1. Neither the constitutional provision, that full faith and
credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records,
and judicial, proceedings of every other state nor the act of
Congress passed in pursuance thereof prevents an inquiry into the
jurisdiction of the court by which a judgment offered in evidence
was rendered.
2. The record of a judgment rendered in another state may be
contradicted as to the facts necessary to give the court
jurisdiction, and if it be shown that such facts did not exist, the
record will be a nullity notwithstanding it may recite that they
did exist.
3. Want of jurisdiction may be shown either as to the subject
matter or the person, or, in proceedings
in rem, as to the
thing.
4. By a law of New Jersey, nonresidents were prohibited from
raking clams and oysters in the waters of that state under penalty
of forfeiture of the vessel employed, and any two justices of the
county in which the seizure of the vessel should be made were
authorized, on information given, to hear and determine the case.
Held that if the seizure was not made in the county where
the prosecution took place, the justices of that county had no
jurisdiction, and that this fact might be inquired into in an
action for making such seizure brought in New York, notwithstanding
the record of a conviction was produced which stated that the
seizure was made within such county.
A statute of New Jersey approved April 16, 1846, and commonly
known there as the Oyster Law, thus enacts:
"SECTION 7. It shall not be lawful for any person who is not at
the time an actual inhabitant and resident of this state, . . . to
rake or gather claims, oysters, or shellfish, . . . in any of
Page 85 U. S. 458
the rivers, bays, or waters of this state on board of any . . .
boat or other vessel, and every person who shall offend herein
shall forfeit and pay $20; . . . and the said . . . boat or other
vessel, used and employed in the commission of such offense, with
all the clams, oysters, clam rakes, tongs, tackle, furniture, and
apparel, shall be forfeited, and the same seized, secured, and
disposed of, in the manner prescribed in the ninth and tenth
sections of this act."
"SECTION 9. It shall be the duty of all sheriffs . . . to seize
and secure any such . . . boat or other vessel as aforesaid, and
immediately thereupon give information thereof
to two justices
of the peace of the county where such seizure shall have been
made, who are hereby empowered and required to meet at such
time and place as they shall appoint for the trial thereof and hear
and determine the same, and in case the same shall be condemned, it
shall be sold by the order and under the direction of the said
justices, who, after deducting all legal costs and charges, shall
pay one-half of the proceeds of said sale to the collector of the
county in which such offense shall have been committed and the
other half to the person who shall have seized and prosecuted the
same."
This statute being in force, Whitman, a citizen of New York,
sued Thompson, Sheriff of Monmouth County, New Jersey, in the court
below in an action of trespass for taking and carrying away a
certain sloop of his named the
Anna Whitman, her cargo,
furniture, and apparel.
The declaration charged that on the 26th of September, 1862, the
defendant, with force and arms, on the high seas, in the outward
vicinity of the Narrows of the port of New York and within the
Southern District of New York, seized and took the said sloop, with
her tackle, furniture &c., the property of the plaintiff, and
carried away and converted the same. The defendant pleaded not
guilty and a special plea in bar. The latter plea justified the
trespass by setting up that the plaintiff, a resident of New York,
on the day of seizure, was raking and gathering clams with said
sloop in the waters of the State of New Jersey, to-wit, within the
limits of the County of Monmouth, contrary to a law of that state,
and that by virtue of the said law the defendant, who
Page 85 U. S. 459
was sheriff of said county, seized the sloop within the limits
thereof, and informed against her before two justices of the peace
of said county, by whom she was condemned and ordered to be sold.
In answer to this plea, the plaintiff took issue as to the place of
seizure, denying that it was within the State of New Jersey or the
County of Monmouth, thus challenging the jurisdiction of the
justices as well as the right of the defendant to make the seizure.
