1. The provision in the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States which declares that no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States than
according to the rules of the common law applies to the facts tried
by a jury in a cause in a state court.
2. So much of the 5th section of the Act of Congress of March 3,
1863, entitled "An act relating to habeas corpus and regulating
proceedings in certain cases," as provides for the removal of a
judgment in a state court, and in which the cause was tried by a
jury, to the circuit court of the United States for a retrial on
the facts and law is not in pursuance of the Constitution, and is
void.
Patrie brought a suit for an assault and battery and false
Page 76 U. S. 275
imprisonment against Murray and Buckley in the Supreme Court of
the Third District of New York, to which the defendants pleaded the
general issue and pleaded further as a special defense that the
said Murray was Marshal of the Southern District of New York, and
the said Buckley his deputy, and that as such marshal, he, Murray,
was, by order of the President, on or about the 28th August, 1862,
directed to take the plaintiff into custody; that the said Buckley,
as such deputy, was directed by him, the marshal, to execute the
said order; and that, acting as such deputy and in pursuance of his
directions, he, Buckley, did, in a lawful manner, and without force
or violence, take the said Patrie into custody; that during all the
time he was in custody, he was kept and detained in pursuance of
said order of the President, and not otherwise.
In December following, a writ of error was issued to the Supreme
Court of the Third District to remove the cause to the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
The writ was issued under the 5th section of an Act of Congress
passed March 3, 1863, entitled "An act relating to Habeas Corpus,
and regulating proceedings in certain cases." The 5th section of
this act provides as follows:
"If any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or
shall be commenced in any state court, against any officer, civil
or military, . . . or for any arrest or imprisonment made . . . at
any time during the present rebellion, by virtue or under color of
any authority by or under the President of the United States, . . .
it shall . . . be competent for either party, within six months
after the rendition of a judgment in any such cause,
Page 76 U. S. 276
by writ of error or other process, to remove the same to the
circuit court of the United States for that district in which such
judgment shall have been rendered, and the said circuit court shall
thereupon proceed to try and determine the facts and law in such
action in the same manner as if the same had been there originally
commenced, the judgment in such case notwithstanding."
The state court refused to make a return to the writ of error.
Thereupon an alternative mandamus was issued by the circuit court
of the United States, to which a return was made setting forth the
suit, trial, and judgment already referred to. To this there was a
demurrer and joinder, and, after due consideration, the demurrer
was sustained and a judgment for a peremptory mandamus rendered.
From this judgment a writ of error was taken to this Court.
[
Footnote 1]
Page 76 U. S. 277
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case has received the most deliberate consideration of the
Court. As we have arrived at the conclusion that the Seventh
Amendment, upon its true construction, applies to a cause tried by
a jury in a state court, this opinion will be confined to
considerations involved in the second question submitted to us for
argument at the bar. The decision of that in the affirmative
disposes of the case.
The Seventh Amendment is as follows:
"In suits at common law where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the
common law."
It must be admitted that according to the construction uniformly
given to the first clause of this amendment, the suits there
mentioned are confined to those in the federal courts, and the
argument is perhaps more than plausible which is that the words,
"and no fact tried by a jury," mentioned in the second, relate to
the trial by jury as provided for in the previous clause. We have
felt the full force of this argument, and if the two clauses were
necessarily to be construed together and to be regarded as
inseparable, we think the argument would be conclusive. But this is
not the view that has been taken of it by this Court. In
Parsons v. Bedford, [
Footnote 2] Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion
of the Court referring to this part of the amendment, observed
"that it should be read as a substantial and independent clause,"
and that it was "a prohibition to the courts of the United States
to reexamine any facts tried by a jury in any other manner." The
history of the amendment confirms this view. [
Footnote 3] He further observed that
"the only modes
Page 76 U. S. 278
known to the common law to reexamine such facts was the granting
of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried or the award
of a
venire facias de novo by the appellate court for some
error of law that had intervened in the proceedings."
