1. Under the form of creating a qualification or attaching a
condition, the States cannot, in effect, inflict a punishment for a
past act which was not punishable at the time it was committed.
2. Deprivation or suspension of any civil rights for past
conduct is punishment for such conduct.
3. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a judicial trial. If the punishment be less than
death, the act is termed
Page 71 U. S. 278
a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the
Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and
penalties.
4. These bills, though generally directed against individuals by
name, may be directed against a whole class, and they may inflict
punishment absolutely or may inflict it conditionally.
5. The clauses of the Second Article of the Constitution of
Missouri (set forth at length in the statement of the case,
infra, pp.
71 U. S.
279-281), which require priests and clergymen, in order
that they may continue in the exercise of their professions and be
allowed to preach and teach, to take and subscribe an oath that
they have not committed certain designated acts, some of which were
at the time offences with heavy penalties attached, and some of
which were at the time acts innocent in themselves, constitute a
bill of attainder within the meaning of the provision in the
Federal Constitution prohibiting the States from passing bills of
that character.
6. These clauses presume that the priests and clergymen are
guilty of the acts specified, and adjudge the deprivation of their
right to preach or teach unless the presumption be first removed by
their expurgatory oath; they assume the guilt and adjudge the
punishment conditionally.
7. There is no practical difference between assuming the guilt
and declaring it. The deprivation is effected with equal certainty
in the one case as in the other. The legal result is the same, on
the principle that what cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly.
8. The prohibition of the Constitution was intended to secure
the rights of the citizen against deprivation for past conduct by
legislative enactment under any form, however disguised.
9. An
ex post facto law is one which imposes a
punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was
committed, or imposes additional punishment to that then
prescribed, or changes the rules of evidence by which less or
different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then
required.
10. The clauses of the Second Article of the Constitution of
Missouri, already referred to, in depriving priests and clergymen
of the right to preach and teach, impose a penalty for some acts
which were innocent at the time they were committed, and increase
the penalty prescribed for such of the acts specified as at the
time constituted public offences, and in both particulars violate
the provision of the Federal Constitution prohibiting the passage
by the State of an
ex post facto law. They further violate
that provision in altering the rules of evidence with respect to
the proof of the acts specified -- thus, in assuming the guilt
instead of the innocence of the parties, in requiring them to
establish their innocence instead of requiring the government to
prove their guilt, and in declaring that their innocence can be
shown only in one way, by an expurgatory oath.
11. Although the prohibition of the Constitution to pass an
ex post facto law is aimed at criminal cases, it cannot be
evaded by giving a civil form to that which is, in substance,
criminal.
Page 71 U. S. 279
In January, 1865, a convention of representatives of the people
of Missouri assembled at St. Louis, for the purpose of amending the
constitution of the State. The representatives had been elected in
November, 1864. In April, 1865, the present constitution -- amended
and revised from the previous one -- was adopted by the convention;
and in June, 1865, by a vote of the people. The following are the
third, sixth, seventh, ninth, and fourteenth sections of the second
article of the constitution:
"SEC. 3. At any election held by the people under this
Constitution, or in pursuance of any law of this State, or under
any ordinance or by-law of any municipal corporation, no person
shall be deemed a qualified voter,
who has ever been in armed
hostility to the United States, or to the lawful authorities
thereof, or to the government of this State; or has ever given
aid, comfort, countenance, or support to persons engaged in any
such hostility; or has ever, in any manner, adhered to the enemies,
foreign or domestic, of the United States, either by contributing
to them, or by unlawfully sending within their lines, money, goods,
letters, or information; or has ever disloyally held communication
with such enemies; or has ever advised or aided any person to enter
the service of such enemies;
or has ever, by act or word,
manifested his adherence to the cause of such enemies, or his
desire for their triumph over the arms of the United
States, or
his sympathy with those engaged in exciting or
carrying on rebellion against the United States; or has ever,
except under overpowering compulsion, submitted to the authority,
or been in the service, of the so-called 'Confederate States of
America;' or has ever left this State, and gone within the lines of
the armies of the so-called 'Confederate States of America,' with
the purpose of adhering to said States or armies; or has ever been
a member of, or connected with, any order, society, or
organization, inimical to the government of the United States, or
to the government of this State; or has ever been engaged in
guerilla warfare against loyal inhabitants of the United States, or
in that description of marauding commonly known as 'bush-whacking;'
or
has ever knowingly and willingly harbored, aided, or
countenanced any person so engaged; or
has ever come into
or left this State, for the purpose of avoiding enrollment for or
draft
Page 71 U. S. 280
into the military service of the United States; or has ever,
with a view to avoid enrollment in the militia of this State, or to
escape the performance of duty therein, or for any other
purpose, enrolled himself, or authorized himself to be enrolled, by
or before any officer, as disloyal, or as a southern sympathizer,
or
in any other terms indicating his disaffection to the
Government of the United States in its contest with rebellion,
or his sympathy with those engaged in such rebellion; or, having
ever voted at any election by the people in this State, or in any
other of the United States, or in any of their Territories, or held
office in this State, or in any other of the United States, or in
any of their Territories, or under the United States, shall
thereafter have sought or received, under claim of alienage, the
protection of any foreign government, through any consul or other
officer thereof, in order to secure exemption from military duty in
the militia of this State, or in the army of the United States;
nor shall any such person be capable of holding in this State
any office of honor, trust, or profit, under its authority; or of
being an officer, councilman, director, trustee, or other manager
of any corporation, public or private, now existing or hereafter
established by its authority; or of acting as a professor or
teacher in any educational institution, or in any common or other
school; or of holding any real estate or other property in trust
for the use of any church, religious society, or congregation.
