1. The complainant, Starr, and his brother, being in possession
of certain lots in the City of Portland, Oregon, filed a bill in
equity in the state court to quiet their title and compel the
defendant, who claimed an adverse interest under his patent from
the United States, to execute a release to them. Their bill set
forth two distinct and independent causes of action, or grounds for
relief -- one founded upon an agreement made by the defendant with
the parties through whom the complainants claimed, to ratify and
confirm the title of such parties, and the other founded upon a
patent of the United States, issued to the City of Portland for
land within its limits, in trust for the several use and benefit of
the occupants thereof. This patent embraced the premises in
controversy, and the complainants claimed as beneficiaries under
it. On motion of the defendant, the court held that the two grounds
for equitable relief were inconsistent, and compelled the
complainants to elect upon which ground they would proceed. They
objected to the order, but, under its compulsion, elected to
proceed under the city patent, and accordingly amended their bill
so as to present their claim for relief solely as beneficiaries
under that instrument. The state court held that the patent to
Stark was void as against the complainants, and decreed in their
favor. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the
decree was reversed, that court holding that the patent to the city
was void, and the bill was subsequently dismissed. The defendant
having afterwards commenced an action of ejectment for the
possession of the premises and recovered judgment, the complainant,
who had in the meantime acquired the interest of his brother, filed
the present bill, setting up substantially the same matter
respecting the agreement of Stark with the parties through whom he
claimed which was originally averred in the first suit, and also
that the defendant was estopped by his acts from asserting title to
the premises.
Held that the proceedings and decree in the
first suit did not conclude the complainant in the present suit
upon the agreement.
2. The principle that a party seeking to enforce a claim, legal
or equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or
the proofs or both, all the grounds upon which he expects a
judgment in his favor, and is not at liberty to split up his demand
and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the
grounds upon which special relief is sought, and leave the rest to
be presented in a second suit if the first fail, does not require
distinct causes of action -- that is to say, distinct matters, each
of which would authorize by itself independent relief, to be
presented in a single suit, though they exist at the same time, and
might be considered together.
3. Before the laws of the United States were extended over the
Territory of Oregon, the settlers in that country had formed for
themselves a provisional government under which they adopted
regulations for the possession and occupation of land in the
territory among themselves, although the title to the land was in
the United States. Under the regulations, land was occupied,
cultivated, and improved, and bought and sold, as if the parties
had possessed the fee. The claimants did not, in their dealings
with the land, deny the proprietorship
Page 94 U. S. 478
of the United States, but they acted upon the expectation that
their possessions and improvements would be respected by the
government and that ultimately they should acquire the title, and
it was the general understanding of the people that whenever the
legal title was obtained, it should inure to the benefit of the
grantees of the claimant who secured the patent of the United
States. This understanding affected all transactions in land until
the passage of the Donation Act of Sept. 27, 1850.
Held
that a purchaser under these circumstances from the claimant, or a
person whose purchase from another had been confirmed by the
claimant, acquired as against him an equitable right to the land
which a court of equity will enforce when he had obtained the
patent of the United States, and this equitable right passes to
subsequent grantees of the first purchaser or confirmee.
4. Where a ratification by an attorney of a deed of settlement
is insufficient in form because of the manner in which he expressed
his agency in appending his signature to the instrument declaring
the ratification, a court of equity will look beyond the form of
the execution and, having ascertained his intention in signing the
instrument, will, if possible, give it the effect intended if such
ratification has been acted upon by others and has not been
objected to by the principal when called to his attention.
5. The subsequent action of the principal in asserting a right
in severalty to property, which he could only do upon his approval
of such ratification by his attorney, will estop him from denying
the ratification.
This was a suit in equity to restrain the defendant from
enforcing a judgment recovered by him against the tenants of the
complainant for the possession of certain premises situated in the
City of Portland, Oregon, and to compel the defendant to execute a
release of his interest to the complainant.
It appears from the record, that on the 22d of March, 1848, and
for some time previous, one Francis W. Pettygrove held a claim to
six hundred and forty acres of land in Oregon, which was taken up
by him under the law of the provisional government, established by
the settlers there in 1845, before the laws of the United States
were extended over the country. On the land covered by this claim a
large part of the City of Portland is built. On the day mentioned,
Pettygrove conveyed his claim, with the exception of certain
designated lots, to one Daniel H. Lownsdale, of Portland. By the
conveyance, the grantor, for the consideration of $5,000, and
divers other good causes and considerations, bargained, remised,
and released to the grantee named all his "right, title, interest,
claim, and
Page 94 U. S. 479
demand at law and in equity, present and in expectancy," in and
to the land claim the boundaries of which were given.
