1. Where a testator made a bequest to his wife of all his
estate, real and personal, "to have and to hold during her life,
and to do with as she sees proper before her death," the wife took
a life estate in the property, with only such power as a life
tenant can have, and her conveyance of the real property passed no
greater interest.
2. For the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
there must generally be some intended deception in the conduct or
declarations of the party to be estopped or such gross negligence
on his part as amounts to constructive fraud by which another has
been misled to his injury.
3.. Where the estoppel relates to the title of real property, it
is essential to the
Page 93 U. S. 327
application of the doctrine that the party claiming to have been
influenced by the conduct or declarations of another was himself
not only destitute of knowledge of the true state of the title, but
also of any convenient and available means of acquiring such
knowledge. Where the condition of the title is known to both
parties or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth,
there is no estoppel.
In April, 1831, Robert Sinclair, of Hampshire County, Va., died
leaving a widow and eight surviving children. He was, at the time
of his death, possessed of some personal property and the real
property in controversy, consisting of one hundred and ten acres.
By his last will and testament, he made the following devise:
"I give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Nancy Sinclair, all my
estate, both real and personal -- that is to say, all my lands,
cattle, horses, sheep, farming utensils, household and kitchen
furniture, with everything that I possess, to have and to hold
during her life, and to do with as she sees proper before her
death."
The will was duly probated in the proper county.
In July, 1839, the widow, for the consideration of $1,100,
executed a deed to the Union Potomac Company, a corporation created
under the laws of Virginia, of the real property thus devised to
her, describing it as the tract or parcel on which she then resided
and the same which was conveyed to her "by the last will and
testament of her late husband." As security for the payment of the
consideration, she took at the time from the company its bond and a
mortgage upon the property. The mortgage described the property as
the tract of land which had on that day been conveyed by her to the
Union Potomac Company.
In 1854, this bond and mortgage were assigned to the complainant
and Hector Sinclair, the latter a son of the widow, in
consideration of $100 cash, and the yearly payment of the like sum
during her life. Previous to this time, Brant and Hector Sinclair
had purchased the interest of all the other heirs, except Jane
Sinclair, who was at the time, and still is, an idiot or an insane
person, and such purchase is recited in the assignment, as is also
the previous conveyance of a life interest to the company.
Page 93 U. S. 328
In July, 1857, these parties instituted suit for the foreclosure
of the mortgage and sale of the property. The bill described the
property as a tract of valuable coal land which the company had
purchased of the widow, and prayed for the sale of the estate
purchased. Copies of the deed of the widow and of the mortgage of
the company were annexed to the bill. In due course of proceedings,
a decree was obtained directing a sale, by commissioners appointed
for that purpose, of the property, describing it as "the lands in
the bill and proceedings mentioned," if certain payments were not
made within a designated period. The payments not being made, the
commissioners, in December, 1858, sold the mortgaged property to
one Patrick Hammill, who thus succeeded to all the rights of the
Union Potomac Company.
The defendant corporation, the Virginia Coal and Iron Company,
derive their title and interest in the premises by sundry mesne
conveyances from Hammill, and in 1867 went into their possession.
Since then, it has cut down a large amount of valuable timber and
has engaged in mining and extracting coal from the land and
disposing of it.
Brant, having acquired the interest of Hector Sinclair, brought
the present suit to restrain the company from mining and extracting
coal from the land and to compel an accounting for the timber cut
and the coal taken and converted to its use.
The court below dismissed the bill, whereupon Brant brought the
case here.
Page 93 U. S. 332
MR. JUSTICE FIELD stated the case, and delivered the opinion of
the Court.
The disposition of the case depends upon the construction
Page 93 U. S. 333
given to the devise of Robert Sinclair to his widow and the
operation of the foreclosure proceedings as an estoppel upon the
complainant from asserting title to the property.
