1. A court of equity has not jurisdiction to avoid a will or to
set aside the probate thereof on the ground of fraud, mistake, or
forgery, this being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
of probate.
Page 88 U. S. 504
2. Nor will a court of equity give relief by charging the
executor of a will or a legatee with a trust in favor of a third
person alleged to be defrauded by the forged or fraudulent will
where the court of probate could afford relief by refusing probate
of the will in whole or in part.
3. The same rule applies to devises of real estate, of which the
courts of law have exclusive jurisdiction except in those states in
which they are subjected to probate jurisdiction.
4.
Semble that where the courts of probate have not
jurisdiction, or where the period for its further exercise has
expired and no laches are attributable to the injured party, courts
of equity will, without disturbing the operation of the will,
interpose to give relief to parties injured by a fraudulent or
forged will against those who are in possession of the decedent's
estate or its proceeds,
mala fide, or without
consideration.
5. But such relief will not be granted to parties who are in
laches, as where from ignorance of the testator's death they made
no effort to obtain relief until eight or nine years after the
probate of his will.
6. Ignorance of a fraud committed, which is the ordinary excuse
for delay, does not apply in such a case, especially when it is
alleged that the circumstances of the fraud were publicly and
generally known at the domicile of the testator shortly after his
death.
7. Whilst alterations in the jurisdiction of the state courts
cannot affect the equitable jurisdiction of the circuit courts of
the United States so long as the equitable rights themselves
remain, yet an enlargement of equitable rights may be administered
by the circuit courts as well as by the courts of the state.
This was a suit in equity brought by the alleged heirs-at-law of
David C. Broderick, late United States Senator from California, to
set aside the probate of his will, and have the same declared a
forgery, and to recover the said Broderick's estate, much of which
consisted of lands now comprised in the thickly settled portions of
the City of San Francisco.
The complainants were John Kieley and Mary, his wife, George
Wilson and Ann, his wife, and Ellen Lynch, all residents of Sidney,
in New South Wales, and subjects of Great Britain and Ireland. They
alleged that Mary Kieley, Ann Wilson, and Ellen Lynch were, at the
death of Broderick, his next of kin and only heirs-at-law, being
daughters of Catharine Broderick, sister of Thomas Broderick, the
father of the said David.
Page 88 U. S. 505
There were several hundred defendants who were in possession of
and claiming as owners the property in question. John A. McGlynn,
one of the executors who propounded the will and procured its
probate, was also one of the defendants.
The bill was filed on the 16th of December, 1869, and stated
that Broderick died on the 16th of September, 1859, intestate,
being at the time a citizen of the United States and a resident of
San Francisco, in California, seized and possessed of real and
personal property in said state. Then, after stating the
relationship and status of the complainants, the bill proceeded to
allege that at the time of his death, Broderick was seized of the
real estate set out in the schedule annexed to the bill, and was
possessed of personal property to the amount of $20,500, also set
forth in a schedule.
It then alleged that on the 20th day of February, 1869, the
defendant McGlynn, on behalf of himself and one A. J. Butler,
presented to the Probate Court of San Francisco a certain paper
writing (a copy of which was annexed) which they falsely pretended
was the last will and testament of the said Broderick, in which the
said McGlynn, Butler, and one George Wilkes were named as
executors, and at the same time presented their petition in writing
whereby they prayed the court to admit the said will to probate and
issue to them letters testamentary, knowing at the time that the
said paper was a forgery. And the bill charged the fact to be that
it was a forgery, and not Broderick's will; that it was forged
about the 1st of January, 1860, after his death, for the purpose of
defrauding his legal heirs, and that it was written by one Alfred
Phillips, and that the name of Broderick was signed thereto by one
Moses Flanagan. The bill then proceeded to state as follows:
"That the said Butler, well knowing that the said paper was a
forgery, caused it to be presented as aforesaid as the genuine,
true, and valid will of the said Broderick, and caused a commission
to issue under the seal of the said probate court to a commissioner
of the State of California residing in New York City
Page 88 U. S. 506
to take the testimony, reduce to writing, and return it to the
said probate court, of John J. Hoff and Alfred A. Phillips, whose
names appear as subscribing witnesses to said paper, and their
testimony was so taken and returned to the effect and purport that
the name of the said Broderick signed to said instrument was the
genuine signature of the said Broderick, and that he did sign,
seal, publish, and declare the said instrument to be his last will
and testament in the presence of the said witnesses, and that they
did sign the same, as witnesses, at his request, in his presence
and in the presence of each other, and the said Butler did also
procure and present to said court the testimony of certain experts
in handwriting who testified to said court that, in their opinion,
the name of Broderick, subscribed to the said paper, was in the
genuine handwriting of the said Broderick, he, the said Butler,
well knowing that the same was not the genuine handwriting of said
Broderick and the same was not in truth and fact the genuine
handwriting of said Broderick, and by means of such false testimony
(your orators not having any notice in fact of said proceedings,
and no one appearing in their behalf), they did obtain the order
and judgment of the said court admitting the said will to probate
as the genuine last will and testament of the said Broderick, and
granting letters testamentary to Butler (now deceased) and McGlynn,
as executors of said last will and testament, and they proceeded to
act as such executors, and allowed and procured to be approved by
the probate judge claims against the said estate to the amount of
$80,000."
