1. Part owners or tenants in common in real estate of which
partition is asked in equity have an interest in the subject matter
of the suit, and in the relief sought, so intimately connected with
that of their cotenants that if these cannot be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court, the bill will be dismissed.
2. The Act of February 28, 1839 (set forth in the case), has no
application to suits where the parties stand in this position, but
has reference, among others, to suits at law against joint obligors
in contract, verbal or written.
3. A citizen of the District of Columbia cannot be a party to a
suit in the federal courts where the jurisdiction depends on the
citizenship of the parties.
4. Although the simple fact that a transfer or conveyance of the
subject of controversy is made for the purpose of vesting an
interest in parties competent to litigate in the federal courts
does not defeat the jurisdiction,
Page 73 U. S. 281
if the transaction vests the real interest in the grantee or
assignee, yet if the conveyance or assignment is colorable only,
and the real interest remains in the grantor or assignor, the court
cannot entertain jurisdiction of the case.
5. A decree in the circuit court dismissing a bill on the merits
will be reversed here if the circuit court had not jurisdiction,
and a decree of dismissal without prejudice directed.
The Judiciary Act gives jurisdiction to the circuit court in
controversies "between citizens of different states," the District
of Columbia, as it has been held, not coming within this term.
Another act -- one of February 28th, 1839 -- enacts thus:
"That where, in any suit at law or in equity, commenced in any
court of the United States, there shall be several defendants,
anyone or more of whom shall not be inhabitants of or found within
the district where the suit is brought or shall not voluntarily
appear thereto, it shall be lawful for the court to entertain
jurisdiction, and proceed to the trial and adjudication of such
suit between the parties who may be properly before it. But the
judgment or decree rendered therein shall not conclude or prejudice
other parties not regularly served with process, or not voluntarily
appearing to answer; and the nonjoinder of parties who are not so
inhabitants, or found within the district, shall constitute no
manner of abatement or other objection to said suit. [
Footnote 1]"
In this state of statutory law, Mary Barney, a citizen of
Delaware, and one of the heirs of Samuel Chase, filed a bill in the
Circuit Court of the United States for Maryland against the City of
Baltimore and several individuals, coheirs with her, certain of
them being citizens of Maryland, and certain others (William,
Matilda, and Ann Ridgely), citizens of the District of Columbia, to
have a partition of real estate of which it was alleged that the
said Chase died intestate: and to have also an account of rents and
profits, with other incidental relief.
In the progress of the suit, the bill was dismissed as to
the
Page 73 U. S. 282
three Ridgelys, citizens of the District, and an amended bill
filed, stating that they had conveyed their interest in the
property in controversy to one Samuel Chase Ridgely (also a
defendant in the case), and who was a citizen of Maryland, it being
admitted by writing filed that this conveyance was made for the
purpose of conferring jurisdiction of the case on the federal
court, that it was without consideration, and that the grantee
would, on request of the grantors, reconvey, to them. This Samuel
Chase Ridgely made his will soon after the conveyance, devising the
property to his three grantors, the District Ridgelys, and having
died during the pendency of the suit, it went back to them. They
then conveyed to one Proud in the same way as they had previously
conveyed to their co-defendant, S. C., Ridgely, it being admitted
that the conveyance was executed to remove a difficulty in the way
of the exercise of the jurisdiction of the circuit court.
The circuit court dismissed the bill by a decree which on its
face appeared to be a dismissal on the merits. This appeal was then
taken.
Coming here, the case was elaborately argued on the merits. But
a point of jurisdiction was raised and discussed previously. On
this latter point, the case was disposed of by this Court; the
question of merits not being reached.
On the point of jurisdiction, Messrs. W. Schley and W. H.
Norris, for the City of Baltimore, appellees, contended that the
appeal ought to be dismissed. Confessedly, citizens of the District
could not be made parties to a suit in a Circuit Court of a state.
Yet the three parties who here were such citizens, co-heirs with
the complainant, were material parties to any bill for account or
bill for partition. No complete decree could be made in their
absence. The difficulty was sought to be remedied by the
conveyances to S. C., Ridgely and Proud; but the grants not being
real grants, could not aid the case. [
Footnote 2]
Page 73 U. S. 283
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The first question which the record before us presents is,
whether the Circuit Court of the District of Maryland, sitting as a
court of chancery, could entertain jurisdiction of
Page 73 U. S. 284
the case. The difficulty arises in reference to the interest of
William, Ann, and Matilda Ridgely, in the subject matter of the
litigation, and resolves itself into two distinct inquiries,
namely:
1. Can a court of chancery render a decree upon a bill of this
character without having before it, as parties to the suit, some
person capable of representing their interest?