But the foregoing provisions, in relation to acts done against the
United States, shall not apply to any person not a citizen thereof,
who shall have committed such acts while in the service of some
foreign country at war with the United States, and who has, since
such acts, been naturalized, or may hereafter be naturalized, under
the laws of the United States and the oath of loyalty hereinafter
prescribed, when taken by any such person, shall be considered as
taken in such sense."
"SEC. 6. The oath to be taken as aforesaid shall be known as the
Oath of Loyalty, and shall be in the following terms:"
" I, A. B., do solemnly swear that I am well acquainted with the
terms of the third section of the second article of the
Constitution of the State of Missouri, adopted in the year eighteen
hundred and sixty-five, and have carefully considered the same;
that I have never, directly or indirectly, done any of the acts in
said section specified; that I have always been truly and loyally
on the side of the United States against all enemies thereof,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the United States, and will support the Constitution and laws
thereof as the supreme
Page 71 U. S. 281
law of the land, any law or ordinance of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding; that I will, to the best of my ability,
protect and defend the Union of the United States, and not allow
the same to be broken up and dissolved, or the government thereof
to be destroyed or overthrown, under any circumstances, if in my
power to prevent it; that I will support the Constitution of the
State of Missouri; and that I make this oath without any mental
reservation or evasion, and hold it to be binding on me."
"SEC. 7. Within sixty days after this Constitution takes effect,
every person in this State holding any office of honor, trust, or
profit, under the Constitution or laws thereof, or under any
municipal corporation, or any of the other offices, positions, or
trusts, mentioned in the third section of this Article, shall take
and subscribe the said oath. If any officer or person referred to
in this section shall fail to comply with the requirements thereof,
his office, position, or trust, shall,
ipso facto, become
vacant, and the vacancy shall be filled according to the law
governing the case."
"SEC. 9. No person shall assume the duties of any state, county,
city, town, or other office, to which he may be appointed,
otherwise than by a vote of the people; nor shall any person, after
the expiration of sixty days after this Constitution takes effect,
be permitted to practise as an attorney or counselor at law; nor,
after that time, shall any person be competent as a bishop, priest,
deacon, minister, elder, or other clergyman of any religious
persuasion, sect, or denomination, to teach, or preach, or
solemnize marriages, unless such person shall have first taken,
subscribed, and filed said oath."
"SEC. 14. Whoever shall, after the times limited in the seventh
and ninth sections of this Article, hold or exercise any of the
offices, positions, trusts, professions, or functions therein
specified, without having taken, subscribed, and filed said oath of
loyalty, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine, not
less than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county
jail not less than six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment; and whoever shall take said oath falsely, by swearing
or by affirmation, shall, on conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty
of perjury, and be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not
less than two years."
In September, A.D. 1865, after the adoption of this
constitution, the Reverend Mr. Cummings, a priest of the Roman
Page 71 U. S. 282
Catholic Church, was indicted and convicted in the Circuit Court
of Pike County, in the State of Missouri, of the crime of teaching
and preaching in that month, as a priest and minister of that
religious denomination, without having first taken the oath
prescribed by the constitution of the State, and was sentenced to
pay a fine of five hundred dollars and to be committed to jail
until said fine and costs of suit were paid.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, the judgment was
affirmed; and the case was brought to this Court on writ of error,
under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.