On the 30th of March, 1849, Lownsdale, for the consideration of
$6,000, bargained, quitclaimed, and released his interest in the
claim, with the exception of certain lots, to Stephen Coffin,
designating the interest conveyed, and describing the claim in
similar language. With the execution of this conveyance, Lownsdale
and Coffin entered into a contract by which Coffin agreed to make
every exertion to obtain the title of the United States to the
claim, divide the proceeds of any sales of lots or other property
or privileges on the land claimed, to bear half the expenses of any
improvements they might jointly conclude to make, to further the
interest of the town site, to divide the profits and the losses,
and that Coffin should execute to Lownsdale a good title to
one-half of the claim upon the termination of the contract, which
was dissolvable by mutual consent.
On the 13th of December, 1849, Lownsdale and Coffin, for the
consideration of $26,666, payable by installments, conveyed one
undivided third part of the claim to William W. Chapman, of
Portland. From that time, the three parties owned the claim
jointly, designating themselves as partners.
During this time, the defendant Stark asserted ownership to one
undivided half of the claim, by purchase from one Lovejoy, who, he
contended, had held the claim in connection with Pettygrove.
In January, 1850, Lownsdale went to San Francisco, leaving with
Chapman a power of attorney to transact and superintend his
business in the territory during his absence; to do anything
pertaining to his interests in Oregon which he, in his judgment,
might think advisable, "particularly in signing deeds to Portland
lots."
At San Francisco, Lownsdale met Stark, and they made a
settlement of their respective claims by which the claim was
divided by a line running through what is now called Stark Street,
Stark taking the part north of the line, and Lownsdale the part
south of it. This settlement was embodied in a deed of release and
quitclaim, executed by them on the 1st of March, 1850. By the deed,
Stark ratified and confirmed the
Page 94 U. S. 480
conveyances of certain designated lots north of that line, made
by Lownsdale or his attorney, previous to the first day of January,
1850, and also all grants and conveyances made subsequently to the
first day of March, with a proviso that Stark should receive the
proceeds of the subsequent conveyances.
During the absence of Lownsdale, Chapman and Coffin agreed to
partition off three blocks among the three owners, assigning one to
each owner in severalty, at an agreed valuation. In this way, block
78 was assigned to Lownsdale, block 79 to Coffin, and block 81 to
Chapman. This partition, making assignment, was made by the
following instrument:
"This indenture, made and entered into this twentieth day of
March, A.D. 1850, between Stephen Coffin, D. H. Lownsdale, and W.
W. Chapman, proprietors of Portland, of the first part, and W. W.
Chapman, of Portland, Washington County, Oregon, of the second
part, witnesseth, that the party of the first part, for and in
consideration of the sum of $2,000, the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, doth release, confirm, and quitclaim unto the said
Chapman the following-described property in the said town of
Portland, to-wit, lots numbers one (1), two (2), three (3), four
(4), in fractional block number eighty-one (81), being the
warehouse fraction, and situate east of Water Street, to the water
north of Oak Street and south of Pine Street, according to the plat
of said town."
"In testimony whereof, the parties have hereunto set their hands
and seals day and year aforesaid."
"[Signed]"
"S. COFFIN [SEAL]"
"D. H. LOWNSDALE [SEAL]"
"
By his Attorney-in-fact, W. W. Chapman"
"W. W. CHAPMAN [SEAL]"
Chapman and Coffin first heard, early in April, 1850, of the
settlement between Stark and Lownsdale. They at once refused to
ratify it unless the agreement or deed of settlement was modified
so as to cover the disposition of property made by them during
Lownsdale's absence up to the time they were informed of the
settlement.
Stark had left Portland in September of the previous year.