2. And secondly, if it cannot, did the contrivance resorted to,
of conveying to S. C. Ridgely and Proud, taken in connection with
the admitted facts on that subject, enable the court to take
jurisdiction of the case?
The learning on the subject of parties to suits in chancery is
copious, and within a limited extent, the principles which govern
their introduction are flexible. There is a class of persons having
such relations to the matter in controversy, merely formal or
otherwise, that while they may be called proper parties, the court
will take no account of the omission to make them parties. There is
another class of persons whose relations to the suit are such, that
if their interest and their absence are formally brought to the
attention of the court, it will require them to be made parties if
within its jurisdiction, before deciding the case. But if this
cannot be done, it will proceed to administer such relief as may be
in its power, between the parties before it. And there is a third
class, whose interests in the subject matter of the suit, and in
the relief sought, are so bound up with that of the other parties,
that their legal presence as parties to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity, without which the court cannot proceed. In such
cases, the court refuses to entertain the suit, when these parties
cannot be subjected to its jurisdiction.
This class cannot be better described than in the language of
this Court in
Shields v. Barrow, [
Footnote 3] in which a very able and satisfactory
discussion of the whole subject is had. They are there said to
be
"persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but
an interest of such a nature, that a final decree cannot be made
without either affecting that interest,
Page 73 U. S. 285
or leaving the controversy in such a condition this its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience."
This language aptly describes the character of the interest of
the Ridgelys in the land of which partition is sought in this suit,
and in the account which is asked for, of rents and profits. If a
decree is made which is intended to bind them, it is manifestly
unjust to do this when they are not parties to the suit and have no
opportunity to be heard. But as the decree cannot bind them, the
court cannot for that very reason afford the relief asked, to the
other parties.
If, for instance, the decree should partition the land and state
an account, the particular pieces of land allotted to the parties
before the Court would still be undivided as to these parties,
whose interest in each piece would remain as before the partition.
And they could at any time apply to the proper court and ask a
repartition of the whole tract, unaffected by the decree in this
case, because they can be bound by no decree to which they are not
parties. The same observations apply to any account stated by the
court of rents and profits and to any decree settling the amount
due on that score.
Nor does the Act of February 28, 1839, relieve the case of the
difficulty. That act has been frequently construed in this Court,
and perhaps never more pertinently to the matter in hand than in
the case already cited of
Shields v. Barrow.
The Court there says in relation to this act that
"it does not affect any case where persons having an interest
are not joined, because their citizenship is such that their
joinder would defeat the jurisdiction, and so far as it touches
suits in equity, we understand it to be no more than a legislative
affirmance of the rule previously established by the cases of
Cameron v. McRoberts, [
Footnote 4]
Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
[
Footnote 5] and
Harding v.
Handy. [
Footnote 6] . . .
The act says it shall be lawful for the court to entertain
jurisdiction, but as is observed by this Court in
Mallow v.
Hinde, [
Footnote 7] when
speaking of a
Page 73 U. S. 286
case where an indispensable party was not before the Court,"
"we do not put this case upon the ground of jurisdiction, but
upon a much broader ground, which must apply to all courts of
equity, whatever may be their structure as to jurisdiction; we put
it on the ground that no court can adjudicate directly upon a
person's right without the party's being actually or constructively
before the court,"
"so that while this act removed any difficulty as to
jurisdiction between competent parties regularly served with
process, it does not attempt to displace that principle of
jurisprudence on which the Court rested the case last mentioned. .
. . It remains true, notwithstanding the act of Congress and the
forty-seventh rule, that a circuit court can make no decree
affecting the rights of an absent person, and can make no decree
between the parties before it, which so far involves or depends
upon the rights of an absent person that complete and final justice
cannot be done between the parties to the suit, without affecting
those rights. [
Footnote 8]"
These views do not render the act of 1839 either useless or
ineffectual, for while it is true that in reference to parties in
chancery proceedings, that act only pronounced the rule which this
Court had previously asserted, its beneficial influence in cases of
common law cognizance are often called into exercise. It is a rule
of the common law that where one of several joint obligors in a
contract, whether verbal or in writing, is sued alone, be can plead
the nonjoinder of the other obligors in abatement, and in cases
where the joint obligors not sued were citizens of the same state
with the plaintiff, or were residents of some other district than
that where the suit was brought, the jurisdiction of the court was
defeated. This very serious difficulty was remedied by the act of
1839, for in such cases the plaintiff can now prosecute his suit to
judgment against anyone of such joint obligors in any district
where he may be found. Of this class of cases are
Inbusch v.
