1. The doctrine reasserted, as often adjudged in this Court
before, that where a case is tried by the circuit court under the
Act of March 3, 1865, if the finding be a general one, this Court
will only review questions of law arising in the progress of the
trial and duly presented by a bill of exceptions, or errors of law
apparent on the face of the pleadings.
2. Under the act above named, the circuit court is not required
to make a special finding.
3. Where parties mean to insure a vessel "lost or not lost," the
use of that phrase is not necessary to make the policy
retrospective. It is sufficient if it appear by the description of
the risk and the subject matter of the contract that the policy was
intended to cover a previous loss.
4. Where it policy of insurance, following the exact language of
the application, insured on the 1st of March, 1869, a vessel then
at sea, "at and from the 1st day of January, 1869, at noon, until
the lst day of January, 1870, at noon," nothing being said in
either policy or application as to "lost or not lost" nor about who
was the master of the vessel, nor as to what voyage she was on,
held, on a suit on the policy -- and the company not
having shown that the name of the master or the precise destination
were material facts -- that the application had no tendency to show
that the assured, when he made the application, did not communicate
to the defendants all the material facts and circumstances within
his knowledge and answer truly all questions put to him in regard
to those several matters.
On the 6th of January, 1869, the schooner
B. F. Folsom
(John Orlando, master), and owned by a person whose name she bore,
Mr. B. F. Folsom, resident in Philadelphia, together with Orlando,
the captain and husband, sailed from Boston for Montevideo and
Buenos Ayres. When out six days she sprung a leak, and in a few
days afterwards became wholly disabled. Another vessel, bound for
Bremen, passing along, took off all aboard and carried them to
Bremerhaven, an outer port of Bremen, where, on the 18th of
February, 1869, all were safely landed. The vessel itself was lost.
At Bremerhaven, the master being wholly without funds or credit,
could not telegraph. But he wrote two days after his arrival --
that is to say he wrote on the 20th of
Page 85 U. S. 238
February, to Mr. Folsom, at Philadelphia, and mailed the letter
on the day on which it was written.
On the 1st of March, 1869, the Mercantile Mutual Insurance
Company of New York insured the vessel, valued at $35,000, on
Folsom's application, "at and from the first day of January, 1869,
at noon, until the first day of January, 1870, at noon," nothing
being said in the policy about "lost or not lost," nor about who
was the master of the vessel, nor on what voyage she then was.
The letter of the master to Folsom which had been mailed at
Bremen on the 20th of February, 1869, arriving in due course at
Philadelphia was received by Folsom, and the loss of the vessel
being indisputable, Folsom claimed the insurance money. The company
declining to pay, he brought suit in ordinary form on the policy.
Plea, the general issue.
The cause was tried without a jury, the jury having been waived
by a stipulation duly filed, pursuant to the Act of Congress of
March 3, 1865, which authorizes such mode of trial and enacts in
regard to it, [
Footnote 1]
"The findings of the court upon the facts,
which findings
MAY be either general or special, shall have the same effect
as the verdict of a jury. The rulings of the court in the case,
in the progress of the trial, when excepted to at the
time, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States
upon a writ of error, or upon appeal, provided the rulings be duly
presented by a bill of exceptions. When the finding is special, the
review may also extend to the determination of the sufficiency of
the facts found to support the judgment."
On the trial, the policy having been put in evidence and it
being admitted that the proper preliminary proofs of loss and of
interest had been furnished by the plaintiff to the company, the
plaintiff rested. The record proceeded:
"Whereupon the counsel for the said defendant did then and there
insist before the judge of the said circuit court, on the behalf of
the said defendant, that the said several matters so produced and
given in evidence on the part of the said plaintiff,
Page 85 U. S. 239
as aforesaid, were insufficient and ought not to be admitted or
allowed as decisive evidence to entitle the said plaintiff to a
verdict. But to this the counsel for the said plaintiff did then
and there object, and insist before the judge of the said circuit
court that the same were sufficient and ought to be admitted and
allowed to entitle the said plaintiff to a verdict, and the judge
of the said circuit court did then and there declare and deliver
his opinion, that the said several matters so produced and given in
evidence on the part of the said plaintiff were sufficient to
entitle the said plaintiff to a verdict."
