1. Where a damage done is done wholly upon land, the fact that
the cause of the damage originated on water subject to the
admiralty jurisdiction does not make the cause one for the
admiralty.
2. Hence, where a vessel lying at a wharf, on waters subject to
admiralty jurisdiction, took fire, and the fire, spreading itself
to certain storehouses on the wharf, consumed these and their
stores, it was held not to be a case for admiralty proceeding.
The steam propeller
Falcon, employed by its owners in
navigating our great northern lakes, anchored beside the wharf of
Hough & Kershaw, in Chicago River -- "navigable water." Upon
the wharf large packing houses were built, and these at the time
were filled with valuable stores. Owing to the negligence of those
in charge of the
Falcon, the vessel took fire, and the
flames, stretching themselves to the wharf and packing houses, set
these last on fire, which with their stores were wholly consumed.
Hough & Kershaw filed accordingly, in the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, a libel in admiralty for cause
of damage, civil and maritime, against the owners of the
Falcon, and attached a vessel of theirs called the
Plymouth.
The district court, regarding the case as not one for the
admiralty dismissed the libel for want of jurisdiction. The circuit
court, on appeal, considered that the dismissal was rightly made.
The case was now here for review.
It is necessary to say that by act of Congress, [
Footnote 1] the district courts of the United
States possess admiralty jurisdiction "in matters of contract and
tort arising in, upon, or concerning steamboats or other vessels"
on our great northern lakes, the same as they do in cases of the
like steamboats, and other vessels employed in navigation and
commerce on the high seas and tidewaters.
Page 70 U. S. 33
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court:
The court below dismissed the libel for want of jurisdiction,
and that question is the only one that has been argued in this
Court.
It will be observed that the entire damage complained of by the
libellants as proceeding from the negligence of the master and crew
and for which the owners of the vessel are sought to be charged
occurred not on the water, but on the land. The origin of the wrong
was on the water, but the substance and consummation of the injury
on land. It is admitted by all the authorities that the
jurisdiction of the admiralty over marine torts depends upon
locality -- the high seas, or other navigable waters within
admiralty cognizance; and, being so dependent upon locality, the
jurisdiction is limited to the sea or navigable waters not
extending beyond high water mark.
In the case of
Thomas v. Lane, [
Footnote 2] Mr. Justice Story in a case where the
imprisonment was stated in the libel to be on shore, observed:
"In regard to torts, I have always understood that the
jurisdiction of the admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the
locality of the act. The admiralty has
Page 70 U. S. 34
not, and never, I believe, deliberately claimed to have, any
jurisdiction over torts except such as are maritime torts -- that
is, torts upon the high seas or on waters within the ebb and flow
of the tide."
Since the case of the
Genesee Chief, navigable waters
may be substituted for tide waters. This view of the jurisdiction
over maritime torts has not been denied.
But it has been strongly argued that this is a mixed case, the
tort having been committed partly on water and partly on land, and
that as the origin of the wrong was on the water -- in other words,
as the wrong began on the water (where the admiralty possesses
jurisdiction) -- it should draw after it all the consequences
resulting from the act. These mixed cases, however, will be found,
not cases of tort, but of contract, which do not depend altogether
upon locality as the test of jurisdiction, such as contracts of
materialmen for supplies, charter parties, and the like. These
cases depend upon the nature and subject matter of the contract,
whether a maritime contract, and the service a maritime service to
be performed upon the sea, or other navigable waters, though made
upon land. The cases of torts to be found in the admiralty, as
belonging to this class, hardly partake of the character of mixed
cases, or have, at most, but a very remote resemblance. [
Footnote 3]
They are cases of personal wrongs which commenced on the land,
such as improperly enticing a minor on board a ship and there
exercising unlawful authority over him. The substance and
consummation of the wrong were on board the vessel -- on the high
seas or navigable waters -- and the injury complete within
admiralty cognizance. It was the tortious acts on board the vessel
to which the jurisdiction attached.