Before he left, he executed the following power of attorney, and
delivered it to John H. Couch:
Page 94 U. S. 481
"Know all men by these presents, that I, Benjamin Stark,
merchant, resident of Portland, in the Territory of Oregon, do
hereby make, constitute, and appoint John H. Couch, of Portland
aforesaid (merchant, and my mercantile partner), my true and lawful
attorney, for me, and in my stead, to do any and all acts, during
my temporary absence from this territory which I might myself
lawfully do were I personally present, hereby ratifying and
confirming all and every act which my said attorney shall so
perform, and by these presents recalling and annulling all
authority conflicting with this letter of attorney which I have
previously given to any person or persons whatsoever."
"Witness my hand and seal at Portland this twenty-sixth day of
September, A.D. 1849."
"BENJ. STARK [SEAL]"
"Witness: WM. SETON OGDEN"
With this power, Stark sent the following letter to his
attorney:
"JOHN H. COUCH, Esq.:"
"SIR -- With this you have from me a power of attorney of the
fullest character, under which, during my absence from the
territory, you can look out for all my interests, particularly with
reference to my interest in the Portland town claim."
"As regards the claim, I wish you to notify Mr. Coffin as soon
as he returns of the true position of things, and, if possible,
have the difficulty concerning my undivided half settled. I have
spoken to James W. Nesmith, Esq., and to Mr. Pritchard, Secretary
of State, and they will both hold themselves in readiness to act as
my counsel."
"Should you find after the return of Mr. Coffin that the matter
can be brought no nearer to a settlement upon just and equitable
principles, I wish you to submit to them (Nesmith and Pritchard)
all my papers, a part of which you have herewith, and others which
you can have from A. L. Lovejoy, Esq., upon application to him, and
direct them to pursue such measures as they deem most
judicious."
"Mr. Lovejoy can give some valuable hints to my counsel, as he
was formerly my agent. It will be necessary for you to advise the
public of your appointment as my attorney during my absence. The
proper kind of notice to publish, Nesmith or Pritchard can
prepare."
"Wishing you may have but little trouble with my affairs,
yet
Page 94 U. S. 482
trusting that you will battle to the utmost for my rights if
necessary, I am yours, affectionately,"
"BENJ. STARK"
"PORTLAND, 26th September, 1849"
Assuming to act under the authority of this power and letter,
Couch undertook to obtain from Chapman and Coffin a ratification of
the agreement of settlement between Stark and Lownsdale. For that
purpose, he consented to the modification demanded by them.
Accordingly the agreement was ratified by Chapman and Coffin by the
following instrument signed by them endorsed upon the
agreement:
"We, Stephen Coffin and W. W. Chapman, partners with Daniel H.
Lownsdale, in the Town of Portland, hereby ratify and confirm a
certain agreement between Benjamin Stark and D. H. Lownsdale,
bearing date the first day of March, A.D. 1850, respecting an
adjustment of title, hereby placing the disposition of property up
to notice of said adjustment upon the same footing with the
disposition of property before the first day of January last."
"In testimony whereof we have hereunto set our hands and seals
this the thirteenth day of April, A.D. 1850."
"S. COFFIN [L.S.]"
"W. W. CHAPMAN [L.S.]"
Under this instrument the following ratification by the attorney
of Stark was executed:
"PORTLAND, O.T., April 15, 1850"
"I ratify the above agreement as far as my interest is concerned
in said property."
"JOHN H. COUCH,"
"
For BENJ. STARK"
All other material facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion
of the Court.
The complainant obtained a decree for the release prayed, and
the defendant appealed to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the 7th of December, 1860, the Commissioner of the
Page 94 U. S. 483
General Land Office at Washington issued a patent of the United
States to the corporate authorities of the City of Portland,
Oregon, for lands within the limits of the city to the extent of
three hundred and seven acres and forty-nine hundredths of an acre,
in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof.
This patent was issued upon an entry made by the city authorities
on the belief that the lands were brought under the operation of
the Town-Site Act of May 23, 1844, by the Organic Act of 1848,
establishing the territorial government of Oregon, and were not
subject to disposition under the Donation Act of 1850. The patent
embraced the premises in controversy in this suit, but reserved
from its operation any valid claims that might exist in virtue of
the several donations to Benjamin Stark and others.
On the following day, Dec. 8, 1860, the Commissioner of the
General Land Office also issued a patent to Stark for land situated
within the limits of Portland, claimed by him under the Donation
Act, subject, however, to such rights as might exist in virtue of
the entry by the city. This patent also covered the premises in
controversy.
