The Act of March 3, 1591, c. 551, forbidding certain classes of
alien immigrants to land in the United States, is constitutional
and valid.
Upon a writ of habeas corpus, if sufficient ground for the
prisoner's detention by the government is shown, he is not to be
discharged for defects in the original arrest or commitment.
Page 142 U. S. 652
Inspectors of immigration under the Act of March 3, 1891, c.
551, are to be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
The decision of an inspector of immigration, within the
authority conferred upon him by the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 651,
that an alien immigrant shall not be permitted to land because
within one of the classes specified in that act, is final and
conclusive against his right to land, except upon appeal to the
Commissioner of Immigration and the Secretary of the Treasury, and
cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus even if it is not shown that
the inspector took or recorded any evidence on the question.
Habeas corpus, sued out May 13, 1891, by a female subject of the
Emperor of Japan restrained of her liberty and detained at San
Francisco upon the ground that she should not be permitted to land
in the United States. The case, as appearing by the papers filed
and by the report of a commissioner of the circuit court, to whom
the case was referred by that court "to find the facts and his
conclusions of law, and to report a judgment therein," and by the
admissions of counsel at the argument in this Court, was as
follows:
The petitioner arrived at the port of San Francisco on the
steamship
Belgic from Yokohama, Japan, on May 7, 1891.
William H. Thornley, Commissioner of Immigration of the State of
California, and claiming to act under instructions from and
contract with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States,
refused to allow her to land, and on May 13, 1891, in a
"report of alien immigrants forbidden to land under the
provisions of the Act of Congress approved August 3, 1882 at the
port of San Francisco, being passengers upon the steamer
Belgic, Walker, master, which arrived May 7, 1891, from
Yokohama,"
made these statements as to the petitioner:
"Sex, female; age, 25. Passport states that she comes to San
Francisco in company with her husband, which is not a fact. She
states that she has been married two years, and that her husband
has been in the United States one year, but she does not know his
address. She has $22, and is to stop at some hotel until her
husband calls for her."
With this report Thornley sent a letter to the collector stating
that after a careful examination of the alien immigrants on board
the
Belgic, he was satisfied that the petitioner and five
others were "prohibited from landing by the existing
Page 142 U. S. 653
immigration laws" for reasons specifically stated with regard to
each, and that, pending the collector's final decision as to their
right to land, he had "placed them temporarily in the Methodist
Chinese Mission, as the steamer was not a proper place to detain
them, until the date of sailing." On the same day, the collector
wrote to Thornley, approving his action.
Thereafter, on the same day, this writ of habeas corpus was
issued to Thornley, and he made the following return thereon:
"In obedience to the within writ, I hereby produce the body of
Nishimura Ekiu, as within directed, and return that I hold her in
my custody by direction of the customs authorities of the port of
San Francisco, California, under the provisions of the immigration
act; that, by an understanding between the United States attorney
and the attorney for petitioner, said party will remain in the
custody of the Methodist Episcopal Japanese and Chinese Mission
pending a final disposition of the writ."
The petitioner remained at the mission house until the final
order of the circuit court.
Afterwards, and before a hearing, the following proceedings took
place: on May 16th the district attorney of the United States
intervened in opposition to the writ of habeas corpus, insisting
that the finding and decision of Thornley and the collector were
final and conclusive, and could not be reviewed by the court. John
L. Hatch, having been appointed on May 14, by the Secretary of the
Treasury, inspector of immigration at the port of San Francisco, on
May 16th made the inspection and examination required by the Act of
March 3, 1891, c. 551, entitled "An act in amendment to the various
acts relative to immigration and the importation of aliens under
contract or agreement to perform labor," the material provisions of
which are set out in the margin,
* and refused
to
Page 142 U. S. 654
allow the petitioner to land, and made a report to the collector
in the very words of Thornley's report, except in stating
Page 142 U. S. 655
the date of the act of Congress, under which he acted, as March
3, 1891, instead of August 3, 1882, and, on May 18th,
Page 142 U. S. 656
Hatch intervened in opposition to the writ of habeas corpus,
stating these doings of his, and that upon said examination he
found the petitioner to be "an alien immigrant from Yokohama,
empire of Japan," and "a person without means of support, without
relatives or friends in the United States," and
"a person unable to care for herself, and liable to become a
public charge,and therefore inhibited from landing under the
provisions of said act of 1891, and previous acts of which said act
is amendatory,"
and insisting that his finding and decision were reviewable by
the Superintendent of immigration and the Secretary of the Treasury
only.
