1. In all cases where a maritime lien arises, the original
jurisdiction to enforce it by a proceeding
in rem is
exclusive in the district courts of the United States, as provided
by the ninth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
2. State legislatures have no authority to create maritime
liens, nor can they confer jurisdiction upon a state court to
enforce such a lien by a suit or proceeding
in rem, as
practiced in admiralty courts,
3. Upon an ordinary contract of affreightment, the lien of the
shipper is a maritime lien, and a proceeding
in rem to
enforce it is within the exclusive
Page 74 U. S. 625
original cognizance of the district courts of the United States,
albeit the contract be for transportation between ports and places
within the same state and all the parties be citizens of the same
state, provided only that such contract be for transportation upon
navigable waters to which the general jurisdiction of the admiralty
extends.
4. The "saving," in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, "to
suitors, in all cases, of the right of a common law remedy, where
the common law is competent to give it" does not authorize a
proceeding
in rem to enforce a maritime lien in a common
law court, whether state or federal. Common law remedies are not
applicable to enforce such a lien, but are suits
in
personam, though such suits, under special statutes, may be
commenced by attachment of the property of the debtor. Proceedings
in a suit at common law on a contract of affreightment are the same
as in suits on contracts not regarded as maritime, wholly
irrespective of the fact that the injured party might have sought
redress in the admiralty. The judgment in such a case is not
against the vessel as the offending thing, but against the parties
who have violated their contract, and can only affect the vessel so
far as the defendants may have property therein.
5. These principles applied to the provision of the statute of
7th October, 1864, of the State of Alabama, under which contracts
of affreightment are authorized to be enforced
in rem
through courts of the state by proceedings the same in form as
those used in courts of admiralty of the United States, and the
statute held unconstitutional and void.
The case was thus:
The Constitution ordains that the judicial power of the United
States shall extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." And the ninth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789
provides that the district courts of the United States
"Shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, . . .
saving to suitors in
all cases the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it."
In this state of federal law, fundamental and statutory, the
State of Alabama, by enactments, entitled "PROCEEDINGS IN
ADMIRALTY," [
Footnote 1]
provided that there should be a lien on all vessels for work and
materials done or furnished and for all debts contracted by the
master, owner or consignee
Page 74 U. S. 626
and for the wages of the officers, crew &c., in preference
to other debts due from the owners thereof. By the terms of the
code, the lien is to be asserted by filing a complaint in any
county in which the vessel may be found, stating the amount and
nature of the claim and praying a seizure of the vessel. Thereupon
the clerk is to issue a writ commanding the sheriff to seize the
vessel, her tackle, apparel and furniture. At any time before
judgment, the master, owner or other persons may release the vessel
by entering into bond in double the amount of the claim stipulating
to pay the amount of the judgment. Any number of persons may unite
in the same complaint, and if more than one complaint be filed, the
court must consolidate them and render but one judgment against the
vessel, which is to be considered several as to each complainant.
If a stipulation be entered into, the stipulators are defendants.
If none, the court must render a judgment
ex parte
condemning the boat, tackle &c., to be sold in satisfaction of
the claim, and the affidavit of complainant is made presumptive
evidence of the justice of the demand.
Finally, the code provides that,
"unless where otherwise provided in this chapter, the
proceedings to enforce the lien shall be the same as in the
courts of admiralty of the United States,
but either
party may have any question of fact decided by a jury, upon an
issue made up under direction of the court."
By the act of 7th October, 1864, "to amend the
admiralty
laws of the state," these provisions are extended to the
contract of
affreightment.
Under this statute, Boone & Co. filed their libel, March 30,
1866, in the
City Court of Mobile, claiming $5,800 for the
loss of certain bales of cotton shipped to them from Vienna,
in
the State of Alabama, to Mobile,
in the same state,
and prayed
"process in admiralty" for the seizure of the
steamboat
Belfast.