To this ruling the defendant excepted.
The insurance company then showed that on the 22d of February,
1869, there had been published in various newspapers in New York,
as also in two newspapers in Philadelphia, this telegraphic
dispatch:
"LIVERPOOL, February 21"
"The
Orlando, from
Baltimore for
Buenos
Ayres, has been lost at sea. Crew saved and landed at
Bremerhaven."
Folsom had seen and read this dispatch, and the insurance
company which took, at its office in New York, the papers
containing it kept what was called a dispatch book, in which the
dispatch, together with records of seventeen other marine
disasters, was, on the same 22d of February when it appeared,
posted by a clerk, whose duty it was to post in such book notices
of all marine disasters. Over the dispatch was written in large
letters "ORLANDO."
It was admitted by the plaintiff that in Lloyd's Register there
was no schooner named
Orlando, but that there was a bark
named
Orlanda, a whaler, and that a bark of the name of
Orlando had been owned, within two or three years, by a
person who was then a partner of the plaintiff, and that at the
time when he applied for the insurance, he did not call the
company's attention to the publication which had appeared in the
papers, and that he made the application himself.
The company, in turn, admitted that in the Register for the year
1869, which they used in their office, as in the
Page 85 U. S. 240
Register of 1868, which they also had used, the schooner
"B.
F. Folsom" was rated, and that under such name and rating
there appeared the name of "J. Orlando, captain."
The company then offered in evidence Folsom's application for
insurance, which was in these words:
"Insurance is wanted by
B. F. Folsom for account of
whom it may concern, loss, if any, payable to him, for $3,000, on
schooner
B. F. Folson, vessel valued at $35,000, and to be
insured at and from the first day of January, 1869, at noon, until
the first day of January, 1870, at noon."
The purpose of the offer of this evidence was apparently to show
that in applying for insurance, Folsom had suppressed the name of
the master, Orlando, and the ports to which the vessel was sailing,
to-wit, Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, and so to bring on the
inference that in the application he meant to divert the company's
recollection or attention from the dispatch previously received by
it and on its books, in which it was mentioned that a vessel, where
the peculiar name of "Orlando" appeared, and which vessel the
dispatch mentioned was on her way to
Buenos Ayres, as one
port, had been lost at sea.
The plaintiff objected to the reception of the evidence on the
ground that the application was merged in the policy, and that the
plea did not allege that the policy was obtained by any fraud or
misrepresentation. The court rejected the evidence.
The company's counsel then requested the court to rule on
numerous propositions, substantially as follows:
First. That as the loss occurred before the issuing of
the policy, and the words, "lost or not lost," were not contained
therein, the insurance never took effect, and that therefore the
plaintiff could not recover.
Second. That at the time of the application for
insurance, and the issuing of the policy, the plaintiff ought to
have communicated to the company:
(a) The existence of the dispatch appearing in the
newspapers.
Page 85 U. S. 241
(b) That he had seen it.
(c) The surmises or conjectures, if any, which he had with
reference to the same.
Third. That it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove affirmatively, that at the time of application for insurance
and of the issuing of the policy, he had communicated to the
company the information that the vessel had sailed on a voyage from
Boston to Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, and that the name of her
master was John Orlando.
Fourth. That the master having failed to advise the
owner by telegraph of the loss of the vessel, the plaintiff could
not recover.
But the judge of the circuit court refused to rule in accordance
with any one of these several requests, to which refusals the
counsel for the defendant excepted.
Both parties here rested. The record proceeded:
"And the counsel for the defendant, after the putting in of the
evidence was completed, and before the conclusion of the trial,
further insisted that the matters so proved and given in evidence,
on the part of the said defendant, as hereinbefore set forth, taken
in connection with the matters proved and given in evidence, on the
part of the plaintiff, as hereinbefore set forth, were sufficient
and ought to be admitted and allowed as decisive evidence to
entitle the said defendant to a decision in their favor, and to bar
the said plaintiff of his action aforesaid, and did then and there
pray the said court to admit and allow the said matters so proved
and given in evidence, in connection as aforesaid, to be conclusive
evidence in favor of the said defendant, to entitle them to a
decision in their favor and to bar the said plaintiff of his action
aforesaid; but the said court decided that the matters so proved
and given in evidence on the part of the said defendant, taken in
connection with the matters so proved and given in evidence on the
part of the said plaintiff, were not sufficient to bar the said
plaintiff of his action aforesaid, and refused to make and render
its decision in favor of the said defendant, but found in favor of
the plaintiff upon the evidence for the sum of $3,348.20, to which
decision the said counsel for the defendant then and there duly
excepted. "
Page 85 U. S. 242
Thereupon the counsel for the defendant requested the court to
make the certain special findings of fact [setting them out], to
the end that the same might be reviewed. The record proceeded:
"But the court refused to make any special findings of fact
herein, to which refusal the counsel for the defendant did then and
there except."