At the hearing before the commissioner of the circuit court, the
petitioner offered to introduce evidence as to her right to land,
and contended that the act of 1891, if construed as vesting in the
officers named therein exclusive authority to determine that right,
was insofar unconstitutional, as depriving her of her liberty
without due process of law, and that by the Constitution she had a
right to the writ of habeas corpus, which carried with it the right
to a determination by the court as to the legality of her
detention, and therefore, necessarily, the right to inquire into
the facts relating thereto.
The commissioner excluded the evidence offered as to the
petitioner's right to land, and reported that the question of that
right had been tried and determined by a duly constituted and
competent tribunal having jurisdiction in the premises; that the
decision of Hatch, as Inspector of Immigration, was conclusive on
the right of the petitioner to land, and could not be reviewed by
the court, but only by the Commissioner of Immigration and the
Secretary of the Treasury, and that the petitioner was not
unlawfully restrained of her liberty.
On July 24, 1891, the circuit court confirmed its commissioner's
report, and ordered
"that she be remanded by the marshal to the custody from which
she has been taken, to-wit, to the custody of J. L. Hatch,
immigration inspector for the port of San Francisco, to be dealt
with as he may find that
Page 142 U. S. 657
the law requires, upon either the present testimony before him
or that and such other as he may deem proper to take."
The petitioner appealed to this Court.
Page 142 U. S. 658
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
As this case involves the constitutionality of a law of the
United States, it is within the appellate jurisdiction of this
Page 142 U. S. 659
Court notwithstanding the appeal was taken since the act
establishing circuit courts of appeals took effect. Act March 3,
1891, c. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827, 828, 1115.
It is an accepted maxim of international law that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions or to admit them only in such cases
and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. Vattel,
lib. 2, §§ 94, 100; 1 Phillimore (3d ed.) c. 10, § 220. In the
United States, this power is vested in the national government, to
which the Constitution has committed the entire control of
international relations, in peace as well as in war. It belongs to
the political department of the government, and may be exercised
either through treaties made by the President and Senate or through
statutes enacted by Congress, upon whom the Constitution has
conferred power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
including the entrance of ships, the importation of goods, and the
bringing of persons into the ports of the United States; to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization; to declare war, and to
provide and maintain armies and navies, and to make all laws which
may be necessary and proper for carrying into effect these powers
and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government
of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8;
Head Money Cases,
112 U. S. 580;
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.
S. 581,
130 U. S.
604-609.
The supervision of the admission of aliens into the United
States may be entrusted by Congress either to the Department of
State, having the general management of foreign relations, or to
the Department of the Treasury, charged with the enforcement of the
laws regulating foreign commerce, and Congress has often passed
acts forbidding the immigration of particular classes of
foreigners, and has committed the execution of these acts to the
Secretary of the Treasury, to collectors of customs, and to
inspectors acting under their authority.
See, for
instance, Acts of March 3, 1875, c. 141, 18 Stat. 477; August
3, 1882, c. 376, 22 Stat. 214; February 23, 1887, c.
Page 142 U. S. 660
220, 24 Stat. 414; October 19, 1888, c. 1210, 25 Stat. 566, as
well as the various acts for the exclusion of the Chinese.
An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer
claiming authority to do so under an act of Congress and thereby
restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful.
Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.
S. 536;
United States v. Jung Ah Lung,
124 U. S. 621;
Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U.
S. 424;
Lau Ow Bew, Petitioner, 141 U.