In the same court a libel was also filed by J. & S. Steers,
claiming compensation for other bales, shipped by them from
Columbus,
Mississippi, to Mobile, in
Alabama,
already mentioned. And a libel by Watson & Co. claiming it for
cotton shipped by them, from and to the same points.
Page 74 U. S. 627
All the navigation which was the subject of the case was upon
the Tombigbee River, navigable water of the United States.
Under these several libels, the sheriff, by virtue of writs of
seizure, took the steamer into possession and posted his monitions,
and the causes under the statute were consolidated and heard
together. The answer, applicable to the three cases alike, set
forth that the steamer was duly enrolled and licensed in pursuance
of laws of the United States, and that on the 15th January, 1866,
she was regularly cleared at Mobile, Alabama, for Columbus,
Mississippi, and that on her downward trip, the cotton claimed was
lost, and therefore that the city court had
no
jurisdiction.
A decree was rendered on 28 July for the three libellants.
Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Alabama, where one
assignment of errors was: "That the city court erred in overruling
the protest to the jurisdiction." The decree of the city court was,
however, affirmed by the supreme court, and deciding, as that court
thus did, in favor of the validity of a statute of a state drawn in
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the laws of the
United States, the case was brought here under the twenty-fifth
section of the Judiciary Act.
Not much contesting the point that if the court had no
jurisdiction in the two cases where the carriage was not wholly
within one state no agreement below could authorize what it did
about these two (jurisdiction being of course to be conferred by
the law alone), the matter of debate was reduced here chiefly to
the first case -- that, namely, of Boone & Co. -- where the
whole carriage was within the State of Alabama and to the question
of constitutional law arising upon
it, to-wit: whether the
contract, made as it was for the transportation of goods from one
place to another both in the same state and without the goods being
carried
in transitu into or through any other state or
foreign dominion, was a contract which could be enforced by a
proceeding in admiralty in the federal courts alone.
Page 74 U. S. 628
If the state court had no jurisdiction in that case,
a
fortiori it could have none in the two others.
Page 74 U. S. 631
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Persons furnishing materials or supplies for ships or vessels
within the State of Alabama have a lien by the law of that state on
the same for all debts contracted by the master, owner, or
consignee thereof for the work done, and for the materials and
supplies furnished, in preference to other debts due and owing from
the owners of such ships or vessels. By the code of that state it
is also provided, under the title "proceedings in admiralty," that
whenever any steamboat or other watercraft shall receive on board,
as a common carrier, any goods or merchandise as freight to be
delivered at any specified place and shall fail to deliver the same
as directed in the bill of lading or other contract of shipment,
the owner or consignee of such goods or merchandise shall have a
lien on such boat or other watercraft
Page 74 U. S. 632
for his loss or damage, to be enforced in the same manner and
subject to the rules and regulations prescribed in relation to
similar liens for labor, materials, and supplies furnished to such
steamboats or other watercraft as described in the antecedent
provision. [
Footnote 2]
Pursuant to those statutory rules and regulations of the state,
the libel in this case was filed in the City Court of Mobile, and
the libellants alleged that they, on the twenty-third of January,
1866, shipped on board the steamboat
Belfast, then lying
at Vienna in that state, one hundred bales of cotton to be
transported to Mobile, in the same state, and there to be delivered
to certain consignees, they paying freight therefor at the rate of
five dollars per bale, the dangers of the river excepted; that on
the way down the river, below Vienna, twenty-nine bales of the
cotton were lost not by the dangers of the river, and were never
delivered to the consignees, whereby the libellants suffered loss
to the amount of five thousand eight hundred dollars. Introductory
allegations of the libel, also, are the same as in a libel
in
rem in the district courts of the United States, and in
conclusion, the "libellants pray process in admiralty" against the
steamer, "her tackle, apparel, and furniture," and that the same
may be condemned to satisfy their damages and costs. Process was