For several years before these patents were issued, the
complainant, with his brother, had been in the occupation, use, and
enjoyment of the premises and had erected upon them expensive and
permanent improvements. During this time, they asserted that by
virtue of a certain agreement made by Stark with parties through
whom they had obtained their interest, they had acquired a right to
have the legal title transferred to them whenever that was obtained
from the United States. After Stark had secured his patent, they
applied to him for a release, but he refused to give them one and
threatened them with legal proceedings to recover possession of the
premises. They thereupon brought a suit in equity in the state
court to compel a release of his interest. In their bill, which was
filed in January, 1864, they set forth their long and peaceable
possession; that they had made large and valuable improvements;
that the defendant asserted title to the premises under his patent
and threatened suits for their recovery; and stated the conveyances
under which they claimed, and the agreement upon which they founded
their right to a release
Page 94 U. S. 484
of his interest, and they prayed a decree compelling such
release.
Subsequently, the bill was amended by the addition of clauses
setting forth the patent of the United States issued to the
corporate authorities of the city, in trust for the several use and
benefit of the occupants, and alleging that the complainants, as
beneficiaries, claimed an interest in the premises under that
instrument.
The state court appeared to consider these two grounds for
equitable relief -- one founded upon the agreement of Stark with
the parties through whom the complainants claimed and the other
founded upon the city patent -- as inconsistent with each other,
and compelled the complainants to elect upon which they would
proceed. They objected to the order, but, under its compulsion,
elected to proceed upon the city patent. The bill was accordingly
amended so as to present their claim for relief solely as
beneficiaries under that instrument. The point in contention, then,
was which of the two patents carried the title to the premises. If
the patent to the city authorities was valid, Stark took nothing by
his patent. If, however, his patent was valid, the city had
acquired no interest in the premises.
The state circuit court and the state supreme court held that
the patent to Stark was void as against the complainants, and
enjoined him from taking legal proceedings to eject them from the
premises. The case having been brought to this Court, the decree of
the supreme court was reversed and the cause remanded with
directions to dismiss the suit. Upon our mandate, the suit was
accordingly dismissed in September, 1868. In deciding the case, we
held that the act of 1848, organizing the Territory of Oregon, did
not extend over the country the Town-Site Act of 1844, and that the
patent to the city authorities, being made upon an entry under that
act, passed no title to the land covered by the donation claim of
Stark. His right to a patent had been previously perfected, and his
claim had been surveyed before the passage of the act of 1854, by
which the Town-Site Act was first extended with qualifications to
the territory.
Stark v.
Starrs, 6 Wall. 402.
After the suit was thus dismissed, Stark commenced actions
Page 94 U. S. 485
of ejectment against the tenants of the complainant for
possession of the premises. These were consolidated into one
action, in which Stark recovered judgment, with damages, for use
and occupation. The complainant thereupon commenced the present
suit in equity, alleging that he has a good and equitable title to
the premises as against Stark and praying an injunction against any
legal proceedings for their possession, and a decree that he be
required to release such title as he may have acquired by his
donation claim and patent. In the bill, the complainant sets up
substantially the same matter, though with greater fullness and
detail, which was originally averred in the first suit brought by
himself and his brother, and omitted in the amended bill in that
suit upon the election required by the court, and also claims that
the defendant is estopped by his acts from asserting title to the
premises.
The first question presented for our determination is whether
the complainant is concluded upon that matter in the present suit,
by reason of the proceedings and decree in the first suit. While
that suit was pending, the complainant acquired the interest of his
brother.
It is undoubtedly a settled principle that a party seeking to
enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court,
either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, all the grounds upon
which he expects a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to
split up his demand and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only
a portion of the grounds upon which special relief is sought, and
leave the rest to be presented in a second suit if the first fail.
There would be no end to litigation if such a practice were
permissible. But this principle does not require distinct causes of
action -- that is to say, distinct matters -- each of which would
authorize by itself independent relief to be presented in a single
suit, though they exist at the same time and might be considered
together. The agreement between Stark and the parties through whom
the complainants claimed constituted a cause for relief distinct
from and independent of that arising from the interest asserted by
them as beneficiaries under the patent to the city authorities.
