to the statute's purpose. We
believe . . . that the disruption is equal as between the two
groups. Like military veterans, alternate servicemen have been
exposed to the uncertainties caused by the draft law. They too were
burdened at one time by an unsatisfied military obligation that
adversely affected their employment potential; were forced, because
of the draft law, to [forgo] immediately entering into vocational
training or higher education; and were deprived, during the time
they performed alternate service, of the opportunity to obtain
educational objectives or pursue more rewarding civilian
goals."
Id. at 858-859.
The error in this rationale is that it states too broadly the
congressional objective reflected in (2), (3), and (4) of § 1651.
The wording of those sections, in conjunction with the attendant
legislative history, makes clear that Congress' purpose in enacting
the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966 was not primarily
to "eliminate the educational gaps between persons who served their
country and those who did not," but rather to compensate for the
disruption that military service causes to civilian lives. In other
words, the aim of the Act was to assist those who served on active
duty in the Armed Forces to "readjust" to civilian life. Indeed, as
the appellants argue, Brief for Appellants 20 n. 18,
"the very name of the statute -- the Veterans' Readjustment
Benefits Act -- emphasizes congressional concern with the veteran's
need for assistance in readjusting to civilian life."
Of course, merely labeling the class of beneficiaries under the
Act as those having served on active duty in
Page 415 U. S. 378
the Armed Services cannot rationalize a statutory discrimination
against conscientious objectors who have performed alternative
civilian service, if, in fact, the lives of the latter were equally
disrupted and equally in need of readjustment.
See Richardson
v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78,
404 U. S. 83
(1971). The District Court found that military veterans and
alternative service performers share the characteristic during
their respective service careers of "inability to pursue the
educational and economic objectives that persons not subject to the
draft law could pursue." 352 F. Supp. at 859. But this finding of
similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike is not sufficient to
invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only
one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of
the two groups. Congress expressly recognized that significant
differences exist between military service veterans and alternative
service performers, particularly in respect of the Act's purpose to
provide benefits to assist in readjusting to civilian life. These
differences "afford the basis for a different treatment within a
constitutional framework,"
McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U. S. 263,
410 U. S. 271
(1973).
First, the disruption caused by military service is
quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative civilian
service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is
obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on
the other hand, involves a six-year commitment. While active duty
may be limited to two years, the military veteran remains subject
to an Active Reserve and then Standby Reserve obligation after
release from active duty. This additional military service
obligation was emphasized by Congress as a significant reason for
providing veterans' readjustment benefits. A section entitled
"Compulsory Reserve requirements" of the Senate Report states:
Page 415 U. S. 379
"The hardships of cold war service are still further aggravated
by the compulsory military Reserve obligation which the Government
has imposed on all men who entered service after August 9, 1955.
This obligation is, of course, in sharp contrast with the
traditional military obligation which ends immediately upon
discharge from active duty. More importantly, however, the Active
Reserve obligation impedes the cold war veterans' full
participation in civil life, which, in turn, again exposes them to
unfair competition from their civilian contemporaries. The fact
that veterans must discharge a post-Korean Reserve obligation
involving drills and other military activities quite obviously
enables their civilian contemporaries, by comparison, to make still
more gains toward enjoyment of the fruits of our free enterprise
society. . . . [F]or those men who wish to devote full time to
their civil goals, the Reserve obligation constitutes a substantial
supplementary burden."
S.Rep. No. 269, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1965).
Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and
alternative service performers are qualitatively different.
Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom
during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the
military veteran becomes part of the military establishment,
subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress
was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military
service in consequence of which military servicemen have a special
need for readjustment benefits. The Senate Report accompanying the
Act states:
"Compulsory military service, because of its incompatibility
with our traditions and national temperament, is not lightly
imposed upon our
Page 415 U. S. 380
citizenry. Only war, or the imminent threat of war from
unfriendly powers, creates the conditions, which, by the values of
our society, justify this extraordinary deviation from our free
enterprise, individualistic way of life. When, as now, the need for
large but limited forces conflicts with our sense of equity which
expects equal national service from all, we are concerned to find
that less than half of our young men will ever be compelled to
serve a substantial period in the
Military
Establishment."