On the trial, conflicting testimony was given upon this point, but
the defendant produced a record of the proceedings before the
justices which stated the offense as having been committed, and the
seizure as made, within the County of Monmouth, with a history of
the proceedings to the condemnation and order of sale. The
defendant, relying on the provision of the Constitution [
Footnote 1] which says that:
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the . . .
judicial proceedings of every other state; and that Congress may by
general laws prescribe the manner in which such . . . proceedings
shall be proved, and the effect thereof"
and on the Act of Congress of May 26, 1790, [
Footnote 2] which, after prescribing a mode in
which the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any
state shall be authenticated, enacts that
"The said records and proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid,
shall have such faith and credit given to them, in every court
within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the state from whence the said records are or may be
taken,"
asserted that this record was conclusive both as to the
jurisdiction of the court and the merits of the case, and that it
was a bar to the action, and requested the court so to charge the
jury. But the court refused so to charge, and charged that the said
record was only
prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated, and threw upon the plaintiff the burden of proving the
contrary. The defendant excepted,
Page 85 U. S. 460
and the jury, under the direction of the court, found for the
plaintiff generally and, in answer to certain questions framed by
the court, found specially first, that the seizure was made within
the State of New Jersey; secondly, that it was not made in the
County of Monmouth; thirdly, that the plaintiff was not engaged on
the day of the seizure in taking clams within the limits of the
County of Monmouth. Judgment being rendered for the plaintiff, the
case was brought here for review.
The chief error assigned was the charge of the court, above
mentioned, that the record from New Jersey was only
prima
facie evidence of the facts which it stated, though the
counsel for the plaintiff in error also argued that if the record
was not conclusive of the facts stated in it, and if the seizure
was first made outside of the limits of Monmouth County, yet that
confessedly the vessel was brought right into Monmouth County, so
that the seizure, being continuous, might properly enough be held
to have been made there, and that this was particularly true if it
was assumed, as it was on the other side, that the vessel, when
first seized, though seized within the state, was not seized within
the limits of any county.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The main question in the cause is whether the record produced by
the defendant was conclusive of the jurisdictional facts therein
contained. It stated, with due particularity, sufficient facts to
give the justices jurisdiction under the law of New Jersey. Could
that statement be questioned collaterally in another action brought
in another state? If it could be, the ruling of the court was
substantially correct. If not, there was error. It is true that the
court charged generally that the record was only
prima
facie evidence of
Page 85 U. S. 461
the facts stated therein, but as the jurisdictional question was
the principal question at issue, and as the jury was required to
find specially thereon, the charge may be regarded as having
reference to the question of jurisdiction. And if upon that
question it was correct, no injury was done to the defendant.
Without that provision of the Constitution of the United States
which declares that "full faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state," and the act of Congress passed to carry it into
effect, it is clear that the record in question would not be
conclusive as to the facts necessary to give the justices of
Monmouth County jurisdiction, whatever might be its effect in New
Jersey. In any other state it would be regarded like any foreign
judgment, and as to a foreign judgment, it is perfectly well
settled that the inquiry is always open whether the court by which
it was rendered had jurisdiction of the person or the thing. "Upon
principle," says Chief Justice Marshall,
"it would seem that the operation of every judgment must depend
on the power of the court to render that judgment, or in other
words, on its jurisdiction over the subject matter which it has
determined. In some cases that jurisdiction unquestionably depends
as well on the state of the thing as on the constitution of the
court. If by any means whatever a prize court should be induced to
condemn, as prize of war, a vessel which was never captured, it
could not be contended that this condemnation operated a change of
property. Upon principle, then, it would seem that to a certain
extent the capacity of the court to act upon the thing condemned
arising from its being within or without, their jurisdiction, as
well as the constitution of the court, may be considered by that
tribunal which is to decide on the effect of the sentence.
[
Footnote 3]"
The act of Congress above referred to, which was passed 26th of
May, 1790, after providing for the mode of authenticating the acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of the
Page 85 U. S. 462
states, declares,
"and the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as
aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every
court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be
taken."
It has been supposed that this act, in connection with the
constitutional provision which it was intended to carry out, had
the effect of rendering the judgments of each state equivalent to
domestic judgments in every other state, or at least of giving to
them in every other state the same effect in all respects which
they have in the state where they are rendered. And the language of
this Court in
Mills v. Duryee [
Footnote 4] seemed to give countenance to this idea. The
Court in that case held that the act gave to the judgments of each
state the same conclusive effect as records in all the states as
they had at home, and that
nil debet could not be pleaded
to an action brought thereon in another state. This decision has
never been departed from in relation to the general effect of such
judgments where the questions raised were not questions of
jurisdiction. But where the jurisdiction of the court which
rendered the judgment has been assailed, quite a different view has
prevailed. Justice Story who pronounced the judgment in
Mills
v. Duryee, in his Commentary on the Constitution, [
Footnote 5] after stating the general
doctrine established by that case with regard to the conclusive
effect of judgments of one state in every other state, adds:
"But this does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of
the court in which the original judgment was given to pronounce it,
or the right of the state itself to exercise authority over the
person or the subject matter. The Constitution did not mean to
confer [upon the states] a new power or jurisdiction, but simply to
regulate the effect of the acknowledged jurisdiction over persons
and things within their territory."