"And afterward the said Butler and McGlynn caused application to
be made to said probate court for, and obtained, an order of sale
of the estate of the said Broderick, deceased, under which they
sold the whole of the said estate. That at the time of said sale,
which took place in the City and County of San Francisco, it was a
matter of public and general notoriety that the said pretended last
will and testament of said Broderick, under and by virtue whereof
all said probate proceedings were taken and said property sold, was
not the will of said Broderick, but was a forged and simulated
paper, and all of those who purchased at the said sale, and the
defendants and those through whom they deraign title subsequent to
the said sale, purchased and acquired whatever interest they have
or had with full notice of the frauds hereinbefore alleged. "
Page 88 U. S. 507
It appeared by a subsequent statement that the will was admitted
to probate on the 8th of October, 1860, and that the sale referred
to took place November 7, 1861.
The bill then alleged that the complainants had no knowledge or
information of Broderick's death, nor of the forgery of the will,
nor of its presentation for probate, nor of the probate or order of
sale, nor of any of the proceedings, until the last day of
December, 1866, within three years of filing the bill, and that
since that time they had been diligently endeavoring to discover
the facts and the evidence relating thereto.
The bill charged that the defendants claimed as owners or were
in possession of some portion of Broderick's estate, deriving their
only title or claim thereto by or under the probate sales and
conveyances as made by the said pretended executors by virtue
thereof, that Butler was dead, and that Wilkes no longer had any
interest.
It then prayed an answer to several specific interrogatories, as
namely whether the several defendants did not know or had not been
informed that the probated paper was a forged instrument? Whether
it was not in fact forged and not the will of Broderick? Whether it
was not fabricated after his death, as stated in the bill? Whether
Butler did not cause it to be propounded for probate, knowing it to
be a forgery? Whether he did not procure the testimony and probate,
and sell the property by virtue of orders of said Probate Court, as
stated? And that McGlynn and others, who took part in the probate
sale of the property, might set forth the details thereof, the time
when sold, the amounts received, and the disposition of the
proceeds.
It prayed further that the will might be declared a forgery,
that the probate and all subsequent proceedings might be set aside
and annulled, including the decrees of probate, sale &c., or
that the defendants, purchasers of lands and lots under the said
orders of sale, or deraigning title therefrom, might be charged as
trustees for the complainants and might be compelled to convey to
them, or that a commissioner
Page 88 U. S. 508
be appointed to make such conveyance, and for general
relief.
By the will in question, a copy of which was annexed to the
bill, the testator, after payment of his debts, gave to his friend
John A. McGlynn $10,000, and all the residue of his estate to
George Wilkes, of New York, and made Wilkes, McGlynn, and Butler
executors. It purported to be dated at New York, January 2,
1859.
Many of the defendants answered the bill, denying all knowledge
or belief of any fraud or forgery in the will, and claiming to be
bona fide purchasers without any notice of any such fraud
or forgery. Many other defendants demurred to the bill.
In August, 1871, an amended bill was filed whereby the
complainants reiterated with much particularity the facts that they
never resided in California or the United States, and never heard,
or had any opportunity of hearing of Broderick's death, or the
events connected with the probate of the will, until more than
eight years after its being filed for probate, being illiterate,
and living in a remote and secluded region in Australia, and
stating other facts of the same general character to account for
their not having sooner taken any proceedings to assert their
rights.
