1. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between the United States and
Mexico does not divest the pueblo existing at the site of the City
of San Francisco of any rights of property or alter the character
of the interests it may have held in any lands Under the former
government. It makes no distinction in the protection it provides
between the property of individuals and the property held by towns
under the Mexican government.
2. The Act of March 3, 1851, does not change the nature of
estates in land held by individuals or towns. By proceedings under
that act, imperfect rights -- mere equitable claims -- might be
converted by the decrees of the board created by the act or of the
courts, and the patent of the government following, into legal
titles, but if the claim was held subject to any trust before
presentation to the board the trust was not discharged by the
confirmation and the subsequent patent. The confirmation only
enures to the benefit of the confirmee so far as the legal title is
concerned. It does not determine the equitable relations between
him and third parties.
3. By the laws of Mexico, in force on the acquisition of the
country, pueblos or towns in California were entitled, for their
benefit and the benefit of their inhabitants, to the use of lands
constituting the site of such pueblos and towns and of adjoining
lands, within certain prescribed limits. The right of the pueblos
in these lands was a restricted and qualified right to alienate
portions of the land to its inhabitants for building or
cultivation, and to use the remainder for commons, for pasture
lands, or as a source of revenue or for other public purposes. This
right of disposition and use was in all particulars subject to the
control of the government of the country.
4. Lands thus held by pueblos or towns under the Mexican
government are not held by them in absolute property, but in trust
for the benefit of their inhabitants, and are held subject to a
similar trust by municipal bodies, created by legislation since the
conquest, which have succeeded to the possession of such
property.
5. The municipal lands held by the City of San Francisco, as
successor to the former pueblo existing there, being held in trust
for its inhabitants, are not the subject of seizure and sale under
judgment and execution against the city.
On the 20th of June, 1855, the Common Council of the City of San
Francisco, the legislative body of that city, passed "An ordinance
for the settlement and quieting of the land titles in the City of
San Francisco." This ordinance is generally known in San Francisco
as "The Van Ness Ordinance,"
Page 72 U. S. 327
after the name of its reputed author. By the second section of
the ordinance, the city relinquished and granted all her right and
claim to the lands within the corporate limits, as defined by the
charter of 1851, with certain exceptions, to the parties in the
actual possession thereof, by themselves or tenants on or before
the 1st day of January, 1855, and to their heirs and assigns
forever, provided such possession continued up to the time of the
introduction of the ordinance into the common council, or, if
interrupted by an intruder or trespasser, had been or might be
recovered by legal process. This ordinance was ratified by the
legislature of the state on the 11th of March, 1858.
At the time this ordinance was passed, the City of San Francisco
asserted a claim to four square leagues of land as successor of a
Mexican pueblo, established and in existence at the site of the
present city, and had presented her claim for the same to the board
of commissioners created under the "act to ascertain and settle the
private land claims in the state of California" of March 3, 1851,
for confirmation, and the board had confirmed the claim for a
portion of the land and rejected the claim for the rest. The
portion confirmed included the premises in controversy.
One Greeley, having acquired title to certain premises from
parties who were in the actual possession of them at the time
mentioned in the ordinance, brought the present action, ejectment,
in one of the district courts of the State of California against
two persons whom he found in occupation -- Townsend and Powelson,
defendants below -- to oust them. The defendants filed separate
answers.
Townsend, after pleading a general denial, averred as a separate
answer in substance
"That by the treaty of peace between the United States and
Mexico dated at Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, the ownership
and title in fee simple of the lot passed to and became vested in
the United States, and that the United States afterwards, by force
and effect of the Act of the Congress thereof passed March 3, 1851,
entitled 'An act to ascertain and settle the private land claims in
the state of California,' and by force and
Page 72 U. S. 328
effect of the final decision and decree of the board of
commissioners of said United States, appointed and acting
thereunder (upon the petition and claim of the City of San
Francisco, presented to and filed before said board in favor of
said city), the ownership and title in fee so acquired and held by
the United States passed to and vested in the City of San
Francisco, and that by divers mesne conveyances and by force of
divers ordinances of the said city, and an act or acts of the
Legislature of California, the title in fee had, prior to the 28th
day of March, A.D. 1862, become, and then was, vested in and held
by one Mumford, who executed a lease of the premises to the
defendant Powelson, under which Powelson entered and took
possession, and has ever since continued, and still is, lawfully,
peaceably, and rightfully in possession thereof."
