ICC v. Campbell - 289 U.S. 385 (1933)
U.S. Supreme Court
ICC v. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385 (1933)
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Campbell
Argued April 21, 1933
Decided May 8, 1933
289 U.S. 385
1. Where the Interstate Commerce Commission finds that a system of rates discriminates unjustly against a shipper, and orders the discrimination removed for the future, but also finds that the rates he paid were not in themselves unreasonable, and dismisses his complaint for damages because the record before it will not support an award of reparation based on the undue prejudice, its action in the latter aspect is judicial in character, negative in form, and not reviewable elsewhere. P. 289 U. S. 387.
2. Discrimination alone being the gist of the offense, the difference between one rate and another is not the measure of the damages suffered by the shipper, though it is one of the evidentiary circumstances. P. 289 U. S. 389.
3. When a shipper who paid only reasonable rates sues for damages on account of rate discrimination, he must prove not merely that business competitors enjoyed lower rates, but how much he himself lost through diversion of business and profits, lowered market prices, etc., because of the discrimination, and such consequences are not necessarily to be inferred from the discrimination, without more. P. 289 U. S. 390.
4. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel a judicial officer to act, but it may not be used to compel a decision in a particular way, or as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error to dictate the manner of his action. P. 289 U. S. 394.
5. Even if the Interstate Commerce Commission committed an error of law in the present case in refusing to find the ultimate fact of damage as an inference from the evidentiary facts set out in its decision, the error cannot be corrected by mandamus. P. 289 U. S. 393.
6. The policy of the law has been to give finality to orders of the Commission negative in form and substance, and to keep them out of the courts. A dissatisfied complainant is not permitted to escape these limitations indirectly by broadening the functions of mandamus when he is barred from more direct review. P 289 U. S. 394.
61 App.D.C. 382, 63 F.2d 358, reversed.
Certiorari to review the reversal of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia refusing a writ of mandamus.