The complainant contends that the widow took a life estate in
the property, with only such power as a life tenant can have, and
that her conveyance therefore carried no greater interest to the
Union Potomac Company. The defendant corporation, on the other
hand, insists that, with the life estate, the widow took full power
to dispose of the property absolutely, and that her conveyance
accordingly passed the fee.
We are of opinion that the position taken by the complainant is
the correct one. The interest conveyed by the devise to the widow
was only a life estate. The language used admits of no other
conclusion, and the accompanying words "to do with as she sees
proper before her death" only conferred power to deal with the
property in such manner as she might choose, consistently with that
estate, and perhaps without liability for waste committed. These
words, used in connection with a conveyance of a leasehold estate,
would never be understood as conferring a power to sell the
property so as to pass a greater estate. Whatever power of disposal
the words confer is limited by the estate with which they are
connected.
In the case of
Bradley v. Westcott, reported in the
13th of Vesey, the testator gave all his personal estate to his
wife for her sole use for life, to be at her full, free, and
absolute disposal and disposition during life, and the court held
that as the testator had given in express terms an interest for
life, the ambiguous words afterwards thrown in could not extend
that interest to the absolute property. "I must construe," said the
Master of the Rolls,
"the subsequent words with reference to the express interest for
life previously given, that she is to have as full, free, and
absolute disposition as a tenant for life can have."
In
Smith v. Bell, reported in the 6th of Peters, the
testator gave all his personal estate, after certain payments, to
his wife, "to and for her own use and disposal absolutely," with a
provision that the remainder after her decease should go to his
son. The Court held that the latter clause qualified the
former,
Page 93 U. S. 334
and showed that the wife only took a life estate. In construing
the language of the devise, Chief Justice Marshall, after observing
that the operation of the words "to and for her own use and benefit
and disposal absolutely," annexed to the bequest, standing alone,
could not be questioned, said,
"But suppose the testator had added the words 'during her
natural life,' these words would have restrained those which
preceded them and have limited the use and benefit, and the
absolute disposal given by the prior words, to the use and benefit
and to a disposal for the life of the wife. The words, then, are
susceptible of such limitation. It may be imposed on them by other
words. Even the words 'disposal absolutely' may have their
character qualified by restraining words connected with and
explaining them to mean such absolute disposal as a tenant for life
may make."
The Chief Justice then proceeded to show that other equivalent
words might be used equally manifesting the intent of the testator
to restrain the estate of the wife to her life, and that the words,
"devising a remainder to the son" were thus equivalent.
In
Boyd v. Strahan, 36 Ill. 355, there was a bequest to
the wife of all the personal property of the testator not otherwise
disposed of, "to be at her own disposal and for her own proper use
and benefit during her natural life," and the court held that the
words "during her natural life" so qualified the power of disposal
as to make it mean such disposal as a tenant for life could
make.
Numerous other cases to the same purport might be cited. They
all show, that where a power of disposal accompanies a bequest or
devise of a life estate, the power is limited to such disposition
as a tenant for life can make, unless there are other words clearly
indicating that a larger power was intended.
The position that the complainant is estopped, by the
proceedings for the foreclosure of the mortgage, from asserting
title to the property has less plausibility than the one already
considered. There was nothing in the fact that the complainant and
Hector Sinclair owned seven-eighths of the reversion, which
prevented them from taking a mortgage upon the life estate or
Page 93 U. S. 335
purchasing one already executed. There was no misrepresentation
of the character of the title which they sought to subject to sale
by the foreclosure suit. The bill of complaint in the suit referred
to the deed from the widow to the Union Potomac Company and to the
mortgage executed to secure the consideration, and copies were
annexed. The deed described the property sold as the tract conveyed
to the widow by the last will and testament of her late husband.