Page 71 U. S. 316
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes before us on a writ of error to the Supreme
Court of Missouri, and involves a consideration of the test oath
imposed by the constitution of that State. The plaintiff in error
is a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, and was indicted and
convicted in one of the circuit courts of the State of the crime of
teaching and preaching as a priest and minister of that religious
denomination without having first taken the oath, and was sentenced
to pay a fine of five hundred dollars, and to be committed to jail
until the same was paid. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the
State, the judgment was affirmed.
The oath prescribed by the constitution, divided into its
separable parts, embraces more than thirty distinct affirmations or
tests. Some of the acts, against which it is directed, constitute
offences of the highest grade, to which, upon conviction, heavy
penalties are attached. Some of the acts have never been classed as
offences in the laws of any State, and some of the acts, under many
circumstances, would not even be blameworthy. It requires the
affiant to deny not only that he has ever "been in armed hostility
to the United States, or to the lawful authorities thereof," but,
among other things, that he has ever, "by act or word," manifested
his adherence to the cause of the enemies of the United
Page 71 U. S. 317
States, foreign or domestic, or his desire for their triumph
over the arms of the United States, or his sympathy with those
engaged in rebellion, or has ever harbored or aided any person
engaged in guerrilla warfare against the loyal inhabitants of the
United States, or has ever entered or left the State for the
purpose of avoiding enrollment or draft in the military service of
the United States; or, to escape the performance of duty in the
militia of the United States, has ever indicated, in any terms, his
disaffection to the government of the United States in its contest
with the Rebellion.
Every person who is unable to take this oath is declared
incapable of holding, in the State,
"any office of honor, trust, or profit under its authority, or
of being an officer, councilman, director, or trustee, or other
manager of any corporation, public or private, now existing or
hereafter established by its authority, or of acting as a professor
or teacher in any educational institution, or in any common or
other school, or of holding any real estate or other property in
trust for the use of any church, religious society, or
congregation."
And every person holding, at the time the constitution takes
effect, any of the offices, trusts, or positions mentioned is
required, within sixty days thereafter, to take the oath, and, if
he fail to comply with this requirement, it is declared that his
office, trust, or position shall
ipso facto become
vacant.
No person, after the expiration of the sixty days, is permitted,
without taking the oath,
"to practice as an attorney or counselor at law, nor after that
period can any person be competent, as a bishop, priest, deacon,
minister, elder, or other clergyman, of any religious persuasion,
sect, or denomination, to teach, or preach, or solemnize
marriages."
Fine and imprisonment are prescribed as a punishment for holding
or exercising any of "the offices, positions, trusts, professions,
or functions" specified, without having taken the oath, and false
swearing or affirmation in taking it is declared to be perjury,
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary.
Page 71 U. S. 318
The oath thus required is, for its severity, without any
precedent that we can discover. In the first place, it is
retrospective; it embraces all the past from this day, and, if
taken years hence, it will also cover all the intervening period.
In its retrospective feature, we believe it is peculiar to this
country. In England and France, there have been test oaths, but
they were always limited to an affirmation of present belief, or
present disposition towards the government, and were never exacted
with reference to particular instances of past misconduct. In the
second place, the oath is directed not merely against overt and
visible acts of hostility to the government, but is intended to
reach words, desires, and sympathies, also. And, in the third
place, it allows no distinction between acts springing from
malignant enmity and acts which may have been prompted by charity,
or affection, or relationship. If one has ever expressed sympathy
with any who were drawn into the Rebellion, even if the recipients
of that sympathy were connected by the closest ties of blood, he is
as unable to subscribe to the oath as the most active and the most
cruel of the rebels, and is equally debarred from the offices of
honor or trust, and the positions and employments specified.
But, as it was observed by the learned counsel who appeared on
behalf of the State of Missouri, this Court cannot decide the case
upon the justice or hardship of these provisions. Its duty is to
determine whether they are in conflict with the Constitution of the
United States. On behalf of Missouri, it is urged that they only
prescribe a qualification for holding certain offices and
practising certain callings, and that it is therefore within the
power of the State to adopt them. On the other hand, it is
contended that they are in conflict with that clause of the
Constitution which forbids any State to pass a bill of attainder or
an
ex post facto law.
We admit the propositions of the counsel of Missouri that the
States which existed previous to the adoption of the Federal
Constitution possessed originally all the attributes of
sovereignty; that they still retain those attributes,
Page 71 U. S. 319
except as they have been surrendered by the formation of the
Constitution and the amendments thereto; that the new States, upon
their admission into the Union, became invested with equal rights,
and were thereafter subject only to similar restrictions, and that
among the rights reserved to the States is the right of each State
to determine the qualifications for office and the conditions upon
which its citizens may exercise their various callings and pursuits
within its jurisdiction.