The company brought the case here on error.
Page 85 U. S. 246
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Underwriters in a policy of marine insurance undertake, in
consideration of a certain premium, to indemnify the party insured
against loss arising from certain perils of the sea or sea risks to
which the ship, merchandise, or freight of the insured may be
exposed during a particular voyage of for a specified period of
time. Long experience shows
Page 85 U. S. 247
that such a system is essential to commerce, as it tends to
promote the spirit of maritime adventure by diminishing the risk of
ruinous loss to which those who engage in it would otherwise be
exposed. Losses of the kind cannot be prevented by any degree of
human forecast or skill, but the system of insurance, as practiced
among merchants, enables those engaged in such pursuits to provide
themselves with indemnity against the consequences of such
disasters. By such contracts, either associated capital becomes
pledged for such indemnity or the loss is so distributed among
different underwriters that the ultimate sufferers are not in
general seriously injured. Indemnity is the great object of the
insured, but the underwriter pursues the business as a means of
profit.
On the first of March, 1869, the defendant subscribed a time
policy of insurance in the sum of three thousand dollars, for a
premium of twelve percent net, upon the schooner
B. B.
Folsom, her tackle, apparel, and other furniture, valued at
thirty-five thousand dollars; in which policy it is recited that
the insurance is to the plaintiff on account of whom it may
concern, and in case of loss, to be paid in funds current in the
City of New York; and the policy contains the clause following,
to-wit: "insured at and from the first day of January, 1869, at
noon, until the first day of January, 1870, at noon," with liberty
to the insured, if on a passage at the expiration of the term, to
renew the policy for one, two, or three months, at the same rate of
premium, provided application be made to the company on or before
the expiration of the first term. Also "privileged to cancel the
policy at the expiration of six months,
pro rata premium
to be returned for time not used, no loss being claimed." Prior to
the date of the policy, to-wit, on the sixth of January in the same
year, the schooner set sail and departed from the port of Boston,
bound on a voyage to the port of Montevideo, laden with an assorted
cargo, and during the voyage she met with tempestuous weather, and
on the thirtieth of the same month, by the force of the wind and
waves was
Page 85 U. S. 248
wrecked, foundered, and sunk, and was wholly lost to the
plaintiff. Seasonable notice of the loss was given to the
defendants, and payment being refused, the plaintiff brought an
action of assumpsit to recover the amount insured. Service having
been made, the defendants appeared and pleaded the general issue,
and the parties having in due form waived a trial by jury, went to
trial before the court without a jury. Matters of fact were
accordingly submitted to the court, and the court found that the
defendants did undertake and promise the plaintiff in manner and
form as he, the plaintiff, in his writ and declaration had alleged,
and assessed damages for the plaintiff in the sum of three thousand
three hundred and forty-eight dollars and twenty cents, and the
court rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount so found.
Exceptions were filed by the defendants, and they sued out a writ
of error and removed the cause into this Court.
By the terms of the Act of Congress permitting issues of fact in
civil cases to be tried and determined by the court without the
intervention of a jury, it is provided that the finding of the
court upon the facts may be either general or special, and that the
finding shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury.
[
Footnote 2]
Where a jury is waived, as therein provided, and the issues of
fact are submitted to the court, the finding of the court may be
either general or special, as in cases where an issue of fact is
tried by a jury; but where the finding is general, the parties are
concluded by the determination of the court, except in cases where
exceptions are taken to the rulings of the court in the progress of
the trial. Such rulings, if duly presented by a bill of exceptions,
may be reviewed here, even though the finding is general, but the
finding of the court, if general, cannot be reviewed in this Court
by bill of exceptions or in any other manner. [
Footnote 3] Facts
Page 85 U. S. 249
found by a jury could only be reexamined under the rules of the
common law, either by the granting of a new trial by the court
where the issue was tried or to which the record was returnable, or
by the award of a
venire facias de novo by an appellate
court for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings.