"
* * * *"
"Action to redress the inequities of this situation is long
overdue. Our post-Korean veterans are beset with problems almost
identical with those to which the two previous GI bills were
addressed. Like their fathers and elder brothers, post-Korean
veterans lose time from their competitive civil lives directly
because of military service. As a consequence, they lose valuable
opportunities ranging from educational advantages to worthwhile job
possibilities and potentially profitable business ventures.
In
addition, after completion of their military service they confront
serious difficulties during the transition to civil life."
"
* * * *"
"The major part of the burden caused by these cold war
conditions quite obviously falls upon those of our youths who are
called to extended tours of active military service.
It is they
who must serve in the Armed Forces throughout troubled parts of the
world, thereby subjecting themselves to the mental and physical
hazards as well as the economic and family detriments which are
peculiar to military service and which do not exist in normal civil
life. It is they who, upon separation from
Page 415 U. S. 381
service, find themselves far, far behind those in their age
group whose lives have not been disrupted by military service."
S.Rep. No. 269, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 6-7 8 (1965) (emphasis
added).
See also H.R.Rep. No. 1258, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
4 (1966). [
Footnote 15]
Congress' reliance upon these differences between military and
civilian service is highlighted by the inclusion of Class I-O
conscientious objectors, who serve in the military in noncombatant
roles, within the class of beneficiaries entitled to educational
benefits under the Act. [
Footnote 16]
These quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly
recognized by Congress, form a rational basis for
Page 415 U. S. 382
Congress' classification limiting educational benefits to
military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to
civilian life; alternative service performers are not required to
leave civilian life to perform their services.
The statutory classification also bears a rational relationship
to objective (1) of § 1651, that of
"enhancing and making more attractive service in the Armed
Forces and making more attractive service in the Armed Forces of
the United States."
By providing educational benefits to
all military
veterans who serve on active duty, Congress expressed its judgment
that such benefits would make military service more attractive to
enlistees and draftees alike. Appellee concedes, Brief for Appellee
28, that this objective is rationally promoted by providing
educational benefits to those who
enlist. But, appellee
argues, there is no rational basis for extending educational
benefits to
draftees who serve in the military and not to
draftees who perform civilian alternative service, since neither
group is induced by educational benefits to enlist. Therefore,
appellee concludes, the Act's classification scheme does not afford
equal protection, because it fails to treat equally persons
similarly circumstanced.
The two groups of draftees are, in fact, no similarly
circumstanced. To be sure, a draftee, by definition, does not find
educational benefits sufficient incentive to enlist. But military
service with educational benefits is obviously more attractive to a
draftee than military service without educational benefits. Thus,
the existence of educational benefits may help induce a registrant
either to volunteer for the draft or not to seek a lower Selective
Service classification. [
Footnote 17] Furthermore, once drafter, educational
benefits may help make military service more palatable to a
draftee, and thus reduce a draftee's unwillingness to be a soldier.
On the other hand, because a
Page 415 U. S. 383
conscientious objector basis his refusal to serve in the Armed
Forces upon deeply held religious beliefs, we will not assume that
educational benefits will make military service more attractive to
him. When, as in this case, the inclusion of one group promotes a
legitimate governmental purpose, and the addition of other groups
would not, we cannot say that the statute's classification of
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries is invidiously discriminatory.
[
Footnote 18]
III
Finally, appellee argues that the District Court erred in
holding that "the challenged exclusion does not abridge
[appellee's] free exercise of his religion." 352 F. Supp. at 860.
He contends that the Act's denial of benefits to alternative
service conscientious objectors interferes with his free exercise
of religion by increasing the price he must pay for adherence to
his religious beliefs. That contention must be rejected in light of
our decision in
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.
S. 437 (1971).
There, the petitioners, conscientious objectors to
particular wars, argued that § 6(j) of the Military
Selective
Page 415 U. S. 384
Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j), which limits an
exemption from military service to those who conscientiously object
to "participation in war
in any form" (emphasis supplied),
infringed their rights under the Free Exercise Clause by requiring
them to abandon their religious beliefs and participate in what
they deemed an unjust war or go to jail. We acknowledged that
"the Free Exercise Clause bars 'governmental regulation of
religious beliefs as such,'
Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U. S.
398,
374 U. S. 402 (1963), or
interference with the dissemination of religious ideas.