Another argument mainly relied upon against this construction is
that the ten amendments proposed by Congress and adopted by the
states are limitations upon the powers of the federal government,
and not upon the states, and we are referred to the cases of
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore; [
Footnote 4]
Lessee of Livingston v.
Moore; [
Footnote 5]
Twitchell v. Commonwealth, [
Footnote 6] as authorities for the position. This is
admitted, and it follows that the Seventh Amendment could not be
invoked in a state court to prohibit it from reexamining, on a writ
of error, facts that had been tried by a jury in the court below.
But this would seem to be the only consequence deducible from these
cases or from the principles they assert. They have no pertinent,
much less authoritative, application to the question in hand. That
question is not whether the limitation in the amendment has any
effect as to the powers of an appellate state court, but what is
its effect upon the powers of the federal appellate court? Is the
limitation confined to cases of writs of error to the inferior
federal courts, or does it not also apply to writs of error to
state courts in cases involving federal questions? The latter is
the precise question for our determination. Now it will be admitted
that the amendment, in terms, makes no such discrimination. They
are: "and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in
any court of the United States than according to the rules of the
common law." It is admitted that the clause applies to the
appellate powers of the Supreme Court of the United States in all
common law cases coming up from an inferior federal court, and also
to the circuit court in like cases, in the exercise of its
appellate powers. And why not, as it respects the exercise of these
powers in cases of federal cognizance
Page 76 U. S. 279
coming up from a state court? The terms of the amendment are
general, and contain no qualification in respect to the restriction
upon the appellate jurisdiction of the courts except as to the
class of cases, namely, suits at common law, where the trial has
been by jury. The natural inference is that no other was intended.
Its language, upon any reasonable, if not necessary,
interpretation, we think, applies to this entire class, no matter
from what court the case comes, of which cognizance can be taken by
the appellate court.
It seems to us also that cases of federal cognizance, coming up
from state courts, are not only within the words, but are also
within the reason and policy of the amendment. They are cases
involving questions arising under the Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties, or under some other federal authority,
and therefore are as completely within the exercise of the judicial
power of the United States -- as much so as if the cases had been
originally brought in some inferior federal court. No other cases
tried in the state courts can be brought under the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court or any inferior federal court on which
appellate jurisdiction may have been conferred. The case must be
one involving some federal question, and it is difficult to
perceive any sensible reason for the distinction that is attempted
to be made between the reexamination by the appellate court of a
case coming up from an inferior federal, and one of the class above
mentioned coming up from a state court. In both instances, the
cases are to be disposed of by the same system of laws and by the
same judicial tribunal.
Mr. Hamilton, in the 82d number of the Federalist, speaking of
the relation that would subsist between the national and state
courts in the instances of concurrent jurisdiction, observes that
the Constitution, in direct terms, gives an appellate jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court in all the enumerated cases of federal
cognizance in which it is not to have an original one, without a
single expression to confine its operations to the inferior federal
courts. The objects of
Page 76 U. S. 280
appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone
contemplated. From this circumstance, he observes, and from the
reason of the thing, it ought to be construed to extend to the
state tribunals.
"The courts of the latter will, of course, be national
auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the Union, and an
appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal which is
destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice
and the rules of national decisions."
This idea of calling to the aid of the federal judiciary the
state tribunals by leaving to them concurrent jurisdiction in which
federal questions might be involved, with the right of appeal to
the Supreme Court, will be found to be extensively acted upon in
the distribution of the judicial powers of the United States in the
act of 1789, known as the Judiciary Act. Besides the general
concurrent jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act, a striking instance
of this is found in the 33d section of the act, which provides
"That for any crime or offense against the United States the
offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by
any justice of the peace or other magistrate of any of the United
States where he may be found, agreeably to the usual mode of
process against offenders in such state and at the expense of the
United States, be arrested and imprisoned or bailed, as the case
may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by this
act has cognizance of the offense."
