1. The title of an act cannot be used to extend or to restrain
any positive provisions contained in the body of the act. It is
only when the meaning of these is doubtful that resort may be had
to the title, and even then it has little weight.
2. What is termed the policy of the government with reference to
any particular legislation is too unstable a ground upon which to
rest the judgment of the court in the interpretation of
statutes.
3. On the 14th of July, 1862, Congress passed "An act increasing
temporarily the duties on imports, and for other purposes." The
fourteenth section of the act provides that after the first day of
August, 1862,
"there shall be levied, collected, and paid on
all
goods, wares, and merchandise of the growth or produce of countries
beyond the Cape of Good Hope, when imported from places this side
of the Cape of Good Hope, a duty of ten percent
ad
valorem, and in addition to the duties imposed on any such
articles when imported directly from the place or places of their
growth or production."
Upon the construction of the section,
Held that the latter clause does not qualify the
general language of the first clause "on
all goods,
&c.," so as to exclude from it the articles previously exempt.
It only provides that the duty laid by the first clause shall be in
addition to existing duties imposed on such articles when imported
directly from their places of growth or production; in other words,
that such articles as already pay a duty when imported directly
from these places shall pay a further duty if imported from places
this side of the Cape, its object being to increase the duty upon
the articles when not imported directly from their places of growth
or production. The words "any such articles" do not mean all the
articles embraced in the first clause, but only such of them as
were already subject to duty.
4. The section in question does not make a discrimination in
favor of the ports of the Pacific, and thus contravene that clause
of the Constitution which requires that "all duties, imposts, and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." The terms
"beyond the Cape of Good Hope" are employed as descriptive of the
locality of certain countries, not their relative position with
respect to ports of import. They indicate the locality of certain
countries with reference to the position of the lawmakers at the
national capital.
On the 14th of July, 1862, Congress passed "an act increasing
temporarily the duties on imports and for other purposes." The 14th
section was as follows:
"
And be it further enacted that from and after the day
and
Page 72 U. S. 108
year aforesaid [August 1, 1862], there shall be levied,
collected, and paid on all goods, wares, and merchandise of the
growth or produce of
countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope,
when imported from places this side of the Cape of Good Hope, a
duty of ten percent ad valorem,
and in addition to the
duties imposed on any such articles when imported directly from the
place or places of their growth or production."
With this act in force, the plaintiffs imported into New York
from Liverpool several packages of raw silk, the growth or produce
of Persia and China, upon which the ten percent duty was exacted.
This duty was paid under protest, and a case being agreed on, the
present action was brought in the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York against the collector to recover back the
amount.
The matter was the proper interpretation of the above section of
the act of Congress, previously to the date of which it is admitted
that the goods described were free of duty.
The following section of the Act of 3 March, 1863, was
introduced into the argument as throwing light perhaps on the
former:
"SEC. 2.
And be it further enacted that section
fourteen of an act entitled 'An Act increasing temporarily the
duties on imports, and for other purposes,' approved July
fourteenth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, be, and the same hereby
is modified so as to allow cotton, and raw silk as reeled from the
cocoon, of the growth or produce of countries beyond the Cape of
Good Hope, to be exempt from any additional duty when imported from
places this side of the Cape of Good Hope, for two years from and
after the passage of this act. [
Footnote 1]"
The questions were:
1. Whether the 14th section of the act of July, 1862, was
applicable to goods hitherto free of duty; and
2. Whether this statute is reconcilable with the Constitution of
the United States, which requires that "all duties,
Page 72 U. S. 109
imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States."
The court gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiffs
thereupon brought the case here on error.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case arises upon the fourteenth section of the Act of
Congress of July 14, 1862, entitled "An act increasing temporarily
the duties on imports, and for other purposes." That section
provides that after the first day of August, 1862,
"there shall be levied, collected, and paid on all goods, wares,
and merchandise of the growth or produce of countries beyond the
Cape of Good Hope, when imported from places this side of the Cape
of Good Hope, a duty of ten percent
ad valorem, and in
addition to the duties imposed on any such articles when imported
directly from the place or places of their growth or production.
[
Footnote 2]"
Soon after the passage of this act, the plaintiffs made several
importations into the port of New York from Liverpool, England, of
packages of raw silk, the product of Persia and China, upon which
the ten percent duty was exacted. This duty was paid under protest,
and the present action was brought against the collector to recover
back the amount.
At the time the act was passed, raw silk was not subject to any
duty, and it was contended by the plaintiffs in the court below,
and is contended by them here, that the fourteenth section only
applied to such articles, the growth and product of countries
beyond the Cape of Good Hope, as were then liable to duty, and did
not embrace articles upon which no duty was imposed.
In support of this construction, reference is made to the
language of other sections of the act where a duty is laid
Page 72 U. S. 110
upon articles previously exempt, to the title of the act, and to
the supposed policy of the government.
It is true that some of the other sections, when providing for a
duty upon articles previously exempt, express the intention of the
legislature in this respect in language free from doubt. This fact,
however, does not necessarily control the construction of a
distinct and independent section. The fourteenth section relates to
articles different from those covered by the other sections, and
necessarily differs from them in its language, as it makes a
discrimination, which they do not, in the duty imposed according to
the place from which the articles are exported.