accordingly issued commanding the sheriff to seize and take the
steamer &c., into his possession, and to hold the same until
released by due course of law. Respondents appeared as claimants
and alleged that they were the owners of the steamer, and they
admitted that the cotton was shipped on board at the time and
place, and on the terms and for the purpose alleged in the libel;
but they excepted to the jurisdiction of the court and alleged that
the steamer, at the time the cotton was shipped, was duly enrolled
and licensed under the laws of the United States; that she was then
and there regularly engaged in commerce and navigation between the
City of Columbus, in the State of Mississippi, and the City of
Mobile, in
Page 74 U. S. 633
the State of Alabama, and that the cotton described in the libel
was lost in her trip down the river from the former city to her
port of destination. Defense of the respondents upon the merits was
that the steamer and cargo were captured by a band of robbers in
the trip down the river, within the ebb and flow of the tide and
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States, and without any negligence or fault on the part of the
officers and crew of the steamer. They also set up the defense that
it was agreed between the master and the shippers that the vessel
should not be liable for the loss of the cotton if it was captured
by armed men during the voyage without any negligence or fault on
the part of the carrier. Libellants excepted to that part of the
answer denying the jurisdiction of the court as insufficient and
invalid, and they also excepted to the defense, as pleaded, that
the steamer was robbed of the cotton, as no bar to a recovery in
the case, and the court sustained the views of the libellants in
both particulars, and the respondents excepted to the respective
rulings of the court.
Two other consignments of cotton were also on board the steamer
at the time the alleged robbery occurred. Ninety bales were shipped
by J. H. Steers & Company at Columbus, and one hundred bales
were shipped by John Watson & Company at the same place. Both
shipments were to be transported to the port of Mobile, and there
to be delivered to certain consignees under a similar contract of
affreightment as that alleged in the first case, except as to the
price to be paid for the transportation. Steers & Company lost
thirty-four bales of their shipment, and Watson & Company lost
thirty bales, as alleged by the respective parties. Libels in the
same form were also filed by those parties about the same time in
the same court, and the owners of the steamer appeared in each case
as claimants and pleaded the same defenses in the three cases.
Evidence was introduced by the respective libellants proving
that the entire cotton lost and not delivered was of the value of
four thousand dollars. They also introduced
Page 74 U. S. 634
the several bills of lading, and the respondents admitted the
shipments as alleged in the respective libels. On the other hand,
the libellants admitted that the steamer was robbed as alleged in
the answer, and without any neglect or fault of the owners of the
steamer or those in charge of her navigation.
Agreement of the parties, as stated in the bill of exceptions,
was that the three cases should be tried together, and they were
all submitted at the same time and upon the same issues. Finding of
the court was that the whole loss in the three cases was four
thousand dollars, and of that sum the decree of the court allowed
one thousand dollars to the libellants in the first case, fourteen
hundred dollars to the libellants in the second case, and sixteen
hundred dollars to the libellants in the third case, with costs to
the prevailing party.
Exceptions were seasonably tendered by the respondents to the
rulings and decision of the court, and the exceptions were duly
allowed by the court. Appeals were then taken by the respondents to
the supreme court of the state, where the objections to the
jurisdiction of the court were renewed in the formal assignment of
errors. The parties were heard, but the court overruled the
objections to the jurisdiction of the court and affirmed the
respective decrees rendered in the subordinate court. Writs of
error were then sued out under the twenty-fifth section of the
Judiciary Act, and the respective causes were removed into this
Court.
Jurisdiction of this Court to reexamine the questions presented
in the pleadings may be assumed as existing without discussion, as
it is conceded that the questions are the same as were raised and
decided in the state courts, and it is not controverted that the
questions are such as may be reexamined here under the twenty-fifth
section of the Judiciary Act.
