1. The power of the Supreme Court of the United States to revise
the proceedings of a circuit court in a case brought up on a
certificate of division is strictly confined to the questions
stated in the certificate.
2. Judgments and decrees rendered in the courts of the United
States are liens upon the defendant's real estate in all cases
where similar judgments or decrees of the state courts are made
liens by the law of the state.
3. A decree for the payment of money in an admiralty suit
in
personam stands in this respect upon the same footing as a
decree in equity.
4. Judgments and decrees in equity rendered by the state courts
of Ohio are, by the laws of that state, liens upon lands;
therefore,
5. Where one party filed his libel against another in the
federal district court for Ohio claiming damages by a collision of
two vessels on the Lake and got a decree
in personam for
money as compensation, the decree is a lien on the respondent's
land.
6. That lien gives the libellant a right to levy on the lands to
which it attaches, and consequently such interest in the lands as
will enable him to sustain a bill of discovery against the
respondent and any third person who sets up an unfounded claim
under a different lien.
7. On such a bill, the respondent, if he makes out his case, is
entitled to a decree which will remove the cloud from his title,
but the court cannot proceed further and in the same case order the
land to be sold for the payment of the debt found due by the
original decree.
The complainants, on the 12th day of November, A.D. 1856, upon
appeal from the district court, obtained a decree in the
Page 67 U. S. 431
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of
Ohio against the defendants, Philo Chamberlain and John H.
Crawford, in a proceeding by libel for damages sustained by the
libellants by a collision on the waters of Lake Erie between the
steamer
Atlantic, belonging to the libellants, and the
propeller
Ogdensburg, belonging to said Chamberlain and
Crawford, whereby the steamer was sunk and lost.
The case was taken by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and the decree of the circuit court there affirmed.
On the 7th day of July, 1859, a joint decree was entered in said
circuit court upon the mandate of the Supreme Court, and by the
agreement of the parties, against Chamberlain and Crawford, and
also against the defendants, I. L. Hewitt, John H. Chamberlain and
George W. McNeil, their sureties in the appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States. It was stipulated and agreed between the
libellants and the defendants in the last-named decree that Philo
Chamberlain and John H. Crawford, the original defendants in the
libel, should make certain payments periodically on account of the
last-named decree, that if such payments should be punctually made,
no execution should issue, but that in default of any such
payment's being made as required by the agreement, the complainants
might thereupon proceed to collect the amount due and unpaid, as
they should see fit. Two payments were made and two defaults
afterwards occurred; complainants caused execution to issue upon
the decree against the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of
the defendants therein; the Marshal found no goods or chattels
whereon to levy, and for want of such goods and chattels he levied
upon the lands of the defendants, situated in the Northern District
of Ohio and described in the bill. The other defendants claimed
rights and interests in and liens upon said lands. The defendants
had no goods or chattels liable to execution and no lands or
tenements in the State of Ohio other than those levied upon and
described in the bill. The prayer of the bill was for discovery,
that the rights of the parties and the dates and validity of their
several liens in respect of said lands might be ascertained, that
the lands might be sold and the proceeds
Page 67 U. S. 432
applied, so far as could of right be done, to the payment of the
amount due, and for general relief.
To this bill the defendants filed a general demurrer.
A hearing was had on the questions raised by the demurrer in the
circuit court at the July Term, 1860, and the opinions of the
judges being opposed, the questions were certified to this Court
for decision.
The points of law upon which the circuit court divided are
distinctly set forth by MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD in the opinion of this
Court.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD.
