1. Until Congress makes some regulation touching the liabilities
of parties for marine torts resulting in death of the persons
injured, the statute of Indiana giving a right of action to the
personal representatives of the deceased, where his death is caused
by the wrongful act or omission of another, applies, the tort being
committed within the territorial limits of the state, and, as thus
applied, it constitutes no encroachment upon the commercial power
of Congress.
2. The action of Congress as to a regulation of commerce, or the
liability for its infringement, is exclusive of state authority;
but until some action is taken by Congress, the legislation of a
state, not directed against commerce or any of its regulations, but
relating generally to the rights, duties, and liabilities of
citizens, is of obligatory force within its territorial
jurisdiction, although it may indirectly and remotely affect the
operations of foreign or interstate commerce or persons engaged in
such commerce.
3. The Act of March 30, 1852, "to provide for the better
security of the lives of
Page 93 U. S. 100
passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or part by
steam, and for other purposes," does not exempt the owners and
master of a steam vessel, and the vessel, from liability for
injuries caused by the negligence of its pilot or engineer, but
makes them liable for all damages sustained by a passenger or his
baggage, from any neglect to comply with the provisions of the law,
no matter where the fault may lie, and, in addition to this remedy,
any person injured by the negligence of the pilot or engineer may
have his action directly against those officers.
4. The relation between the owner or master and pilot, as that
of master and employee, is not changed by the fact that the
selection of the pilot is limited to those who have been found by
examination to possess the requisite knowledge and skill, and have
been licensed by the government inspectors.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
In December, 1858, the defendants were the owners of a line of
steamers employed in navigating the River Ohio between the port and
city of Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, and the port and city of
Louisville, in the State of Kentucky, for the purpose of carrying
passengers, freight, and the United States mail. On the 4th of that
month, at night, two boats of the line, designated, respectively,
as the
United States and the
America, collided at
a point on the river opposite the mainland of the State of Indiana.
By the collision, the hull of one of them was broken in, and a fire
started, which burned the boat to the water's edge, destroying it,
and causing the death of one of its passengers, by the name of
Sappington, a citizen of Indiana. The administrator of the deceased
brought the present action for his death in one of the courts of
common pleas of Indiana, under a statute of that state, which
provides,
"that when the death of one is caused by the wrongful act of
omission of another, the personal representatives of the former may
maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might
have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter for an
injury for the same act or omission."
The complaint in the action alleged that the collision occurred
within the territorial jurisdiction of Indiana, above the line of
low water mark of the river, and charged it generally to the
careless and negligent navigation of the steamboat
United
Page 93 U. S. 101
States, by the defendants' servants, and officers of
the vessel, but especially to the carelessness of the pilot in
running the same at too great a speed down the stream, in giving
the first signal to the approaching boat as to the choice of sides
of the river contrary to the established custom of pilots
navigating the Ohio, and the rules prescribed by the act of
Congress, and in not slackening the speed of the boat and giving a
signal of alarm and danger until it was too late to avoid the
collision.
To defeat this action, the defendants relied upon substantially
the following grounds of defense: 1st, that the injuries complained
of occurred on the River Ohio, beyond low water mark on the Indiana
side, and within the limits of the State of Kentucky, and that, by
a law of that state, an action for the death of a party from the
carelessness of another could only be brought within one year from
such death, which period had elapsed when the present action was
brought, and 2d that at the time of the alleged injuries the
colliding boats were engaged in carrying on interstate commerce
under the laws of the United States, and the defendants, as their
owners, were not liable for injuries occurring in their navigation
through the carelessness of their officers, except as prescribed by
those laws, and that these did not cover the liability asserted by
the plaintiff under the statute of Indiana.
Under the first head, no question is presented for consideration
of which we can take cognizance. It is admitted that the
territorial limits of Indiana extend to low water mark on the north
side of the river, and the jury found that the collision took place
above that mark. It is therefore of no moment to the defendants
that the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the state possessed
concurrent jurisdiction with Kentucky on the river, under the act
of the Commonwealth of Virginia of 1789, providing for the erection
of the District of Kentucky into an independent state, and that the
Legislation of Indiana could, for that reason, be equally enforced
with respect to any matters occurring on the river, as with respect
to similar matters occurring within her territorial limits on the
land.