The mortgage described the property as the tract of land conveyed
on the same day to the mortgagor. The decree ordering the sale
described the property as "the lands in the bill and proceedings
mentioned." The purchaser was bound to take notice of the title. He
was directed to its source by the pleadings in the case. The
doctrine of
caveat emptor applies to all judicial sales of
this character; the purchaser takes only the title which the
mortgagor possessed. And here, as a matter of fact, he knew that he
was obtaining only a life estate by his purchase. He so stated at
the sale and frequently afterwards. There is no evidence that
either the complainant or Hector Sinclair ever made any
representations to the defendant corporation to induce it to buy
the property from the purchaser at the sale, or that they made any
representations to anyone respecting the title, inconsistent with
the fact, but, on the contrary, it is abundantly established by the
evidence in the record, that from the time they took from the widow
the assignment of the bond and mortgage of the Union Potomac
Company in 1854, they always claimed to own seven-eighths of the
reversion. The assignment itself recited that the widow had owned
and had sold to that company a life interest in the property, and
that they had acquired the interest of the heirs.
It is difficult to see where the doctrine of equitable estoppel
comes in here. For the application of that doctrine there must
generally be some intended deception in the conduct or declarations
of the party to be estopped or such gross negligence on his part as
to amount to constructive fraud by which another has been misled to
his injury. "In all this class of cases," says Story,
"the doctrine proceeds upon the ground of constructive fraud or
of gross negligence, which in effect implies fraud.
Page 93 U. S. 336
And therefore, when the circumstances of the case repel any such
inference, although there may be some degree of negligence, yet
courts of equity will not grant relief. It has been accordingly
laid down by a very learned judge that the cases on this subject go
to this result only, that there must be positive fraud or
concealment, or negligence so gross as to amount to constructive
fraud."
1 Story's Eq. 391. To the same purport is the language of the
adjudged cases. Thus it is said by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania that
"the primary ground of the doctrine is that it would be a fraud
in a party to assert what his previous conduct had denied when on
the faith of that denial others have acted. The element of fraud is
essential either in the intention of the party estopped or in the
effect of the evidence which he attempts to set up."
Hill v. Eppley, 31 Penn.St. 334;
Henshaw v.
Bissell, 18 Wall. 271;
Biddle Boggs v. Merced
Mining Company, 14 Cal. 368;
Davis v. Davis, 26
id. 23;
Commonwealth v. Moltz, 10 Barr, 531;
Copeland v. Copeland, 28 Me. 539;
Delaplaine v.
Hitchcock, 6 Hill, 616;
Havis v. Marchant, 1
Curt.C.C. 136;
Zuchtmann v. Robert, 109 Mass. 53. And it
would seem that to the enforcement of an estoppel of this character
with respect to the title of property such as will prevent a party
from asserting his legal rights, and the effect of which will be to
transfer the enjoyment of the property to another, the intention to
deceive and mislead, or negligence so gross as to be culpable,
should be clearly established.
There are undoubtedly cases where a party may be concluded from
asserting his original rights to property in consequence of his
acts or conduct, in which the presence of fraud, actual or
constructive, is wanting, as where one of two innocent parties must
suffer from the negligence of another, he through whose agency the
negligence was occasioned will be held to bear the loss, and where
one has received the fruits of a transaction, he is not permitted
to deny its validity whilst retaining its benefits. But such cases
are generally referable to other principles than that of equitable
estoppel, although the same result is produced; thus, the first
case here mentioned is the affixing of liability upon the party who
from negligence indirectly occasioned the injury, and the second is
the application of the doctrine of
Page 93 U. S. 337
ratification or election. Be this as it may, the general ground
of the application of the principle of equitable estoppel is as we
have stated.
It is also essential for its application with respect to the
title of real property that the party claiming to have been
influenced by the conduct or declarations of another to his injury
was himself not only destitute of knowledge of the true state of
the title, but also of any convenient and available means of
acquiring such knowledge. Where the condition of the title is known
to both parties or both have the same means of ascertaining the
truth, there can be no estoppel.
Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts
240;
Knouff v. Thompson, 4 Harris 361.
Tested by these views, the defense of estoppel set up in this
case entirely fails.
The decree of the circuit court must be reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion,
and it is
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE and MR. JUSTICE DAVIS dissented.