Farwell [
Footnote 9] and
others which preceded it.
Page 73 U. S. 287
But this role does not conflict with that under which the courts
of chancery act in refusing to make a decree, where by reason of
the absence of persons interested in the matter, the decree would
be ineffectual or would injuriously affect the interest of the
absent parties. In the class of cases just mentioned at common law,
the plaintiff, by his judgment against one of his joint debtors,
gets the relief he is entitled to, and no injustice is done to that
debtor, because he is only made to perform an obligation which he
was legally bound to perform before. The absent joint obligors are
not injured, because their rights are in no sense affected, and
they remain liable to contribution to their co-obligor who may pay
the judgment by suit, as they would have been had he paid it
without suit.
We are therefore of opinion that the circuit court could render
no decree on the merits of this case without having rightfully
before it some person representing the interest of the
Ridgelys.
This leads us to the second inquiry connected with the
jurisdiction of the case, namely whether the conveyances to Proud
and S. C. Ridgely, who were citizens of Maryland, and were made
defendants, removed the difficulty growing out of the residence of
the Ridgelys in the District of Columbia?
In the case of
Hepburn v. Ellzey, [
Footnote 10] it was decided by this Court,
speaking through Marshall, C.J., that a citizen of the District of
Columbia was not a citizen of a state within the meaning of the
Judiciary Act, and could not sue in a federal court. The same
principle was asserted in reference to a citizen of a territory in
the case of
New Orleans v. Winter, [
Footnote 11] and it was there held to defeat the
jurisdiction, although the citizen of the Territory of Mississippi
was joined with a person who, if suing alone, could have maintained
the suit. These rulings have never been disturbed, but the
principle asserted has been acted upon ever since by
Page 73 U. S. 288
the courts when the point has arisen. [
Footnote 12] Indeed the counsel for complainant seem
to have conceded that the Ridgelys of the District could not become
parties by their voluntary submission, and that their being parties
deprived the court of jurisdiction because they were dismissed from
the suit after they had appeared and answered to the merits.
If the conveyance by the Ridgelys of the District to S. C.
Ridgely of Maryland had really transferred the interest of the
former to the latter, although made for the avowed purpose of
enabling the court to entertain jurisdiction of the case, it would
have accomplished that purpose.
McDonald v. Smalley
[
Footnote 13] and several
cases since have well established this rule. But in point of fact
that conveyance did not transfer the real interest of the grantors.
It was made without consideration, with a distinct understanding
that the grantors retained all their real interest and that the
deed was to have no other effect than to give jurisdiction to the
court. And it is now equally well settled that the court will not,
under such circumstances, give effect to what is a fraud upon the
court and is nothing more. In the case of
Smith v.
Kernochen, [
Footnote
14] this Court said,
"The true and only ground of objection in all these cases is
that the assignor or grantor, as the case may be, is the real party
in the suit, and the plaintiff on the record but nominal and
colorable, his name being used merely for the purpose of
jurisdiction. The suit is then in fact a controversy between the
former and the defendants, notwithstanding the conveyance."
And the Court cites
McDonald v. Smalley, already
mentioned;
Maxfields' Lessee v. Levy, [
Footnote 15]
Hurst's Lessee v.
McNeil, [
Footnote 16]
and
Briggs v. French. [
Footnote 17]
It is not possible to see how the case before us can be taken
out of the principal here laid down. We are therefore of opinion
that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the case.
It follows that the decree of that court which, on its face,
Page 73 U. S. 289
appears to be a dismissal of the bill on the merits, must be
reversed and the case remanded with directions to that court to
enter a decree dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction and
without prejudice to plaintiff's right to bring any suit she may be
advised in the proper court.
[
Footnote 1]
5 Stat. at Large 321.
[
Footnote 2]
Russell v. Clark's
Executors, 7 Cranch 98;
Shields v.
Barrow, 17 How. 139;
Smith
v. Kernochen, 7 How. 216.
[
Footnote 3]
Morgan v.
Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290.
[
Footnote 4]
16 U. S. 3 Wheat.
591.
[
Footnote 5]
22 U. S. 9 Wheat.
738.
[
Footnote 6]
24 U. S. 11
Wheat. 132.
[
Footnote 7]
25 U. S. 12
Wheat. 198.
[
Footnote 8]
See also Northern Ind. R. Co. v.
Michigan Central R. Co., 15 How. 233.
[
Footnote 9]
66 U. S. 1 Black
566.
