The act of the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of the
Land Office in canceling an entry for land is not a ministerial
duty, but is a matter resting in the judgment and discretion of
these officers as representing the Executive Department.
Accordingly, this Court will not interfere by injunction more than
by mandamus to control it.
The Secretary of the Interior having directed the Commissioner
of the Land Office to cancel an entry under which Gaines and others
claimed an equitable right to certain lands in Arkansas, these last
brought their suit in the Circuit Court of the District of
Columbia, praying that the Secretary and Commissioner should be
enjoined from making such cancellation. The defendants entered
their appearance and Wilson, the Commissioner, filed a plea. The
substance of this plea was that the matters set up in the bill were
within the exclusive control of the executive department of the
government, the Secretary and Commissioner representing the
President, and that the court had no jurisdiction or authority to
interfere with the exercise of this power by injunction. In point
of fact, the validity of the entry in question depended upon the
construction of certain acts of Congress upon the meaning of which
different Secretaries of the Interior had been so far divided that
it was thought best to take the opinion of the Attorney General
upon their interpretation.
The court below, sustaining the plea, dismissed the bill, and
the question on this appeal was the correctness of such action.
Page 74 U. S. 348
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The extent of the jurisdiction which may lawfully be asserted by
the federal courts over the officers of the executive departments
of the government, has been mooted in
Page 74 U. S. 349
this Court from the case of
Marbury v. Madison
[
Footnote 1] down to the
present time, and while the principles which should govern the
action of the courts in that regard have been settled long since,
the frequent application of late to this Court and to other federal
courts for the exercise of powers not belonging to them shows that
the question is one not generally understood.
In the case already referred to of
Marbury v. Madison,
the Chief Justice commented at some length upon the power of the
courts over the action of the executive officers of the government,
in the course of which he arrived at the conclusion that it is a
question which must always depend upon the nature of the act. He
then argues that by the Constitution the President is invested with
certain political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his
own discretion and for which he is accountable only to his country
and his conscience, and that he has officers to aid him in the
exercise of these powers, who are directly accountable to him. The
acts of such an officer, he says, can never, as an officer, be
examinable in a court of justice. He holds, however, that where an
officer is required by law to perform an act not of this political
or executive character which affects the private rights of
individuals, he is to that extent amenable to the courts. The duty
which it was held in that case could be enforced in the proper
court by mandamus was the delivery of a commission already signed
by the President. The point as there presented was new and
embarrassing, and it is no reflection on the distinguished jurist
who delivered the opinion to say that the rule which governs the
court in its action in this class of cases has since been laid down
with more precision without conflicting with the principles there
stated.
In the case of
McIntire v. Wood, [
Footnote 2] an application was made to the Circuit
Court for the District of Ohio for a mandamus to the register of
the land office to compel him to issue certificates of purchase to
plaintiff for lands to which he
Page 74 U. S. 350
supposed himself entitled by law. This Court was of opinion that
no power had been vested by Congress in the circuit courts to issue
the writ in such cases. The reasoning of the court is not extended,
but the case bears a strong analogy to the one under
consideration.
But in
Kendall v. United States, [
Footnote 3] the majority of the Court held that
the courts of the District of Columbia had a larger power than the
circuit courts, and could issue writs of mandamus to federal
officers in proper cases. As this is the first case in which the
writ was actually ordered, it is worth while to examine the ground
on which it was placed. "The act required to be done by the
Postmaster General," says the Court,
"is simply to credit the relators with the full amount of the
award of the solicitor. This is a precise, definite act, purely
ministerial, and about which the Postmaster General had no
discretion whatever. This was not an official act in any other
sense than being a transaction in the department where the books
and accounts were kept, and was an official act in the same sense
that an entry in the minutes of a court, pursuant to an order of
the court, is an official act. There is no room for the exercise of
any discretion, official or otherwise."
In this language there is no ambiguity, and in it we find a
clear enunciation of the rule which separates the class of cases in
which the court will interfere from those in which it will not. In
the subsequent case of
Decatur v. Paulding, [
Footnote 4] where the writ was refused, the
Chief Justice, who had dissented in the former case, accepts both
the doctrine of the right to issue the writ by the court of the
district, and of the cases in which it may be issued, as settled by
the case of
Kendall v. United States. "The first question,
therefore, to be considered," he says, "is whether the duty imposed
upon the Secretary of the Navy by the resolution in favor of Mrs.
Decatur was a mere ministerial act?" The case of Mrs. Decatur arose
under an act of Congress, and also a joint resolution of that body
of the same date, both providing
Page 74 U. S. 351
compensation for the services of her deceased husband; but the
measure of this compensation (which was to be paid to her by the
Secretary of the Navy) was in the act different from what it was in
the resolution. The Secretary held that but one of these was
intended by Congress, and gave her the election. She brought suit
to compel him to give her both. It is clear she had no other legal
remedy. The United States could not be sued. The Secretary could
not be sued in any other form of action than mandamus. But on the
ground that the action of the Secretary involved the exercise of
judgment and discretion, the order of the circuit court refusing
the writ was sustained.
