Congress created the black lung benefits program to provide
compensation for disability to miners due, at least in part, to
pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment. The program was
first administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA)
under the auspices of the then-existent Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW), and later by the Department of Labor
(DOL). Congress authorized these Departments, during their
respective tenures, to adopt interim regulations governing claims
adjudications, but constrained the Secretary of Labor by providing
that the DOL regulations "shall not be more restrictive than"
HEW's. As here relevant, the HEW interim regulations permit the
invocation of a rebuttable statutory presumption of eligibility for
benefits upon introduction by the claimant of specified medical
evidence, 20 CFR § 410.490(b)(1), and a demonstration that the
"impairment [thus] established . . . arose out of coal mine
employment (
see §§ 410.416 and 410.456)," § 410.490(b)(2).
The referred-to sections presume, "in the absence of persuasive
evidence to the contrary," that pneumoconiosis arose out of such
employment. Once a claimant invokes the eligibility presumption, §
410.490(c) permits the SSA to rebut the presumption by two methods.
In contrast, the comparable DOL interim regulations set forth four
rebuttal provisions. The first two provisions mimic those in the
HEW regulations. The third provision permits rebuttal upon a
showing that the miner's disability did not arise in whole or in
part out of coal mine employment, and the fourth authorizes
rebuttal with evidence demonstrating that the miner does not have
pneumoconiosis. In No. 89-1714, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the DOL regulations were not "more restrictive than" the HEW
regulations by virtue of the DOL's third rebuttal provision, and
therefore reversed an administrative award of benefits to a
claimant found to qualify under the HEW
Page 501 U. S. 681
regulations, but not under the DOL provisions. In Nos. 90-113
and 90-114, the Court of Appeals struck down the DOL regulations as
being "more restrictive than" HEW's, reversing DOL's denial of
benefits to two claimants whose eligibility was deemed rebutted
under the fourth rebuttal provision.
Held: The third and fourth rebuttal provisions in the
DOL regulations do not render those regulations "more restrictive
than" the HEW regulations. Pp.
501 U. S.
695-706.
(a) The Secretary of Labor's determination that her interim
regulations are not more restrictive than HEW's warrants deference
from this Court. Deference to an agency's interpretation of
ambiguous provisions in the statutes it is authorized to implement
is appropriate when Congress has delegated policymaking authority
to the agency.
See, e.g., 467 U. S. S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.
S. 837,
467 U. S. 866.
Here, since the relevant legislation has produced a complex and
highly technical regulatory program, requiring significant
expertise in the identification and classification of medical
eligibility criteria, and entailing the exercise of judgment
grounded in policy concerns, Congress must have intended, with
respect to the "not . . . more restrictive than" phrase, a
delegation of broad policymaking discretion to the Secretary of
Labor. This is evident from the statutory text, in that Congress
declined to require that the DOL adopt the HEW interim regulations
verbatim, and from the statute's legislative history, which
demonstrates that the delegation was made with the intention that
the black lung program evolve as technological expertise matured.
Thus, the Secretary's authority necessarily entails the authority
to interpret HEW's regulations and the discretion to promulgate
interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation thereof.
Pp.
501 U. S.
696-699.
(b) The Secretary of Labor's position satisfies
Chevron's reasonableness requirement.
See 467
U.S. at
467 U. S. 845.
Based on the premise that the HEW regulations were adopted to
ensure that only miners who were disabled due to pneumoconiosis
arising out of coal mine employment would receive benefits, the
Secretary interprets HEW's § 410.490(b)(2) requirement that the
claimant demonstrate that the impairment "arose out of coal mine
employment" as comparable to DOL's third rebuttal provision, and
views subsection (b)(2)'s incorporation by reference of §§ 410.416
and 410.456 as doing the work of DOL's fourth rebuttal method, in
light of the statutory definition of pneumoconiosis as "a . . .
disease . . . arising out of coal mine employment." This
interpretation harmonizes the two interim regulations with the
statute. Moreover, the Secretary's interpretation is more reasoned
than that of the claimants, who assert that the HEW regulations
contain no provision, either in the invocation subsection or in the
rebuttal subsection, that directs factual
Page 501 U. S. 682
inquiry into the issue of disability causation or the existence
of pneumoconiosis. The claimants' contention that § 410.490(b)(1)
creates a "conclusive" presumption of entitlement without regard to
the existence of competent evidence on these questions is deficient
in two respects. First, the claimants' premise is inconsistent with
the statutory text, which expressly provides that the presumptions
in question will be rebuttable, and requires the Secretary of HEW
to consider all relevant evidence. Second, although subsection
(c)'s delineation of two rebuttal methods may support an inference
that the drafter intended to exclude other methods, such an
inference provides no guidance where its application would render a
regulation inconsistent with the statute's purpose and language.