This is a bill in equity, and the case comes before the Court on
a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of
Ohio. According to the transcript, the bill of complaint sets forth
that the complainants, on the 12th day of November, 1856, upon
appeal from the district court of the United States, obtained a
decree in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio for
the sum of $36,000 against the two respondents first named in a
proceeding by libel filed in the district court on the 27th day of
October, 1852, for damages sustained, as alleged in the libel, by
means of a collision on the waters of Lake Erie between the steamer
Atlantic, belonging to the libellants, and the propeller
Ogdensburg, belonging to the aforesaid respondents,
whereby the steamer was sunk and lost. Complainants also allege
that the case was taken by appeal to this Court, and that the
decree of the circuit court was here affirmed; that on the 7th day
of July, 1859, when the mandate of this Court was received and
filed in the circuit court, a joint decree, by the agreement of the
parties, was entered there against the original respondents and
their sureties on the appeal to this Court; that the parties to the
last named decree stipulated and agreed between themselves that
the
Page 67 U. S. 433
original respondents should make certain payments at stated
times on account of the decree, and that if such payments were
regularly and punctually made, no execution should issue on the
decree, but that they also stipulated and agreed that in default of
any such payment as required by the agreement, the complainants
might thereupon proceed to collect the amount due and unpaid as
they should see fit.
They also allege that two payments of $1,000 each were duly made
under the stipulation and agreement, but that the aforesaid
respondents subsequently made default, and when a second default
had occurred, the complainants caused execution to issue upon the
last named decree against the goods and chattels, lands and
tenements of the respondents in that decree, and delivered the same
to the marshal, and that the marshal, finding no goods or chattels
of the execution debtors, and for want of such, levied the
execution upon certain parcels of land belonging to them, situated
in the Northern District of Ohio, and which are particularly
described in the bill of complaint. Rights and interests in, and
liens upon the lands are claimed by the other respondents, as the
complainants allege, in regard to which they, the complainants, are
not particularly advised, and they also allege that the respondents
owned the lands levied upon and described in the bill of complaint
at and before the time of the rendition of the first named decree,
and have so owned the same ever since that time, and that they have
no other lands or tenements in the state, and have no goods or
chattels liable to execution.
Prayer of the bill of complaint is for discovery, and that the
rights of the parties and the dates and validity of their several
liens in respect of the lands may be ascertained, and that the
lands may be sold and the proceeds applied so far as can of right
be done, to the payment of the amount due upon the decrees and for
general relief. To the bill of complaint the respondents in the
decrees demurred and the complainants joined in demurrer, thereupon
the following questions of law occurred before the court, in regard
to which the opinions of the judges of the court were opposed.
Page 67 U. S. 434
1. Whether either of the decrees was a lien upon the real estate
of the respondents therein who owned such real estate as
aforesaid.
2. Whether an execution can be issued upon a decree in admiralty
in Ohio against the lands of the respondents, they having no goods
and chattels liable to execution to satisfy the same.
3. Whether the issuing and levying of the execution in this
case, as aforesaid, were not nullities, and whether the levy of the
execution in anywise bound the lands upon which the same was
levied.
4. Whether real estate can be reached by proceedings in chancery
to satisfy a decree in admiralty in Ohio, where the respondent has
no goods or chattels liable to execution.
I. Provision is made by the Act of the 29th of April, 1802, that
whenever any question shall occur before a circuit court upon which
the opinions of the judges shall be opposed, the point upon which
the disagreement may happen shall, during the same term, upon the
request of either party or their counsel, be stated under the
direction of the judges and certified under the seal of the court
to the Supreme Court at their next session to be held thereafter,
and shall by the said Court be finally decided. 2 Stat. at Large
156. Such certificate, as has repeatedly been held by this Court,
brings nothing before this Court for its consideration but the
points or questions certified, as required by the 6th section of
the act. Defective certificates are sometimes sent up, but in such
case the Court uniformly refuses to certify any opinion and remands
the cause for further proceedings, holding, under all
circumstances, that nothing can come before this Court under that
provision except such single definite questions as shall actually
arise and become the subject of disagreement in the court below and
be duly certified here for decision.
Ogle v.
Lee, 2 Cranch 33;
Perkins v.