The questions for our consideration arise under the second head
of the defense. Under this head it is contended that the statute of
Indiana creates a new liability, and could not, therefore,
Page 93 U. S. 102
be applied to cases where the injuries complained of were caused
by marine torts, without interfering with the exclusive regulation
of commerce vested in Congress. The position of the defendants, as
we understand it, is that as by both the common and maritime law
the right of action for personal torts dies with the person
injured, the statute which allows actions for such torts, when
resulting in the death of the person injured, to be brought by the
personal representatives of the deceased, enlarges the liability of
parties for such torts, and that such enlarged liability, if
applied to cases of marine torts, would constitute a new burden
upon commerce.
In supposed support of this position numerous decisions of this
court are cited by counsel, to the effect that the states cannot by
legislation place burdens upon commerce with foreign nations or
among the several states. The decisions go to that extent, and
their soundness is not questioned. But upon an examination of the
cases in which they were rendered, it will be found that the
legislation adjudged invalid imposed a tax upon some instrument or
subject of commerce, or exacted a license fee from parties engaged
in commercial pursuits, or created an impediment to the free
navigation of some public waters, or prescribed conditions in
accordance with which commerce in particular articles or between
particular places was required to be conducted. In all the cases
the legislation condemned operated directly upon commerce, either
by way of tax upon its business, license upon its pursuit in
particular channels, or conditions for carrying it on. Thus, in
The Passenger
Cases, 7 How. 445, the laws of New York and
Massachusetts exacted a tax from the captains of vessels bringing
passengers from foreign ports for every passenger landed. In the
Wheeling Bridge
Case, 13 How. 518, the statute of Virginia
authorized the erection of a bridge, which was held to obstruct the
free navigation of the River Ohio. In the case of
Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227, the statute of Alabama
required the owner of a steamer navigating the waters of the state
to file, before the boat left the port of Mobile, in the office of
the probate judge of Mobile County, a statement in writing, setting
forth the name of the vessel, and of the owner or owners, and his
or their place of residence and interest in the vessel, and
prescribed penalties for neglecting
Page 93 U. S. 103
the requirement. It thus imposed conditions for carrying on the
coasting trade in the waters of the state in addition to those
prescribed by Congress. And in all the other cases where
legislation of a state has been held to be null for interfering
with the commercial power of Congress, as in
Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 425 [argument of counsel
-- omitted],
State Tonnage Tax
Cases, 12 Wall. 204, and
Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, the
legislation created, in the way of tax, license, or condition, a
direct burden upon commerce, or in some way directly interfered
with its freedom. In the present case, no such operation can be
ascribed to the statute of Indiana. That statute imposes no tax,
prescribes no duty, and in no respect interferes with any
regulations for the navigation and use of vessels. It only declares
a general principle respecting the liability of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the state for torts resulting in the death of
parties injured. And in the application of the principle it makes
no difference where the injury complained of occurred in the state,
whether on land or on water. General legislation of this kind,
prescribing the liabilities or duties of citizens of a state,
without distinction as to pursuit or calling, is not open to any
valid objection because it may affect persons engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce. Objection might with equal propriety be urged
against legislation prescribing the form in which contracts shall
be authenticated, or property descend or be distributed on the
death of its owner, because applicable to the contracts or estates
of persons engaged in such commerce. In conferring upon Congress
the regulation of commerce, it was never intended to cut the states
off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life,
and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might
indirectly affect the commerce of the country. Legislation, in a
great variety of ways, may affect commerce and persons engaged in
it without constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of
the Constitution.
It is true that the commercial power conferred by the
Constitution is one without limitation. It authorizes legislation
with respect to all the subjects of foreign and interstate
commerce, the persons engaged in it, and the instruments by which
it is carried on. And legislation has largely dealt, so far as
commerce by water is concerned, with the instruments of that
Page 93 U. S. 104
commerce. It has embraced the whole subject of navigation,
prescribed what shall constitute American vessels, and by whom they
shall be navigated; how they shall be registered or enrolled and
licensed; to what tonnage, hospital, and other dues they shall be
subjected; what rules they shall obey in passing each other; and
what provision their owners shall make for the health, safety, and
comfort of their crews. Since steam has been applied to the
propulsion of vessels, legislation has embraced an infinite variety
of further details, to guard against accident and consequent loss
of life.