The fact that the SSA, under the HEW regulations, appeared to award
benefits to miners whose administrative files contained scant
evidence of eligibility does not require the Secretary to forgo
inquiries into disability causation and disease existence. The
claimants' argument that HEW omitted such inquiries from its
criteria based on a "cost/benefit" conclusion that the inquiries
would engender inordinate delays, yet generate little probative
evidence, finds scant support in contemporaneous analyses of the
SSA awards; disregards entirely subsequent advances in medical
technology that Congress could not have intended the HEW or the DOL
to ignore; and is based on the unacceptable premise that the
Secretary must demonstrate that her reasonable interpretation of
HEW's regulations is consistent with HEW's contemporaneous
interpretation of those regulations. Pp.
501 U. S.
699-706.
No. 89-1714, 890 F.2d 1295 (CA3 1989), affirmed; No. 90-113, 895
F.2d 178 (CA4 1990), and No. 90-114, 895 F.2d 173 (CA4 1990),
reversed and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and
SOUTER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
501 U. S. 706.
KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
litigation.
Page 501 U. S. 683
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The black lung benefits program, created by Congress, was to be
administered first by the Social Security Administration (SSA)
under the auspices of the then-existent Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW), and later by the Department of Labor
(DOL). Congress authorized these Departments, during their
respective tenures, to adopt interim regulations governing the
adjudication of claims for black lung benefits, but constrained the
Secretary of Labor by providing that the DOL regulations "shall not
be more restrictive than" HEW's. This litigation calls upon us to
determine whether the Secretary of Labor has complied with that
constraint.
I
A
The black lung benefits program was enacted originally as Title
IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (FCMHSA),
83 Stat. 792, 30 U.S.C. § 901
et seq., to provide benefits
for miners totally disabled due at least in
Page 501 U. S. 684
part to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment, and
to the dependents and survivors of such miners.
See Pittston
Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U. S. 105,
488 U. S. 108
(1988);
Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.
S. 135,
484 U. S. 138
(1987).
Through FCMHSA, Congress established a bifurcated system of
compensating miners disabled by pneumoconiosis. [
Footnote 1] Part B thereof created a
temporary program administered by the Social Security
Administration under the auspices of the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare. This program was intended for the
processing of claims filed on or before December 31, 1972. Benefits
awarded under part B were paid by the Federal Government. For
claims filed after 1972, part C originally authorized a permanent
program, administered by the Secretary of Labor, to be coordinated
with federally approved state workmen's compensation programs.
Benefits awarded under part C were to be paid by the claimants'
coal mining employers.
Under FCMHSA, the Secretary of HEW was authorized to promulgate
permanent regulations regarding the determination and adjudication
of part B claims. 30 U.S.C. § 921(b). The Secretary's discretion
was limited, however, by three statutory presumptions defining
eligibility under the part B program. § 921(c). For a claimant
suffering from pneumoconiosis who could establish 10 years of
Page 501 U. S. 685
coal mine employment, there "shall be a rebuttable presumption
that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment." § 921(c)(1).
Similarly, for a miner with at least 10 years of coal mine
employment who "died from a respirable disease there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis." §
921(c)(2). Finally, there was an irrebuttable presumption that a
miner presenting medical evidence demonstrating complicated
pneumoconiosis was totally disabled as a result of that condition.
§ 921(c)(3). Consistent with these presumptions, HEW promulgated
permanent regulations prescribing the methods and standards for
establishing entitlement to black lung benefits under part B.
See 20 CFR §§ 410.401 to 410.476 (1990).
Dissatisfied with the increasing backlog of unadjudicated claims
and the relatively high rate of claim denials resulting from the
application of the HEW permanent regulations, Congress in 1972
amended FCMSHA and redesignated Title IV of that Act as the Black
Lung Benefits Act of 1972. 86 Stat. 150.
See S.Rep. No.
92-743 (1972), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 2305.
See also Comptroller General of the United States, General
Accounting Office, Report to the Congress: Achievements,
Administrative Problems, and Costs in Paying Black Lung Benefits to
Coal Miners and Their Widows 16-18 (September 5, 1972) (nationally,
as of December 31, 1971, claims filed were 347,716, claims
processed were 322,582, and rate of claim denial was 50.5 percent).