Demurrers were also filed to the bill as amended, and upon the
argument of these demurrers the bill was dismissed by the circuit
court. From that decree the present appeal was taken.
The grounds relied on by the defendants on the demurrer, and by
the appellees here, were:
1st. That a court of equity had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter of this suit, the same being vested exclusively in the
Probate Court of the City and County of San Francisco.
2d. That the action was barred by several statutes of limitation
of the State of California.
3d. That the defendants were purchasers at a judicial sale, made
under the orders of a court of competent jurisdiction, never
reversed or set aside and not impeached by the bill.
Page 88 U. S. 509
4th. That the complainants were nonresident foreigners,
incapable of taking or holding property in California.
The special character of the Probate Court of the City and
County of San Francisco, and the provisions of the several statutes
of California about it, and also as to limitations, are set forth
in the opinion of the court. [
Footnote 1]
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
As to the first point, it is undoubtedly the general rule,
established both in England and this country, that a court of
equity will not entertain jurisdiction of a bill to set aside a
will or the probate thereof. The case of
Kerrick v.
Bransby, [
Footnote 2]
decided by the House of Lords in 1727, is considered as having
definitely settled the question. Whatever may have been the
original ground of this rule (perhaps something in the peculiar
constitution of the English courts) the most satisfactory ground
for its continued prevalence is that the constitution of a
succession to a deceased person's estate partakes in some degree of
the nature of a proceeding
in rem, in which all persons in
the world who have any interest are deemed parties, and are
concluded as upon
res judicata by the decision of the
court having jurisdiction. The public interest requires that the
estates of deceased persons, being deprived of a master and subject
to all manner of claims, should at once devolve to a new and
competent ownership, and consequently that there should be some
convenient jurisdiction and mode of proceeding by which this
devolution may be effected with least chance of injustice and
fraud, and that the result attained should be firm and perpetual.
The courts invested with this jurisdiction should have ample powers
both of process and investigation, and sufficient opportunity
should be given to check and revise proceedings tainted with
mistake, fraud, or illegality. These objects
Page 88 U. S. 510
are generally accomplished by the constitution and powers which
are given to the probate courts and the modes provided for
reviewing their proceedings. And one of the principal reasons
assigned by the equity courts for not entertaining bills on
questions of probate is that the probate courts themselves have all
the powers and machinery necessary to give full and adequate
relief.
In England, after the acts of Parliament had authorized devises
of real estate, the same position was assumed by courts of equity
in regard to such devises, it being held that any fraud,
illegality, or mistake affecting their validity could be fully
investigated and redressed in the courts of common law, where only
devises were cognizable.
An occasional exception, or apparent exception, to this
noninterference of courts of equity with wills and devises is found
in the books, but these occasional departures from the rule are
always carefully placed on such special grounds that they tend
rather to establish than to weaken its force. One of the most
prominent cases adverted to is
Barnesley v. Powel,
[
Footnote 3] in which an
executor and residuary legatee had procured probate of a forged
will by fraudulently inducing the testator's son, the person most
directly interested, to execute a deed consenting to its probate,
and Lord Hardwicke declared the deed void and compelled the
executor to consent, in the ecclesiastical court, to a revocation
of the probate. But in doing this, his lordship made a labored
argument to show that the ecclesiastical court had no power to
annul that deed, and that had it attempted to do so, the common law
courts would have restrained it by prohibition.
It has also been held that where a person obtains a legacy by
inserting his own name in the will instead of that of the intended
legatee, he may be declared a trustee for the latter. [
Footnote 4] In such a case, the Court
of Probate could not furnish a remedy, since to strike the bequest
out of the will or to refuse probate of it would defeat the legacy
altogether, and that court is incompetent to declare a trust.
