1. A. killed B., upon whose life there was a policy of insurance
in favor of a third party. The company paid the insurance and sued
A. for the damages it had sustained by his act.
Held that
the action does not lie at common law or under the Civil Code of
Louisiana, where the homicide was committed.
2. That code gives a right of action against the wrongdoer to
certain relatives of the deceased, for injuries to the person
resulting in death. At common law, an action for such injuries
abates.
This is an action by the Mobile Life Insurance Company against
Brame, to recover the sum of $7,000.
The plaintiff alleged that it insured the life of one Craven
McLemore, a citizen of Louisiana, for that amount in favor of third
parties; that on the 24th of October, 1875, while its policies were
in force, Brame did, in the town of Delhi, in Louisiana, willfully
shoot said McLemore, and inflict upon him a mortal wound, from the
effects of which he died on the twenty-sixth day of that month;
that the shooting was an illegal and tortious act on the part of
Brame, and caused damage to the plaintiff in the amount of the
policies on the life of the deceased, which amount the plaintiff
acknowledges to be due, and a part of which has been paid.
An exception of the defendant to the plaintiff's petition was
sustained, and judgment rendered in his favor. The company then
brought the case here.
The Revised Civil Code of Louisiana contains the following
articles:
"ART. 2314. Every act whatever of man that causes damage to
another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it; the
right of this action shall survive, in case of death, in favor of
the minor children and widow of the deceased, or either of them,
and in default of these, in favor of the surviving father or
mother, or either of them, for the space of one year from the
death."
"ART. 2316. Every person is responsible for the damage he
occasions, not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his
imprudence, or his want of skill. "
Page 95 U. S. 755
"ART. 2324. He who causes another person to do an unlawful act,
or assists or encourages in the commission of it, is answerable
in solido with that person for the damage caused by such
act. "
Page 95 U. S. 756
MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the Court.
The argument of the insurance company is that the killing of the
deceased was an injury to or violation of a legal right or interest
of the company; that as a consequence thereof, it sustained a loss
which is the proximate effect of the injury.
The answer of the defendant is founded upon the theory that the
loss is the remote and indirect result merely of the act charged,
that at the common law, no civil action lies for an injury which
results in the death of the party injured, and that the statutes of
Louisiana upon that subject do not include the present case.
The authorities are so numerous and so uniform to the
proposition that by the common law, no civil action lies for an
injury which results in death, that it is impossible to speak of it
as a proposition open to question. It has been decided in many
cases in the English courts and in many of the state
Page 95 U. S. 757
courts, and no deliberate, well considered decision to the
contrary is to be found. In Hilliard on Torts, p. 87, sec. 10, the
rule is thus laid down:
"Upon a similar ground it has been held that at common law the
death of a human being, though clearly involving pecuniary loss, is
not the ground of an action for damages."
The most of the cases upon the subject are there referred to.
Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493;
Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. New York & New Haven Railroad Co., 25
Conn. 265;
Kramer v. Market Street Railroad Co., 25 Cal.
434;
Indianapolis, Pittsburg, & Cleveland Railroad Co. v.
Kealy, 23 Ind. 133;
Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180;
Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349;
Peoria Marine & Fire
Insurance Co. v. Frost, 37 Ill. 333. The only cases that tend
to the contrary of this rule, so far as we know, are
Cross v.
Guthery, 2 Root (Conn.) 90,
Plummer v. Webb, Ware 69,
and
Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. (N.Y.) 210. They are
considered by the New York Court of Appeals in
Green v. Hudson
River Railroad Co., 2 Keyes (N.Y.) 294, and compared with the
many cases to the contrary, and are held not to diminish the force
of the rule as above stated. In that case, the plaintiff alleged
that, on the ninth day of January, 1856, his wife was a passenger
on the defendants' road, and by the gross carelessness and
unskillfulness of the defendants a collision occurred, by means of
which his wife was killed,
"whereby he has lost and been deprived of all the comfort,
benefit, and assistance of his said wife in his domestic affairs,
which he might and otherwise would have had, to his damage,"
&c. A demurrer to this complaint, upon the ground that the
facts alleged constituted no cause of action, was sustained by the
New York Court of Appeals.