See
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953);
Follett
v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943). It
prohibits misuse of secular governmental programs"
"to impede the observance of one or all religions or . . . to
discriminate invidiously between religions, . . . even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect."
"
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at
366 U. S.
607 (opinion of Warren, C.J.). And even as to neutral
prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims, the Free
Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications clashing with
imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden on First
Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government's
valid aims."
401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 462.
We made clear, however, that
"[o]ur cases do not, at their farthest reach, support the
proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an
objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic
government."
"[Rather,] incidental burdens . . . [may be] strictly justified
by substantial governmental interests. . . ."
Id. at
401 U. S. 461,
401 U. S. 462.
Finding
"the Government's interest in procuring the manpower necessary
for military purposes, pursuant to the congressional grant of power
to Congress
Page 415 U. S. 385
to raise and support armies[,] Art. I, § 8, . . . of a kind and
weight sufficient to justify under the Free Exercise Clause the
impact of the conscription laws on those who object to particular
wars,"
id. at
401 U. S. 462,
401 U. S. 461,
we held that § 6(j) did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
The challenged legislation in the present case does not require
appellee and his class to make any choice comparable to that
required of the petitioners in
Gillette. The withholding
of educational benefits involves only an incidental burden upon
appellee's free exercise of religion -- if, indeed, any burden
exists at all. [
Footnote 19]
As
415 U. S.
supra, demonstrates, the Act was enacted pursuant to
Congress' Art. I, § 8, powers to advance the neutral, secular
governmental interests of enhancing military service and aiding the
readjustment of military personnel to civilian life. Appellee and
his class were not included in this class of beneficiaries, not
because of any legislative design to interfere with their free
exercise of religion, but because to do so would not rationally
promote the Act's purposes. Thus, in light of
Gillette,
the Government's substantial interest in raising and supporting
armies, Art. I, § 8, is of "a kind and weight" clearly sufficient
to sustain the challenged legislation, for the burden upon
appellee's free exercise of religion -- the denial of the economic
value of veterans' educational benefits under the Act -- is not
nearly of the same order
Page 415 U. S. 386
or magnitude as the infringement upon free exercise of religion
suffered by petitioners in Gillette.
See also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205,
406 U. S. 21
(1972).
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) exempts from military service
persons "who, by reason of religious training and belief," are
opposed to participation in "war in any form."
Title 32 CFR § 1622.14 (1971) directed local Selective Service
Boards that
"[i]n Class I-O shall be placed every registrant who would have
been classified in Class I-A but for the fact that he has been
found, by reason of religious training and belief, to be
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form and to
be conscientiously opposed to participation in both combatant and
noncombatant training and service in the armed forces."
Further, § 456(j) and 32 CFR §§ 1660.1-.12 (1972) authorized
local Selective Service Boards to order I-O conscientious objectors
to perform alternative civilian service contributing to the
maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest.
[
Footnote 2]
Title 38 U.S.C. § 101 provides in pertinent part:
"(21) The term 'active duty' means -- "
"(A) full-time duty in the Armed Forces, other than active duty
for training."
Title 38 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(1) provides:
"The term 'eligible veteran' means any veteran who (A) served on
active duty for a period of more than 180 days any part of which
occurred after January 31, 1955, and who was discharged or released
therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable or (b) was
discharged or released from active duty after such date for a
service-connected disability."
Title 38 U.S.C. § 1661(a) provides:
"Except as provided in subsection (c) and in the second sentence
of this subsection, each eligible veteran shall be entitled to
educational assistance under this chapter for a period of one and
one-half months (or the equivalent thereof in part-time educational
assistance) for each month or fraction thereof of his service on
active duty after January 31, 1955. If an eligible veteran has
served a period of 18 months or more on active duty after January
31, 1955, and has been released from such service under conditions
that would satisfy his active duty obligations, he shall be
entitled to educational assistance under this chapter for a period
of 36 months (or the equivalent thereof in part-time educational
assistance)."
The amount of money provided by the Act varies with the type of
educational program pursued and the number of dependents a veteran
has. For example, a veteran enrolled in a full-time college or
graduate degree program with two dependents receives $298 per
month. 38 U.S.C. § 1682(a), as amended by the Vietnam Era Veterans'
Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972, § 102, 86 Stat. 1075.