This class of cases may well be referred to as illustrating the
true meaning of the rule of locality in cases of marine
Page 70 U. S. 35
torts, namely that the wrong and injury complained of must have
been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters, or at
least the substance and consummation of the same must have taken
place upon these waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction. In
other words, the cause of damage, in technical language, whatever
else attended it, must have been there complete.
Much stress has been given to the fact by the learned counsel
who would support the jurisdiction in his argument that the vessel
which communicated the fire to the wharf and buildings was a
maritime instrument or agent, and hence characterized the nature of
the tort. In other words, that this characterized it as a maritime
tort, and, of course, of admiralty cognizance.
But this, we think, is a misapprehension. The owner of a vessel
is liable for injuries done to third persons or property by the
negligence or malfeasance of the master and crew while in the
discharge of their duties and acting within the scope of their
authority. It is upon this principle that the defendants are
liable, if at all, to the libellants for the damages sustained. The
circumstance that the agents were in the employment of the owners
on board the vessel, and that the negligence occurred while so
employed, and which occasioned the damage, gives to the libellants
the right of action. But if they had been employed upon any other
structure in the river -- on a raft, or floating platform -- for
work on the river and the fire had been communicated to the wharf
and buildings on account of their negligence while so engaged, the
right of action would have been the same. The jurisdiction of the
admiralty over maritime torts does not depend upon the wrong's
having been committed on board the vessel, but upon its having been
committed upon the high seas or other navigable waters.
A trespass on board of a vessel or by the vessel itself above
tidewater, when that was the limit of jurisdiction, was not of
admiralty cognizance. The reason was that it was not committed with
the locality that gave the jurisdiction. The vessel itself was
unimportant. The fact, therefore,
Page 70 U. S. 36
of its having taken place on board the propeller
Falcon
in the present case is not an element that imparts any peculiar
character to the nature of the tort complained of. This is so in
cases of collision, in which the offending vessel may be attached
and proceeded against as one of the remedies for the wrong done.
The jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the fact
that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the locality
-- the high seas or navigable waters where it occurred. Every
species of tort, however occurring and whether on board a vessel or
not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty
cognizance.
We can give, therefore, no particular weight or influence to the
consideration that the injury in the present case originated from
the negligence of the servants of the respondents on board of a
vessel, except as evidence that it originated on navigable waters
-- the Chicago River -- and, as we have seen, the simple fact that
it originated there, but, the whole damage done upon land, the
cause of action not being complete on navigable waters, affords no
ground for the exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction. The
negligence, of itself, furnishes no cause of action; it is
damnum absque injuria. The case is not distinguishable
from that of a person standing on a vessel, or on any other support
in the river and sending a rocket or torpedo into the city, by
means of which buildings were set on fire and destroyed. That would
be a direct act of trespass, but quite as efficient a cause of
damage as if the fire had proceeded from negligence. Could the
admiralty take jurisdiction? We suppose the strongest advocate for
this jurisdiction would hardly contend for it. Yet the origin of
the trespass is upon navigable waters, which are within its
cognizance. The answer is as already given: the whole or at least
the substantial cause of action arising out of the wrong, must be
complete within the locality upon which the jurisdiction depends --
on the high seas or navigable waters.
The learned counsel, who argued this case for the appellants
with great care and research, admitted that it was one of first
impression; that he could find no case in the books
Page 70 U. S. 37
like it. The reason is apparent, for it is outside the
acknowledged limit of admiralty cognizance over marine torts, among
which it has been sought to be classed. The remedy for the injury
belongs to the courts of common law.
Decree affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Act of February 26, 1845; 5 Stat. at Large 726.
[
Footnote 2]
2 Sumner 9.
[
Footnote 3]
Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumner 2;
The Huntress, per
Ware J., Davies 85;
United States v. Magill, 1 Washington
C.C. 463;
Plumer v. Webb, 4 Mason 383-384; 1 Kent 367* and
n.