These are general propositions, and involve principles of the
highest moment. But it by no means follows that, under the form of
creating a qualification or attaching a condition, the States can
in effect inflict a punishment for a past act which was not
punishable at the time it was committed. The question is not as to
the existence of the power of the State over matters of internal
police, but whether that power has been made in the present case an
instrument for the infliction of punishment against the inhibition
of the Constitution.
Qualifications relate to the fitness or capacity of the party
for a particular pursuit or profession. Webster defines the term to
mean
"any natural endowment or any acquirement which fits a person
for a place, office, or employment, or enables him to sustain any
character, with success."
It is evident from the nature of the pursuits and professions of
the parties placed under disabilities by the constitution of
Missouri that many of the acts from the taint of which they must
purge themselves have no possible relation to their fitness for
those pursuits and professions. There can be no connection between
the fact that Mr. Cummings entered or left the State of Missouri to
avoid enrollment or draft in the military service of the United
States and his fitness to teach the doctrines or administer the
sacraments of his church; nor can a fact of this kind or the
expression of words of sympathy with some of the persons drawn into
the Rebellion constitute any evidence of the unfitness of the
attorney or counselor to practice his profession, or of the
professor to teach the ordinary branches of education, or of
Page 71 U. S. 320
the want of business knowledge or business capacity in the
manager of a corporation, or in any director or trustee. It is
manifest upon the simple statement of many of the acts and of the
professions and pursuits that there is no such relation between
them as to render a denial of the commission of the acts at all
appropriate as a condition of allowing the exercise of the
professions and pursuits. The oath could not, therefore, have been
required as a means of ascertaining whether parties were qualified
or not for their respective callings or the trusts with which they
were charged. It was required in order to reach the person, not the
calling. It was exacted not from any notion that the several acts
designated indicated unfitness for the callings, but because it was
thought that the several acts deserved punishment, and that, for
many of them, there was no way to inflict punishment except by
depriving the parties who had committed them of some of the rights
and privileges of the citizen.
The disabilities created by the Constitution of Missouri must be
regarded as penalties -- they constitute punishment. We do not
agree with the counsel of Missouri that "to punish one is to
deprive him of life, liberty, or property, and that to take from
him anything less than these is no punishment at all." The learned
counsel does not use these terms -- life, liberty, and property --
as comprehending every right known to the law. He does not include
under liberty freedom from outrage on the feelings as well as
restraints on the person. He does not include under property those
estates which one may acquire in professions, though they are often
the source of the highest emoluments and honors. The deprivation of
any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed may be
punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the
deprivation determining this fact. Disqualification from office
many be punishment, as in cases of conviction upon impeachment.
Disqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avocation, or from
positions of trust, or from the privilege of appearing in the
courts, or acting as an executor, administrator, or guardian, may
also, and often has been, imposed as punishment. By statute 9 and
10
Page 71 U. S. 321
William III, chap. 32, if any person educated in or having made
a profession of the Christian religion did, "by writing, printing,
teaching, or advised speaking," deny the truth of the religion, or
the divine authority of the Scriptures, he was for the first
offence rendered incapably to hold any office or place of trust,
and for the second he was rendered incapable of bringing any
action, being guardian, executor, legatee, or purchaser of lands,
besides being subjected to three years' imprisonment without bail.
[
Footnote 1]
By statute 1 George I, chap. 13, contempts against the King's
title arising from refusing or neglecting to take certain
prescribed oaths and yet acting in an office or place of trust for
which they were required were punished by incapacity to hold any
public office, to prosecute any suit, to be guardian or executor,
to take any legacy or deed of gift, and to vote at any election for
members of Parliament, and the offender was also subject to a
forfeiture of five hundred pounds to anyone who would sue for the
same. [
Footnote 2]
"Some punishments," says Blackstone,
"consist in exile or banishment, by abjuration of the realm or
transportation; others in loss of liberty by perpetual or temporary
imprisonment. Some extend to confiscation by forfeiture of lands or
movables, or both, or of the profits of lands for life; others
induce a disability of holding offices or employments, being heirs,
executors, and the like. [
Footnote
3]"
In France, deprivation or suspension of civil rights, or of some
of them, and among these of the right of voting, of eligibility to
office, of taking part in family councils, of being guardian or
trustee, of bearing arms, and of teaching or being employed in a
school or seminary of learning, are punishments prescribed by her
code.