Page 88 U. S. 511
The English authorities were fully discussed by Lord Lyndhurst
in
Allen v. McPherson, [
Footnote 5] and by him and Lords Cottenham, Brougham,
Langdale, and Campbell in the same case on appeal in the House of
Lords. [
Footnote 6] In that
case, a codicil was revoked by a subsequent one in consequence of
false and fraudulent representations on the part of the person to
be benefited by the change, prejudicing the testator against the
person injured thereby. A bill was filed praying that the executor
might be declared trustee for the first legatee to the extent of
the legacies revoked. This bill was demurred to and dismissed, and
the whole discussion turned upon the question whether or not the
ecclesiastical court had jurisdiction to inquire of the matters of
fraud alleged, and the court being of opinion that it had
jurisdiction, the decree was affirmed. The court came to the
conclusion that the ecclesiastical court had power to refuse
probate of the revoking codicil, and indeed had had the question
before it, but after investigating the facts, had granted the
probate. "If," said Lord Lyndhurst,
"an error has been committed in this or any other respect, which
I am very far from supposing, that would not be a ground for coming
to a court of equity. The matter should have been set right upon
appeal. But the present is an attempt to review the decision of the
Court of Probate not by the judicial committee of the Privy
Council, the proper tribunal for that purpose, but by the court of
chancery. I think this cannot be done. It was formerly, indeed,
considered that fraud in obtaining a will might be investigated and
redressed in a court of equity, but that doctrine has long since
been overruled. [
Footnote
7]"
Lord Lyndhurst also reviewed the cases in which a legatee or
executor had been declared trustee for other persons, and came to
the conclusion that they had been either questions of construction,
or cases in which the party had been named a trustee or had engaged
to take as such, or in which the Court of Probate could afford no
adequate or proper remedy. The effect of his reasoning was,
that
Page 88 U. S. 512
where a remedy is within the power of the ecclesiastical court,
either by granting or refusing probate of the whole will or
codicil, or of any portion thereof, a court of equity will not
interfere. And this was the view of a majority of the law lords on
that occasion, Lords Brougham and Campbell agreeing with Lord
Lyndhurst.
It seems, therefore, to be settled law in England that the court
of chancery will not entertain jurisdiction of questions in
relation to the probate or validity of a will which the
ecclesiastical court is competent to adjudicate. It will only act
in cases where the latter court can furnish no adequate remedy.
It is laid down in the Duchess of Kingston's Case, [
Footnote 8] it is true, that fraud will
vitiate the most solemn adjudications of all courts, and so it will
when set up in the proper manner by the proper parties and in the
proper court. But a person who in contemplation of law has had a
day in court, and an opportunity to set up the fraud, and has not
done so, is forever concluded, unless he was ignorant of its
perpetration, in which case he will be entitled to set it up
whenever he discovers it, if not himself guilty of laches.
The same principles substantially have been adopted by most of
the courts having equity jurisdiction in this country. The point
was considerably discussed in the case of
Gaines v. Chew and
Relf. [
Footnote 9] That
was a bill filed by the heir at law of Daniel Clark, and charged
that a certain will made by him in 1813 was fraudulently
suppressed, that another will made in 1811 was fraudulently set up
and admitted to probate, and that the defendants, some of whom were
executors of the latter will, and others purchasers of the estate,
knew the fraud and could furnish the facts to establish the same,
and had received large rents and profits from the estate, of all
which the bill sought a discovery, and an account of profits
received. The bill was demurred to, and on a division of opinion
between the judges of the circuit court, the case came to this
Court on several questions stated,
Page 88 U. S. 513
one of which was whether the circuit court as a court of equity
could entertain jurisdiction without probate of the suppressed
will. Justice McLean delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
"Formerly it was a point on which doubts were entertained
whether courts of equity could not relieve against a will
fraudulently obtained. And there are cases where the chancery has
exercised such a jurisdiction. . . . In other cases, such a
jurisdiction has been disclaimed, though the fraud was fully
established. . . . In another class of cases, the fraudulent actor
has been held a trustee for the party injured. . . . These cases
[referring to various cases cited in the opinion] present no very
satisfactory result as to the question under consideration. But
since the decision of
Kerrick v. Bransby, [
Footnote 10] and
Webb v.
Claverden, [
Footnote
11] it seems to be considered settled in England that equity
will not set aside a will for fraud and imposition. The reason
assigned is where personal estate is disposed of by a fraudulent
will, relief may be had in the ecclesiastical court, and, at law,
on a devise of real property. . . . In cases of fraud, equity has a
concurrent jurisdiction with a court of law, but in regard to a
will charged to have been obtained through fraud, this rule does
not hold. It may be difficult to assign any very satisfactory
reason for this exception. That exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate of wills is vested in another tribunal is the only one that
can be given."