Theory of the respondents is that the respective libels were
libels
in rem to enforce a maritime lien in favor of the
shippers of the cotton under contracts of affreightment for the
transportation of goods and merchandise from one port
Page 74 U. S. 635
to another upon navigable waters, and that the state courts have
no jurisdiction to employ such a process to enforce such a lien in
any case; that the jurisdiction to enforce a maritime lien by a
proceeding
in rem is exclusively vested in the federal
courts by the Constitution of the United States and the laws of
Congress. But the libellants controvert that proposition and insist
that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in these cases
under that clause in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, which
saves "to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy
where the common law is competent to give it." [
Footnote 3]
2. They also contend, if their first proposition is not
sustained, that inasmuch as the three cases were heard together
under an agreement that they should be tried upon the same issues,
and that the libel filed by W. C. Boon & Company, as stated in
the bill of exceptions, was selected as the case to be tried in the
court where the suits were commenced, the rights of the parties in
the other two cases must abide the decision of this Court in that
case.
Assuming that to be so, then they contend that the state court
had jurisdiction in the first case, because the contract of
affreightment was for the transportation of goods and merchandise
between ports and places in the same state. Impliedly the argument
admits that the rule is otherwise where the contract is for the
transportation of goods and merchandise between ports and places in
different states, but the proposition is that where the
contract is between citizens of the same state for the
transportation of goods and merchandise from one port to another in
the same state, the case is not one within the jurisdiction of the
admiralty courts of the United States unless it becomes necessary,
in the course of the voyage, to carry the goods or merchandise into
or through some
other state or foreign dominion.
Obviously the questions presented are questions of very great
importance as affecting the construction of the federal
Constitution and the rights and remedies of the citizens
Page 74 U. S. 636
engaged in an important and lucrative branch of commerce and
navigation.
Judicial power to hear and determine controversies in admiralty,
like other judicial power, was conferred upon the government of the
United States by the federal Constitution, and by the express terms
of the instrument it extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, which doubtless must be held to mean all such cases
of a maritime character as were cognizable in the admiralty courts
of the states at the time the Constitution was adopted. [
Footnote 4]
Admiralty jurisdiction, as exercised in the federal courts, is
not restricted to the subjects cognizable in the English courts of
admiralty at the date of the Revolution, nor is it as extensive as
that exercised by the continental courts, organized under and
governed by the principles of the civil law. [
Footnote 5]
Best guides as to the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of
the federal courts are the Constitution of the United States, the
laws of Congress, and the decisions of this Court.
Two of the contracts of affreightment in these cases were for
the transportation of cotton between ports and places in different
states, but as the contract alleged in the libel filed in the first
case was for the transportation of cotton from one port to another
in the same state, it becomes necessary to determine, irrespective
of the questions presented in the other cases, whether such a
contract is cognizable in the admiralty courts of the United
States, because if not, the libellants in any view of the case must
prevail, as there would be, in that state of the case, no
jurisdiction in this Court to reexamine the decision of the state
court in that case.
Much controversy has existed as to the true extent of the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts, but
great aid will be derived in the solution of this question by an
examination of the decisions of this Court at different periods
since the judicial system of the United States was organized.
Page 74 U. S. 637
Principal subjects of admiralty jurisdiction are maritime
contracts and maritime torts, including captures
jure
belli and seizures on water for municipal and revenue
forfeitures.
(1) Contracts, claims, or service, purely maritime, and touching
rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation, are
cognizable in the admiralty. [
Footnote 6]
(2) Torts or injuries committed on navigable waters of a civil
nature are also cognizable in the admiralty courts.
Jurisdiction in the former case depends upon the nature of the
contract, but in the latter it depends entirely upon locality.
Mistakes need not be made if these rules are observed, but
contracts to be performed on waters not navigable are not maritime
any more than those made to be performed on land. Nor are torts
cognizable in the admiralty unless committed on waters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as defined by law. [
Footnote 7]
Such jurisdiction, whether of torts or of contracts, was and
still is restricted in the parent country to tidewaters, as they
have no large fresh water lakes or fresh water rivers which are
navigable. Waters where the tide did not ebb and flow were regarded
in that country as not within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, and such was the decision of this Court in the case
of
The Jefferson, [
Footnote 8] and the rule established in that case was
followed for more than a quarter of a century.
