Collins v. LoiselAnnotate this Case
259 U.S. 309 (1922)
U.S. Supreme Court
Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922)
Collins v. Loisel
Argued April 28, 1922
Decided May 29, 1922
259 U.S. 309
1. To warrant extradition (in this case, to India under the treaties with Great Britain), it is not necessary that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries be the same, nor that the scope of the liability be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in each; it is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions. P. 259 U. S. 311.
2. The Act of August 3, 1882, c. 378, § 5, 22 Stat. 216, repealing Rev.Stats. § 5271 so far as inconsistent, admits as evidence in extradition proceedings warrants and other papers, and copies thereof, as well as depositions, authenticated so as to authorize their admission for similar purposes in courts of the foreign country when such authentication is proven by the certificate of the principal diplomatic or Consular officer of the United States resident in such country. P. 259 U. S. 313.
3. In extradition for an offense committed at Bombay, India is the "foreign country" within the meaning of this statute, and the papers may be certified by the Consul General of the United States stationed at Calcutta, of whose identity and of whose status as our principal diplomatic or Consular officer resident in that country the court takes judicial notice. P. 259 U. S. 314.
4. Evidence that the accused obtained valuable personal property by knowingly false representations of his wealth and standing, of his authority to draw the draft given the vendor, and of the identity and financial standing of the drawee held sufficient to show an obtaining by false pretenses within the law of Louisiana, as well as a cheat at common law. P. 259 U. S. 314.
5. Under the Treaty of August 9, 1842, with Great Britain, providing that extradition shall only be had on such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the person charged is found, would justify his arrest and commitment for trial if the offense had been committed there, and under the law of Louisiana, allowing accused persons to present evidence in their own behalf before the committing magistrate, a person arrested for extradition is entitled to introduce evidence rebutting probable cause, but not evidence in defense. P. 259 U. S. 315.
6. The function of the committing magistrate is to determine whether there is competent evidence sufficient to hold the accused for trial, and not whether it would suffice for a conviction. P. 259 U. S. 315.
7. His conclusions as to relevancy of evidence are not reexaminable in habeas corpus unless so clearly unjustified a to amount to denial of the hearing prescribed by law. P. 259 U. S. 317.
8. The phrase "such evidence of criminality" in the Treaty of 1842, supra, refer to sufficiency of evidence in elements essential to a conviction, not to the character of specific instruments of evidence or to rules governing admissibility. P. 259 U. S. 317.
9. The procedural law of the state cannot entitle the prisoner to introduce evidence made irrelevant by the treaty. P. 259 U. S. 317.
Appeal from a judgment of the district court in habeas corpus, remanding the appellant to the custody of the marshal under a commitment issued in an extradition proceeding.
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