After referring to several cases, the judge proceeds:
"The American decisions on this subject have followed the
English authorities. And a deliberate consideration of the question
leads us to say that both the general and local law [of Louisiana]
require the will of 1813 to be proved before any title can be set
up under it."
The court, however, sustained the bill as a bill of discovery to
assist the complainants in their proofs before the Court of
Probate, and intimate, on the authority of
Barnesley v.
Powell, that if the Probate Court should refuse to take
jurisdiction from a defect of power to bring the parties before it,
lapse of time, or any other ground, and
Page 88 U. S. 514
there should be no remedy in the higher courts of the state, it
might become the duty of the circuit court, having the parties
before it, to require them to go to the Court of Probate and
consent to the proof of the will of 1813 and the revocation of the
will of 1811, and the judge also went so far as to intimate further
that should this procedure fail, it might be a matter of grave
consideration whether the inherent powers of a court of chancery
might not afford a remedy, where the right was clear, by
establishing the will of 1813. Of course the latter expressions
were
obiter dicta, and can hardly be said to have the
support of any well considered cases. But the matter decided by the
court, and the burden of the opinion is in strict accord with the
settled conclusions of the English courts.
Without quoting from the decisions of the various state courts,
it is sufficient to refer to the case of
California v.
McGlynn [
Footnote 12]
on the very will now in question. That case was founded on an
information for an escheat of Broderick's estate and a bill in
equity at the suit of the state against the executors of the will
praying for an injunction to restrain them from selling the
property of Broderick and from intermeddling therewith. The
principal frauds set up in the present case were set up in that,
and a preliminary injunction granted by the district court was
dissolved by the supreme court on appeal on the ground that the
probate of the will belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
probate court, and, having been decided by that court, was
res
judicata, and could not be reviewed by the court of chancery.
The opinion of the court, delivered by Justice Norton, is quite
elaborate, and arrives at the following conclusion:
"Upon examining the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States and of the courts of the several states, it will be found
that they have uniformly held that the principles established in
England apply and govern cases arising under the probate laws of
this country, and that in the United States, wherever the power to
probate a will is given
Page 88 U. S. 515
to a probate or surrogate's court the decree of such court is
final and conclusive, and not subject, except on an appeal to a
higher court, to be questioned in any other court or be set aside
or vacated by the court of chancery on any ground."
The judge further stated what the statutes of California
demonstrate that in that state, the jurisdiction of the probate
court is the same in regard to wills of real estate as to wills of
personal estate, both classes requiring probate, and the probate of
each having the same validity and effect. This is the case in
several, perhaps the greater number, of the United States. In some
of the older states, as in England, the probate of a will has no
effect upon devises of real estate therein, except perhaps to stand
as
prima facie proof of its execution. But in many states,
wills of real and personal estate are placed upon the same footing
in respect to probate and authentication. It is true the estate in
lands devised goes to the devisee, and not to the executor, but
that is the only difference in the effect of the will or probate as
respects the two classes of property.
There is nothing in the jurisdiction of the probate courts of
California which distinguishes them in respect of the questions
under consideration from other probate courts. They are invested
with the jurisdiction of probate of wills and letters of
administration, and all cognate matters usually incident to that
branch of judicature. The constitution of the state as originally
adopted in 1849 provided that the judicial power of the state
should be vested in a supreme court, district courts, county
courts, and justices of the peace, and that the legislature might
establish such municipal and other inferior courts as might be
deemed necessary. [
Footnote
13] It also ordained that there should be elected in each of
the organized counties one judge, who should hold his office for
four years, and should hold the county court, and perform the
duties of surrogate or probate judge. [
Footnote 14]
These provisions were somewhat modified in September,
Page 88 U. S. 516
1862, but not in any manner material to this case. Moreover, the
will in question was admitted to probate in October, 1860, before
any modification took place. The act of the legislature in force at
that time on the subject of probate was the Act of May 1, 1851,
entitled "An act to regulate the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons." By this act as it stood in 1860, having been
somewhat modified by sundry amendments, it was declared that the
county courts, when sitting for the transaction of probate
business, should be known and called the "probate court," and the
county judge should be
ex officio probate judge. The mode
of procedure for the probate of wills was pointed out. A petition
was to be filed in the proper court by the executor or other person
interested, and a day appointed for proving the will not less than
ten nor more than thirty days distant, and notice was to be
published not less than twice a week in a newspaper published in
the county, if there was one; if not, then by posting in three
public places in the county. [
Footnote 15] Citations were also to be issued to the
heirs if they resided in the county and to any executors named in
the will and not joining in the application for probate. Subpoenas
were to be issued to the witnesses if they resided in the county.