Attempt was subsequently made to restrict the jurisdiction of
the admiralty courts in torts to cases arising on the high seas,
but this Court held that it extended to all waters within the ebb
and flow of the tide, though
infra corpus comitatus, and
as far up the rivers emptying into the sea or bays and arms of the
sea as the tide ebbed and flowed. And that rule, ever after it was
promulgated, prevailed and was universally applied by the district
courts in cases of collision. [
Footnote 9]
Application of that rule was made by the federal courts
Page 74 U. S. 638
in collision cases arising upon the Hudson, the Penobscot, the
Kennebec, the Merrimac, the Alabama, and many other rivers
navigable only between ports and places in one state.
Exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, was conferred upon the district courts
by the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, including all seizures
under the laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United
States, where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable
from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, within their
respective districts as well as upon the high seas.
Remedies for marine torts, it is conceded, may be sought in the
admiralty courts under that provision, although committed within
the body of a county, but it is denied that redress can be obtained
in the admiralty for the breach of a contract of affreightment in a
case where the port of shipment and the port of destination are in
the same state.
Repeated attempts were made at an early day to induce the court
to hold that seizures on water were not cases of admiralty
cognizance, and that contracts of affreightment were exclusively
cognizable in the courts of common law, but this Court refused to
adopt either proposition, and held that the entire admiralty power
of the Constitution was lodged in the federal courts and that
Congress intended by the ninth section of the Judiciary Act to
invest the district courts with that power as courts of original
jurisdiction; that the phrase, "exclusive original cognizance" was
used for that purpose and was intended to be exclusive of the state
courts as well as the other federal courts. [
Footnote 10]
When the case of
The Lexington was decided, it was
still supposed that the admiralty jurisdiction was limited to
waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, but the case is a
decisive authority to show that the jurisdiction of the admiralty
in matters of contract was understood to be coextensive with the
jurisdiction in cases of marine torts.
Page 74 U. S. 639
Subject matter of the suit in the case of
Waring v.
Clarke was that of a collision, and the subject matter in the
case of
The Lexington was a loss of specie
in
transitu under a contract of affreightment. Viewed in any
light, those two cases settle the question that where the voyage
and transportation are over tidewaters, the jurisdiction of the
admiralty is the same in matters in maritime contracts as in marine
torts.
Such was the state of the law upon the subject, as decided by
this Court, when the case of
The Genesee Chief [
Footnote 11] was brought here for
reexamination, and in that case this Court held that the
jurisdiction in admiralty depended not upon the ebb and flow of the
tide, but upon the navigable character of the water; that if the
water was navigable, it was deemed to be public, and if public,
that it was regarded as within the legitimate scope of the
admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution.
Prior to that decision, the Western lakes and navigable rivers
of the United States above tidewaters were not supposed to be
waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Strange as that proposition may now appear to one
familiar with the provision contained in the ninth section of the
Judiciary Act, it is nevertheless true that the rule restricting
admiralty jurisdiction to tidewaters had prevailed from the
organization of the judicial system to that date, but the effect of
that decision was to dispel that error and place the admiralty
jurisdiction upon its true constitutional and legal basis as
defined in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of
Congress.
Subsequent decision of this Court in the case of
The
Magnolia was that the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts extends to cases of collision upon navigable waters,
although the place of the collision may be within the body of a
county and above the ebb and flow of the tide, and this Court also
held in that case that the district courts exercise jurisdiction
over fresh water rivers, "navigable from the
Page 74 U. S. 640
sea," by virtue of the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, and
not as conferred by the act of the 26th of February, 1845, which is
applicable only to the "lakes, and navigable waters connecting said
lakes." [
Footnote 12]
Direct proposition of the respondents in the case of
The
Commerce [
Footnote 13]
was that the case before the Court, which was a collision on the
Hudson River, was not a case cognizable in the admiralty because it
did not appear that either of the vessels was engaged in foreign
commerce or in commerce among the several states; but the Court
held that judicial power in all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution, and that in cases
of tort, the question of jurisdiction was wholly unaffected by the
considerations suggested in that proposition; and we reaffirm the
rule there laid down that locality is the true test of admiralty
cognizance in all cases of marine torts; that if it appears, as in
cases of collision, depredations upon property, illegal
dispossession of ships, or seizures for the violation of the
revenue laws that the wrongful act was committed on navigable
waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States, then the case is one properly cognizable in the admiralty.