There was therefore no rule of law which compelled the presentation
of the two causes of relief in the same suit. They required
different allegations
Page 94 U. S. 486
in the bill and different evidence on the hearing. The court
might have considered one cause insufficient and sustained the bill
on the other. It might have ruled against the agreement and,
sustaining the city patent, enjoined the defendant from asserting
any interest in the premises; or it might have denied the validity
of the patent and decreed a release upon the agreement. The
provisions of the decree would have conformed to the cause
sustained; its directions in the one case would have differed from
its directions in the other. It was competent, therefore, and
within the discretion of the court to compel the presentation of
the two causes, calling as they did for different relief in
separate suits. A decision upon one could not possibly be a bar to
proceedings upon the other, from their intrinsically distinct
nature. Having required the complainants to proceed in that suit
only upon one cause or ground for relief, the court left the other
cause open for any future suit which they might choose to
bring.
To appreciate and give proper effect to the agreement made by
Stark with parties through whom the complainant derives his
interest and upon which he founds his claim to equitable relief in
this suit, reference must be had to the condition on which land in
Oregon was held at that time. The entire land in the territory
belonged to the United States. No provision had been made for the
sale or other disposition of any portions of it to private parties.
The preemption law had not been extended over the country, nor
until the passage of the act of September 27, 1850, usually
designated as the Donation Act, was there any known mode for
obtaining the legal title. And yet the inhabitants dealt in the
land as though possessed of the fee. They not only occupied,
cultivated, and improved such portions as their necessities
required, but they bought and sold it as land is bought and sold
where the title has passed out of the government. This dealing in
the land without having the title arose necessarily from the
settlement of the country before the laws of the United States were
extended over it. Indeed, a large number of emigrants from the
United States had settled in the country whilst its sovereignty was
in dispute with Great Britain. It was not until the 15th of June,
1846, that its sovereignty was determined by the treaty, and
previous to this
Page 94 U. S. 487
time, in 1845, the emigrants had formed for themselves a
provisional government, under which laws were passed, protection to
persons and property secured, and justice administered, with all
the order and regularity of long-established communities. The
inhabitants engaged in the pursuits, industries, and enterprises
which might be expected from an active, intelligent, and moral
people. For the preservation of order and security, they were
obliged to make some regulations for the possession and occupation
of land among themselves. They accordingly established a land
system, providing in what manner and to what extent land should be
taken up and possessed. Under it, each person over a specified age,
upon complying with certain conditions, was allowed to hold six
hundred and forty acres. He was required to designate the extent of
his claim either by natural or artificial boundaries; make, within
prescribed periods, improvements thereon; and have the claim
recorded in the office of the territorial recorder, in a book kept
for that purpose. All claims thus taken up and recorded were
respected by the people, and the claimants were protected not only
by the law of the provisional government but by the general public
sentiment of the country in their possession and enjoyment. They
were at liberty to use the claims for any legitimate purpose as
absolute owners, either for cultivation and residences, or as sites
for villages or towns. They did not deny in any of their dealings
the proprietorship of the United States, but they acted upon a
confident expectation that their possessions and improvements would
be respected by the government, and that ultimately they should
acquire the title.
* This expectation
was founded upon the uniform action of the government in its
dealings with the public domain occupied by settlers in advance of
legislation for its sale. It was therefore understood by the people
that whenever the legal title was thus obtained, it should inure to
the benefit of the grantees of the claimant who secured the patent
of the United States. This understanding constituted, in reality,
the unwritten conventional law of the state, which affected all
transactions in land until the passage of the Donation
Page 94 U. S. 488
Act. That act shows that Congress, in its passage, was cognizant
of this fact, for it impliedly recognizes the validity of previous
contracts for the transfer of land made by a claimant to whom, upon
proof of his settlement and its continuation for four years, a
patent should be afterwards issued. This matter was considered by
this Court in
Lamb v. Davenport, reported in the 18th of
Wallace. It was there objected that a contract for the sale of
lands thus held, made before the passage of the Donation Act, was
void because the proviso to the fourth section declares that all
future contracts of sale by any person entitled to the benefit of
the act, before he received a patent, should be void, but the Court
said, speaking through MR. JUSTICE MILLER:
"The act was on its face intended to cover settlements already
made, and the careful limitation of this proviso to future
contracts of sale -- that is, sales made after the passage of the
act -- raises a strong implication of the validity of such
contracts made before the passage of the statute. It was well known
that many actual settlers held under such contracts, and while
Congress intended to protect the donee from future improvident
sales, it left contracts already made undisturbed."
