In re Chiles - 89 U.S. 157 (1874)
U.S. Supreme Court
In re Chiles, 89 U.S. 22 Wall. 157 157 (1874)
In re Chiles
89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 157
1. In the original decree in the case of Texas v. White & Chiles, 7 Wall. 700, the defendants were perpetually enjoined from setting up any claim or title to any of the bonds, or coupons attached to them, which were the subject matter of the suit. The bill, answers, and proceedings in the case show that the purpose of the suit was to establish the title of the state to these bonds, and to free it from the embarrassment of the claim of defendants.
2. All parties to the suit were therefore bound by the decree as to that title, and because Chiles was the owner or now asserts himself to be the owner through a transaction not set up in his answer, he is not the less concluded and bound to obey the above injunction.
3. Notwithstanding he now asserts a different title or source of title held by him when the suit was brought from the one imputed to him in the suit and defended by him, he is in contempt of court in setting up and seeking to enforce his claim.
4. Punishments for contempt of court have two aspects, namely -- 1. to vindicate the dimity of the court from disrespect shown to it or its orders; 2. to compel the performance of some order or decree of the court which it is in the power of the party to perform and which he refuses to obey.
5. In the present case, there is no part of the original decree which Chiles can perform which remains unexecuted, and no additional order or decree can be made for him to perform in this proceeding for contempt.
6. The Court therefore sentences him to a fine of $250 and costs for his contempt in setting up a claim of title to seventy-six of the bonds mentioned in the decree.
On motion by the State of Texas for a rule on John Chiles to show cause why he should not be dealt with as guilty of a contempt of this Court in disobeying one of its decrees and why he should not by proper instrument convey to the said state all his right, title, and interest to seventy-six certain bonds of the United States now in the possession of Droege & Co., of London.
The case was thus:
On the 12th of January, 1863, the State of Texas being then in rebellion against the United States, certain persons calling themselves its Military Board, and who were possessed, under a statute of the then so-called state, of actual power within its confines, entered into a contract with a certain G. W. White and J. Chiles by which, in consideration of military stores to be furnished to the state, the state was to sell and transfer to them certain bonds of the United States which, long before the rebellion, the United States had given to the State of Texas as an indemnity for the surrender of certain territory claimed by it, and which bonds were thus known as the Texas Indemnity Bonds.
Two lots of bonds were mentioned in this contract. One of them was thus:
"2d. Seventy-six bonds with coupons attached, principal and interest amounting to $87,400, said seventy-six bonds and coupons supposed to be upon deposit with Droege & Co., England."
The rebellion being suppressed, and the government of the State of Texas having passed again into the hands of persons loyal to the United States, the state filed a bill in this Court against White & Chiles, one J. A. Hardenberg and several other persons to establish its title to and to get control and possession of these bonds or of their proceeds. The case is reported in 74 U. S. 7th Wall. page 700.
The bill recited the circumstances under which the United States issued and the State of Texas received the bonds known as the Texas indemnity bonds, and then alleged that these bonds fell into the hands of a combination of conspirators who, assuming to be the lawful government of the State of Texas, sold them to White & Chiles, delivering one hundred and thirty-five of them, and selling the seventy-six above mentioned, which were then deposited with Droege & Co., in England. It alleged that the contract of sale by the military board of Texas and the statute under which that board acted were void because the object and purpose of both were to aid the rebellion in its efforts to overthrow the government of the United States, and it alleged that the bonds were not legally transferred for want of the endorsement of the Governor of Texas, which, by a statute of that state, was made necessary to any legal transfer of them.
There was thus an assertion of title and ownership of these bonds both in law and in equity in the plaintiff, the State of Texas, with a recital of the origin and state of that title.
There was then an allegation of three distinct grounds on which the claim of the defendants was charged to be invalid:
1. That their possession was obtained through an unlawful band of conspirators who, taking possession of these bonds and of the political power of the state, had delivered the
bonds to White & Chiles without any authority to do so.
2. That such bonds could not be lawfully delivered or transferred so as to carry the title of the state to them to any person without the endorsement of the governor, which none of these bonds had.
3. That the contract under which White & Chiles received the bonds delivered to them, and claimed title to those not delivered, was void because made with the intent to aid the rebellion.