Hart's Ex'r, 11 Wheat. 237;
Kennedy v. Georgia
state Bank, 8 How. 611. All suggestions, therefore, respecting
any supposed informality in the decree or irregularities in the
proceedings of the suit are obviously premature and out of place,
and may well
Page 67 U. S. 435
be dismissed without further remark, because no such inquiries
are involved in the points certified, and by all the decisions of
this Court, matters not so certified are not before the Court for
its consideration, but remain in the court below to be determined
by the circuit judges.
Wayman v.
Southard, 10 Wheat. 21;
Saunders
v. Gould, 4 Pet. 392. Such other matters
undoubtedly may be brought here for revision by another certificate
of division in an opinion like the present or by an appeal after
final judgment, but nothing of the kind is here now for the
consideration of the Court.
II. Recurring to the questions certified in the transcript, it
is obvious that the first three involve the same general
considerations, and present the important inquiries
1. Whether a decree in admiralty for the payment of money,
rendered in a federal court in a suit
in personam under
the circumstances stated, is a lien upon the lands of the
respondents in the decree, and if so then
2. Whether an execution issued on the same may, for the want of
goods and chattels of the execution debtor, be lawfully levied on
his real estate.
Libellants, under the 21st Rule in admiralty, adopted at the
last session of this Court, may have a writ of execution in the
nature of a
fieri facias in all cases of a final decree
for the payment of money, commanding the marshal or his deputy to
levy and collect the amount thereof out of the goods and chattels,
lands and tenements, or other real estate of the defendant or
stipulator. Execution, however, was issued upon the decree
described in the bill of complaint in 1860, before the present rule
was adopted and while the old rule adopted in 1845 was in
operation. By that rule, it was provided that the libellant might,
at his election, have an attachment to compel the defendant to
perform the decree or a writ of execution in the nature of a
capias, and of a
fieri facias, commanding the
marshal or his deputy to levy the amount thereof of the goods and
chattels of the defendant, and for want thereof to arrest his body
to answer the exigency of the execution. Authority was given to the
courts of the United States by the 17th section of the Judiciary
Act to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly
conducting of business in the said courts, provided
Page 67 U. S. 436
such rules were not repugnant to the laws of the United States,
and by the 7th section of the Act of the 2d of March, 1793,
additional authority was conferred upon the several courts of the
United States to make rules and orders for their respective courts
directing certain prescribed proceedings, and other matters in the
vacation, and otherwise in a manner not repugnant to the laws of
the United States, and to regulate the practice of said courts
respectively for the advancement of justice, and to prevent delays
in the proceedings. 1 Stat. at Large 83, 335.
Full power and authority were also given to this Court by the
6th section of the Act of the 23d of August, 1842, to prescribe,
regulate and alter the forms of writs and other process to be used
and issued in the district and circuit courts and the forms and
modes of framing and filing libels, bills, answers, and other
pleadings and proceedings in suits at common law, or in admiralty
and in equity, pending in those courts, and also the forms and
modes of taking and obtaining evidence, and of obtaining discovery,
and of proceeding to obtain relief, and of proceeding before
trustees appointed by the court, and generally to regulate the
whole practice of the said courts so as to prevent delays and
promote the other objects specified in the section. 5 Stat. at
Large 518. None of those provisions, however, authorizes this Court
to adopt rules making judgments or decrees for the payment of money
a lien on land where no such charge is created by law, or to
displace any such right where the same is conferred or recognized
by an Act of Congress. Remarks are to be found in the opinion of
the Court in
Beers v.
Haughton, 9 Pet. 360, which give some countenance
to that theory, but the remarks were not necessary to the
adjudication of the matter in controversy, and evidently should be
understood as referring to the examples previously mentioned in the
opinion of the Court, where process had been modified to make it
conform to state laws adopted by rule of Court. Congress, said the
Court, may adopt such state laws directly or by substantive
enactment, or they may confide the authority to adopt them to the
courts of the United States, and the judge who delivered
Page 67 U. S. 437
the opinion, in enforcing the preposition, went on to say that
the courts may by their rules not only alter the forms, but the
effect and operation of process, both mesne and final, so that it
may reach property not before liable, or may exempt property
previously subject to such process.