The power to prescribe these and similar regulations necessarily
involves the right to declare the liability which shall follow
their infraction. Whatever, therefore, Congress determines, either
as to a regulation or the liability for its infringement, is
exclusive of state authority. But with reference to a great variety
of matters touching the rights and liabilities of persons engaged
in commerce, either as owners or navigators of vessels, the laws of
Congress are silent, and the laws of the state govern. The rules
for the acquisition of property by persons engaged in navigation,
and for its transfer and descent, are, with some exceptions, those
prescribed by the state to which the vessels belong; and it may be
said generally that the legislation of a state, not directed
against commerce or any of its regulations but relating to the
rights, duties, and liabilities of citizens, and only indirectly
and remotely affecting the operations of commerce, is of obligatory
force upon citizens within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on
land or water, or engaged in commerce, foreign or interstate, or in
any other pursuit. In our judgment, the statute of Indiana falls
under this class. Until Congress, therefore, makes some regulation
touching the liability of parties for marine torts resulting in the
death of the persons injured, we are of opinion that the statute of
Indiana applies, giving a right of action in such cases to the
personal representatives of the deceased, and that as thus applied
it constitutes no encroachment upon the commercial power of
Congress.
United States v.
Bevans, 3 Wheat. 337.
In the case of
Steamboat Company v. Chase, reported in
the 16th of Wallace, this Court sustained an action for a
marine
Page 93 U. S. 105
tort resulting in the death of the party injured, in the name of
the administrator of the deceased, under a statute of Rhode Island,
similar in its general features to the one of Indiana. There the
deceased was killed whilst crossing Narraganset Bay in a sailboat
by collision with a steamer of the company, and though objections
were taken, and elaborately argued, against the jurisdiction of the
court, it was not even suggested that the right of action conferred
by the statute, when applied to cases arising out of marine torts,
in any way infringed upon the commercial power of Congress.
In addition to the objection urged to the statute of Indiana,
the defendants also contended that, as owners of the colliding
vessels, they were exempt from liability to the deceased, as a
passenger on one of them, and, of course, to his representatives,
as the collision was caused, without any fault of theirs, by the
negligence of the pilots; and they relied upon the thirtieth
section of the Act of Congress of March 30, 1852, to provide for
the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels
propelled in whole or part by steam. That act was in force when the
injuries complained of in this case were committed, and its
principal features have been retained in subsequent legislation.
The section provided
"That whenever damage is sustained by any passenger or his
baggage, from explosion, fire, collision, or other cause, the
master and the owner of such vessel, or either of them, and the
vessel, shall be liable to each and every person so injured to the
full amount of damages, if it happens through any neglect to comply
with the provisions of law herein prescribed, or through known
defects or imperfections of the steaming apparatus or of the hull,
and any person sustaining loss or injury through the carelessness,
negligence, or willful misconduct of an engineer or pilot, or their
neglect or refusal to obey the provisions of law herein prescribed
as to navigating such steamers, may sue such engineer or pilot, and
recover damages for any such injury caused as aforesaid by any such
engineer or pilot."
10 Stat. 72.
It was argued that by this section Congress intended the
exemption claimed. And confirmation of this view was found in the
fact that the owners were obliged to take a pilot, and were
restricted in their choice to those licensed by the government
Page 93 U. S. 106
inspectors. It was supposed that the relation between owner and
pilot, as that of master and employee, was thus changed, and that,
with the change, the responsibility of the former for the
negligence of the latter ceased. The court, however, proceeded
through the trial upon a different theory of the position of the
defendants. It held that, as owners, they were responsible for the
conduct of all the officers and employees of the vessels, and that
it was immaterial whether the vessels were or not at the time of
the collision under the exclusive charge of the pilots. The
instructions to the jury, at least, went to that extent. They in
substance declared that, if the collision occurred within the
territorial jurisdiction of Indiana, and was caused, without fault
of the deceased, by the carelessness or misconduct of the
defendants, or any of their agents, servants, or employees, in
navigating and managing the steamers, or either of them, the
plaintiff was entitled to recover.