In the Commentary on the Conflict of Laws, [
Footnote 6] substantially the same remarks are
repeated, with this addition:
"It [the Constitution] did not make the
Page 85 U. S. 463
judgments of other states domestic judgments to all intents and
purposes, but only gave a general validity, faith, and credit to
them as evidence. No execution can issue upon such judgments
without a new suit in the tribunals of other states. And they enjoy
not the right of priority or lien which they have in the state
where they are pronounced, but that only which the
lex
fori gives to them by its own laws in their character of
foreign judgments."
Many cases in the state courts are referred to by Justice Story
in support of this view. Chancellor Kent expresses the same
doctrine in nearly the same words in a note to his Commentaries.
[
Footnote 7] "The doctrine in
Mills v. Duryee," says he,
"is to be taken with the qualification that in all instances,
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment may be
inquired into, and the plea of
nil debet will allow the
defendant to show that the court had no jurisdiction over his
person. It is only when the jurisdiction of the court in another
state is not impeached either as to the subject matter or the
person that the record of the judgment is entitled to full faith
and credit. The court must have had jurisdiction not only of the
cause, but of the parties, and in that case the judgment is final
and conclusive."
The learned commentator adds, however, this qualifying
remark:
"A special plea in bar of a suit on a judgment in another state,
to be valid, must deny, by positive averments, every fact which
would go to show that the court in another state had jurisdiction
of the person, or of the subject matter."
In the case of
Hampton v. McConnel, [
Footnote 8] this Court reiterated the
doctrine of
Mills v. Duryee that
"the judgment of a state court should have the same credit,
validity, and effect in every other court of the United States
which it had in the state courts where it was pronounced, and that
whatever pleas would be good to a suit therein in such state, and
none others, could be pleaded in any court in the United
States."
But in the subsequent case of
McElmoyle v. Cohen,
[
Footnote 9]
Page 85 U. S. 464
the Court explained that neither in
Mills v. Duryee nor
in
Hampton v. McConnel was it intended to exclude pleas of
avoidance and satisfaction, such as payment, statute of limitations
&c., or pleas denying the jurisdiction of the court in which
the judgment was given, and quoted with approbation the remark of
Justice Story that
"the Constitution did not mean to confer a new power of
jurisdiction, but simply to regulate the effect of the acknowledged
jurisdiction over persons and things within the state."
The case of
Landes v. Brant, [
Footnote 10] has been quoted to show that a judgment
cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding. There, a judgment
relied on by the defendant was rendered in the Territory of
Louisiana in 1808, and the objection to it was that no return
appeared upon the summons, and the defendant was proved to have
been absent in Mexico at the time; but the judgment commenced in
the usual form, "And now at this day come the parties aforesaid by
their attorneys," &c. The court pertinently remarked, [
Footnote 11] that the defendant may
have left behind counsel to defend suits brought against him in his
absence, but that if the recital was false and the judgment
voidable for want of notice, it should have been set aside by
audita querela or motion in the usual way, and could not
be impeached collaterally. Here, it is evident the proof failed to
show want of jurisdiction. The party assailing the judgment should
have shown that the counsel who appeared were not employed by the
defendant, according to the doctrine held in the cases of
Shumway v. Stillman, [
Footnote 12]
Aldrich v. Kinney, [
Footnote 13] and
Price v. Ward.