This case is cited and relied on in the case of
Commissioner
of Patents v. Whiteley, [
Footnote 5] and some of the observations of Chief Justice
Taney, in delivering the opinion in the former, are so pertinent to
the case before us, and state so well the relations of the judicial
branch of the government to the officers engaged in the executive
branch, that they may well be reproduced here.
Speaking of the functions of these officers, he says:
"In general, such duties, whether imposed by act of Congress or
by resolution, are not mere ministerial duties. The head of an
executive department of the government, in the administration of
the various and important concerns of his office, is continually
required to exercise judgment and discretion. He must exercise his
judgment in expounding the laws and resolutions of Congress under
which he is required to act."
"If," he says,
"a suit should come before this Court, which involved the
construction of any of those laws, the court certainly would not be
bound to adopt the construction given by the head of the
department. And if they supposed his decision to be wrong, they
would, of course, so pronounce their judgment. But this judgment,
upon the construction of the law, must be given in a case in which
they have jurisdiction, and in which it is their duty to interpret
the acts of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights
Page 74 U. S. 352
of the parties before them. The court could not entertain an
appeal from the decision of one of the secretaries, nor revise his
judgment in any case where the law authorized him to exercise
judgment or discretion. Nor can it by mandamus act directly upon
the officer, and guide and control his judgment or discretion in
the matters committed to his care, in the ordinary exercise of his
official duties. . . . The interference of the courts with the
performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments
would be productive of nothing but mischief, and we are quite
satisfied that such a power was never intended to be given to
them."
To the same effect are also the cases,
United States v.
Seaman; [
Footnote 6]
Same v. Guthrie; [
Footnote
7]
Same v. Commissioner of Land Office. [
Footnote 8]
It may, however, be suggested that the relief sought in all
those cases was through the writ of mandamus, and that the
decisions are based upon the special principles applicable to the
use of that writ. This is only true so far as these principles
assert the general doctrine that an officer to whom public duties
are confided by law is not subject to the control of the courts in
the exercise of the judgment and discretion which the law reposes
in him as a part of his official functions. Certain powers and
duties are confided to those officers and to them alone, and
however the courts may, in ascertaining the rights of parties in
suits properly before them, pass upon the legality of their acts
after the matter has once passed beyond their control, there exists
no power in the courts, by any of its processes, to act upon the
officer so as to interfere with the exercise of that judgment while
the matter is properly before him for action. The reason for this
is that the law reposes this discretion in him for that occasion,
and not in the courts. The doctrine, therefore, is as applicable to
the writ of injunction as it is to the writ of mandamus.
In the one case, the officer is required to abandon his right to
exercise his personal judgment, and to substitute that of
Page 74 U. S. 353
the court, by performing the act as it commands. In the other he
is forbidden to do the act which his judgment and discretion tell
him should be done. There can be no difference in the principle
which forbids interference with the duties of these officers,
whether it be by writ of mandamus or injunction.
Accordingly, in the case of
Mississippi v. Johnson
[
Footnote 9] which was an
application to this Court for the writ of injunction in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the Court says that it is
unable to perceive that the fact that the relief asked is by
injunction takes the case out of the general principles which
forbid judicial interference with the exercise of executive
discretion.
In the same case, the Chief Justice gives is this clear
definition of a ministerial duty in the relation in which we have
been considering it:
"A ministerial duty, the performance of which may in proper
cases be required of the head of a department by judicial process,
is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a
simple, definite duty, arising under circumstances admitted or
proved to exist and imposed by law."
The action of the officers of the land department, with which we
are asked to interfere in this case, is clearly not of this
character. The validity of plaintiffs' entry, which is involved in
their decision, is a question which requires the careful
consideration and construction of more than one act of Congress. It
has been for a long time before the department, and has received
the attention of successive secretaries of the interior, and has
been found so difficult as to justify those officers in requiring
the opinion of the Attorney General. It is far from being a
ministerial act under any definition given by this Court.
The numerous cases referred to by counsel, in which this Court
-- after the title had passed from the United States, and the
matter had ceased to be under the control of the executive
department -- has sustained the courts of justice in
Page 74 U. S. 354
decreeing the equitable title to belong to the person against
whom the department had decided are not in conflict with these
views, but furnish an additional reason for refusing to interfere
with such cases while they remain under such control.
Decree affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
5 U. S. 1 Cranch
137.
[
Footnote 2]
11 U. S. 7 Cranch
504.
[
Footnote 3]
37 U. S. 12 Pet.
524.
[
Footnote 4]
39 U. S. 14 Pet.
497.
[
Footnote 5]
71 U. S. 4 Wall.
522.
[
Footnote 6]
58 U. S. 17 How.
225.
[
Footnote 7]
58 U. S. 17 How
284.
[
Footnote 8]
72 U. S. 5 Wall.
563.
[
Footnote 9]
71 U. S. 4 Wall.
475.