Explained as above, the remarks are perhaps without objection,
but it cannot for a moment be admitted that any rule adopted by
this Court, merely as such, can enlarge, diminish, or vary the
operation and effect of mesne or final process upon the property of
the debtor in respect to the matter under consideration. Although a
lien on land constitutes no property or right in the land itself,
still it confers a right to levy on the same to the exclusion of
other adverse interests acquired subsequently to the judgment, and
when the levy is actually made on the land affected by the lien,
the title of the creditor generally relates back to the time of the
judgment so as to cut out intermediate encumbrances.
Conrad v. Atlantic Ins.
Co., 1 Pet. 443;
Massingill
v. Downs, 11 How. 760,
48 U. S. 767.
Different regulations, however, prevail upon the subject in
different jurisdictions, and in some of the states, neither
judgments nor decrees for the payment of money, except in cases of
attachment on mesne process, create any preference in favor of the
creditor until the execution issuing on the same has been duly
levied on the land. Reference is made to these various regulations
as confirming the proposition that rules of court can have no
effect to create such a right or to displace it where it has been
conferred by the Legislature.
III. Two errors, as was supposed, existed in the old rule, and
it was on that account that it was abolished and the new one was
substituted in its place. Arrest of the body of the debtor was
improperly allowed, and the remedy of the creditor against the
property of the debtor was improperly restricted. 5 Stat. at Large
321, 410; 4 Stat. at Large 281. Repeal of the old rule corrected
one of the supposed errors and the new rule was adopted to correct
the other, so that the practice of the admiralty courts upon both
subjects might conform to the existing provisions of law. Such were
the views of the court at the time the alteration was made in the
rule, but it is insisted by the
Page 67 U. S. 438
respondents that decrees in admiralty, although rendered in
suits
in personam and for the payment of money, are not in
any case a lien on land under the laws of Congress. They do not
deny that judgments and decrees in equity for the payment of money
are a lien on land in the State of Ohio, nor that, by the laws of
Congress, such judgments and decrees in the federal courts follow
in that respect the laws of the state in which the same were
rendered or pronounced.
Argument in support of the first proposition is certainly
unnecessary, because it is the subject of express legislation.
Code, sec. 421; Swan's Stat. 675. Laws to that effect were passed
at a very early period in the history of the state, and they appear
to have been continued to the present time. Repeated decisions of
this Court also have established the doctrine that the lien of
judgments and decrees in the federal courts arises out of the
adoption of the state laws upon that subject, and that the lien may
be considered as a rule of property under the thirty-fourth section
of the Judiciary Act.
Clements v.
Berry, 11 How. 411;
United
States v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124;
Ralston v.
Bell, 2 Dall. 158. To the same effect, also, is the
decision of Mr. Justice Grier in
Lombard v. Bayard, 1
Wall.Jr. 96, wherein he held:
"1. That the lien of judgments in the courts of the United
States does not result from any direct legislation of Congress on
that subject. 2. That under the Judiciary Act, which ordains that
the laws of the several states shall be the rules of decision at
common law, the courts of the United States have uniformly adopted
the principles of state policy and jurisprudence on the subject of
the lien of judgments, so far as the same were applicable, treating
them as rules affecting real property, and its transmission,
whether by descent or purchase. Regarding those propositions in the
form first stated as settled and undeniable, nothing remains for
consideration on this branch of the case except to inquire and
ascertain whether or not decrees in admiralty for the payment of
money stand upon the same footing as decrees in equity, for if they
stand upon the same, then it is clear that the first three
questions must be
Page 67 U. S. 439
answered in the affirmative, and if not, then they must be
answered in the negative."