[
Footnote 14] The remark of
the court that the judgment could not be attacked in a collateral
proceeding was unnecessary to the decision, and was in effect
overruled by the subsequent cases of
D'Arcy v. Ketchum and
Webster v. Reid. D'Arcy v. Ketchum [
Footnote 15] was an action in the
Circuit Court of the United States for Louisiana, brought on a
judgment rendered in New York under a local statute against two
defendants, only one of
Page 85 U. S. 465
whom was served with process, the other being a resident of
Louisiana. In that case, it was held by this Court that the
judgment was void as to the defendant not served, and that the law
of New York could not make it valid outside of that state; that the
constitutional provision and act of Congress giving full faith,
credit, and effect to the judgments of each state in every other
state do not refer to judgments rendered by a court having no
jurisdiction of the parties; that the mischief intended to be
remedied was not only the inconvenience of retrying a cause which
had once been fairly tried by a competent tribunal, but also the
uncertainty and confusion that prevailed in England and this
country as to the credit and effect which should be given to
foreign judgments, some courts holding that they should be
conclusive of the matters adjudged, and others that they should be
regarded as only
prima facie binding. But this uncertainty
and confusion related only to valid judgments -- that is, to
judgments rendered in a cause in which the court had jurisdiction
of the parties and cause, or (as might have been added) in
proceedings
in rem, where the court had jurisdiction of
the
res. No effect was ever given by any court to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal which had not such jurisdiction.
"The international law as it existed among the states in 1790,"
said the Court, [
Footnote
16]
"was that a judgment rendered in one state, assuming to bind the
person of a citizen of another, was void within the foreign state
when the defendant had not been served with process or voluntarily
made defense, because neither the legislative jurisdiction nor that
of courts of justice, had binding force. Subject to this
established principle, Congress also legislated, and the question
is whether it was intended to overthrow this principle and to
declare a new rule which would bind the citizens of one state to
the laws of another. There was no evil in this part of the existing
law, and no remedy called for, and in our opinion, Congress did not
intend to overthrow the old rule by the enactment that such faith
and credit
Page 85 U. S. 466
should be given to records of judgments as they had in the
states where made."
In the subsequent case of
Webster v. Reid, [
Footnote 17] the plaintiff claimed,
by virtue of a sale made under judgments in behalf of one Johnson
and one Brigham against "The Owners of Half-Breed Lands lying in
Lee County," Iowa Territory, in pursuance of a law of the
territory. The defendant offered to prove that no service had ever
been made upon any person in the suits in which the judgments were
rendered, and no notice by publication as required by the act. This
Court held that as there was no service of process, the judgments
were nullities. Perhaps it appeared on the face of the judgments in
that case that no service was made, but the Court held that the
defendant was entitled to prove that no notice was given, and that
none was published.
In
Harris v. Hardeman, [
Footnote 18] which was a writ of error to a judgment held
void by the court for want of service of process on the defendant,
the subject now under consideration was gone over by Mr. Justice
Daniel at some length, and several cases in the state courts were
cited and approved which held that a judgment may be attacked in a
collateral proceeding by showing that the court had no jurisdiction
of the person or, in proceedings
in rem, no jurisdiction
of the thing. Amongst other cases quoted were those of
Borden
v. Fitch [
Footnote 19]
and
Starbuck v. Murray, [
Footnote 20] and from the latter the following remarks
were quoted with apparent approval.
"But it is contended that if other matter may be pleaded by the
defendant, he is estopped from asserting anything against the
allegation contained in the record. It imports perfect verity, it
is said, and the parties to it cannot be heard to impeach it. It
appears to me that this proposition assumes the very fact to be
established, which is the only question in issue. For what purpose
does the defendant question the jurisdiction of the court? Solely
to show that its proceedings and judgment are void, and therefore
the
Page 85 U. S. 467
supposed record is, in truth, no record. . . . The plaintiffs in
effect declare to the defendant -- the paper declared on is a
record, because it says you appeared, and you appeared because the
paper is a record. This is reasoning in a circle."
The subject is adverted to in several subsequent cases in this
Court, and generally, if not universally, in terms implying
acquiescence in the doctrine stated in
D'Arcy v.
Ketchum.
Thus, in
Christmas v. Russell, [
Footnote 21] where the Court decided that fraud
in obtaining a judgment in another state is a good ground of
defense to an action on the judgment, it was distinctly stated
[
Footnote 22] in the opinion
that such judgments are open to inquiry as to the jurisdiction of
the court and notice to the defendant. And in a number of cases in
which was questioned the jurisdiction of a court, whether of the
same or another state, over the general subject matter in which the
particular case adjudicated was embraced, this Court has maintained
the same general language. Thus, in
Elliott v. Peirsol,
[
Footnote 23] it was held
that the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Kentucky might question the jurisdiction of a county court of that
state to order a certificate of acknowledgment to be corrected, and
for want of such jurisdiction to regard the order as void. Justice
Trimble, delivering the opinion of this Court in that case,
said:
"Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every
question which occurs in the cause, and whether its decision be
correct or otherwise, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as
binding in every other court. But if it act without authority, its
judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not
voidable, but simply void."