The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that
all men have certain inalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that, in the pursuit of
happiness, all avocations, all honors, all positions are alike open
to everyone, and that in the protection
Page 71 U. S. 322
of these rights all are equal before the law. Any deprivation or
suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punishment,
and can be in no other wise defined.
Punishment not being, therefore, restricted, as contended by
counsel, to the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, but also
embracing deprivation or suspension of political or civil rights,
and the disabilities prescribed by the provisions of the Missouri
Constitution being in effect punishment, we proceed to consider
whether there is any inhibition in the Constitution of the United
States against their enforcement.
The counsel for Missouri closed his argument in this case by
presenting a striking picture of the struggle for ascendency in
that State during the recent Rebellion between the friends and the
enemies of the Union, and of the fierce passions which that
struggle aroused. It was in the midst of the struggle that the
present constitution was framed, although it was not adopted by the
people until the war had closed. It would have been strange,
therefore, had it not exhibited in its provisions some traces of
the excitement amidst which the convention held its
deliberations.
It was against the excited action of the States, under such
influences as these, that the framers of the Federal Constitution
intended to guard. In
Fletcher v. Peck, [
Footnote 4] Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking of such action, uses this language:
"Whatever respect might have been felt for the State
sovereignties, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the
Constitution viewed with some apprehension the violent acts which
might grow out of the feelings of the moment, and that the people
of the United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested
a determination to shield themselves and their property from the
effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are
exposed. The restrictions on the legislative power of the States
are obviously founded in this sentiment, and the Constitution of
the United States contains what may be deemed a bill of rights for
the people of each State. "
Page 71 U. S. 323
"No State shall pass any bill of attainder,
ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts."
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a judicial trial.
If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill
of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution,
bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties. In these
cases, the legislative body, in addition to its legitimate
functions, exercises the powers and office of judge; it assumes, in
the language of the textbooks, judicial magistracy; it pronounces
upon the guilt of the party without any of the forms or safeguards
of trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced,
whether conformable to the rules of evidence or otherwise; and it
fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with its own nations
of the enormity of the offence.
"Bills of this sort," says Mr. Justice Story,
"have been most usually passed in England in times of rebellion,
or gross subserviency to the Crown, or of violent political
excitements -- periods in which all nations are most liable (as
well the free as the enslaved) to forget their duties and to
trample upon the rights and liberties of others. [
Footnote 5]"
These bills are generally directed against individuals by name,
but they may be directed against a whole class. The bill against
the Earl of Kildare and others, passed in the reign of Henry VIII,
[
Footnote 6] enacted that "all
such persons which be or heretofore have been comforters, abettors,
partakers, confederates, or adherents unto the said" late earl, and
certain other parties, who were named, "in his or their false and
traitorous acts and purposes, shall in likewise stand, and be
attainted, adjudged, and convicted of high treason," and that
"the same attainder, judgment, and conviction against the said
comforters, abettors, partakers, confederates, and adherents, shall
be as strong and effectual in the law against them, and every of
them, as though they and every of them
Page 71 U. S. 324
had been specially, singularly, and particularly named by their
proper names and surnames in the said act."
These bills may inflict punishment absolutely or may inflict it
conditionally.
The bill against the Earl of Clarendon, passed in the reign of
Charles the Second, enacted that the earl should suffer perpetual
exile, and be forever banished from the realm; and that, if he
returned, or was found in England, or in any other of the King's
dominions, after the first of February, 1667, he should suffer the
pains and penalties of treason, with the proviso, however, that if
be surrendered himself before the said first day of February for
trial, the penalties and disabilities declared should be void and
of no effect. [
Footnote 7]
"A British act of Parliament," to cite the language of the
Supreme Court of Kentucky,
"might declare, that if certain individuals, or a class of
individuals, failed to do a given act by a named day, they should
be deemed to be, and treated as convicted felons or traitors. Such
an act comes precisely within the definition of a bill of
attainder, and the English courts would enforce it without
indictment or trial by jury. [
Footnote 8]"
If the clauses of the second article of the Constitution of
Missouri to which we have referred had in terms declared that Mr.
Cummings was guilty, or should be held guilty, of having been in
armed hostility to the United States, or of having entered that
State to avoid being enrolled or drafted into the military service
of the United States, and, therefore, should be deprived of the
right to preach as a priest of the Catholic Church, or to teach in
any institution of learning, there could be no question that the
clauses would constitute a bill of attainder within the meaning of
the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, instead of mentioning
his name, had declared that all priests and clergymen within the
State of Missouri were guilty of these acts, or should be held
guilty of them, and hence be subjected to the like deprivation, the
clauses would be equally open to objection. And
Page 71 U. S. 325
further, if these clauses had declared that all such priests and
clergymen should be so held guilty, and be thus deprived, provided
they did not, by a day designated, do certain specified acts, they
would be no less within the inhibition of the Federal
Constitution.