Any person interested might appear and contest the will, and if it
should appear that there were minors or nonresidents of the county
interested, the court was to appoint an attorney to represent them.
If any person should appear and contest the will, he must file a
statement in writing of the grounds of his opposition. Issues when
formed were to be sent to the district court for trial by jury
unless the parties consented to a trial in the probate court.
[
Footnote 16] Incompetency,
restraint, undue influence, fraudulent representations, and any
other cause affecting the validity of the will are specially
mentioned as questions upon which issues might thus be formed.
Various provisions were added calculated to secure a thorough
investigation on the merits. [
Footnote 17]
Page 88 U. S. 517
It was further provided that when a will had been admitted to
probate, any person interested might at any time within one year
after such probate contest the same or the validity of the will by
filing in the same court a petition containing his allegations
against its validity or the sufficiency of the proof and praying
that the probate might be revoked. Hereupon new citations were to
be issued and a new trial had. But it was declared that if no
person should within one year appear to contest the will or
probate, the latter should be conclusive, saving to infants,
married women, and persons of unsound mind, a like period of one
year after disability removed. [
Footnote 18]
In view of these provisions, it is difficult to conceive of a
more complete and effective probate jurisdiction or one better
calculated to attain the ends of justice and truth.
The question recurs do the facts stated in the present bill lay
a sufficient ground for equitable interference with the probate of
Broderick's will or for establishing a trust as against the
purchasers of his estate in favor of the complainants? It needs no
argument to show, as it is perfectly apparent, that every objection
to the will or the probate thereof could have been raised, if it
was not raised, in the probate court during the proceedings
instituted for proving the will, or at any time within a year after
probate was granted, and that the relief sought by declaring the
purchasers trustees for the benefit of the complainants would have
been fully compassed by denying probate of the will. On the
establishment or nonestablishment of the will depended the entire
right of the parties, and that was a question entirely and
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the probate court. In such a
case, a court of equity will not interfere, for it has no
jurisdiction to do so. The probate court was fully competent to
afford adequate relief.
But the complainants allege that in consequence of circumstances
beyond their control, and without their fault, they had no
knowledge or information of Broderick's death,
Page 88 U. S. 518
and, of course, no knowledge of the forgery of his will until
within three years prior to the commencement of this suit, and
after the period for contesting the will in the probate court had
expired, and when the power of said court to investigate the
subject further had ceased. They therefore insist that as the
probate court had no further jurisdiction over the subject, a court
of equity was competent to give relief as against parties having
possession of the estate or its proceeds
mala fide or
without consideration.
Concede this to be true to a certain extent where injured
parties have not lost their opportunity of appearing in the court
of probate or in the equity court by any laches of their own; still
it cannot help the complainants. What excuse have they for not
appearing in the probate court, for example? None. No allegation is
made that the notices were fraudulently suppressed or that the
death of Broderick was fraudulently concealed. The only excuse
attempted to be offered is that they lived in a secluded region and
did not hear of his death or of the probate proceedings. If this
excuse could prevail, it would unsettle all proceedings
in
rem.