The same views were repeated in
United States v.
Arredondo, [
Footnote
24]
Vorhees v. Bank of the United States, [
Footnote 25]
Wilcox v.
Jackson, [
Footnote 26]
Shriver's Lessee v. Lynn, [
Footnote 27]
Hickey's Lessee v. Stewart,
[
Footnote 28] and
Williamson v. Berry. [
Footnote 29] In the last case, the authorities are
reviewed, and the Court said:
"The jurisdiction of any
Page 85 U. S. 468
court exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into
in every other court when the proceedings in the former are relied
upon and brought before the latter by a party claiming the benefit
of such proceedings,"
and
"the rule prevails whether the decree or judgment has been given
in a court of admiralty, chancery, ecclesiastical court, or court
of common law, or whether the point ruled has arisen under the laws
of nations, the practice in chancery, or the municipal laws of
states."
But it must be admitted that no decision has ever been made on
the precise point involved in the case before us, in which evidence
was admitted to contradict the record as to jurisdictional facts
asserted therein, and especially as to facts stated to have been
passed upon by the court.
But if it is once conceded that the validity of a judgment may
be attacked collaterally by evidence showing that the court had no
jurisdiction, it is not perceived how any allegation contained in
the record itself, however strongly made, can affect the right so
to question it. The very object of the evidence is to invalidate
the paper as a record. If that can be successfully done, no
statements contained therein have any force. If any such statements
could be used to prevent inquiry, a slight form of words might
always be adopted so as effectually to nullify the right of such
inquiry. Recitals of this kind must be regarded like asseverations
of good faith in a deed, which avail nothing if the instrument is
shown to be fraudulent. The records of the domestic tribunals of
England and some of the states, it is true, are held to import
absolute verity as well in relation to jurisdictional as to other
facts in all collateral proceedings. Public policy and the dignity
of the courts are supposed to require that no averment shall be
admitted to contradict the record. But, as we have seen, that rule
has no extraterritorial force.
It may be observed that no courts have more decidedly affirmed
the doctrine that want of jurisdiction may be shown by proof to
invalidate the judgments of the courts of other states than have
the courts of New Jersey. The subject was examined and the doctrine
affirmed, after a careful review
Page 85 U. S. 469
of the cases, in the case of
Moulin v. Insurance
Company, in 4 Zabriskie, [
Footnote 30] and again in the same case in 1 Dutcher
[
Footnote 31] and in
Price v. Ward, [
Footnote 32] and as lately as November, 1870, in the case
of
Mackay v. Gordon. [
Footnote 33] The judgment of Chief Justice Beasley in the
last case is an able exposition of the law. It was a case similar
to that of
D'Arcy v. Ketchum, in 11 Howard, being a
judgment rendered in New York under the statutes of that state,
before referred to, against two persons, one of whom was not served
with process. "Every independent government," said the Chief
Justice,
"is at liberty to prescribe its own methods of judicial process
and to declare by what forms parties shall be brought before its
tribunals. But, in the exercise of this power, no government, if it
desires extraterritorial recognition of its acts, can violate those
rights which are universally esteemed fundamental and essential to
society. Thus, a judgment by the court of a state against a citizen
of such state, in his absence, and without any notice, express or
implied, would, it is presumed, be regarded in every external
jurisdiction as absolutely void and unenforceable. Such would
certainly be the case if such judgment was so rendered against the
citizen of a foreign state."
On the whole, we think it clear that the jurisdiction of the
court by which a judgment is rendered in any state may be
questioned in a collateral proceeding in another state,
notwithstanding the provision of the fourth article of the
Constitution and the law of 1790, and notwithstanding the averments
contained in the record of the judgment itself.