[
Footnote 3]
In defining the class, the District Court stated:
"The court also rules that certification of a class, pursuant to
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23, is warranted, the class to include all those
selective service registrants who have completed 180 days of
'alternate service' pursuant to 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j), and who
have either (1) satisfactorily completed two years of such service
or (2) been released therefrom for medical or other reason after
180 days of such service."
352 F.
Supp. 848, 851.
[
Footnote 4]
Although
"the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it
does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process.'"
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163,
377 U. S. 168
(1964);
see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.
S. 677,
411 U. S. 680
n. 5 (1973);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.
S. 618,
394 U. S.
641-642 (1969);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.
S. 497 (1954). Thus, if a classification would be
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is also inconsistent with the due process requirement
of the Fifth Amendment.
See Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U. S. 78,
404 U. S. 81
(1971).
[
Footnote 5]
Title 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) provides:
"(a) On and after October 17, 1940, except as provided in
sections 775, 784, and as to matters arising under chapter 37 of
this title, the decisions of the Administrator on any question of
law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans'
Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents
or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or
any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to
review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or
otherwise."
[
Footnote 6]
A second paragraph of the judgment declares that appellee and
members of his class, who have satisfactorily completed two years
of alternative civilian service, or who, after completing 180 days
of such service, have been released therefrom, are to be considered
"eligible" within § 1652(a)(1) to receive benefits to the same
degree and extent as veterans of "active duty"; and alternative
service shall be considered "active duty" within § 101 (21) as
applied only to c. 34 of Title 38.
352 F.
Supp. at 862. In view of our result, this paragraph of the
judgment is also reversed.
[
Footnote 7]
The District Court's jurisdiction was invoked by appellee
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1343, and 1361. Appellants
appealed pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1252, which
provides:
"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory
or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United
States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any
civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any
of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such
officer or employee, is a party."
The appellants do not appeal the District Court's adverse ruling
upon two alternative grounds for dismissal: that the complaint
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and
that the plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies.
[
Footnote 8]
Compare 74 U. S. 7
Wall. 506 (1869);
Sheldon v.
Sill, 8 How. 441 (1850),
with 14 U.
S. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816);
St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S.
38,
298 U. S. 84
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See Hart, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1362 (1953).
[
Footnote 9]
Section 5 of the Economy Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 9, which created
the present Veterans' Administration, provided:
"All decisions rendered by the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs under the provisions of this title . . . shall be final and
conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other official
or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review by
mandamus or otherwise any such decision."
In 1940, the no-review statute was amended, § 11, 54 Stat. 1197,
to expand its application:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of law . . . the decisions
of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs on any question of law or
fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under this or any
other Act administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be
final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the
United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
decisions."
When veterans' benefits legislation was finally consolidated in
the Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, § 211, 71 Stat. 92, the
no-review clause was left substantially unaltered:
"[D]ecisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact
concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any law
administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be final and
conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States
shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision."
[
Footnote 10]
The only discussion of § 5 of the Economy Act of 1933 was in the
Senate, where it was stated that § 5 "gives to the Veterans'
Administration only such authority as the Administration now has."
77 Cong Rec. 254 (1933).
The 1940 Act received little more discussion. However, Senator
George remarked of the no-review clause:
"[T]he bill only confirms what has been the accepted belief and
conviction, that, with respect to any pension, [or] gratuity, . . .
there is no right of action in the courts. . . . It is not so much
a limitation as a restatement of what is believed to be the law
upon the question."
86 Cong.Rec. 13383 (1940). The House debate indicates that the
no-review clause
"is desirable for the purpose of uniformity and to make clear
what is believed to be the intention of Congress that the various
laws shall be uniformly administered in accordance with the liberal
policies governing the Veterans' Administration."
Id. at 13491.
The legislative history attending the 1957 amendment to the no
review clause is similarly uninstructive, indicating only that the
change was one of consolidation.
See H.R.Rep. No. 279,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1957); S.Rep. No. 332, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1 (1957).
See Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial
Review, and the Constitutional Problems of "Positive" Government,
39 Ind.L.J. 181, 188-189 (1964); Comment, Judicial Review and the
Governmental Recovery of Veterans' Benefits, 118 U.Pa.L.Rev. 288,
291-292 (1969).