4. Expressions are to be found in one or more of the cases
referred to which countenance the idea that the state laws in
respect to the lien of judgments and decrees were adopted by the
courts of the United States, but upon a closer examination of the
subject, it will appear, we think, that those laws are recognized
and substantially adopted by the Acts of Congress regulating
process in the courts of the United States. Authority was given to
all the courts of the United States by the 14th Section of the
Judiciary Act to issue writs of
scire facias, habeas
corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute
which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.
Provision was also made by the 2d Section of the Act of the 29th of
September, 1789, that the forms of writs and executions, except
their style and modes of process, should be the same in each state,
respectively, as were then used or allowed in the Supreme Court of
the same, but it was provided that the forms and modes of
proceedings in causes of equity and admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction should be according to the course of the civil law.
Power to issue process, mesne and final, was conferred upon all the
courts of the United States by the first provision, but the forms
of process in suits at common law and the forms and modes of
proceedings in equity and admiralty and maritime causes were
prescribed by the second. Discrimination was made between suits at
common law and suits in equity and admiralty, but the forms and
modes of proceedings in the two latter were referred to the civil
law. Expiring, as the last named act did, at the end of the next
session after which it was passed, further legislation became
necessary, and Congress accordingly passed the Act of the 8th of
May, 1792, confirming the forms of writs, executions, and other
process then used in the courts of the United States in suits at
common law, but declaring in effect that the forms and modes of
proceeding in suits of equity, and in those of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, should be according to the principles,
rules, and usages
Page 67 U. S. 440
which belong to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty
respectively, as contradistinguished from courts of common law.
Certain exceptions are specified in the same section, and the whole
provision is made subject to such regulations as the Supreme Court
of the United States shall think proper from time to time by rule
to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same.
1 Stat. at Large 276.
Two cases at least came before this Court involving the
construction of that provision and its validity. Those cases among
other things affirm:
1. That the states have no authority to control or regulate the
proceedings in the courts of the United States except so far as the
state process acts are adopted by Congress or by the courts of the
United States under the authority of Congress.
2. That the foregoing provision adopted the forms of writs,
executions, and other process of the states as existing in 1789,
subject to such alterations as the courts of the United States
might make, but not subject to alterations since made in the state
laws.
3. That the laws of the United States authorize the courts of
the Union so to alter the form of the process of execution then
used in the state courts as to subject to execution lands and other
property not then subject to execution by the state laws in force
at that time.
Wayman v.
Southard, 10 Wheat. 41,
23 U. S. 43;
Bank of United States v.
Halstead, 10 Wheat. 63. In enforcing the third
proposition, Mr. Justice Thompson, in the last case, said it is
understood that it has been the general if not the universal
practice of the courts of the United States so to alter their
executions as to authorize a levy upon whatever property is made
subject to the like process from the state courts, and under such
alterations many sales of land have no doubt been made which might
be disturbed if a contrary construction should be adopted. Both of
those cases were decided in 1825, and at the same term this Court
held, in the case of
Manro v.