This is decisive of the case, for, according to the findings of
the jury, the justices of Monmouth County could not have had any
jurisdiction to condemn the sloop in question. It is true she was
seized in the waters of New Jersey, but the express finding is that
the seizure was not made within the limits of the County of
Monmouth, and that no clams were raked within the county on that
day. The authority
Page 85 U. S. 470
to make the seizure and to entertain cognizance thereof is given
by the ninth section of the act, as follows:
"It shall be the duty of all sheriffs and constables, and may be
lawful for any other person or persons, to seize and secure any
such canoe, flat, scow, boat, or other vessel as aforesaid, and
immediately thereupon give information thereof to
two justices
of the peace of the county where such seizure shall have been
made, who are hereby empowered and required to meet at such
time and place as they shall appoint for the trial thereof, and
hear and determine the same, and in case the same shall be
condemned, it shall be sold by the order of and under the direction
of the said justices, who, after deducting all legal costs and
charges, shall pay one-half of the proceeds of said sale to the
collector of the county in which such offense shall have been
committed, and the other half to the person who shall have seized
and prosecuted the same."
From this it appears that the seizure must be made in a county,
and that the case can only be heard by justices of the county where
it is made -- "two justices of the peace of the county where such
seizure shall have been made." The seizure in this case, as
specially found by the jury, was not made in Monmouth County, but
the justices who tried the case were justices of that county.
Consequently the justices had no jurisdiction, and the record had
no validity.
It is argued that the seizure was continuous in its character,
and became a seizure in Monmouth County when the sloop was carried
into that county. This position is untenable. Suppose the seizure
had been made in Cumberland County, in Delaware Bay, could the
sloop have been carried around to Monmouth County and there
condemned on the ground that the seizure was continuous, and became
finally a seizure in Monmouth County? This would hardly be
contended. But it is said that the seizure was made within the
state, off the County of Monmouth, and not within the limits of any
county, and hence that Monmouth County was the first county in
which the seizure took place. If this had been true (as it
undoubtedly was), and the jury had so
Page 85 U. S. 471
found, still it would not have helped the case. The major
proposition is not correct. A seizure is a single act, and not a
continuous fact. Possession, which follows seizure, is continuous.
It is the seizure which must be made within the county where the
vessel is to be proceeded against and condemned. The case may have
been a
casus omissus in the law; it is certainly not
included in it.
As this disposes of all the errors which have been assigned, the
judgment must be
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Article IV, Sec. 1.
[
Footnote 2]
1 Stat. at Large 122.
[
Footnote 3]
Rose v.
Himely, 4 Cranch 269. To the same effect,
see Story on the Constitution, chap. xxix; 1 Greenleaf on
Evidence ยง 540.
[
Footnote 4]
11 U. S. 7
Cranch 484.
[
Footnote 5]
Sec. 1313.
[
Footnote 6]
Sec. 609.
[
Footnote 7]
Vol. 1, p. 281;
see also vol. 2, 95, note, and cases
cited.
[
Footnote 8]
16 U. S. 3 Wheat.
234.
[
Footnote 9]
38 U. S. 13 Pet.
312.
[
Footnote 10]
51 U. S. 10 How.
348.
[
Footnote 11]
Page
51 U. S.
371.
[
Footnote 12]
6 Wendell 453.
[
Footnote 13]
4 Conn. 380.
[
Footnote 14]
1 Dutcher 225.
[
Footnote 15]
52 U. S. 11 How.
165.
[
Footnote 16]
Page
52 U. S.
176.
[
Footnote 17]
52 U. S. 11 How.
437.
[
Footnote 18]
55 U. S. 14 How.
334.
[
Footnote 19]
15 Johnson 141.
[
Footnote 20]
5 Wendell 156.
[
Footnote 21]
72 U. S. 5 Wall.
290.
[
Footnote 22]
Page
72 U. S.
305.
[
Footnote 23]
26 U. S. 1 Pet.
328,
26 U. S.
340.
[
Footnote 24]
31 U. S. 6 Pet.
691.
[
Footnote 25]
35 U. S. 10
Pet. 475.
[
Footnote 26]
38 U. S. 13
Pet. 511.
[
Footnote 27]
43 U. S. 2 How.
59,
43 U. S. 60.
[
Footnote 28]
44 U. S. 3 How.
762.
[
Footnote 29]
49 U. S. 8 How.
540.
[
Footnote 30]
Page 222.
[
Footnote 31]
Page 57.
[
Footnote 32]
1 Dutcher 225.
[
Footnote 33]
34 N.J. 286.