[
Footnote 14]
Navigable rivers which empty into the sea or into the bays and
gulfs which form a part of the sea are but arms of the sea, and are
as much within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States as the sea itself.
Difficulties attend every attempt to define the exact limits of
admiralty jurisdiction, but it cannot be made to depend upon the
power of Congress to regulate commerce, as conferred in the
Constitution. They are entirely distinct things, having no
necessary connection with one another, and are conferred in the
Constitution by separate and distinct grants. [
Footnote 15]
Congress may regulate commerce with foreign nations
Page 74 U. S. 641
and among the several states, but the judicial power, which,
among other things, extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, was conferred upon the federal government by the
Constitution, and Congress cannot enlarge it, not even to suit the
wants of commerce, nor for the more convenient execution of its
commercial regulations. [
Footnote 16]
Remarks, it is conceded, are found in the opinion of the Court
in the case of
Allen v. Newberry, [
Footnote 17] inconsistent with these views, but
they were not necessary to that decision, as the contract in that
case was for the transportation of goods on one of the Western
lakes, where the jurisdiction in admiralty is restricted, by an act
of Congress, to "steamboats and other vessels . . . employed in the
business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in
different states and territories." [
Footnote 18]
No such restrictions are contained in the ninth section of the
Judiciary Act, and consequently those remarks, as applied to a case
falling within that provision, must be regarded as incorrect.
Such a rule, if applied to the commerce and navigation of the
Atlantic coast, would produce incalculable mischief, as the vessels
in many cases, even in voyages from one port in a state to another
port in the same state, are obliged, in the course of the voyage,
to go outside of any particular state, and it would not be
difficult to give examples where more than half the voyage is
necessarily upon the high seas. Unless the admiralty has
jurisdiction in such a case to enforce the maritime lien in case of
a collision or jettison, it is difficult to see to what forum the
injured party can resort for redress. Piracy, it is said, is
justiciable everywhere, but it cannot be admitted that maritime
torts are justiciable nowhere.
Unable to deny that the admiralty has jurisdiction over marine
torts, though the voyage is between ports and places in the same
state, the advocates of the more restricted jurisdiction
Page 74 U. S. 642
over maritime contracts set up a distinction, and contend that
the admiralty jurisdiction over such contracts is limited by the
power granted to Congress to regulate commerce. Reference may be
made to the case of
Maguire v. Card, [
Footnote 19] as one where that distinction was
adopted, but the decisive answer to that case, and the one
preceding it in the same volume, will be found in the later cases
already referred to, and in the case of
The Mary
Washington, [
Footnote
20] where the opinion was given by the present CHIEF JUSTICE.
All three of the cases, therefore, as well the case of W. C. Boon
& Company as the other two, are cases within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts.
II. Suppose that to be so, then, it is contended by the
libellants, in the second place, that all three of the original
actions were well brought in the state court as a court of
concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the United
States in admiralty, and that the particular remedy, given by the
statute of the state, and adopted in these cases, is within the
true intent and meaning of the saving clause in the ninth section
of the Judiciary Act.
Wherever a maritime lien arises, the injured party may pursue
his remedy, whether for a breach of a maritime contract or for a
marine tort, by a suit
in rem, or by a suit
in
personam, at his election. Attention will be called to three
classes of cases only as examples to illustrate that proposition,
but many more might be given to the same effect.
Shippers have a lien by the maritime law upon the vessel
employed in the transportation of their goods and merchandise from
one port to another as a security for the fulfillment of the
contract of the carrier that he will safely keep, duly transport,
and rightly deliver the goods and merchandise shipped on board, as
stipulated in the bill of lading or other contract of shipment.