In all these cases, there would be the legislative enactment
creating the deprivation without any of the ordinary forms and
guards provided for the security of the citizen in the
administration of justice by the established tribunals.
The results which would follow from clauses of the character
mentioned do follow from the clauses actually adopted. The
difference between the last case supposed and the case actually
presented is one of form only, and not of substance. The existing
clauses presume the guilt of the priests and clergymen, and adjudge
the deprivation of their right to preach or teach unless the
presumption be first removed by their expurgatory oath -- in other
words, they assume the guilt and adjudge the punishment
conditionally. The clauses supposed differ only in that they
declare the guilt instead of assuming it. The deprivation is
effected with equal certainty in the one case as it would be in the
other, but not with equal directness. The purpose of the lawmaker
in the case supposed would be openly avowed; in the case existing,
it is only disguised. The legal result must be the same, for what
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Constitution
deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was leveled at
the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the citizen
should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by
legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised. If the
inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its
insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile
proceeding.
We proceed to consider the second clause of what Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall terms a bill of rights for the people of each
State -- the clause which inhibits the passage of an
ex post
facto law.
By an
ex post facto law is meant one which imposes a
punishment
Page 71 U. S. 326
for an act which was not punishable at the time it was
committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then
prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or
different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then
required.
In
Fletcher v. Peck, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall defined
an
ex post facto law to be one "which renders an act
punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was
committed." "Such a law," said that eminent judge,
"may inflict penalties on the person, or may inflict pecuniary
penalties which swell the public treasury. The legislature is then
prohibited from passing a law by which a man's estate, or any part
of it, shall be seized for a crime, which was not declared by some
previous law to render him liable to that punishment. Why, then,
should violence be done to the natural meaning of words for the
purpose of leaving to the legislature the power of seizing for
public use the estate of an individual, in the form of a law
annulling the title by which he holds the estate? The Court can
perceive no sufficient grounds for making this distinction. This
rescinding act would have the effect of an
ex post facto
law. It forfeits the estate of Fletcher for a crime not committed
by himself, but by those from whom he purchased. This cannot be
effected in the form of an
ex post facto law, or bill of
attainder; why, then, is it allowable in the form of a law
annulling the original grant?"
The act to which reference is here made was one passed by the
State of Georgia rescinding a previous act under which lands had
been granted. The rescinding act, annulling the title of the
grantees, did not, in terms, define any crimes, or inflict any
punishment, or direct any judicial proceedings; yet, inasmuch as
the legislature was forbidden from passing any law by which a man's
estate could be seized for a crime which was not declared such by
some previous law rendering him liable to that punishment, the
Chief Justice was of opinion that the rescinding act had the effect
of an
ex post facto law, and was within the constitutional
prohibition.
Page 71 U. S. 327
The clauses in the Missouri Constitution which are the subject
of consideration do not, in terms, define any crimes or declare
that any punishment shall be inflicted, but they produce the same
result upon the parties against whom they are directed as though
the crimes were defined and the punishment was declared. They
assume that there are persons in Missouri who are guilty of some of
the acts designated. They would have no meaning in the constitution
were not such the fact. They are aimed at past acts, and not future
acts. They were intended especially to operate upon parties who, in
some form or manner, by action or words, directly or indirectly,
had aided or countenanced the Rebellion, or sympathized with
parties engaged in the Rebellion, or had endeavored to escape the
proper responsibilities and duties of a citizen in time of war, and
they were intended to operate by depriving such persons of the
right to hold certain offices and trusts, and to pursue their
ordinary and regular avocations. This deprivation is punishment,
nor is it any less so because a way is opened for escape from it by
the expurgatory oath. The framers of the constitution of Missouri
knew at the time that whole classes of individuals would be unable
to take the oath prescribed. To them there is no escape provided;
to them the deprivation was intended to be, and is, absolute and
perpetual. To make the enjoyment of a right dependent upon an
impossible condition is equivalent to an absolute denial of the
right under any condition, and such denial, enforced for a past
act, is nothing less than punishment imposed for that act. It is a
misapplication of terms to call it anything else.