[
Footnote 4] Nothing,
therefore, is open to reexamination in this case except such of the
rulings of the court made in the progress of the trial as are duly
presented by a bill of exceptions. [
Footnote 5] All matters of fact, under such a submission,
must be found by the circuit court and not by the Supreme Court, as
the act of Congress provides that the issues of fact may be tried
and determined by the circuit court where the suit is brought.
Inferences of fact must also be drawn by the circuit court, as it
is the circuit court and not the Supreme Court which, by the
agreement of the parties, is substituted for a jury. [
Footnote 6] None of these rules is new, as
they were established by numerous decisions of this Court long
before the act of Congress in question was enacted. [
Footnote 7] Propositions of fact found by the
court in a case where the trial by jury is waived, as provided in
the act of Congress, are equivalent to a special verdict, and the
Supreme Court will not examine the evidence on which the finding is
founded, as the Act of Congress contemplates that the finding shall
be by the circuit court; nor is the circuit court required to make
a special finding, as the act provides that the finding of the
circuit court may be either general or special, and that it shall
have the same effect as
Page 85 U. S. 250
the verdict of a jury. [
Footnote
8] Where a case is tried by the court without a jury, the bill
of exceptions brings up nothing for revision except what it would
have done had there been a jury trial. [
Footnote 9] Tested by these considerations, it is clear
that the exceptions of the defendants to the rulings of the court
refusing to make any special finding, as requested by their
counsel, may be overruled without any further remark.
Exception is also taken by the defendants to the refusal of the
court to decide that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff in
the opening was not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a
verdict.
Having introduced the policy, the plaintiff proved by the master
that the schooner, on the sixth of January prior to the date of the
policy, departed on her voyage, and that she was lost at the time
and by the means before stated. In addition to the incidents of the
loss, he also proved the circumstances under which the master and
crew were saved from the wreck and carried to the port of
Bremerhaven by the vessel which rescued them; that the master wrote
to the owner by the first mail from that place after their arrival
there, and that he was unable to use the telegraph, as he had no
funds to prepay a telegram. Due notice of the loss and of the
interest of the plaintiff having been admitted, the plaintiff
rested, and the defendants moved the court to decide that the
evidence was not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict,
which the court refused to do.
Suppose the motion is regarded as a motion for a nonsuit, it was
clearly one which could not be granted, as it is well settled law
that the circuit court does not possess the power to order a
peremptory nonsuit against the will of the plaintiff. [
Footnote 10] Power to grant a
peremptory nonsuit is not vested in a circuit court, but the
defendant may, if he sees fit, at the close of the plaintiff's
case, move the court to instruct
Page 85 U. S. 251
the jury that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff is not
sufficient to warrant the jury in finding a verdict in his favor,
and it is held that such a motion is not one addressed to the
discretion of the court, but that it presents a question of law,
and that it is as much the subject of exceptions as any other
ruling of the court in the course of the trial. [
Footnote 11] All things considered the
court is inclined, not without some hesitation, to regard the
motion as one of the latter character, and in that view it presents
the question whether, by the terms of the policy, the risk was
within it, as the proofs show that the loss occurred before the
policy was issued.
Policies of insurance intended to have a retroactive effect,
usually contain the words "lost or not lost," and the defendants
contend that the policy in this case, inasmuch as it does not
contain those words, does not cover the loss described in the
declaration; but it is well settled law that other words may be
employed in such a contract which will have the same operation and
legal effect, and it appears that the policy in this case, by its
express terms, was to commence on the first day of January, 1869,
and to continue until the first day of January, 1870. Elementary
writers and the decisions of the courts make it perfectly certain
that the phrase "lost or not lost" is not necessary to make a
policy retroactive. It is sufficient if it appear by the
description of the risk and the subject matter of the contract that
the policy was intended to cover a previous loss. Contracts of the
kind are as valid as those intended to cover a subsequent loss, if
it appears that the insured as well as the underwriter was ignorant
of the loss at the time the contract was made. [
Footnote 12]
Viewed in the light of these suggestions, it is quite clear
Page 85 U. S. 252
that it would have been error if the circuit court had decided
as requested by the defendants, and that the decision made by the
circuit court in denying the motion was correct.