And that all acts done by the defendant Townsend with reference
to the premises, have been done as the agent and attorney of the
said Mumford, and by his authority, and by the license and
permission of the said Powelson, his lessee.
The answer of the other defendant, Powelson, was substantially
the same, except that he averred that he held as tenant under
Mumford.
On the trial, various exceptions were taken to the ruling of the
court upon matters relating to the possession of the plaintiff, but
the manner in which the matters arose are not stated, because the
rulings made thereon are not noticed by the court, for the reasons
given in its opinion.
The defendants offered in evidence a certified copy of the
petition of the City of San Francisco, filed on the second day of
July, A.D. 1852, before the Board of United States Land
Commissioners, appointed and sitting under the already mentioned
Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, the said copy being certified to
be a true copy of said petition by the United States Surveyor
General of California.
Also, in connection with the said petition, a certified copy of
the decree of said board of land commissioners thereupon made, and
filed in the office of the secretary of said board on the 21st of
December, A.D. 1854, confirming to
Page 72 U. S. 329
the city a tract of land therein described; the said
last-mentioned copy being likewise certified by said surveyor
general to be a true copy of the said decree.
The court then inquiring of the defendants and requiring them to
state by what proof they intended to follow the said documentary
evidence, they offered to prove that the premises in controversy
were a part of the land described in the decree of confirmation;
that the appeal for the decree was dismissed by the District Court
of the United States March 30, 1857, and that the decree had become
final, and they also offered to deraign title to the premises in
dispute under said confirmation, from the city to Mumford, by
conveyances executed and delivered since the decree of
confirmation, and since the dismissal of the appeal therefrom, and
prior to the 28th day of March, A.D. 1862, and offered to justify
the acts to Townsend done in reference to the premises by proving
authority for his acts as agent and attorney for Mumford, and to
justify the entry of the defendant Powelson by proving a lease to
him of the premises from Mumford.
The court then inquiring further of the defendants, and
requiring them to state by what means, and in what particular
manner they expected to deraign title to Mumford from the city,
they offered to show the recovery of a judgment against the city,
the issue of an execution thereon, and the sale by the sheriff of
the county thereunder of the premises in controversy, and the
purchase of the same by one Wakeman, the delivery of a sheriff's
deed to him, and his conveyance of his interest to the said
Mumford.
Thereupon the plaintiff objected to the admission of the
evidence offered, or of any part of it, on various grounds, and
among others, on the ground that the premises in controversy were
not subject to seizure and sale under execution upon a judgment
against the city, and hence that the title could not be affected in
any way by the introduction of the evidence offered. The court
sustained the objection and excluded the evidence. The defendants
excepted to the ruling. The plaintiff had judgment, and the supreme
court
Page 72 U. S. 330
of the state having affirmed it, the case was here upon writ of
error, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.
Page 72 U. S. 332
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action of ejectment to recover the possession of a
tract of land situated within the corporate limits of the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California. The plaintiff in the
court below, the defendant in this Court, claims to be owner in fee
of the premises, by virtue of an ordinance of the common council of
the city passed on the 20th of June, 1855, and an act of the
legislature of the state confirmatory thereof. At the time this
ordinance was passed, the City of Francisco asserted title as
successor of a Mexican pueblo, established and in existence on the
acquisition of the country by the United States, to four square
leagues of land, embracing the site of the present city, and had
presented her claim for the same to the board of land commissioners
created under the Act of March 3, 1851, for recognition and
confirmation, and the board had confirmed the claim to a portion of
the land and rejected the claim for the residue. The portion
confirmed included the premises in controversy in this case.
By the second section of the ordinance, the city relinquished
and granted all the title and claim which she thus held to the land
within her corporate limits, as defined by the charter of 1851,
with certain exceptions, to the parties in the actual possession
thereof, by themselves or tenants, on or before the first day of
January, 1855, provided such possession was continued up to the
time of the introduction of the ordinance into the common council,
or if interrupted by an intruder or trespasser, had been or might
be recovered by legal process.