[
Footnote 11]
"There is for consideration the added expense to the Government
not only with respect to the added burden upon the courts, but the
administrative expense of defending the suits."
Hearing on H.R. 360, 478, 2442 and 6777 before a Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1963
(1952).
[
Footnote 12]
"In the adjudication of compensation and pension claims, a wide
variety of medical, legal, and other technical questions constantly
arise which require the study of expert examiners of considerable
training and experience, and which are not readily susceptible of
judicial standardization. Among other questions to be determined in
the adjudication of such claims are those involving length and
character of service, origin of disabilities, complex rating
schedules, a multiplicity of medical and physical phenomena for
consideration intercurrently with such schedules, and the
application of established norms to the peculiarities of the
particular case. These matters have not been considered by the
Congress or the courts appropriate for judicial determination, but
have been regarded as apt subjects for the purely administrative
procedure. Due to the nature and complexity of the determinations
to be made, it is inevitable that the decisions of the courts in
such matters would lack uniformity. It cannot be expected that the
decisions of the many courts would be based on the uniform
application of principles as is now done by the Veterans'
Administration through its system of coordination by the central
office and by its centralized Board of Veterans' Appeals."
Hearing,
supra, n 11, at 1962-1963.
[
Footnote 13]
In an effort to enhance the attractiveness of service in the
Public Health Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the Act also makes educational benefits available
to commissioned officers in those services. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(21),
1652(a)(3). Officers in those services are usually specialists in
various fields of science, and possess a high degree of technical
expertise.
See 42 CFR §§ 21.11, 21.25-.31, 21.41-.42
(1972); 33 U.S.C. §§ 883a-883b. Appellee does not argue that he and
his class, and the officers of those services, are so similarly
circumstanced that the different treatment the Act accords the two
groups constitutes a denial of equal protection.
[
Footnote 14]
Appellee argues that the statutory classification should be
subject to strict scrutiny and upheld only if a compelling
governmental justification is demonstrated because (1) the
challenged classification interferes with the fundamental
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, and (2) I-O
conscientious objectors are a suspect class deserving special
judicial protection. We find no merit in either contention.
Unquestionably, the free exercise of religion is a fundamental
constitutional right. However, since we hold in
415 U.
S. infra, that the Act does not violate
appellee's right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion
to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny
stricter than the traditional rational basis test. With respect to
appellee's second contention, we find the traditional indicia of
suspectedness lacking in this case. The class does not possess an
"immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth,"
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at
411 U. S. 686,
nor is the class
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process,"
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S.
1,
411 U. S. 28
(1973). As the District Court observed:
"Congress, which is under no obligation to carve out the
conscientious objector exemption for military training,
see
United States v. Macintosh, 1931,
283 U. S.
605,
283 U. S. 624;
Gillette
v. United States, 1971,
401 U. S. 437,
401 U. S.
457,
401 U. S. 461 n. 23, has
nevertheless done so. Perhaps this exemption from military training
reflects a congressional judgment that conscientious objectors
simply could not be trained for duty; but it is equally plausible
that the exemption reflects a congressional determination to
respect individual conscience.
See United States v. Macintosh,
supra, 283 U.S. at
283 U. S. 633 ([Hughes,]
C.J., dissenting). Given the solicitous regard that Congress has
manifested for conscientious objectors, it would seem presumptuous
of a court to subject the educational benefits legislation to
strict scrutiny on the basis of the 'suspect classification'
theory, whose underlying rationale is that, where legislation
affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of
constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may
have broken down."
352 F. Supp. at 855.
[
Footnote 15]
Testimony and statements at a hearing on the proposed Veterans'
Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, before the Senate Subcommittee
on Veterans' Affairs, reflect a consciousness of the special
sacrifices made by veterans of military service. For example,
Senator Yarborough, chairman of the subcommittee and author of the
Act, remarked that
"[t]he bill I have introduced provides an opportunity to
demonstrate that we, as a nation, do recognize the extreme unique
personal sacrifices extracted from our cold war veterans by their
military service."
"Their need is not based on the type of military duty they
performed, but on the lack of opportunity to readjust back to
civilian life after having been removed for 2 to 4 years."