A copy of this contract was set out as Exhibit "A" of the bill, and mentioned, as already stated, specifically the seventy-six bonds.
White & Chiles filed separate answers to this bill and took issue either as matter of law or of fact on all these grounds of complaint. They asserted the justice and legality of their title to the bonds and to all of them, and of course denied the right of the state to recover of them or of their vendees either these bonds or their proceeds in the Treasury or their value.
On the 12th of April, 1869, a decree was entered in the case. It ordered:
"That the contract bearing date the 12th January, 1865, purporting to have been executed between the military board of the State of Texas and White & Chiles -- which said contract is set forth as Exhibit A to the complainant's bill of complaint -- is null and void and of no effect, and that the said White & Chiles, their agents and attorneys and all others claiming to act in their behalf be perpetually enjoined from asserting any right or claim under the same, and that the complainant is entitled to recover and receive the bonds and coupons mentioned in said contract as having been transferred or sold to the said White & Chiles, which at the several times of service of process in this suit were in possession or under the control of the defendants respectively, and any proceeds thereof which have come into such possession or control with notice of the equity of the complainant."
"That the said G. W. White, John Chiles, J. A. Hardenberg &c., and each of them, be hereby perpetually enjoined from setting up any claim or title to any of the bonds and coupons attached which are described in the first article of said contract
filed as Exhibit A to the bill of complaint, and that the above complainant is entitled to restitution of such of the bonds and coupons and proceeds as have come into the possession or control of the said defendants, respectively, and as aforesaid."
By the terms of the decree, each party had leave to move for further orders.
In this state of things, Chiles, on or about the date of it, addressed and served on Droege & Co. this notice:
"July 17th, 1874"
"MESSRS. DROEGE & Co.,"
"You are again hereby notified that I am the owner, by contract with the State of Texas, of seventy-six Texan indemnity bonds of one thousand dollars each, and coupons attached, amounting in all to $87,400, and also of the balance of one hundred and fifty-one of said bonds, with coupons attached, placed in your custody by John Milton Swisher, of Texas. And you are hereby notified not to part with the possession of said bonds and coupons or any portion of them without due authority from me."
"My solicitors will wait upon you with the necessary process to bring the matter before a judicial tribunal as soon as the proper preparations can be perfected."
The State of Texas now accordingly made the motion on which the present rule to show cause was granted.
The petition on which it was granted charged that Chiles had continually and repeatedly asserted a claim to seventy-six of the bonds mentioned in the said decree, thereby seriously impeding a settlement and compromise by the State of Texas with persons who have possession of such bonds in England, and especially charging him with writing and serving the preceding notice to Droege & Co., as also a certain other notice to other persons in England, having some sort of relation to the proceeds of some of these Texas indemnity bonds; this last notice, however, not being much pressed by the counsel of Texas as a feature in the case, and the reliance being on the notice to Droege & Co. as to the seventy-six
bonds, which were distinctly referred to in the bill in the original suit.
In answer to the rule to show cause and in answer to interrogatories propounded to him by the complainant's counsel, Chiles admitted that he signed the above-mentioned notices in the City of New York and caused them to be served on the parties, and that he had claimed ever since the decree in the original case and did now claim, as owner, the seventy-six above-mentioned bonds. But he denied that he was guilty of any contempt or violation of the injunction of this Court on two grounds:
1st. That the decree of the Court only enjoined him from asserting a claim under the contract between White & Chiles and the military board of Texas, which was the Exhibit "A" mentioned in the decree, whereas the title which he now asserted to all the bonds, including the seventy-six, was, as he alleged, under a wholly different contract made by himself alone on the 4th of March, 1865, with the said military board (which he deemed was the proper authority of the State of Texas), after the one which was declared void by the decree of this Court but before the suit was brought. And that in that last contract White had no interest whatever. He added that being in no wise forbidden, or not at full liberty to assert a claim as owner to the said bonds thereunder, he proposed to have the question of his right to the said bonds thereunder adjudicated by the proper court in England.
2d. That there could be no violation of the injunction until he asserted his claim by some kind of judicial proceeding, which he had not yet attempted to do.
The question therefore was whether, on this petition and answer, he could be properly punished for a contempt.