And the Court held that the purchaser by such a contract
acquired, as against his vendor, an equitable right to the land
which would be enforced when the legal title was obtained.
In the present case it appears that prior to March 22, 1848, one
Francis W. Pettygrove held a claim to six hundred and forty acres,
taken up under the law of the provisional government, upon which a
great part of the present City of Portland is built. On that day he
conveyed his claim, with the exception of certain lots, and all his
interest therein, "present and in expectancy," to Daniel H.
Lownsdale. In March, 1849, Lownsdale conveyed his interest in the
claim, with a similar exception of certain lots, to Stephen Coffin,
taking back a contract to the effect, substantially, that Coffin
would hold the property equally for his benefit and execute to him
a good title to one-half of the claim, with the improvements, upon
the termination of the contract. In December following, Lownsdale
and Coffin conveyed one undivided third interest in the claim to
Chapman. The three were in fact equal owners of the claim, and
styled themselves partners in the property, although
Page 94 U. S. 489
the conveyances showed that the documentary title to it was in
the names of Chapman and Coffin alone. These parties, while
retaining the general possession and ownership of the claim, laid
off upon it numerous blocks and lots and sold a large number of the
lots to different parties, publicly avowing at the time their
intention to obtain, if possible, a title to the land from the
United States, and thus to perfect the title of the purchasers.
In January, 1850, Lownsdale went to San Francisco, leaving a
power of attorney with Chapman to do anything pertaining to his
interest which Chapman might think advisable, particularly in
signing deeds to lots in the City of Portland. Whilst in San
Francisco, he met the defendant Stark, who claimed one-half
interest in the Portland land claim by purchase from one Lovejoy,
who, he asserted, held the claim originally with Pettygrove. A
settlement was accordingly made between them. It was agreed that
Lownsdale should release, with certain exceptions, all claim to
land north of a designated line, now known as Stark Street, and
that Stark should release, with certain exceptions, all claim to
land south of the line and confirm certain sales and conveyances
made within the tract released to him. This agreement was carried
out by a deed of mutual release and quitclaim executed by them on
the 1st of March, 1850. The deed confirmed the conveyances of
certain lots made by Lownsdale or his attorney previous to Jan. 1,
1850, north of the line, and all subsequent conveyances to March 1,
1850, but with a proviso that Stark should receive the proceeds of
the subsequent conveyances. The instrument also provided that in
case any person, with certain exceptions, holding or claiming under
Lownsdale, referring to Chapman and Coffin, should refuse to ratify
and confirm the deed within six months, Stark might at his option
have it cancelled.
Whilst Lownsdale was absent at San Francisco, three blocks were
partitioned by Chapman and Coffin among the three owners, one block
being taken by each at an agreed valuation. One of them, designated
number 78, was assigned to Lownsdale, one, designated number 79,
was assigned to Coffin, and one, number 81, was assigned to
Chapman. This latter block lies north of the dividing line, within
the tract falling to Stark,
Page 94 U. S. 490
and embraces the premises in controversy. The assignment of this
block is contained in a deed purporting to be a conveyance by
Chapman, Coffin, and Lownsdale -- the latter by Chapman, his
attorney. As a conveyance of any interest to Chapman from
Lownsdale, it is waste paper. An attorney cannot convey to himself
by a power from his principal. But at that time, Coffin, as already
stated, held in his name the interest of Lownsdale. The instrument
was therefore effectual as a release to Chapman of the entire
interest of both. No one but Lownsdale could object to the
transaction, and he never complained of it, but, on the contrary,
approved of it. In the settlement between the joint owners or
partners, Chapman was charged with the estimated value of the
block.
When Chapman and Coffin learned of the agreement between
Lownsdale and Stark, they refused to ratify it unless it were
modified so as to cover the transfers made by them during
Lownsdale's absence, referring particularly to the disposition made
of the three blocks. During the previous year, Stark, on leaving
Portland, had given a power of attorney to his partner to do any
and all acts during his absence which he could do if present.