Now some of the acts to which the expurgatory oath is directed
were not offences at the time they were committed. It was no
offence against any law to enter or leave the State of Missouri for
the purpose of avoiding enrollment or draft in the military service
of the United States, however much the evasion of such service
might be the subject of moral censure. Clauses which prescribe a
penalty for an act of this nature are within the terms of the
definition of an
ex
Page 71 U. S. 328
post facto law -- "they impose a punishment for an act
not punishable at the time it was committed."
Some of the acts at which the oath is directed constituted high
offences at the time they were committed, to which, upon
conviction, fine and imprisonment or other heavy penalties were
attached. The clauses which provide a further penalty for these
acts are also within the definition of an
ex post facto
law -- "they impose additional punishment to that prescribed when
the act was committed."
And this is not all. The clauses in question subvert the
presumptions of innocence, and alter the rules of evidence, which
heretofore, under the universally recognized principles of the
common law, have been supposed to be fundamental and unchangeable.
They assume that the parties are guilty; they call upon the parties
to establish their innocence; and they declare that such innocence
can be shown only in one way -- by an inquisition, in the form of
an expurgatory oath, into the consciences of the parties.
The objectionable character of these clauses will be more
apparent if we put them into the ordinary form of a legislative
act. Thus, if instead of the general provisions in the
constitution, the convention had provided as follows : Be it
enacted, that all persons who have been in armed hostility to the
United States shall, upon conviction thereof, not only be punished
as the laws provided at the time the offences charged were
committed, but shall also be thereafter rendered incapable of
holding any of the offices, trusts, and positions, and of
exercising any of the pursuits mentioned in the second article of
the Constitution of Missouri -- no one would have any doubt of the
nature of the enactment. It would be an
ex post facto law,
and void, for it would add a new punishment for an old offence. So,
too, if the convention had passed an enactment of a similar kind
with reference to those acts which do not constitute offences.
Thus, had it provided as follows: Be it enacted, that all persons
who have heretofore, at any time, entered or left the State of
Missouri, with intent to avoid enrollment or draft in the military
service of the United States, shall, upon conviction
Page 71 U. S. 329
thereof, be forever rendered incapable of holding any office of
honor, trust, or profit in the State, or of teaching in any
seminary of learning, or of preaching as a minister of the gospel
of any denomination, or of exercising any of the professions or
pursuits mentioned in the second article of the constitution --
there would be no question of the character of the enactment. It
would be an
ex post facto law, because it would impose a
punishment for an act not punishable at the time it was
committed.
The provisions of the constitution of Missouri accomplish
precisely what enactments like those supposed would have
accomplished. They impose the same penalty, without the formality
of a judicial trial and conviction, for the parties embraced by the
supposed enactments would be incapable of taking the oath
prescribed; to them, its requirement would be an impossible
condition. Now, as the State, had she attempted the course
supposed, would have failed, it must follow that any other mode
producing the same result must equally fail. The provision of the
Federal Constitution, intended to secure the liberty of the
citizen, cannot be evaded by the form in which the power of the
State is exerted. If this were not so, if that which cannot be
accomplished by means looking directly to the end can be
accomplished by indirect means, the inhibition may be evaded at
pleasure. No kind of oppression can be named, against which the
framers of the Constitution intended to guard, which may not be
effected. Take the case supposed by counsel -- that of a man tried
for treason and acquitted, or, if convicted, pardoned -- the
legislature may nevertheless enact that, if the person thus
acquitted or pardoned does not take an oath that he never has
committed the acts charged against him, he shall not be permitted
to hold any office of honor or trust or profit, or pursue any
avocation in the State. Take the case before us -- the Constitution
of Missouri, as we have seen, excludes, on failure to take the oath
prescribed by it, a large class of persons within her borders from
numerous positions and pursuits; it would have been equally within
the power of the State to have extended the
Page 71 U. S. 330
exclusion so as to deprive the parties, who are unable to take
the oath, from any avocation whatever in the State. Take still
another case: suppose that, in the progress of events, persons now
in the minority in the State should obtain the ascendency, and
secure the control of the government; nothing could prevent, if the
constitutional prohibition can be evaded, the enactment of a
provision requiring every person, as a condition of holding any
position of honor or trust, or of pursuing any avocation in the
State, to take an oath that he had never advocated or advised or
supported the imposition of the present expurgatory oath. Under
this form of legislation, the most flagrant invasion of private
rights, in periods of excitement, may be enacted, and individuals,
and even whole classes, may be deprived of political and civil
rights.