S. 583. And Congress may, if it sees fit, as in the
statutes in question in
United States v. Jung Ah Lung,
just cited, authorize the courts to investigate and ascertain the
facts on which the right to land depends. But, on the other hand,
the final determination of those facts may be in trusted by
Congress to executive officers, and in such a case, as in all
others, in which a statute gives a discretionary power to an
officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain
facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by
law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or controvert the
sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
Martin v.
Mott, 12 Wheat. 19,
25 U. S. 31;
Philadelphia & Trenton
Railroad v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448,
39 U. S. 458;
Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457;
In re Oteiza, 136 U. S. 330. It
is not within the province of the judiciary to order that
foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any
domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been
admitted into the country pursuant to law shall be permitted to
enter in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of
the legislative and executive branches of the national government.
As to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative
officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are
due process of law.
Murray v. Hoboken
Co., 18 How. 272;
Hilton v. Merritt,
110 U. S. 97.
The immigration Act of August 3, 1882, c. 376, which was held to
be constitutional in the
Head-Money Cases, above cited,
imposed a duty of fifty cents for each alien passenger coming by
vessel into any port of the United States, to be
Page 142 U. S. 661
paid to the collector of customs, and by him into the Treasury,
to constitute an immigrant fund; by § 2, the Secretary of the
Treasury was charged with the duty of execution the provisions of
the act, and with the supervision of the business of immigration to
the United States, and, for these purposes, was empowered to make
contracts with any state commission, board, or officers, and it was
made their duty to go on board vessels and examine the condition of
immigrants,
"and if on such examination there shall be found among such
passengers any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to
take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge,
they shall report the same in writing to the collector of such
port, and such persons shall not be permitted to land,"
and by section 3, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized
to establish rules and regulations, and to issue instructions, to
carry out this and other immigration laws of the United States. 22
Stat. 214.
The doings of Thornley, the state commissioner of immigration,
in examining and detaining the petitioner, and in reporting to the
collector appear to have been under that act, and would be
justified by the second section thereof unless that section should
be taken to have been impliedly repealed by the last paragraph of
section 8 of the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 551, by which all duties
imposed and powers conferred by that section upon state
commissions, boards, or officers, acting under contract with the
Secretary of the Treasury, "shall be performed and exercised, as
occasion may arise, by the inspection officers of the United
States." 26 Stat. 1085.
But it is unnecessary to express a definite opinion on the
authority of Thornley to inspect and detain the petitioner.
Putting her in the mission house as a more suitable place than
the steamship, pending the decision of the question of her right to
land, and keeping her there, by agreement between her attorney and
the attorney for the United States, until final judgment upon the
writ of habeas corpus, left her in the same position, so far as
regarded her right to land in the United States, as if she never
had been removed from the steamship.
Before the hearing upon the writ of habeas corpus, Hatch
Page 142 U. S. 662
was appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury inspector of
immigration at the port of San Francisco, and, after making the
inspection and examination required by the act of 1891, refused to
allow the petitioner to land, and made a report to the collector of
customs stating facts which tended to show, and which the inspector
decided did show, that she was a "person likely to become a public
charge," and so within one of the classes of aliens "excluded from
admission into the United States" by the first section of that act.
And Hatch intervened in the proceedings on the writ of habeas
corpus, setting up his decision in bar of the writ.
A writ of habeas corpus is not like an action to recover damages
for an unlawful arrest or commitment, but its object is to
ascertain whether the prisoner can lawfully be detained in custody,
and, if sufficient ground for his detention by the government is
shown, he is not to be discharged for defects in the original
arrest or commitment.
Ex part Bollman,
4 Cranch 75, 114 [argument of counsel -- omitted],
8 U. S. 125;
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509,
97 U. S. 519;
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.
S. 621,
104 U. S. 624;
Kelley v. Thomas, 15 Gray 192;
King v. Marks, 3
East, 157;
Shuttleworth's Case, 9 Q.B. 651.
The case must therefore turn on the validity and effect of the
action of Hatch as Inspector of Immigration.