In support of the exemption, the counsel of the defendants
called to our attention an opinion of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, in a similar case arising upon the same collision, where
such exemption was upheld. The opinion is marked by the usual
ability which characterizes the judgments of that court; but after
much hesitation and doubt, we have been compelled to dissent from
its conclusions. The statute appears to us to declare, that the
owners and master of a steam vessel, and the vessel itself, shall
be liable for all damages sustained by a passenger or his baggage,
from any neglect to comply with the provisions of the law, no
matter where the fault may lie; and that, in addition to this
remedy, any person injured by the negligence of the pilot or
engineer may have his action directly against those officers.
The occasions upon which a pilot or engineer would be able to
respond to any considerable amount would be exceptional. The
statute of England, which exempts the owners of vessels and the
vessels from liability for faults of pilots -- pilotage there being
compulsory, and pilots being licensed -- has not met with much
commendation from the admiralty courts, and the general tendency of
their adjudications has been to construe the exemption with great
strictness. This course of decision is
Page 93 U. S. 107
very fully stated in the exposition of the law made by MR.
JUSTICE SWAYNE, in the case of
The China, 7
Wall. 53, where this Court declined to hold that compulsory
pilotage relieved the vessel from liability. In the case of
The
Halley, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 15, decided as recently as
1867, Sir Robert Phillimore strongly questioned the policy of the
statute, and said that it appeared to him difficult to reconcile
the claims of natural justice with the law which exempted the owner
who had a licensed pilot on board from liability for the injuries
done by the bad navigation of his vessel to the property of an
innocent owner, and observed that no one acquainted with the
working of the law could be ignorant that it was fruitful in
injustice. The doctrine that the owners are responsible for the
acts of their agents and employees ought not to be discarded,
because the selection of a pilot by the owner is limited to those
who, by the state, have been found by examination to possess the
requisite knowledge of the difficulties of local navigation, and
the requisite skill to conduct a vessel through them. "As a general
rule," says Mr. Justice Grier,
"masters of vessels are not expected to be, and cannot be,
acquainted with the rocks and shoals on every coast [and, we may
add, with the currents and shoals of every river], nor able to
conduct a vessel safely into every port. Nor can the absent owners,
or their agent the master, be supposed capable of judging of the
capacity of persons offering to serve as pilots. They need a
servant, but are not in a situation to test or judge of his
qualifications, and have not, therefore, the information necessary
to choice. The pilot laws kindly interfere, and do that for the
owners which they could not do for themselves."
Smith v. The Creole and The Sampson, 2 Wall.Jr. 515.
And the learned Justice observes that in such cases, where a pilot
is required to be taken from those licensed, the relation of master
and servant is not changed; that the pilot continues the servant of
the owners, acting in their employ, and receiving wages for
services rendered to them, and that the fact that he is selected
for them by persons more capable of judging of his qualifications
cannot alter the relation.
And in the case of
The Halley, Sir Robert Phillimore
upon this subject says:
"I do not quite understand why, because the
Page 93 U. S. 108
state insists, on the one hand, upon all persons who exercise
the office of pilot, within certain districts, being duly educated
for the purpose, and having a certificate of their fitness, and
insists, on the other hand, that the master shall, within these
districts, take one of these persons on board to superintend the
steering of his vessel, the usual relation of owner and servant is
to be entirely at an end, and still less do I see why the sufferer
is to be deprived of all practical redress for injuries inflicted
upon him by the ship which such a pilot navigates."
By the common law, the owners are responsible for the damages
committed by their vessel, without any reference to the particular
agent by whose negligence the injury was committed. By the maritime
law, the vessel, as well as the owners, is liable to the party
injured for damages caused by its torts. By that law, the vessel is
deemed to be an offending thing, and may be prosecuted, without any
reference to the adjustment of responsibility between the owners
and employees, for the negligence which resulted in the injury. Any
departure from this liability of the owners or of the vessel,
except as the liability of the former may be released by a
surrender of the vessel, has been found in practice to work great
injustice. The statute ought to be very clear, before we should
conclude that any such departure was intended by Congress. The
section we have cited would not justify such a conclusion. Its
language readily admits of the construction we have given, and that
construction is in harmony with the purposes of the act.
Judgment affirmed.