Hearings on S. 9 before the Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., 6, 8 (1965). In testimony before the subcommittee, Senator
Mondale stated that
"[t]he previous GI bills were not designed to reward veterans
for the battle risks they ran, but were designed to assist them in
readjusting to civilian life and in catching up to those whose
lives were not disrupted by military service. And that is what the
cold war GI bill is intended to do."
Id. at 152.
[
Footnote 16]
Title 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) provides that I-A-O conscientious
objectors may be inducted into the Armed Forces and assigned to
noncombatant service. Thus, I-A-O conscientious objectors perform
"active duty" as defined in 38 U.S.C. § 101(21), and are therefore
eligible under 38 U.S.C. §§ 1652(a)(1), 1661(a) to receive
veterans' educational benefits.
[
Footnote 17]
The lower classifications are listed and defined in 32 CFR §§
1622.1-1623.2 (1973).
[
Footnote 18]
Appellee also contends that the Act violates his Fifth Amendment
due process rights because, "[t]he exclusion of I-O conscientious
objectors from the vital assistance provided by the Act's
educational program is the product of a vindictive and harsh
policy" whose "purpose is clearly to punish I-O conscientious
objectors for adhering to their beliefs." Brief for Appellee 20,
51. To be sure, if that were the purpose of the exclusion of I-O
conscientious objectors from the benefits of the Act, the
classification would be unconstitutional,
"[f]or if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of
the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U. S. 528,
413 U. S. 534
(1973). However, we have not been cited to, nor has our own
research discovered, a single reference in the legislative history
of the Act to support appellee's claim. We therefore find
appellee's claim wholly lacking in merit.
[
Footnote 19]
By enacting legislation exempting conscientious objectors from
the well recognized and peculiar rigors of military service,
Congress has bestowed relative benefits upon conscientious
objectors by permitting them to perform their alternative service
obligation as civilians. Thus, Congress' decision to grant
educational benefits to military servicemen might arguably be
viewed as an attempt to equalize the burdens of military service
and alternative civilian service, rather than an effort by Congress
to place a relative burden upon a conscientious objector's free
exercise of religion.
See Clark, Guidelines for the Free
Exercise Clause, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 327, 349 (1969).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
In my dissent applicable to
Braunfield v. Brown,
366 U. S. 599, I
expressed the view that Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law was
unconstitutional as applied to Sabbatarians,
see 366 U.S.
at
366 U. S. 561,
366 U. S. 575,
366 U. S. 577.
The State imposed a penalty on a Sabbatarian for keeping his shop
open on the day which was the Sabbath of the Christian majority;
and that seemed to me to exact an impermissible price for the free
exercise of the Sabbatarian's religion. Indeed, in that case, the
Sabbatarian would be unable to continue in business if he could not
stay open on Sunday, and would lose his capital investment.
See
id. at
366 U. S.
611.
In
Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S.
61, we held, in overruling
United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644,
that the words of the oath prescribed by Congress for
naturalization -- "will support and defend the Constitution and
laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign
and domestic" -- should not be read as requiring the bearing of
arms, as there is room under our Constitution for the support and
defense of the Nation in times of great peril by those whose
religious scruples bar them from shouldering arms. We said:
"The effort of war is indivisible, and those whose religious
scruples prevent them from killing are no less patriots than those
whose special traits or handicaps result in their assignment to
duties far behind the fighting front. Each is making the utmost
contribution according to his capacity. The fact that his role may
be limited by religious convictions, rather than by physical
characteristics, has
Page 415 U. S. 387
no necessary bearing on his attachment to his country or on his
willingness to support and defend it to his utmost."
328 U.S. at
328 U. S.
64-65.
Closer in point to the present problem is
Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U. S. 398,
where a Seventh Day Adventist was denied unemployment benefits by
the State because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath day
of her faith. We held that that disqualification for unemployment
benefits imposed an impermissible burden on the free exercise of
her religion, saying:
"Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared
ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her
religion, but the pressure upon her to [forgo] that practice is
unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand,
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a
choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship."
Id. at
374 U. S.
404.
And we found no "compelling" state interest to justify the
State's infringement of one's religious liberty in that manner.
Id. at
374 U. S.
406-408.
In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.
S. 205, we held that Wisconsin's compulsory school
attendance law as applied to Amish children would gravely impair
the free exercise of their religious beliefs.