Almedia, 10 Wheat. 490, that the proceedings in
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, under the
beforementioned Process Act, were to be according to the modified
admiralty practice of our own country, and that it was not a
sufficient objection to the issuing of the process of
attachment
Page 67 U. S. 441
that it had fallen into disuse in the parent country. Such was
the state of the decisions of this Court when the Act of the 19th
of May, 1828, was passed. 4 Stat. at Large 278. Regulation of mesne
process is the subject of the first section, commencing with the
forms of mesne process in suits at common law in the courts of the
United States held in those states admitted into the Union since
the date of the first process act. Forms of mesne process in those
courts are required to be the same in each of the said states
respectively "as are now used in the highest court of original and
general jurisdiction of the same." Separate provision is also made
in the same section in respect to the forms of mesne process in
proceedings in equity and in those of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. Repetition of those regulations is unnecessary, as
they are substantially the same as those of the former act, except
that the regulations relate solely to mesne process. Right of
imparlance also is made, by the second section of the act, to
depend in certain cases upon state laws. Where judgments are a lien
upon the property of the defendant, and where, by the laws of the
state, defendants are entitled in the courts thereof to an
imparlance of one term or more, the provision is that the
defendants in actions in the courts of the United States, holden in
such state, shall be entitled to an imparlance of one term. showing
that it was the intention of Congress to prevent a creditor suing
in the federal courts from obtaining an advantage over another
creditor suing in the state courts. Bearing in mind that the first
section of the act under consideration has respect solely to the
forms of mesne process in the several courts of the United States,
and that the provision specifies and prescribes the source from
which the forms of such process shall be derived in suits of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as well as in suits at common
law and in equity, we come to the examination of the third section
of the same act, which provides that
writs of execution
and other final process issued on judgments
and decrees
rendered
in any of the courts of the United States, and
the
proceeding thereupon shall be the same, except their
style, in each state respectively, as are now used in the courts of
such state, saving to the courts of the United States
Page 67 U. S. 442
in those states in which there are not courts of equity, with
the ordinary equity jurisdiction, the power of prescribing the mode
of executing their decrees in equity by rules of court.
Courts of justice may construe a legislative provision but they
cannot repeal what is expressly enacted. When Congress, in plain
and unambiguous terms declares that writs of execution on decrees
rendered
in any of the courts of the United States, and
the proceedings thereupon, shall be the same as are now used in the
courts of such state, it is not possible for this Court to hold
that the decrees of one of the courts of the United States are not
embraced in that provision -- especially not as the very court
whose decrees it is said are excluded from the provision is
specifically mentioned in the first section of the same act as one
of the courts of the United States, and its proceedings there made
the subject of special and material regulation. Exclusive original
jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases is conferred upon the
district courts of the United States, but the circuit courts hear
such cases on appeal, and, as matter of daily practice, render
decrees thereon for the payment of money, and it is not to be
doubted, we think, that such decrees are as much within the
provision under consideration as decrees in equity, and if so, no
reason is perceived why the same rule should not be applied to
decrees of a like character rendered in the district courts.
Undoubtedly Congress intended by that provision to adopt the state
laws in respect to the proceedings on final process as they existed
at the date of the act, and the effect of the enactment, or one of
its effects, was to render judgments and decrees for the payment of
money rendered in the federal courts a lien on the land of the
debtor in all cases and under like circumstances as when rendered
in the state courts. Under the earlier process acts, this Court
twice decided that the laws of the states furnished the rule of
decision in respect to the lien of judgments and decrees rendered
in the federal courts upon the land of the debtor, and since the
passage of the act under consideration, it has been twice affirmed
by this Court as a matter of history that the act was passed to
confirm the view expressed in those decisions.
Beers
v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 361;
Ross v.
Duval, 13 Pet. 64.
Page 67 U. S. 443
Perfect coincidence of opinion upon the subject appears to have
prevailed throughout between Congress and the Court, and on all
sides apparently the endeavor has been to assimilate the
proceedings in the federal courts for the levying of executions
issued on judgments and decrees for the payment of money to those
prevailing in the courts of the states. Strong confirmation as to
the views of Congress upon the subject is derived from the 4th
section of the Act of the 4th of July, 1840. 5 Stat. at Large 393.
By the fourth section of that act it is provided that judgments and
decrees hereafter rendered in the circuit and district courts
within any state shall cease to be liens on real estate or chattels
real in the same manner and at like periods as judgments and
decrees of the courts of such state now cease by law to be liens
thereon. District courts, as is well known, exercise no
jurisdiction in equity, so that the inference is a very strong and
indeed a conclusive one, that the reference to decrees, so far as
that court is concerned, is solely to decrees in admiralty for the
payment of money.