The party through whom the plaintiff in the court below
Page 72 U. S. 333
traces his title was in such actual possession of the premises
in controversy at the times designated by the ordinance -- at least
the jury must have found, under the instructions of the court, that
he was in such actual possession, and in this Court the finding
must be taken as conclusive.
We have not looked into the rulings of the court below upon this
matter, and therefore do not intimate, nor have we any reason to
suppose, that error intervened. We have not looked into those
rulings, because if error was committed, it would not constitute
ground of reversal.
The twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, under
which alone this Court has jurisdiction to review the final
judgments and decrees of the highest courts of a state, provides
for such review only in three classes of cases:
First. Where is drawn in question the validity of a
treaty or statute of, or authority exercised under the United
States, and the decision is against their validity;
Second. Where is drawn in question the validity of a
statute of, or an authority exercised under any state on the ground
of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of
the United States and the decision is in favor of their validity,
and
Third. Where is drawn in question the construction of
any clause of the Constitution or of a treaty or statute of or
commission held under the United States and the decision is against
the title, right, privilege, or exemption specially set up or
claimed by either party under such clause of the Constitution,
treaty, statute, or commission. And in these cases no error can be
regarded as ground of reversal except it appear on the face of the
record, and relate to these questions of validity or
construction.
The inquiry then is whether error was committed in the
disposition of any questions of this character arising upon the
record.
The defendants in the court below alleged in their answer to the
complaint -- the designation applied in the practice of California
to the first pleading in a civil action, whether at law or in
equity -- in substance as follows: that by virtue of
Page 72 U. S. 334
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between the United States and
the Republic of Mexico, the ownership and fee of the premises in
controversy passed to the United States; that by force of the Act
of March 3, 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in
California, and the final decree of the board of commissioners
created under that act, the ownership and fee of the premises
vested in the City of San Francisco; and that by various mesne
conveyances and ordinances of the city and acts of the legislature
of the state, they passed to one Mumford, under whom one of the
defendants holds as tenant, and for whom the other has acted as
agent.
On the trial, the defendants produced the petition of the City
of San Francisco to the board of land commissioners for
confirmation of the claim asserted to four square leagues, the
decision of the board confirming the claim to a portion of the
land; the dismissal of the appeal on the part of the United States
by order of the district court, in March, 1857; the recovery of a
judgment against the city; the issue of an execution thereon; the
purchase of the premises by one Wakeman; the delivery of a
sheriff's deed to him; and the transfer of his title by sundry
mesne conveyances to Mumford.
Upon objection, the evidence thus offered was excluded on
various grounds, and among others that the title of the city to the
premises was not the subject of seizure and sale under execution.
This ruling denied the position assumed by the defendants in their
answer respecting the operation of the treaty, the act of Congress,
and the decision of the board in passing a fee simple title to the
city, for if the city had in this way or in any other way become
invested with a title in fee simple at the time the judgment was
docketed or the execution was issued, there could be no question
that the title passed by the sheriff's sale and a deed.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo does not purport to divest the
pueblo existing at the site of the City of San Francisco of any
rights of property or to alter the character of the interests it
may have held in any lands under the former government. It provides
for the protection of the
Page 72 U. S. 335
rights of the inhabitants of the ceded country to their
property, and there is nothing in any of its clauses inducing the
inference that any distinction was to be made with reference to the
property claimed by towns under the Mexican government. The
subsequent legislation of Congress does not favor any such
supposition, for it has treated the claims of such towns as
entitled to the same protection as the claims of individuals, and
has authorized their presentation to the board of commissioners of
confirmation.
Nor is there anything in the Act of March 3, 1851, which changes
the nature of estates in land held by individuals or towns. One of
the objects of that act was to enable claimants of land, individual
or municipal, by virtue of any right or title derived from Spain or
Mexico, to obtain a recognition of their claims, and when these
were of an imperfect character, to furnish a mode for perfecting
them.