Section 7 of the act of 1891 establishes the office of
Superintendent of Immigration, and enacts that he "shall be an
officer in the Treasury Department, under the control and
supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury." By § 8, "the proper
inspection officers" are required to go on board any vessel
bringing alien immigrants and to inspect and examine them, and may
for this purpose remove and detain them on shore, without such
removal's being considered a landing; and
"shall have power to administer oaths, and to take and consider
testimony touching the right of any such aliens to enter the United
States, all of which shall be entered of record. . . . All
decisions made by the inspection officers or their assistants
touching the right of any alien to land, when adverse to such
right, shall be final unless appeal be taken to the Superintendent
of Immigration, whose action shall be subject to review by the
Secretary
Page 142 U. S. 663
of the Treasury,"
and the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules for
inspection along the borders of Canada, British Columbia, and
Mexico, "provided that not exceeding one inspector shall be
appointed for each customs district."
It was argued that the appointment of Hatch was illegal because
it was made by the Secretary of the Treasury, and should have been
made by the Superintendent of Immigration. But the Constitution
does not allow Congress to vest the appointment of inferior
officers elsewhere than "in the President alone, in the courts of
law, or in the heads of departments." The act of 1891 manifestly
contemplates and intends that the inspectors of immigration shall
be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and appointments of
such officers by the Superintendent of Immigration could be upheld
only by presuming them to be made with the concurrence or approval
of the Secretary of the Treasury, his official head. Constitution,
Art. II, Section 2;
United States v.
Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385;
Stanton v.
Wilkeson, 8 Ben. 357;
Price v. Abbott, 17 F. 506.
It was also argued that Hatch's proceedings did not conform to
section 8 of the act of 1891 because it did not appear that he took
testimony on oath, and because there was no record of any testimony
or of his decision. But the statute does not require inspectors to
take any testimony at all, and allows them to decide on their own
inspection and examination the question of the right of any alien
immigrant to land. The provision relied on merely empowers
inspectors to administer oaths, and to take and consider testimony,
and requires only testimony so taken to be entered of record.
The decision of the Inspector of Immigration being in conformity
with the act of 1891, there can be no doubt that it was final and
conclusive against the petitioner's right to land in the Unites
states. The words of section 8 are clear to that effect, and were
manifestly intended to prevent the question of an alien immigrant's
right to land, when once decided adversely by an inspector, acting
within the jurisdiction conferred upon him, from being impeached or
reviewed, in the courts or otherwise, save only by appeal to the
inspector's
Page 142 U. S. 664
official superiors, and in accordance with the provisions of the
act. Section 13, by which the circuit and district courts of the
United States are "invested with full and concurrent jurisdiction
of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the
provisions of this act," evidently refers to causes of judicial
cognizance, already provided for, whether civil actions in the
nature of debt for penalties under sections 3 and 4, or indictments
for misdemeanors under section 6, 8, and 10. Its intention was to
vest concurrent jurisdiction of such causes in the circuit and
district courts, and it is impossible to construe it as giving the
courts jurisdiction to determine matters which the act has
expressly committed to the final determination of executive
officers.
The result is that the act of 1891 is constitutional and valid;
the Inspector of Immigration was duly appointed; his decision
against the petitioner's right to land in the United States was
within the authority conferred upon him by that act; no appeal
having been taken to the Superintendent of Immigration, that
decision was final and conclusive; the petitioner is not unlawfully
restrained of her liberty, and the order of the circuit court
is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER dissented.
*
"SEC. 1. The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from
admission into the United States in accordance with the existing
acts regulating immigration other than those concerning Chinese
laborers: all idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to
become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a
dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a
felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude,"
etc.
By sections 3 and 4, certain offenses are defined and subjected
to the penalties imposed by the Act of February 26, 1885, c. 164,
section 3, namely, penalties of $1,000,
"which may be sued for and recovered by the United States, or by
any person who shall first bring his action therefor, . . . as
debts of like amount are now recovered in the circuit courts of the
United States, the proceeds to be paid into the Treasury of the
United States."