Imprisonment for debt also and the computation of interest upon
judgments in all civil cases, both in the circuit and district
courts, are by Acts of Congress expressly referred to the laws of
the state for the rule of decision and the ascertainment of the
rights of the parties. 5 Stat. at Large 320, 410, 515. Usage,
however, it is said, is opposed to such a construction of the
provisions under consideration, and reference is made to
authorities to show that, in England, an execution issued on a
decree in the admiralty never runs against the land of the debtor,
which may well be admitted, but the reason for the restriction must
not be overlooked, which is that courts of admiralty in that
country are not regarded as courts of record. Under the
Constitution, the judicial power of the United States is vested in
one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. Such judicial power extends
to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as well as to
the cases of law and equity described in the Constitution.
When the judicial system of the United States was organized,
Page 67 U. S. 444
exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction was conferred upon the district courts.
Appeals in certain cases were allowed to the circuit court, but
neither an admiralty nor an equity cause could be brought here from
the circuit court in any other mode than by writ of error. 1 Stat.
at Large 83. Later regulations allow appeals, but they place causes
in equity and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the same
footing. 2 Stat. at Large 244.
Circuit courts as well as district courts were created by the
act of Congress establishing the judicial system of the United
States, and the latter as well as the former are courts of record.
No one ever doubted the fact, and consequently it is not necessary
to enter into any argument to prove it. These considerations lead
necessarily to the conclusion that the answer to the first three
questions must be in the affirmative.
5. Before proceeding to answer the fourth question submitted, it
becomes necessary to advert very briefly to the state of facts
bearing upon the point as exhibited in the transcript. Execution
was issued on the decree in favor of the complainants, and the
marshal duly levied the same upon the several parcels of land
described in the bill of complaint. They are therefore interested
in the title to the subject matter in controversy, and inasmuch as
the statement of the case shows that rights and interests in and
liens upon the lands of a conflicting character are claimed by the
other parties, they, the complainants, were entitled to the
discovery and to so much of the relief prayed for as has respect to
the ascertainment and determination of the rights and interests of
the parties and the dates and validity of their liens upon the said
lands. equity will not allow a title to real estate, otherwise
clear, to be clouded by a claim which cannot be enforced either at
law or in equity, and consequently will interfere in behalf of the
holder of the legal title to remove a cloud on the same, or an
impediment or difficulty in the way of an effectual assertion of
his rights in a court of law. Such interference cannot be sustained
unless the complainant shows some title or interest in the land;
but it makes no difference whether such
Page 67 U. S. 445
title or interest was acquired by the levy of an execution
issued on a judgment at law, or on a decree in equity or admiralty
for the payment of money. Complainants' rights and remedies are
precisely the same as they would have been if the execution levied
on the land had been issued on a judgment at law or a decree in
equity for the payment of money. Jurisdiction in equity to remove a
cloud from the title of the complainant is fully maintained by the
modern decisions of the courts, and so generally is the principle
acknowledged, that all doubt upon the subject may be considered as
put at rest. 1 Story Eq., 8th ed., secs. 700, 705;
Hamilton v.
Cummings, 1 John.Ch. 522;
Pettit v. Shepherd, 5 Paige
Ch. 501.
Where the respondents claimed an unfounded lien on certain real
estate of the complainant, and it appeared that such claim
prevented purchasers of the estate from making payment of the
stipulated price, it was held in
Chipman v. Hartford, 21
Conn. 488, that the complainant was entitled to a discovery and to
have the cloud removed from his title, and, in enforcing that
conclusion, the court said that where an instrument is outstanding
against a party which is void, or an unfounded claim is set up
which he has reason to fear may at some time be used injuriously to
his rights, thereby throwing a cloud over his title, it is a well
recognized principle that equity will interfere and grant the
appropriate relief.
Downing v. Wherin, 19 N.H. 91;
Tanner v. Wise, 3 P.Wms. 296;
Overman v. Parker,
1 Hemp. 692;
Clark v.