[
Footnote 21]
Owners of vessels damaged by collision occasioned without fault
on their part and wholly through the fault of those
Page 74 U. S. 643
in charge of the colliding vessel, also have a maritime lien on
the vessel in fault as a security for such damages as may be
awarded to them in the admiralty for the injury thereby caused to
their vessel, and they may proceed
in rem to enforce their
claim for the damages, or they may waive the lien and bring their
suit
in personam against the master or owners of the
vessel. [
Footnote 22]
Materialmen also, who furnish materials or supplies for a vessel
in a foreign port or in a port other than a port of the state where
the vessel belongs, have a maritime lien on the vessel as a
security for the payment of the price of all such materials and
supplies. They have such a lien because, upon the principles of the
maritime law, such materials and supplies are presumed to be
furnished on the credit of the vessel, and consequently they are
entitled to proceed
in rem in the admiralty court to
enforce the lien, but they are not compelled to do so, as they may
waive the lien and bring their suit
in personam against
the master or owners, as they are also liable as well as the
vessel. [
Footnote 23]
None of these principles is controverted, but the libellants
contend that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
afford the parties the same remedies in all such cases. No warrant
for that proposition, however, is found in the ninth section of the
Judiciary Act nor in any other part of that fundamental regulation
of our judicial system. On the contrary, the exclusive original
cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction is, by the very terms of that section, conferred upon
the district courts of the United States, "saving to suitors in all
cases the right of a common law remedy where the common law is
competent to give it." Nothing is said about a concurrent
jurisdiction in a state court or in any other court, and it is
quite clear that in all cases where the parties are citizens of
different states, the injured party may pursue the common law
remedy here
Page 74 U. S. 644
described and saved, in the circuit court of the district as
well as in the state courts.
Original cognizance is exclusive in the district courts, except
that the suitor may, if he sees fit, elect to pursue a common law
remedy in the state courts or in the circuit court, as before
explained, in all cases where such a remedy is applicable. Common
law remedies are not applicable to enforce a maritime lien by a
proceeding
in rem, and consequently the original
jurisdiction to enforce such a lien by that mode of proceeding is
exclusive in the district courts. [
Footnote 24]
State legislatures have no authority to create a maritime lien,
nor can they confer any jurisdiction upon a state court to enforce
such a lien by a suit or proceeding
in rem, as practiced
in the admiralty courts. Observe the language of the saving clause
under consideration. It is to suitors, and not to the state courts,
nor to the circuit courts of the United States. Examined carefully,
it is evident that Congress intended by that provision to allow the
party to seek redress in the admiralty if he saw fit to do so, but
not to make it compulsory in any case where the common law is
competent to give him a remedy. Properly construed, a party under
that provision may proceed
in rem in the admiralty, or he
may bring a suit
in personam in the same jurisdiction, or
he may elect not to go into admiralty at all, and may resort to his
common law remedy in the state courts or in the circuit court of
the United States, if he can make proper parties to give that court
jurisdiction of his case.
Undoubtedly most common law remedies in cases of contract and
tort, as given in common law courts, and suits
in personam
in the admiralty courts, bear a strong resemblance to each other,
and it is not perhaps inaccurate to regard the two jurisdictions in
that behalf as concurrent, but there is no form of action at common
law which, when compared with the proceeding
in rem in the
admiralty, can be regarded as a concurrent remedy.
Page 74 U. S. 645
Consignees or shippers may proceed in the admiralty
in
rem against the vessel to enforce their maritime lien, or they
may waive that lien and still proceed in the admiralty
in
personam against the owners of the vessel to recover damages
for the nonfulfillment of the contract, or they may elect to bring
a common action against the owners to recover damages, as in other
cases for the breach of a contract to be executed on land.
Proceedings in a suit at common law on a contract of
affreightment are precisely the same as in suits on contracts not
regarded as maritime, wholly irrespective of the fact that the
injured party might have sought redress in the admiralty. When
properly brought, the suit is against the owners of the vessel, and
in states where there are attachment laws, the plaintiff may attach
any property, not exempted from execution, belonging to the
defendants.
