1. The principal of the preceding decision affirmed and applied
to a case, where, although the
mode of collecting the tax
on the article made in the state was different from the mode of
collecting the tax on the articles brought from another state into
it, yet the amount paid was, in fact, the same on the same article
in whatever state made.
2. The effect of the act being such as just described, it was
held to institute no legislation which discriminated against the
products of sister states, but merely to subject them to the same
rate of taxation which similar articles paid that were manufactured
within the state; and accordingly that it was not an attempt to
regulate commerce, but an appropriate and legitimate, exercise of
the taxing power of the states.
The case was this:
With the same provisions of the Constitution as are quoted in
the last case in force (
supra, p. <|75 U.S.
123|>123) the State of Alabama passed a statute, approved
February 22, 1866, which, by its 13th section enacted:
"Before it shall be lawful for any dealer or dealers in
spirituous liquors to offer any such liquors for sale within the
limits of this state, such dealer or dealers
introducing any
such liquors into the state for sale shall first pay the tax
collector of the county into which such liquors are introduced a
tax of
fifty cents per gallon upon each and every gallon
thereof."
Two subsequent sections, the 14th and 15th, provided the mode of
enforcing the collection of the tax thus imposed.
Previous sections of the statute, it ought to be mentioned, laid
a tax of fifty cents per gallon on all whiskey and all brandy from
fruits
manufactured in the state, and in order to collect
this tax, enacted that every distiller should take out a license
and make regular returns of the amount of distilled spirits
manufactured by him. On this he was to pay the fifty cents per
gallon.
With this statute in force, Hinson, a merchant of Mobile, filed
a bill against the tax collector for the city of Mobile, and state
of Alabama, in which he set forth that he had
Page 75 U. S. 149
on hand five barrels of whiskey consigned to him by one Dexter,
of the State of Ohio, to be sold on account of the latter in the
State of Alabama, and that he had five other barrels, purchased by
himself in the State of Louisiana, and that he had brandy and wine
imported from abroad (upon which he had paid the import duties laid
by the United States, at the custom house at Mobile), all of which
liquors he now held and was offering for sale in the same packages
in which they were imported, and not otherwise; that the tax
collector was about to enforce the collection of state and county
taxes on the said liquors, for which he set up the authority of the
13th, 14th and 15th sections of the already quoted act of the
Alabama Legislature. Hinson insisted that this act was void as
being in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and
prayed an injunction. The defendant demurred.
On final hearing, in the Supreme Court of Alabama, that court
gave an elaborate opinion. Referring to the clause of the
Constitution, which says, that "Congress shall have power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states," it admitted that opinions were to be found in the reports
of the federal courts that the power was exclusive; but that the
better opinions were otherwise; and while, if Congress exercised
this power, all conflicting legislation would give way, yet,
subject to the superior power in Congress, the states might
legislate. It proceeded:
"There is no act of Congress with which a state tax upon liquor,
introduced from other states, can interfere, and, therefore, it is
permissible for the state to impose a tax upon the sale of liquor
introduced from another state. Such a tax is not only
constitutional, but it is obviously just and proper, for a tax to
the same extent is imposed upon liquor manufactured in the
state."
"It is admitted that the law under consideration is broad enough
to apply to liquors imported from foreign countries, but it is void
only so far as it is in collision with the acts of Congress on that
subject."
Accordingly, the relief prayed was granted as to all but the
state tax, and relief as to that was granted as to goods
Page 75 U. S. 150
imported from abroad, but the state tax of fifty cents per
gallon on the whiskey of Dexter, of Ohio, and that purchased by
plaintiff in Louisiana was held to be valid.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court
In the argument of this case no reference has been made to any
other section than the 13th of the statute in question.
If this section stood alone in the legislation of Alabama on the
subject of taxing liquors, the effect of it would be that all such
liquors brought into the state from other states and offered for
sale, whether in the original casks by which they came into the
state or by retail in smaller quantities, would be subject to a
heavy tax, while the same class of liquors manufactured in the
state would escape the tax. It is obvious that the right to impose
any such discriminating tax, if it exist at all, cannot be limited
in amount, and that a tax under the same authority can as readily
be laid which would amount to an absolute prohibition to sell
liquors introduced from without while the privilege would remain
unobstructed in regard to articles made in the state. If this can
be done in reference to liquors, it can be done with reference to
all the products of a sister state, and in this mode one state can
establish a complete system of nonintercourse in her commercial
relations with all the other states of the Union.