Attempt was also made at the trial to set up the defense that
the plaintiff concealed material facts from the defendants at the
time the policy was granted, but the circuit court found that the
charge was not sustained by the evidence, which is all that need be
said upon the subject, as it is quite clear that the finding of the
circuit court, where the trial by jury is waived, as in this case,
is not the proper subject of review in the Supreme Court, to which
it may be added that if the rule were otherwise, the Court here
would be compelled to come to the same conclusion as that reached
by the circuit court.
Issues of fact, however, under such a submission are to be tried
and determined by the circuit court, and it is equally clear that
the findings of the circuit court, even when special, cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court except for the purpose of determining
whether the facts found are sufficient to support the judgment, as
the express provision is that the finding of the circuit court in
such a case shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury.
[
Footnote 13]
Exception was also taken to the ruling of the court in refusing
to admit as evidence the application for insurance when tendered by
the defendants in support of the defense of concealment.
Apparently it was offered to show that it did not state where
the vessel was at that time or from what port she had sailed or on
what voyage she was bound, but the court was of the opinion, and
ruled, that inasmuch as the instrument contained no statement in
respect to anyone of those matters, and that its terms were exactly
the same as those of the policy, the contents were immaterial to
the issue, as the contents could have no tendency to show that the
plaintiff, when he made the application, did not communicate to
the
Page 85 U. S. 253
defendants all the material facts and circumstances within his
knowledge, and answer truly all questions put to him in regard to
those several matters. [
Footnote
14] Evidently the burden of proof to establish such a defense
is upon the party pleading it, and the Court here is of the opinion
that the ruling of the circuit court, as fully explained in the
opinion given at the time, and in the opinion subsequently given
denying the motion for new trial, was correct. [
Footnote 15]
Special findings of fact were requested by the defendants, and
they excepted in numerous instances to the rulings of the court
refusing to comply with such requests, all of which are overruled
upon the ground that the finding of the circuit court upon the
facts may be either general or special, as heretofore more fully
explained. [
Footnote 16]
Requests that the court would adopt certain conclusions of law were
also presented by the defendants, in the nature of prayers for
instruction, as in cases where the issues of fact are tried by a
jury, which were refused by the circuit court, and the defendants
also excepted to such refusals. None of these exceptions has
respect to the rulings of the court in admitting or rejecting
evidence, nor to any other ruling of the circuit court which can
properly be denominated a ruling in the progress of the trial, as
everyone of the refusals excepted to appertain to some request made
to affect or control the final conclusion of the court as to the
plaintiff's right to recover. Such requests or prayers for
instruction, in the opinion of the Court, are not the proper
subjects of exception in cases where a jury is waived and the
issues of fact are submitted to the determination of the court.
[
Footnote 17] Exceptions are
allowed to the rulings of the court in the progress of the trial,
and the provision is that the review, if the finding is special,
may also extend to the determination of the sufficiency of the
facts found to support the judgment. Where the finding is
general,
Page 85 U. S. 254
as in this case, nothing is open to review but the rulings of
the court in the progress of the trial, and as none of the
last-named exceptions, which are the ones now under consideration,
were of that class, they are all overruled. [
Footnote 18] Like a special verdict, a special
finding furnishes the means of reviewing such questions of law
arising in the case as respect the sufficiency of the facts found
to support the judgment but where the finding is general the losing
party cannot claim the right to review any questions of law arising
in the case, except such as grow out of the rulings of the circuit
court in the progress of the trial, which do not in any proper
sense include the general finding of the circuit court nor the
conclusions of the circuit court embodied in such general finding,
as such findings are in the nature of a general verdict and
constitute the foundation of the judgment. No review of such a
finding can be made here under a writ of error unless it is
accompanied by an authorized special statement of the facts,
without imposing upon this Court the duty of hearing the whole
case, law and fact, as on an appeal in a chancery or in an
admiralty suit, which would operate as a repeal of the provisions
in the act of Congress that issues of fact in such cases may be
tried and determined by the circuit court, and would also violate
that clause of the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act,
which prohibits this Court from reversing any case "for any error
in fact." [
Footnote 19]
Whether any ruling of the circuit court other than the rulings
in admitting or rejecting evidence can properly be regarded "as
rulings in the progress of the trial," within the meaning of that
phrase in the Act of Congress, it is not necessary in this case to
decide, as it is clear that neither the general finding of the
circuit court nor the conclusions of the circuit court as embodied
in the general finding fall within that category.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 4, 13 Stat. at Large 501.