The title of an act furnishes little aid in the construction of
its provisions. Originally in the English courts the title was held
to be no part of the act -- "no more," says Lord Holt, "than the
title of a book is part of the book." [
Footnote 3] It was generally framed by the clerk of the
House of Parliament, where the act originated, and was intended
only as a means of convenient reference. At the present day, the
title constitutes a part of the act, but it is still considered as
only a formal part; it cannot be used to extend or to restrain any
positive provisions contained in the body of the act. It is only
when the meaning of these is doubtful that resort may be had to the
title, and even then it has little weight. It is seldom the subject
of special consideration by the legislature.
These observations apply with special force to acts of Congress.
Everyone who has had occasion to examine them has found the most
incongruous provisions, having no reference to the matter specified
in the title. Thus the law regulating appeals in Mexican land cases
to the district courts of the United States from the board of
commissioners, created under the Act of March 3, 1851, is found in
an act entitled "An act making appropriations for the civil and
diplomatic expenses of the government for the year ending June 30,
1853, and for other purposes." [
Footnote 4] The law declaring that in the courts of the
United States there shall be no exclusion
Page 72 U. S. 111
of any witness on account of color, nor in civil actions when he
is a party to or interested in the issue tried, is contained in a
proviso to a section in the appropriation act of 1864, the section
itself directing an appropriation for detecting and punishing the
counterfeiting of the securities and coin of the United States.
[
Footnote 5]
During the past session, whilst a bill was pending before
Congress entitled "A bill granting the right of way to ditch and
canal owners over the public lands, and for other purposes," all
after the enacting clause was stricken out and provisions
establishing a complete system for the possession and sale of
interests in mines were substituted in its place. And thus the most
important act in our legislation relating to the mining interests
of the country stands on the statute book under a title purporting
that the act grants a right of way to ditch and canal owners over
the public lands and for other purposes. [
Footnote 6] The words "for other purposes," frequently
added to the title in acts of Congress, are considered as covering
every possible subject of legislation.
The supposed policy of the government is stated to be the
encouragement of manufactures by imposing restrictions on goods
manufactured in whole or in part abroad, and hence it is argued
that it was against such policy to impose duties on the raw
material.
Little weight can be given to considerations of this character
in the construction of the act. The encouragement of manufactures
does not appear to have been the object of the act, but, on the
contrary, its object was manifestly to increase the revenues of the
country, and it may well have been supposed by the lawmakers that
in many cases the raw material could bear a duty without decreasing
the importation or injuriously affecting the manufacturing
interests.
What is termed the policy of the government with reference to
any particular legislation is generally a very uncertain thing,
upon which all sorts of opinions, each variant
Page 72 U. S. 112
from the other, may be formed by different persons. It is a
ground much too unstable upon which to rest the judgment of the
court in the interpretation of statutes.
Looking to the section by itself, we find no little difficulty
in its construction. The first clause declares that upon all goods,
wares, and merchandise the growth or product of countries beyond
the Cape of Good Hope, when imported from places this side of the
Cape, a duty of ten percent
ad valorem shall be levied,
and the latter clause does not qualify this general language so as
to exclude from it the articles previously exempt. It only
provides, as we construe it, that the duty laid by the first clause
shall be in addition to existing duties imposed on such articles
when imported directly from their places of growth or production --
in other words, that such articles as already pay a duty when
imported directly from these places shall pay a further duty if
imported from places this side of the Cape, its object being to
increase the duty upon the articles when not imported directly from
their places of growth or production. The words "any such articles"
do not mean all the articles embraced in the first clause, but only
such of them as were already subject to duty.
The Amendatory Act of March 3, 1863, passed a few months
afterwards, indicates very clearly the understanding of Congress
that the ten percent was imposed as an additional duty, though in
fact raw silk, as already stated, was at the time exempt. Its
language is that the fourteenth section shall be modified so as to
allow
"cotton and raw silk, as reeled from the cocoon, to be exempt
from any additional duty when imported from places this side of the
Cape of Good Hope for two years"
from the passage of the act. [
Footnote 7]
The objection to the statute that it makes a discrimination in
favor of the ports of the Pacific, and thus contravenes that clause
of the Constitution [
Footnote
8] which requires that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States," is not tenable. The
ground of the objection is that
Page 72 U. S. 113
with reference to the Atlantic ports, goods which are the growth
or product of Persia or China, are from countries beyond the Cape
of Good Hope, and are thus chargeable with duty, but with reference
to the Pacific ports, they are from countries this side of the
Cape, and thus not within the terms of the statute.
The answer to the objection is obvious and conclusive. The terms
"beyond the Cape of Good Hope" are employed as descriptive of the
locality of certain countries, not their relative position with
respect to ports of import. They are used to avoid the necessity of
enumerating the countries which lie east of the Cape. "Beyond the
Cape" and "east of the Cape" are often used in the acts of Congress
as equivalent expressions. They indicate the locality of certain
countries with reference to the position of the lawmakers at the
national capital. In a similar manner would the words "beyond the
Mississippi" be construed if found in an act of Congress. They
would be held to refer to the country west of the Mississippi,
which, with reference to the legislators at Washington, would lie
beyond that river.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
12 Stat. at Large 557.
[
Footnote 2]
12 Stat. at Large 557.
[
Footnote 3]
Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Modern 62.
[
Footnote 4]
10 Stat. at Large 98.
[
Footnote 5]
13 Stat. at Large 351.
[
Footnote 6]
14
id. 251.
[
Footnote 7]
12 Stat. at Large 742.
[
Footnote 8]
Art. I, ยง 8.