We have decided, in the case of
Woodruff v. Parham,
immediately
Page 75 U. S. 151
preceding, that the constitutional provision against taxing
imports by the states does not extend to articles brought from a
sister state. But if this were otherwise, and we could hold that as
to such articles the rule laid down in
Brown v. Maryland
concerning foreign imports applied, it would prevent but a very
little of the evil which we have described, for under the decision
in that case, it is only while the goods so imported were held in
the original unbroken condition in which they came into the state
and in the hands of the first importer that they would be protected
from state taxation. As soon as they passed out of his hands into
use, or were offered for sale among the community at large, they
would be liable to a tax which might render their use or sale
impossible.
But while the case has been argued here with a principal
reference to the supposed prohibition against taxing imports, it is
to be seen from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama
delivered in this case that the clause of the Constitution which
gives to Congress the right to regulate commerce among the states
was supposed to present a serious objection to the validity of the
Alabama statute. Nor can it be doubted that a tax which so
seriously affects the interchange of commodities between the states
as to essentially impede or seriously interfere with it is a
regulation of commerce. And it is also true, as conceded in that
opinion, that Congress has the same right to regulate commerce
among the states that it has to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and that whenever it exercises that power, all conflicting
state laws must give way, and that if Congress had made any
regulation covering the matter in question, we need inquire no
further.
That court seems to have relieved itself of the objection by
holding that the tax imposed by the State of Alabama was an
exercise of the concurrent right of regulating commerce remaining
with the states until some regulation on the subject had been made
by Congress. But, assuming the tax to be, as we have supposed, a
discriminating tax, levied exclusively upon the products of sister
states, and
Page 75 U. S. 152
looking to the consequences which the exercise of this power may
produce if it be once conceded, amounting, as we have seen, to a
total abolition of all commercial intercourse between the states,
under the cloak of the taxing power, we are not prepared to admit
that a state can exercise such a power, though Congress may have
failed to act on the subject in any manner whatever.
The question of the nature of the power to regulate commerce and
how far that power is exclusively vested in Congress, has always
been a difficult one, and has seldom been construed in this Court
with unanimity. In the very latest case on this subject,
Crandall v. Nevada, * THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD held that a tax on persons passing through
the state by railroads or other public conveyances was forbidden to
the states by that provision of the Constitution
proprio
vigore, and in the absence of any legislation by Congress on
the subject, while a majority of the Court, preferring to place the
invalidity of the tax on other grounds, merely expressed their
inability, on a review of the cases previously decided, to take
that view of the question. But in that case the opinion of the
Court in
Cooley v. Port Wardens was approved, which holds
that there is a class of legislation of a general nature, affecting
the commercial interests of all the states, which, from its
essential character, is national and which must, so far as it
affects these interests belong exclusively to the federal
government.
The tax in the case before us, if it were of the character we
have suggested, discriminating adversely to the products of all the
other states in favor of those of Alabama and involving a principle
which might lead to actual commercial nonintercourse, would, in our
opinion, belong to that class of legislation and be forbidden by
the clause of the Constitution just mentioned.
But a careful examination of that statute shows that it is not
obnoxious to this objection. A tax is imposed by the previous
sections of the same act of fifty cents per gallon on
Page 75 U. S. 153
all whiskey and all brandy from fruits manufactured in the
state. In order to collect this tax, every distiller is compelled
to take our a license and to make regular returns of the amount of
distilled spirits manufactured by him. On this he pays fifty cents
per gallon. So that when we come in the light of these earlier
sections of the act, to examine the 13th, 14th, and 15th sections,
it is found that no greater tax is laid on liquors brought into the
state than on those manufactured within it. And it is clear that
whereas collecting the tax of the distiller was supposed to be the
most expedient mode of securing its payment, as to liquors
manufactured within the state, the tax on those who sold liquors
brought in from other states was only the complementary provision
necessary to make the tax equal on all liquors sold in the state.
As the effect of the act is such as we have described and it
institutes no legislation which discriminates against the products
of sister states, but merely subjects them to the same rate of
taxation which similar articles pay that are manufactured within
the state, we do not see in it an attempt to regulate commerce, but
an appropriate and legitimate exercise of the taxing power of the
states.
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE NELSON dissented.
See his opinion in the
preceding case,
supra, p. <|75 U.S. 140|>140.
*
73 U. S. 6 Wall.
35.