And a series of acts were also passed in the earlier sessions of
Congress conferring upon the state and county courts cognizance to
hear and determine upon offenses, penalties, and forfeitures, and
for the collection of taxes and duties arising and payable under
the revenue laws, or under a direct tax or internal duties, and
which were continued down till the state courts refused to
entertain jurisdiction of the same. [
Footnote 7] The state courts of New York continued to
exercise jurisdiction under these acts till as late as 1819.
[
Footnote 8]
The reasons, therefore, for the application of this clause
Page 76 U. S. 281
of the Seventh Amendment to cases coming up for review from the
state courts were as strong as in cases from the inferior federal
courts, and the history of the amendment will show that it was the
apprehension and alarm in respect to the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court over cases tried by a jury in the state courts that led
mainly to its adoption.
The appellate jurisdiction of this Court, after defining its
original jurisdiction, is as follows:
"In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make."
Mr. Hamilton, in the 81st number of the Federalist, after
quoting the provision observes:
"The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely
called in question in regard to matters of law, but the clamors
have been loud against it as applied to matters of fact. Some well
intentioned men in this state, deriving their notions from the
language and forms which obtain in our courts, have been induced to
consider it as an implied supersedure of the trial by jury in favor
of the civil law mode of trial."
And the then enters into an argument to show that there is no
real ground for alarm or apprehension on the subject, and suggests
some regulations by Congress by which the objections would be
removed. He observes also that it would have been impracticable for
the Convention to have made an express exception of cases which had
been originally tried by a jury, because in the courts of some of
the states, all causes were tried in this mode, and such exception
would preclude the revision of matters of fact as well where it
might be proper as where it might be improper. He then suggests
that Congress has full power to provide that in appeals to the
Supreme Court, there should be no reexamination of the facts where
the causes had been tried by a jury according to the common law
mode of proceeding. Now it is quite clear that the restrictions
upon this appellate power by Congress pointed out by Mr. Hamilton
for the purpose of quieting the public mind had a direct reference
to the revision of the
Page 76 U. S. 282
judgments of the state courts as well as the inferior federal,
and what is significant on the subject is that the amendment
submitted in the first session of Congress by Mr. Madison adopts
the restriction suggested by Hamilton, and almost in the same
words. We will simply add there is nothing in the history of the
amendment indicating that it was intended to be confined to cases
coming up for revision from the inferior federal courts, but much
is there found to the contrary. [
Footnote 9]
Our conclusion is that no much of the 5th section of the Act of
Congress, March 3, 1863, entitled "An act relating to habeas corpus
and regulating proceedings in certain cases," as provides for the
removal of a judgment in a state court and in which the cause was
tried by a jury to the circuit court of the United States for a
retrial on the facts and law is not in pursuance of the
Constitution, and is void.
The judgment of the court below must therefore be reversed
and the cause remanded with direction to dismiss the writ of error
and all proceedings under it.
[
Footnote 1]
The alternative and peremptory mandamus against the supreme
court of New York was allowed by consent of the counsel for the
defendants, with a view to present the question raised and decided
in the case. The circuit court had refused to issue it against the
court, and issued it only against the clerk. This is stated to
prevent the case from being cited as an authority for the power,
and without intending to express any opinion on this subject. S.
N.
[
Footnote 2]
28 U. S. 3 Pet.
447,
28 U. S.
448.
[
Footnote 3]
Debates in Congress, by Gales & Seaton, vol. 1, pp. 452,
458, 784.
[
Footnote 4]
32 U. S. 7 Pet.
243.
[
Footnote 5]
32 U. S. 7 Pet.
551.
[
Footnote 6]
74 U. S. 7 Wall.
321.
[
Footnote 7]
1 Brightly's Digest 281 and note
g, p. 282.
[
Footnote 8]
United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johnson 4.
[
Footnote 9]
Whetherbee v. Johnson, 14 Mass. 412;
Patrie v.
Murray, 43 Barbour 331.