23 Stat. 333.
"SEC. 6. Any person who shall bring into or land in the United
States by vessel or otherwise, or who shall aid to bring into or
land in the United States by vessel or otherwise, any alien not
lawfully entitled to enter the United States, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction, be punished by a
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for a
term not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and
imprisonment."
"SEC. 7. The office of Superintendent of Immigration is hereby
created and established, and the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, is authorized and directed to appoint
such officer, whose salary shall be four thousand dollars per
annum, payable monthly. The Superintendent of Immigration shall be
an officer in the Treasury Department, under the control and
supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury, to whom he shall make
annual reports in writing of the transactions of his office,
together with such special reports in writing as the Secretary of
the Treasury shall require."
"SEC. 8. Upon the arrival by water at any place within the
United States of any alien immigrants, it shall be the duty of the
commanding officer and the agents of the steam or sailing vessel by
which they came to report the name, nationality, last residence,
and destination of every such alien, before any of them are landed,
to the proper inspection officers, who shall thereupon go or send
competent assistants on board such vessel, and there inspect all
such aliens, or the inspection officers may order a temporary
removal of such aliens for examination at a designated time and
place, and then and there detain them until a thorough inspection
is made. But such removal shall not be considered a landing during
the pendency of such examination. The medical examination shall be
made by surgeons of the marine hospital service. In cases where the
services of a marine hospital surgeon cannot be obtained without
causing unreasonable delay, the inspector may cause an alien to be
examined by a civil surgeon, and the Secretary of the Treasury
shall fix the compensation for such examination. The inspection
officers and their assistants shall have power to administer oaths,
and to take and consider testimony touching the right of any such
aliens to enter the United States, all of which shall be entered of
record. During such inspection, after temporary removal, the
superintendent shall cause such aliens to be properly housed, fed,
and cared for, and also, in his discretion, such as are delayed in
proceeding to their destination after inspection. All decisions
made by the inspection officers or their assistants touching the
right of any alien to land, when adverse to such right, shall be
final unless appeal be taken to the Superintendent of Immigration,
whose action shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the
Treasury. It shall be the duty of the aforesaid officers and agents
of such vessel to adopt due precautions to prevent the landing of
any alien immigrant at any place or time other than that designated
by the inspection officers, and any such officer or agent or person
in charge of such vessel who shall either knowingly or negligently
land or permit to land any alien immigrant at any place or time
other than that designated by the inspection officers shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished by a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
"The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules for
inspection along the borders of Canada, British Columbia, and
Mexico so as not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay, impede, or
annoy passengers in ordinary travel between said countries,
provided that not exceeding one inspector shall be appointed for
each customs district, and whose salary shall not exceed twelve
hundred dollars per year."
"All duties imposed and powers conferred by the second section
of the Act of August third, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, upon
state commissioners, boards, or officers acting under contract with
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall be performed and exercised, as
occasion may arise, by the inspection officers of the United
States."
"SEC. 10. All aliens who may unlawfully come to the United
States shall, if practicable, be immediately sent back on the
vessel by which they were brought in. The cost of their maintenance
while on land, as well as the expense of the return of such aliens,
shall be borne by the owner or owners of the vessel on which such
aliens came, and if any master, agent, consignee, or owner of such
vessel shall refuse to receive back on board the vessel such
aliens, or shall neglect to detain them thereon, or shall refuse or
neglect to return them to the port from which they came, or to pay
the cost of their maintenance while on land, such master, agent,
consignee, or owner shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
shall be punished by a fine not less than three hundred dollars for
each and every offense, and any such vessel shall not have
clearance from any port of the United States while any such fine is
unpaid."
Section 11 provides for the return within one year of any alien
coming into the United States in violation of law.
Section 12 saves all prosecutions and proceedings, criminal or
civil, begun under any act hereby amended.
By section 13, the circuit and district courts of the United
States are "invested with full and concurrent jurisdiction of all
causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions of
this act," and the act is to go into effect on April 1, 1891. 26
Stat. 1084-1086.