In
Hubgh v. New Orleans & Carrollton Railroad Co.,
6 La.Ann. 495, the same principle was decided, and in the same
manner. In giving its opinion, the court said: "The exception of
the defendants presents the question whether the death of a human
being can be the ground of an action for damages." Not being
satisfied with this decision, Messrs. Ogden & Duncan asked for
a rehearing, the argument for which is reported in the same volume,
pp. 498-508. It was denied in an elaborate opinion delivered by
Chief Justice Eustis.
Page 95 U. S. 758
In
Hermann v. Carrollton Railroad Co., 11
id.
5, this principle was again affirmed in an opinion by Chief Justice
Merrick.
It is only necessary to refer to one other case, involving the
same principle as those already cited, but in its facts more
closely resembling the case under consideration.
In
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. New York &
New Haven Railroad Co., supra, the declaration alleged that on
the twentieth day of March, 1850, the plaintiffs had outstanding
and in force a policy of insurance for $2,000 upon the life of
Samuel Beach; that Beach was on that day a passenger on the
defendants' road; that the defendants so carelessly, negligently,
and unskillfully conducted themselves that the train on which Beach
was riding was thrown down a bank into the river; that Beach was
greatly wounded and bruised, by means whereof he then and there
died, by reason of which the plaintiffs were compelled to pay to
his administrators the sum of $2,000 upon the said policy.
The allegation of the present plaintiffs is that Brame
tortiously and illegally took the life of McLemore by shooting him.
This is open to the inference that the act of Brame was felonious.
The case in Connecticut is based upon the allegation of negligence
and carelessness, and is the more favorable to a recovery, in that
it avoids the suggestion existing in the present case, that the
civil injury is merged in the felony. The Supreme Court of
Connecticut held that the action could not be sustained.
We have cited and given references to the important cases on
this question; they are substantially uniform against the right of
recovery.
Upon principle, we think, no other conclusion could be reached
than that stated. The relation between the insurance company and
McLemore, the deceased, was created by a contract between them, to
which Brame was not a party. The injury inflicted by him was upon
McLemore, against his personal rights; that it happened to injure
the plaintiff was an incidental circumstance, a remote and indirect
result, not necessarily or legitimately resulting from the act of
killing. As in
Rockingham Insurance Co. v. Mosher, 39 Me.
253, where an
Page 95 U. S. 759
insurance company brought suit against one who had willfully
fired a store upon which it had a policy of insurance, which it was
thereby compelled to pay, it was held that the loss was remote and
undirected, and that the action could not be sustained. In
Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N.Y. 430, it was held that if A. is
under a contract to convey his land to B., and C. persuades him not
to do so, no action lies by B. against C. So a witness is not
liable for evidence given by him in a suit, although false, by
which another is injured.
Grove v. Brandenburg, 7 Blackf.
(Ind.) 234;
Dunlap v. Gledden, 31 Me. 435. And in
Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 290, a contractor for
the support of town paupers had been subjected to extra expense in
consequence of personal injury inflicted upon one of them; and he
brought the action against the assailant to recover for such
expenditure. The court held the damage to be remote and indirect,
and not sustained by means of any natural or legal relation between
the plaintiff and the party injured, but simply by means of a
special contract between the plaintiff and the town. Some text
writers are referred to as holding a different view, but we are not
cited to any case in this country or Great Britain where a
different doctrine has been held.
By the common law, actions for injuries to the person abate by
death, and cannot be revived or maintained by the executor or the
heir. By the act of Parliament of Aug. 21, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict.,
an action in certain cases is given to the representatives of the
deceased. This principle, in various forms and with various
limitations, has been incorporated into the statutes of many of our
states, and among others into that of Louisiana. It is there given
in favor of the minor children and widow of the deceased, and, in
default of these relatives, in favor of the surviving father and
mother. Acts of La., 1855, pr. 223, p. 270. The case of a creditor,
much less a remote claimant like the plaintiff, is not within the
statute.
In each of the briefs it is stated that the defendant was tried
for the homicide, and acquitted. In the view we take of the case,
the fact of a trial or its result is a circumstance quite
immaterial to the present question, however important it may have
been to the defendant.
Judgment affirmed.