Thus the government provided for discharging the obligation of
protection cast upon it by the stipulations of the treaty, and at
the same time for separating private lands from the public domain.
By proceedings under that act, imperfect rights -- mere equitable
claims -- might be converted by the decrees of the board or courts,
and the patent of the government following into legal titles, but
whether the legal title thus secured to the patentee was to be held
by him charged with any trust was not a matter upon which either
board or court was called upon to pass. If the claim was held
subject to any trust before presentation to the board, the trust
was not discharged by the confirmation and the subsequent patent.
The confirmation only enures to the benefit of the confirmee so far
as the legal title is concerned. It establishes the legal title in
him, but it does not determine the equitable relations between him
and third parties. It is true if a claim were presented by one
designating himself as trustee, executor, or guardian, or if such
relation of the claimant to others appeared in the examination of
the case before the board or courts, the decree might declare that
the confirmation was to the claimant in such fiduciary character.
But if the trust was not stated and did not
Page 72 U. S. 336
appear, the legal title was nonetheless subject to the same
trust in the hands of the claimant.
By the laws of Mexico in force at the date of the acquisition of
the country, pueblos or towns were entitled, for their benefit and
the benefit of their inhabitants, to the use of lands constituting
the site of such pueblos and towns and of adjoining lands within
certain prescribed limits. This right appears to have been common
to the cities and towns of Spain from an early period in her
history, and was recognized in the laws and ordinances for the
settlement and government of her colonies on this continent. These
laws and ordinances provided for the assignment to the pueblos or
towns, when once established and officially recognized, for their
use and the use of their inhabitants, of four square leagues of
land.
It may be difficult to state with precision the exact nature of
the right or title which the pueblos held in these lands. It was
not an indefeasible estate; ownership of the lands in the pueblos
could not in strictness be affirmed. It amounted in truth to little
more than a restricted and qualified right to alienate portions of
the land to its inhabitants for building or cultivation and to use
the remainder for commons, for pasture lands, or as a source of
revenue, or for other public purposes. This right of disposition
and use was in all particulars subject to the control of the
government of the country.
The royal instructions of November, 1789, for the establishment
of the town of Pictic, in the province of Sonora, were made
applicable to all new towns which should be established within the
district under the Commandant General, and that included
California. They gave special directions for the establishment and
government of the new pueblos, declared that there should be
assigned to them four square leagues of land, and provided for the
distribution of building and farming lots to settlers, the laying
out of pasture lands, and lands from which a revenue was to be
derived, and for the appropriation of the residue to the use of the
inhabitants.
Page 72 U. S. 337
It is evident from this brief statement that these lands were
not assigned to the pueblos in absolute property, but were to be
held in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants.
This is the view taken by the Supreme Court of the State of
California after an extended and elaborate consideration of the
subject. [
Footnote 1]
This view was also taken by the circuit court of the United
States in the final decree confirming the claim of the city to her
municipal lands. Since the trial of the present cause in the court
below, the appeal taken by the city from the decree of the board of
commissioners has been heard by the circuit court of the United
States, to which the case was transferred under the act of July
1st, 1864. [
Footnote 2] That
decree declares that the confirmation
"is in trust for the benefit of the lot holders, under grants
from the pueblo, town, or City of San Francisco, or other competent
authority, and as to any residue, in trust for the use and benefit
of the inhabitants of the city."
From this decree the United States and the City of San Francisco
appealed, the United States from the whole decree and the city from
so much thereof as included certain lands reserved for public
purposes in the estimate of the quantity confirmed; but during the
present term of this Court, both parties have, by stipulation,
withdrawn their objections and their respective appeals have been
dismissed. It is therefore now the settled law that the municipal
lands held by the City of San Francisco as successor to the former
pueblo existing there are not held in absolute property, but in
trust for its inhabitants. Trust property thus held is not the
subject of seizure and sale under judgment and execution against
the trustee, whether that trustee be a natural or an artificial
person.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530;
Fulton v.
Hanlow, 20
id. 480.
[
Footnote 2]
13 Stat. at Large 333;
70 U. S. 3
Wall. 686.