[
Footnote 2]
13 Stat. at Large 501.
[
Footnote 3]
Miller v. Insurance
Co., 12 Wall. 297;
Norris v.
Jackson, 9 Wall. 125;
Coddington
v. Richardson, 10 Wall. 516.
[
Footnote 4]
Parsons v.
Bedford, 2 Pet. 448; 2 Story on the Constitution §
1770.
[
Footnote 5]
Copelin v. Insurance
Co., 9 Wall. 461;
Basset
v. United States, 9 Wall. 40.
[
Footnote 6]
Tancred v. Christy, 12 Meeson & Welsby 323.
[
Footnote 7]
Bond v. Brown,
12 How. 254;
Penhallow v.
Doane, 3 Dall. 102;
Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3
Dall. 327 [argument of counsel -- omitted];
Jennings v.
Brig Perseverance, 3 Dall. 336;
Talbot v.
Seeman, 1 Cranch 38;
Saulet v.
Shepherd, 4 Wall. 502;
Faw v.
Roberdeau, 3 Cranch 177;
Dunlop
v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 270;
United
States v. Casks of Wine, 1 Pet. 550;
Hyde v.
Booream, 16 Pet. 176;
Archer v. Morehouse,
Hempstead 184;
Parsons v.
Bedford, 3 Pet. 434;
Craig
v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 427;
United
States v. King, 7 How. 853.
[
Footnote 8]
Copelin v. Insurance
Co., 9 Wall. 461;
Folsom v. Insurance Co.,
9 Blatchford 201.
[
Footnote 9]
Norris v.
Jackson, 9 Wall. 125;
Coddington
v. Richardson, 10 Wall. 516;
Miller v.
Insurance Co., 12 Wall. 285.
[
Footnote 10]
Elmore v.
Grymes, 1 Pet. 469;
Castle v.
Bullard, 23 How. 172.
[
Footnote 11]
Schuchardt v.
Allens, 1 Wall. 359;
Parks v.
Ross, 11 How. 362;
Bliven v.
New England Screw Co., 23 How. 433;
Toomey v.
Railway Co., 3 C.B.N.S. 150;
Ryder v. Wombwell, Law
Reports, 4 Exchequer, 39;
Giblin v. McMullen, Law Reports,
2 Privy Council, App 335.
[
Footnote 12]
Hammond v. Allen, 2 Sumner 396; 1 Phillips on Insurance
§ 925; 2 Parsons on Marine Insurance 44; 1 Arnould on Insurance 26;
2 Kent (11th ed.) 344;
Hallock v. Insurance Co., 2 Dutcher
268.
[
Footnote 13]
Insurance Co. v.
Tweed, 7 Wall. 51;
Generes v.
Bonnemer, 7 Wall. 564;
Norris
v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 127;
Flanders v.
Tweed, 9 Wall. 428;
Dirst
v. Morris, 14 Wall. 490;
Richmond v.
Smith, 15 Wall. 437;
Bethel v.
Mathews, 13 Wall. 2.
[
Footnote 14]
Same Case, 8 Blatchford 170;
Same Case, 9
id. 202.
[
Footnote 15]
Vandervoort v. Columbia Insurance Co., 2 Caines 160;
Insurance Co. v.
Lyman, 15 Wall. 670;
Rawls v. American Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 27 N.Y. 297.
[
Footnote 16]
13 Stat. at Large 501.
[
Footnote 17]
Dirst v.
Morris, 14 Wall. 490.
[
Footnote 18]
Dirst v.
Morris, 14 Wall. 490.
[
Footnote 19]
1 Stat. at Large 85.