The District Court in the present case said that the penalty
which the present Act places on conscientious objectors is of a
lesser "order or magnitude" [
Footnote
2/1] than that
Page 415 U. S. 388
which has been upheld in past cases.
352 F.
Supp. 848, 860.
That is true; yet the discrimination against a man with
religious scruples seems apparent. The present Act derives from a
House bill that had as its purpose solely an education program to
"help a veteran to follow the educational plan that he might have
adopted had he never entered the Armed Forces." H.R.Rep. No. 1258,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5. Full benefits are available to occupants
of safe desk jobs and the thousands of veterans who performed
civilian type duties at home and for whom the rigors of the "war"
were far from "totally disruptive," to use the Government's phrase.
The benefits are provided, though the draftee did not serve
overseas, but lived with his family in a civilian community and
worked from nine until five as a file clerk on a military base or
attended college courses in his off-duty hours. No condition of
hazardous duty was attached to the educational assistance program.
As Senator Yarborough said, [
Footnote
2/2] the benefits would accrue even to those who never served
overseas, because their "educational progress and opportunity"
"[have] been impaired in just as serious and damaging a fashion
as if they had served on distant shores. Their educational needs
are no less than those of their comrades who served abroad."
But the line drawn in the Act is between Class I-O conscientious
objectors who performed alternative civilian
Page 415 U. S. 389
service and all other draftees. Such conscientious objectors get
no educational benefits whatsoever. It is, indeed, demeaning to
those who have religious scruples against shouldering arms to
suggest, as the Government does, that those religious scruples must
be susceptible of compromise before they will be protected. The
urge to forgo religious scruples to gain a monetary advantage would
certainly be a burden on the Free Exercise Clause in cases of those
who were spiritually weak. But that was not the test in
Sherbert or
Girouard. We deal with people whose
religious scruples are unwavering. Those who would die at the stake
for their religious scruples may not constitutionally be penalized
by the Government by the exaction of penalties because of their
free exercise of religion. Where Government places a price on the
free exercise of one's religious scruples it crosses the forbidden
line. [
Footnote 2/3] The issue of
"coercive effects," to use another
Page 415 U. S. 390
Government phrase, is irrelevant. Government, as I read the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, may not place a penalty on
anyone for asserting his religious scruples. That is the nub of the
present case, and the reason why the judgment below should be
affirmed.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"First, the denial is felt, not immediately, as in
Sherbert, but at a point in time substantially removed
from that, when a prospective conscientious objector must consider
whether to apply for an exemption from military service. Secondly,
the denial does not produce a positive economic injury of the sort
effected by a Sunday closing law or ineligibility for unemployment
payments. Considering these factors, the court doubts that the
denial tends to make a prospective alternate service performer
choose between following and not following the dictates of his
conscience."
352 F.
Supp. 848, 860.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Hearings on Legislation to Provide GI Benefits for Post-Korean
Veterans before the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2899.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.
S. 437, is irrelevant to the present case. There, we
were concerned with whether the petitioners were validly excluded
from classification as conscientious objectors. Here, the question
is whether the Government can penalize the exercise of conscience
it concedes is valid and which exempts these draftees from military
service. Moreover, in
Gillette, we relied upon the fact
that the Government's classification was religiously neutral,
id. at
401 U. S. 451,
imposed only "incidental burdens" on the exercise of conscience,
and was "strictly justified by substantial governmental interests
that relate directly to the very impacts questioned,"
id.
at
401 U. S. 462.
Here, the classification is not neutral, but excludes only those
conceded by the Government to have religious-based objections to
war, and thus the burden it imposes on religious beliefs is not
"incidental." And here we have no governmental interest even
approaching that found in
Gillette -- the danger that,
because selective objection to war could not be administered
fairly, our citizens would conclude that
"those who go to war are chosen unfairly or capriciously
[resulting in] a mood of bitterness and cynicism [that] might
corrode the . . . values of willing performance of a citizen's
duties that are the very heart of free government."
Id. at
401 U. S. 460.
The only governmental interest here is the financial one of denying
this appellee and his class educational benefits. That, in my view,
is an invidious discrimination, and a penalty on those who assert
their religious scruples against joining the Armed Services which
shoulder arms.