Quaere, and not determined, whether an ordinance
cutting the earning of a telephone company down to six percent per
annum would, under the circumstance of this case be confiscatory
and unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Court requires clear evidence before it will declare
legislation, otherwise valid, to be void as an unconstitutional
taking of property by reason of establishing rates that are
confiscatory.
Page 225 U. S. 431
In this case, the evidence is not sufficient to justify
enjoining enforcement of an ordinance fixing rates of a telephone
company, and the decree granting an injunction is reversed, but
without prejudice.
The facts, which involve the question of whether an ordinance of
the City of Louisville fixing rates for telephone service in that
city was unconstitutional as confiscatory of the property of the
companies, are stated in the opinion.
Page 225 U. S. 432
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill to prevent the enforcement of an ordinance of the
City of Louisville fixing telephone rates, passed in 1909, after
the attempt of the city to deprive the appellee of its franchise,
when that seemed likely to fail.
See Louisville v. Cumberland
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 224 U.
S. 649. The question raised is the usual one of
confiscation.
Page 225 U. S. 433
In consequence of the conclusion to which we have come, we shall
make a much more summary statement of the facts than in other
circumstances might be necessary. The case was referred to a
master, and he reported in favor of the city. He was of opinion
that, in the first year after the ordinance should go into effect,
there would be a less of $30,000, but that in another year or so,
in view of the probable increase of subscribers, the company would
get back to its former net revenue with a probable continuous
increase thereafter, and would earn a sufficient return. The judge
was of a different opinion, and, for the purposes of the present
decision only, we shall adopt his figures, subject to the changes
that we shall state, which leave us unprepared to sustain the
decree without giving the ordinance a trial to show its actual
effect.
The judge's values were:
Plant, including toll lines . . . . . . . . . $1,575,000.00
Real estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162,000.00
Supplies on hand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18,000.00
Working capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,000.00
-------------
$1,788,000.00
Gross earnings for 1908, including 15%
of receipts from toll lines. This was
undisputed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $325,838.30
The court added 10% more of the toll
line receipts, making. . . . . . . . . . . 330,926.38
The master was of opinion that the re-
maining 85 percent should be added, mak-
ing the total gross earnings . . . . . . . $369,087.00
For the purpose of such an estimate as
this, we think that the toll lines should
be either in or out, and if they are to
be counted in the property upon which
the appellee is not to be prevented by
Page 225 U. S. 434
law from earning a fair return, as they
are above, and the expenses charged to
the appellee, the whole return from
them should be added to the gross
earnings of the appellee. So we take
the total gross earnings as. . . . . . . . $369,087.00
Expenses as found by the
master and accepted accepted
by the judge . . . . . . . . $216,363.07
But this includes amount
charged to the Exchange
for the use of real estate
(less expenses for repairs),
which, in view of the in-
clusion of real estate above,
it should not. . . . . . . . 11,707.52
-----------
$204,655.55
Deduct corrected expenses from gross earnings 204,655.55
-----------
Net earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . $164,431.45
Even if we deduct from the net earnings
a sum estimated by the judge as neces-
sary above actual expenditures of 1908
to make good average depreciation 24,095.02
-----------
we have. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $140,336,43
which is nearly eight percent on the
estimated value. The master prophe-
cies a falling off for the first
year of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,000.00
-----------
which would leave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $110,336.43
or over six percent on the valuation
assumed.
Page 225 U. S. 435
Suppose now that we leave out the toll lines.
Plant, with real estate, etc., as above . . . $1,788,000.00
Deduct toll lines estimated at. . . . . . . . 125,000.00
-----------
$1,663,000.00
Gross earnings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325,838.30
Less 15% from toll lines. . . . . . . . . . . 7,632.11
-----------
$318,206.19
Expenses. . . . . . . . . . . . $216,303.07
Less amount charged for use
of real estate as above. . . 11,707.52
-----------
$204,655.55
Less toll line expenses which,
if estimated (in the absence
of satisfactory proof as to
their amount) by dividing
expenses in proportion to
receipts would be approx-
imately. . . . . . . . . . . 30,000.00
-----------
$174,655.55
Deduct corrected expenses from
gross earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174,655.55
-----------
$143,550.64
Additional deduction for depreciation as
before . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,095.02
-----------
$119,455.62
Which is nearly 7 percent, or, deducting
for loss of custom the first year. . . . . 30,000.00
-----------
$89,455.62
which is just above five percent on the judge's valuation.
Page 225 U. S. 436
We express no opinion whether to cut this telephone company down
to six percent by legislation would or would not be confiscatory.
But when it is remembered what clear evidence the court requires
before it declares legislation otherwise valid void on this ground,
and when it is considered how speculative every figure is that we
have set down with delusive exactness, we are of opinion that the
result is too near the dividing line not to make actual experiment
necessary. The master thought that the probable net income for the
year that would suffer the greatest decrease would be 8.60 percent
on the values estimated by him. The judge, on assumptions to which
we have stated our disagreement, makes the present earnings 5 10/17
percent, with a reduction by the ordinance to 36/17 percent. The
whole question is too much in the air for us to feel authorized to
let the injunction stand.
Decree reversed without prejudice.