In admiralty cases, an appeal suspends the sentence altogether,
and the cause is to be heard in the appellate court as if no
sentence had been pronounced.
If the law under which the sentence of condemnation was
pronounced be repealed after sentence in the court below, and
before final sentence in the appellate court, no sentence of
condemnation can be pronounced unless some special provision be
made for that purpose by statute.
This was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court for
the District of Maryland, which condemned the schooner
General
Pinkney and cargo, for breach of the act of Congress
prohibiting intercourse with certain ports of the Island of St.
Domingo, passed February 28, 1806. Vol. 8, p. 11. This act was
limited to one year; but by the Act of February 24, 1807, it was
continued until the end of the then next session of Congress, when
it expired on 26 April, 1808.
The schooner
General Pinkney, on 22 August, 1806, was
cleared from Alexandria for St. Jago de Cuba with a cargo, but went
to Cape Francois in the Island of St. Domingo, one of the
prohibited ports. On her return, she was seized on 17 November,
1806, and libeled on 5 January, 1807, and condemned in the district
court on 23 July following, which condemnation was affirmed in the
circuit court on 7 November, from which sentence the claimants
immediately appealed in open court to the Supreme Court of the
United States, then next to be holden on the first Monday of
February, 1808, where the cause was continued until the present
term.
Page 9 U. S. 282
The only question now argued was whether this Court could now
affirm the sentence of condemnation, inasmuch as the law which
created the forfeiture, and authorized the condemnation, had
expired?
Page 9 U. S. 283
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court to
the following effect:
The majority of the Court is clearly of opinion that in
admiralty cases, an appeal suspends the sentence altogether, and
that it is not
res adjudicata until the final sentence of
the appellate court be pronounced. The cause in the appellate court
is to be heard
de novo, as if no sentence had been passed.
This has been the uniform practice not only in cases of appeal from
the district to the circuit courts of the United States, but in
this Court also.
In prize causes, the principle has never been disputed, and in
the instance court it is stated in 2 Browne's Civil Law that in
cases of appeal it is lawful to allege what has not before been
alleged, and to prove what has not before been proved.
The Court is therefore of opinion that this cause is to be
considered as if no sentence had been pronounced, and if no
sentence had been pronounced, it has been long settled on general
principles that after the expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty
can be enforced nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law
committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be
made for that purpose by statute.
Page 9 U. S. 284
The following sentence was then pronounced by the Court:
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record,
and was argued by counsel, on consideration whereof the Court is of
opinion that an appeal from the sentence of a court of admiralty
brings the whole case before the appellate court unaffected by the
sentence of condemnation from which the appeal is made, and that a
sentence of condemnation cannot be pronounced on account of a
forfeiture which accrued under a law not in force at the time of
pronouncing such sentence unless, by some statutory provision, the
right to enforce such forfeiture be preserved.
The Court is therefore of opinion that the sentence pronounced
in this cause by the Circuit Court of the District of Maryland
affirming the sentence of the judge of the district court in this
cause be reversed and annulled, and the Court, proceeding to
pronounce the proper sentence, doth direct that the libel be
dismissed and the property libeled be restored to the claimants,
they paying the duties thereon if the same have not been already
paid.
And on the motion of the Attorney General, it is ordered to be
certified that in the opinion of this Court there was probable
cause of seizure.