Smith, 13 Pet. 203;
Lounsbury v. Purdy, 18
N.Y. 515. Applying these principles to the present case, it is
clear that the complainants were entitled to a discovery and to
have the cloud removed from their title, but equity will not
interfere under the circumstances stated to decree that the lands
shall he sold and the proceeds applied as prayed in the bill of
complaint. Affirmative answers must be certified to the first three
questions, and to the fourth, that the complainants, under the
demurrer, are entitled to so much of the relief prayed for as has
respect to the removal of the cloud upon their title to the land
described in the bill of complaint, but that the real estate
mentioned cannot be reached by proceedings in chancery to satisfy
the aforesaid decree.
Page 67 U. S. 446
MR. JUSTICE GRIER, dissenting.
I feel bound to express my dissent from the majority of my
brethren in the opinion just delivered.
It is now seventy years since the establishment of courts of
admiralty in these states, yet it seems that the boundary line of
their jurisdiction is not yet settled. During all this time it has
never been supposed that the definitive sentence or decree of a
court of admiralty was a lien or could be levied on lands. The
dominion of the admiral was over the se -- the ships and men who
frequented i -- their contracts and their torts. His court
proceeded either against the ship or the person of the owner, by
arrest of the thing or the person. When either was arrested, they
could be released by entering into stipulation with approved
sureties (
fide jussoux) who consented that execution
should issue against their goods and chattels in case of
default.
There is no process known to courts of admiralty for seizing or
selling land. But it is said that this process is authorized by the
Process Act of March 19, 1828.
It is now thirty-five years since that act was passed, and now
for the first time, it has been alleged that this provision lay hid
within its sections. The twenty-first rule regulating the practice
in admiralty, made by this Court in 1845 -- seventeen years after
the passage of the act -- shows that this Court had then no
suspicion of the hidden meaning of the third section which has now
been brought to light. If they had supposed that this statute had
made lands subject to lien by the decree of a court of admiralty,
they would have devised some process for taking them in execution
and selling them. The first section of the act ordains that the
forms of mesne process &c., should be the same in courts of
common law as are used in the highest courts of original and
general jurisdiction of the states, and in equity according to the
rules and usages which belong to courts of equity, but "in those of
admiralty jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules and
usages of admiralty, as contradistinguished from courts of common
law."
The third section, which directs process of execution,
speaks
Page 67 U. S. 447
of judgments and decrees in any of the courts of the United
States, and ordains that it shall be the same, except in their
style, as now used in the courts of such state. Now as there are no
courts of admiralty in any state, to what rule was the process of
courts of admiralty to conform? Is it to those of these courts of
common law or equity? The act provides that in states where there
are no courts of equity, the process may be prescribed by rules of
court.
The whole argument of this new construction of this section is
founded on the word "any," which is construed in its most expansive
sense, in spite of consistency in the act, and the evident intent
of the legislation as exhibited in the whole statute.
This innovation in the jurisdiction of admiralty courts
introduces a lien unknown to the laws of any state.
The lien of judgments is a rule of property which it is beyond
the power of this Court to establish. Congress has been careful not
to attempt the exercise of such a power, and only adopts the state
rules in cases where, if the judgments or decrees had been in a
state court, they would have operated as a lien. Congress never
intended by this oblique way to create what would in fact be, to a
large portion of every state, secret liens.
I believe that the construction which this act has received for
thirty-five years past is the true one, and beg leave to protest
against this introduction of a new one which utterly disregards
"the principles, rules and usages of courts of admiralty as
contradistinguished from a court of law."
I am confident such was not the intent and meaning of Congress.
The result of this doctrine may be to bring us into conflict with
the state courts, who may refuse to recognize titles to land
obtained through the process of maritime courts.
MR. JUSTICE CATRON joined with MR. JUSTICE GRIER in the dissent.
The other Judges concurred in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE
Clifford.