Liability of the owners of the vessel under the contract being
the foundation of the suit, nothing can finally be held under the
attachment except the interest of the owners in the vessel, because
the vessel is held under the attachment as the property of the
defendants, and not as the offending thing, as in the case of a
proceeding
in rem to enforce a maritime lien. Attachment
in such suits may be of the property of nonresidents or of
defendants absent from the state, as in suits on contracts not
maritime, and the same rules apply in respect to the service of
process and notice to the defendants.
Applying these rules to the cases before the court, it is
obvious that the jurisdiction exercised by the state court was of
the precise character which is exclusive in the district courts of
the United States sitting in admiralty. Authority does not exist in
the state courts to hear and determine a suit
in rem in
admiralty to enforce a maritime lien.
Such a lien does not arise in a contract for materials and
supplies furnished to a vessel in her home port, and in respect to
such contracts it is competent for the states, under the decisions
of this Court, to create such liens as their legislatures may deem
just and expedient, not amounting to a
Page 74 U. S. 646
regulation of commerce, and to enact reasonable rules and
regulations prescribing the mode of their enforcement. [
Footnote 25]
Contracts for shipbuilding are held not to be maritime
contracts, and of course they fall within the same category, but in
all cases where a maritime lien arises, the original jurisdiction
to enforce the same by a proceeding
in rem is exclusive in
the district courts of the United States, as provided in the ninth
section of the Judiciary Act. [
Footnote 26]
Respective decrees reversed and the several causes remanded
with instructions to dismiss the respective libels.
[
Footnote 1]
Code, §§ 2692, 2708.
[
Footnote 2]
Revised Code, §§ 3127, 3142.
[
Footnote 3]
1 Stat. at Large 77.
[
Footnote 4]
Waring v.
Clarke, 5 How. 454.
[
Footnote 5]
Bags of
Linseed, 1 Black 108.
[
Footnote 6]
Conklin's Admiralty 19.
[
Footnote 7]
The
Commerce, 1 Black 579; 2 Story on the Constitution
(3d ed) §§ 1666-1669.
[
Footnote 8]
23 U. S. 10 Wheat.
428.
[
Footnote 9]
Waring v.
Clarke, 5 How. 441.
[
Footnote 10]
The
Lexington, 6 How. 390;
The
Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297;
The
Betsey, 4 Cranch 443;
The
Samuel, 1 Wheat. 9;
The Octavia, 1 Wheat.
20.
[
Footnote 11]
53 U. S. 12
How. 457.
[
Footnote 12]
The Magnolia,
20 How. 296; 5 Stat. at Large 516.
[
Footnote 13]
66 U. S. 1
Black 578.
[
Footnote 14]
2 Story on the Constitution, § 1669.
[
Footnote 15]
The Genesee
Chief, 12 How. 452.
[
Footnote 16]
The St.
Lawrence, 1 Black 526.
[
Footnote 17]
62 U. S. 21
How. 245.
[
Footnote 18]
The Hine v.
Trevor, 4 Wall. 555.
[
Footnote 19]
62 U. S. 21
How. 249.
[
Footnote 20]
14 American Law Register 692
[
Footnote 21]
The Bird of
Paradise, 5 Wall. 545;
The
Eddy, 5 Wall. 481;
Bags
of Linseed, 1 Black 112; Maude & Pollock on
Shipping 254.
[
Footnote 22]
Sturgis v.
Boyer, 24 How. 117;
Chamberlain v.
Ward, 21 How. 553.
[
Footnote 23]
The St.
Lawrence, 1 Black 529;
Manro v.
Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473;
The
Reindeer, 2 Wall. 384;
The
General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438.
[
Footnote 24]
The Moses
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411.
[
Footnote 25]
The General
Smith, 4 Wheat. 438;
The
St. Lawrence, 1 Black 529.
[
Footnote 26]
Ferry Company v.
Beers, 20 How. 402.