A question arose in New York, soon after the treaty of peace of
1783, upon a statute of that State, which involved a discussion of
the nature and character of these expurgatory oaths, when used as a
means of inflicting punishment for past conduct. The subject was
regarded as so important, and the requirement of the oath such a
violation of the fundamental principles of civil liberty and the
rights of the citizen, that it engaged the attention of eminent
lawyers and distinguished statesmen of the time, and, among others,
of Alexander Hamilton. We will cite some passages of a paper left
by him on the subject in which, with his characteristic fullness
and ability, he examines the oath and demonstrates that it is not
only a mode of inflicting punishment, but a mode in violation of
all the constitutional guarantees, secured by the Revolution, of
the rights and liberties of the people.
"If we examine it" (the measure requiring the oath), said this
great lawyer,
"with an unprejudiced eye, we must acknowledge not only that it
was an evasion of the treaty, but a subversion of one great
principle of social security, to-wit, that every man shall be
presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. This was to invert the
order of things and, instead of obliging the State to prove the
guilt in order
Page 71 U. S. 331
to inflict the penalty, it was to oblige the citizen to
establish his own innocence to avoid the penalty. It was to excite
scruples in the honest and conscientious, and to hold out a bribe
to perjury. . . . It was a mode of inquiry who had committed and of
those crimes to which the penalty of disqualification was annexed,
with this aggravation, that it deprived the citizen of the benefit
of that advantage, which he would have enjoyed by leaving, as in
all other cases, the burden of the proof upon the prosecutor."
"To place this matter in a still clearer light, let it be
supposed that, instead of the mode of indictment and trial by jury,
the legislature was to declare that every citizen who did not swear
he had never adhered to the King of Great Britain should incur all
the penalties which our treason laws prescribe. Would this not be a
palpable evasion of the treaty, and a direct infringement of the
Constitution? The principle is the same in both cases, with only
this difference in the consequences -- that, in the instance
already acted upon, the citizen forfeits a part of his rights; in
the one supposed, he would forfeit the whole. The degree of
punishment is all that distinguishes the cases. In either, justly
considered, it is substituting a new and arbitrary mode of
prosecution to that ancient and highly esteemed one recognized by
the laws and constitution of the State. I mean the trial by
jury."
"Let us not forget that the Constitution declares that trial by
jury, in all cases in which it has been formerly used, should
remain inviolate forever, and that the legislature should at no
time erect any new jurisdiction which should not proceed according
to the course of the common law. Nothing can be more repugnant to
the true genius of the common law than such an inquisition as has
been mentioned into the consciences of men. . . . If any oath with
retrospect to past conduct were to be made the condition on which
individuals, who have resided within the British lines, should hold
their estates, we should immediately see that this proceeding would
be tyrannical, and a violation of the treaty; and yet, when the
same mode is employed to divest
Page 71 U. S. 332
that right, which ought to be deemed still more sacred, many of
us are so infatuated as to overlook the mischief."
"To say that the persons who will be affected by it have
previously forfeited that right, and that, therefore, nothing is
taken away from them, is a begging of the question. How do we know
who are the persons in this situation? If it be answered, this is
the mode taken to ascertain it -- the objection returns -- 'tis an
improper mode, because it puts the most essential interests of the
citizen upon a worse footing than we should be willing to tolerate
where inferior interests were concerned, and because, to elude the
treaty, it substitutes for the established and legal mode of
investigating crimes and inflicting forfeitures, one that is
unknown to the Constitution, and repugnant to the genius of our
law."
Similar views have frequently been expressed by the judiciary in
cases involving analogous questions. They are presented with great
force in
The matter of Dorsey, [
Footnote 9] but we do not deem it necessary to pursue
the subject further.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri must be reversed,
and the cause remanded with directions to enter a judgment
reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court, and directing that
court to discharge the defendant from imprisonment, and suffer him
to depart without day.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and MESSRS. JUSTICE SWAYNE, DAVIS, and MILLER
dissented. In behalf of this portion of the Court, a dissenting
opinion was delivered by MR. JUSTICE MILLER. This opinion applied
equally or more to the case of
Ex parte Garland (the case
next following), which involved principles of a character similar
to those discussed in this case. The dissenting opinion is,
therefore, published after the opinion of the court in that
case.
[
Footnote 1]
4 Black. 44.
[
Footnote 2]
Id. 124.
[
Footnote 3]
Id. 377.
[
Footnote 4]
10 U. S. 6
Cranch 137.
[
Footnote 5]
Commentaries, § 1344.
[
Footnote 6]
28 Henry VIII, chap. 18; 3 Stats. of Realm, 694.
[
Footnote 7]
Printed in 6 Howell's State Trials, p. 391.
[
Footnote 8]
Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana 510.
[
Footnote 9]
7 Porter 294.