Hyde v. Shine - 199 U.S. 62 (1905)
U.S. Supreme Court
Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62 (1906)
Hyde v. Shine
Argued February 21, 23, 1905
Decided May 29, 1905
199 U.S. 62
Section 1014, Rev.Stat., authorizes a removal from a judicial district in a state to the District of Columbia. Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1.
Where the indictment charges that a conspiracy was entered into in a district, the trial court of that district has jurisdiction of the offense although the overt acts carrying out the conspiracy were committed in another jurisdiction.
While this Court does not approve the practice of indicting citizens in courts far distant from their residence if they can be tried in courts of their own jurisdiction, § 1014, Rev.Stat., contains no discrimination based upon
distance, and requires the commitment to be made for trial before the court having cognizance of the offense, and, in the absence of an exception in the statute, the court cannot create one.
Section 23, c. 35, Comp.Stat. District of Columbia, giving the Criminal Court of the District jurisdiction of all crimes and misdemeanors committed in the District not lawfully triable in any other court has reference only to other courts within the District, and was not intended to change the law with respect to the general jurisdiction of courts having jurisdiction of the same offense.
On the facts in this case, the indictment, which charges a completed conspiracy to defraud the United States by means of obtaining state lands through sales to fictitious persons and then exchanging them for land of the United States under the forest reserve acts, held sufficient notwithstanding that the state received full compensation for the lands.
The states and the United States have power to punish violations of a statute enacted as a part of the public policy even though they may not have suffered any pecuniary damage from such violations.
A patent to a fictitious person is in legal effect no more than a declaration that the government thereby conveys the property to no one, and in such a case, the doctrine that a subsequent bona fide purchaser is protected does not apply.
Whether the act charged is or is not a crime is one which the trial court is competent to decide, and, under the circumstances of this case, this Court will not review the validity of the indictment upon habeas corpus.
While a federal court on habeas corpus may order the petitioner's discharge if there is an entire lack of evidence to support the accusation, where a prima facie case is made by the indictment, and the commissioner receives evidence on petitioner's behalf, it is for him to determine whether probable cause existed, and the court will not weigh the evidence on habeas corpus.
The requirement in § 1014, Rev.Stat., that proceedings for removal shall be agreeable to the usual state procedure applies to the proceedings for arrest and examination of the accused before the commissioner, but not to subsequent independent proceedings before the circuit court on habeas corpus.
While the circuit court has power to issue a writ of certiorari auxiliary to the writ of habeas corpus, it is wholly discretionary with it, and its refusal to do so cannot be assigned as error.
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court denying the appellant's application for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari and dismissing his petition therefor.
The proceedings which culminated in the arrest and remanding of the appellant originated in an indictment found in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the appellant
and John A. Benson, Henry P. Dimond, and Joost H. Schneider, charging them with a conspiracy, under Rev.Stat. § 5440, "to defraud the United States out of the possession and use of, and the title to, divers large tracts of the public lands of the United States." All of the defendants except Schneider are residents of San Francisco, California. Upon a complaint made, based upon such indictment, before a United States commissioner for the Northern District of California, Hyde was arrested under Rev.Stat. § 1014, taken before a commissioner, and held to bail to answer the indictment in the sum of $50,000, and in default thereof was committed to the custody of the defendant, Shine, to await the order of the district judge for his removal to the District of Columbia, or until he should be discharged by due course of law. Upon such order of removal being issued, United States v. Hyde, 132 F. 545, appellant presented his petition to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, praying for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, and for his discharge from imprisonment, which were denied, and this appeal taken.