[
Footnote 10]
6 U. S. 2 Cranch
445.
[
Footnote 11]
14 U. S. 1 Wheat.
91.
[
Footnote 12]
Wescott v. Fairfield, Pet.C.C. 45.
[
Footnote 13]
26 U. S. 1 Pet.
620.
[
Footnote 14]
48 U. S. 7 How.
216.
[
Footnote 15]
4 Dall. 330 [omitted].
[
Footnote 16]
1 Wash.C.C. 70.
[
Footnote 17]
2 Sumner 257.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, dissenting.
Unable to concur in the opinion of the Court, I will proceed to
state very briefly the reasons of my dissent.
Consent, I agree, cannot give jurisdiction in a case where it is
not conferred by the Constitution and the laws of Congress, but the
judicial power as described in the Constitution extends in express
terms to controversies between citizens of different states.
[
Footnote 2/1]
By the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act, it is also
provided that the circuit courts shall have exclusive cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity where the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred
dollars, and the suit is between a citizen of the state where the
suit is brought and a citizen of another state. [
Footnote 2/2]
Complainant is a citizen of Delaware, and the respondents are
citizens of Maryland, which brings the case within the express
words of the Judiciary Act and of the Constitution.
Express decision of this Court in
Hagan v. Walker
[
Footnote 2/3] is that since the
Act of the twenty-eighth of February, 1839, it does not defeat the
jurisdiction of the court in a suit in equity that a person named
as defendant is not an inhabitant of or found within the district
where the suit is brought. [
Footnote
2/4]
The court may still adjudicate between the parties who are
properly before it, and the rule is that the absent parties are not
to be concluded or affected by the decree. Cases may arise, said
the Court, in which the court cannot adjudicate
Page 73 U. S. 290
between the parties who are regularly before it, for the reason
that it cannot bind those who are absent, as where relief cannot be
given without taking an account between an absent party and one
before the court. Defect of parties in such a case does not defeat
the jurisdiction, strictly speaking, yet the court will make no
decree in favor of the complainant.
Nonjoinder of an absent party in such a case not only does not
defeat the jurisdiction of the court, but it does not raise any
such question under the Constitution and the law of Congress,
because the parties before the court being citizens of different
states, the jurisdiction of the court is undeniable. Relief will
not be granted in such a case where it appears that the interests
of absent parties will be injuriously affected, but the question is
not one whether a federal court has jurisdiction to hear and
determine the cause. On the contrary, it is a question of equity
practice as to parties, common to all courts exercising equity
powers.
Such an objection is never allowed to prevail if the court can
protect the interest of the absent party or where it appears in the
record that due notice was given to him and that he has formally
waived the objection. The maxim
volenti non fit injuria
applies in such a case, and consequently the difficulty may be
remedied by a conveyance or stipulation appearing in the record.
Courts of equity refuse to grant relief in such cases not because
they have not jurisdiction, but only because the right of absent
parties interested in the subject matter may be injuriously
affected. Hence the rule is that if the court can grant relief
without affecting such rights or can protect those rights in the
decree, the court will not dismiss the suit, and the same rule is
applicable if it appears in the record that the absent parties have
full knowledge of the controversy and that they have in due form of
law waived all objections to the prosecution of the suit. Unless
these views are correct, then it is clear that the Act of the
twenty-eighth of February, 1839, is unconstitutional and void, as
no one will pretend that Congress can extend the jurisdiction of
the federal courts
Page 73 U. S. 291
beyond the power conferred in the Constitution. Validity of that
act of Congress is admitted in the opinion of the majority of the
Court, and it is also admitted that the decision of this Court in
the case of
Inbush v. Farwell [
Footnote 2/5] is correct. Direct decision in that case
was that the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a common law
suit is not defeated by the suggestion that other parties are
jointly liable with the defendants, provided it appears that such
other parties are out of the jurisdiction of the court.
Under the Constitution and the Judiciary Act, the conditions of
jurisdiction are the same in a suit in equity as at common law, and
it is not possible to distinguish the one from the other without
adding language to those provisions which neither the framers of
the Constitution nor Congress ever employed.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the circuit court
had jurisdiction of the case, but the majority of the Court are of
a different opinion, which renders it unnecessary to enter upon the
consideration of the merits.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and FIELD, J., also dissented.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Art. 3, sec. 2.
[
Footnote 2/2]
1 Stat. at Large 78.
[
Footnote 2/3]
55 U. S. 14 How.
36.
[
Footnote 2/4]
5 Stat. at Large 321.
[
Footnote 2/5]
66 U. S. 1
Black 571.