Accompanying this power was a letter in which the land claim was
mentioned and a desire expressed that his interest in that claim
should be particularly attended to and the difficulty concerning
his undivided half settled. This attorney now undertook to remove
the objection urged by Chapman and Coffin, and for that purpose,
after some negotiation, he consented to the modification desired.
The agreement was accordingly ratified by Chapman and Coffin,
modified so as to place the disposition of property made by them
previous to the time they received notice of the settlement upon
the same footing with the disposition of property before the first
of the previous January, and as thus modified the agreement was
also ratified by the attorney. Afterwards, during the same year and
in January, 1851, Chapman sold the premises in controversy. A
portion of them was purchased from him by the complainant and his
brother. The rest of the premises was afterwards purchased by them
from intermediate parties. They were all acquired before the patent
of the United States was issued to Stark. The different purchasers
went at once into
Page 94 U. S. 491
possession, and they or their grantees have ever since, either
by themselves or tenants, been in the occupation of the property
and have made extensive and valuable improvements. The property is
situated in the business part of Portland, and has always been
occupied for business purposes.
The ratification made by the attorney of Stark, it is said,
applies in terms only to the attorney's interest; but the answer is
that the attorney had no interest at the time, and acted only for
Stark. If as a ratification by Stark it is insufficient in form
because of the manner in which the attorney has expressed his
agency in appending his signature to the instrument, a court of
equity will look beyond the form of the execution, and, having
ascertained the intention of the attorney in signing the
instrument, will if possible give it the effect intended. The
ratification, such as it was, undoubtedly led to the purchase of
the property by the complainant and his brother and others. When
Stark subsequently returned to Portland in June, 1850, he was
informed of the action of his attorney and made no objection to it,
although he understood that it was intended as a ratification on
his part of the disposition of the block in question by Chapman and
Coffin.
But more persuasive evidence of his approval of the modification
is furnished by his action with respect to the property. As already
stated, the documentary title to the entire claim was in Chapman
and Coffin. Without their approval, the settlement between Stark
and Lownsdale would have failed of any result. Upon the
ratification by the attorney, Chapman and Coffin abandoned all
interest in any other property than block 81 north of the agreed
line, and Stark at the same time abandoned his interest in the
tract south of that line and appropriated in severalty all the
other property released on the north. In other words, instead of
calling for a cancellation of the deed upon the refusal of Chapman
and Coffin to ratify it, as he was at liberty to do, he adopted it
as approved by them, for, except as thus approved, it was without
any efficacy. He held nothing in severalty, except by their
consent, and upon his claim to hold the property released in this
way he subsequently obtained his patent from the government and
sold to different parties portions of the land. Under
Page 94 U. S. 492
these circumstances, he cannot be permitted to go back upon the
act of his attorney.
So far, therefore, as the transfer of block 81 to Chapman is
concerned, the deed must be held to apply to it as fully as it
applies to the conveyances specially designated and confirmed by
that instrument. It operated as a confirmation of the transfer, and
gave to Chapman an equitable right to call for a release of the
legal title, when that was obtained. That right passed to the
complainant claiming under him.
During the several years intervening between this transaction
and the issue of the patent, Stark frequently conversed with the
Starrs and the other purchasers respecting the property, assured
them, in repeated instances, that he would convey to them the legal
title when he obtained the patent from the government, and advised
them to erect buildings and improve the property. Under his eye,
and with full notice and by his encouragement, the Starrs and
others from whom the Starrs purchased made the improvements. If in
the light of these facts and all the attending circumstances the
defendant could now successfully impugn the ratification made by
his attorney, deny the promises made by himself, and deprive the
complainant of the property and improvements, it would be a
reproach to the administration of justice. Upon every principle of
law and morals, he should be forever enjoined from the commission
of such injustice, and be compelled to quiet the title of the
complainant by a release of all claim to the premises.
Decree affirmed.
NOTE -- In
Stark v. Starr and
Same v. Bacon,
appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon, which were argued at the same time and by the
same counsel as was the preceding case, MR. JUSTICE FIELD, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, remarked: "These cases involve
some of the questions discussed and decided in the above case, and,
upon the authority of that decision, the decrees in both are
affirmed."
*
See observations of Mr. Justice Deady, of the United
States district court, on this subject quoted in
Stark
v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 415, and of Mr. Justice Sawyer,
of the United States circuit court, in
Lamb v. Davenport,
1 Sawyer 619-622.