But even admitting that, as to surplus proceeds, and property
undisposed of, or acquired by those having actual knowledge of the
fraud, the complainants might come into a court of equity on the
ground of their own ignorance of the events when they transpired,
they would still have to encounter the statute of limitations,
which expressly declares that action for relief on the ground of
fraud can only be commenced within three years, and the statutes of
limitation in California apply to suits in equity as well as to
actions at law. [
Footnote
19] It is true that it is added that the cause of action in
such case is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery
by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud. But
that is only the application to cases at law of a principle which
has always been acted upon in courts of equity. If fraud is kept
concealed so as not to come to the knowledge of the party injured,
those courts will not
Page 88 U. S. 519
charge him with laches or negligence in the vindication of his
rights until after he has discovered the facts constituting the
fraud. And this is most just. But that principle cannot avail the
complainants in this case. By their own showing, their delay was
due not to ignorance of the fraud nor any attempt to conceal it,
but to ignorance of Broderick's death and all the open and public
facts of the case. They admit and expressly charge that it was a
matter of public notoriety at San Francisco as early as 1861 that
the will in question was not Broderick's will, but was a forged and
simulated paper. They do not pretend that the facts of the fraud
were shrouded in concealment, but their plea is that they lived in
a remote and secluded region, far from means of information, and
never heard of Broderick's death, or of the sale of his property,
or of any events connected with the settlement of his estate, until
many years after these events had transpired. Parties cannot thus,
by their seclusion from the means of information, claim exemption
from the laws that control human affairs, and set up a right to
open up all the transactions of the past. The world must move on,
and those who claim an interest in persons or things must be
charged with knowledge of their status and condition and of the
vicissitudes to which they are subject. This is the foundation of
all judicial proceedings
in rem.
The fact that two of the complainants are married women does not
take them out of the operation of the statute of limitations of
California. They are only exempt when it is necessary that their
husbands should join them in the suit. This is not necessary by the
law of the state where they sue for their separate estate, as in
the present case. As to such property they act as
femes
sole. This suit, had it lain at all, could have been brought
by the complainants, who are married women, though their husbands
had refused to join them therein.
The statute of 1862 has been referred to, which gives to the
district courts of California power to set aside a will obtained by
fraud or undue influence or a forged will and any probate obtained
by fraud, concealment, or perjury.
Page 88 U. S. 520
Whilst it is true that alterations in the jurisdiction of the
state courts cannot affect the equitable jurisdiction of the
circuit courts of the United States so long as the equitable rights
themselves remain, yet an enlargement of equitable rights may be
administered by the circuit courts as well as by the courts of the
state. And this is probably a case in which an enlargement of
equitable rights is effected, although presented in the form of a
remedial proceeding. Indeed, much of equitable jurisdiction
consists of better and more effective remedies for attaining the
rights of parties. But the statute referred to cannot affect this
suit, inasmuch as the statute of limitations would still apply in
full force, and would present a perfect bar to the suit.
We can perceive no ground on which the bill in this case can be
sustained.
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE specially concurring.
[
Footnote 1]
Infra, p.
88 U. S.
515-519.
[
Footnote 2]
3 Brown's Parliamentary Cases 388.
[
Footnote 3]
1 Vesey 284.
[
Footnote 4]
Mariott v. Mariott, 1 Strange 666.
[
Footnote 5]
1 Phillips, 133.
[
Footnote 6]
1 House of Lords Cases, 191.
[
Footnote 7]
Ib. 209.
[
Footnote 8]
20 Howell's State Trials 544.
[
Footnote 9]
43 U. S. 2 How.
619.
[
Footnote 10]
3 Brown's Parliamentary Cases 385.
[
Footnote 11]
2 Atkyns 424.
[
Footnote 12]
20 Cal. 233, 266.
[
Footnote 13]
Article 5, § 1.
[
Footnote 14]
Article 6, § 8.
[
Footnote 15]
Hittell's Laws of California, Article "Probate Act," chap. 2, §§
4-13
[
Footnote 16]
Ib., §§ 16-20.
[
Footnote 17]
Ib., § 20.
[
Footnote 18]
Hittell's Laws of California, Article "Probate Act" chap. 2, §§
30-36.
[
Footnote 19]
Boyd v. Blankman, 29 Cal. 19.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE DAVIS,
dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court in this
case for the following reasons:
(1) Because courts of equity may exercise jurisdiction to set
aside and annul a decree of the probate court approving and
allowing an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament
of a deceased person in a case where it appears that the instrument
is a forgery and that the decree approving and allowing the
instrument was procured by perjury and fraud, provided it appears
that the injured party has not been guilty of laches and that he
had no other adequate remedy.
(2) Because all the leading authorities cited to support the
opposite rule admit that the jurisdiction does exist in cases where
there is no other remedy.
(3) Because the right of the complainants in this cause is not
barred by the statute of limitations.