In addition to extending the coverage of part B to those claims
filed by living miners prior to July 1, 1973, and those filed by
survivors before January 1, 1974, the 1972 amendments liberalized
in several ways the criteria and procedures applicable to part B
claims. First, the amendments added a fourth statutory presumption
of total disability due to pneumoconiosis for claimants unable to
produce X-ray evidence of the disease. This presumption applied to
a claimant with 15 years of coal mine employment who presented
evidence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary
impairment. Congress expressly limited rebuttal of the presumption
to a showing that the miner did not
Page 501 U. S. 686
have pneumoconiosis or that his respiratory or pulmonary
impairment did not arise out of employment in a coal mine. 30
U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). Second, the 1972 amendments redefined "total
disability" to permit an award of benefits on a showing that a
miner was unable to perform his coal mining duties or other
comparable work -- as opposed to the prior requirement that the
miner demonstrate that he was unable to perform any job,
see § 902(f) -- and prohibited HEW from denying a claim
for benefits solely on the basis of a negative X-ray. § 923(b).
Third, the 1972 amendments made it easier for survivors of a
deceased miner who had been disabled due to pneumoconiosis but had
died from a cause unrelated to the disease to demonstrate
eligibility for benefits.
See § 901. Finally, the
amendments made clear that, "[i]n determining the validity of
claims under [part B], all relevant evidence shall be considered."
§ 923(b).
In response to these amendments, the Secretary of HEW adopted
interim regulations
"designed to 'permit prompt and vigorous processing of the large
backlog of claims' that had developed during the early phases of
administering part B."
Sebben, 488 U.S. at
488 U. S. 109
quoting 20 CFR § 410.490(a) (1973). [
Footnote 2] These interim regulations established
adjudicatory rules for processing part B claims that permit the
invocation of a presumption of eligibility upon demonstration by
the claimant of specified factors, and a subsequent opportunity for
the Social Security Administration, in administering the program,
to rebut the presumption.
Specifically, the HEW interim regulations permit claimants to
invoke a rebuttable presumption that a miner is "totally
Page 501 U. S. 687
disabled due to pneumoconiosis" in one of two ways. First, the
claimant can introduce an X-ray, a biopsy, or an autopsy indicating
pneumoconiosis. 20 CFR § 410.490(b)(1)(i) (1990). Second, for a
miner with at least 15 years of coal mine employment, a claimant
may introduce ventilatory studies establishing the presence of a
chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease. § 410.490(b)(1)(ii). In
either case, in order to invoke the presumption, the claimant also
must demonstrate that the
"impairment established in accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of
this section arose out of coal mine employment (
see §§
410.416 and 410.456)."
§ 410.490(b)(2).
Once a claimant invokes the presumption of eligibility under §
410.490(b), the HEW interim regulations permit rebuttal by the SSA
upon a showing that the miner is doing his usual coal mine work or
comparable and gainful work, or is capable of doing such work.
See § 410.490(c).
The statutory changes adopted by the 1972 amendments and the
application of HEW's interim regulations resulted in a surge of
claims approvals under part B.
See Lopatto, The Federal
Black Lung Program: A 1983 Primer, 85 W.Va.L.Rev. 677, 686 (1983)
(demonstrating that the overall approval rate for part B claims had
substantially increased by December 31, 1974). Because the HEW
interim regulations expired with the part B program, however, the
Secretary of Labor was constrained to adjudicate all part C claims,
i.e., those filed after June 30, 1973, by living miners,
and after December 31, 1973, by survivors, under the more stringent
permanent HEW regulations.
See Sebben, 488 U.S. at
488 U. S. 110.
Neither the Congress nor the Secretary of Labor was content with
the application to part C claims of the unwieldy and restrictive
permanent regulations.
See Letter, dated Sept. 13, 1974,
of William J. Kilberg, Solicitor of Labor, to John B. Rhinelander,
General Counsel, Department of HEW, appearing in H.R.Rep. No.
94-770, p. 14 (1975). Not only did the application of the permanent
regulations cause the DOL to process claims slowly, but the
DOL's
Page 501 U. S. 688
claims approval rate was significantly below that of the SSA.
See Lopatto,
supra, at 691. Accordingly, Congress
turned its attention once again to the black lung benefits
program.
C
The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (BLBRA), 92 Stat. 95,
approved and effective Mar. 1, 1978, further liberalized the
criteria for eligibility for black lung benefits in several ways.
First, the Act expanded the definition of pneumoconiosis to include
"sequelae" of the disease, including respiratory and pulmonary
impairments arising out of coal mine employment.
See 30
U.S.C. § 902(b). Second, BLBRA required the DOL to accept a board
certified or board-eligible radiologist's interpretation of
submitted X-rays if the films met minimal quality standards,
thereby prohibiting the DOL from denying a claim based on a
secondary assessment of the X-rays provided by a Government-funded
radiologist.
See § 923(b). Finally, the BLBRA added a
fifth presumption of eligibility, and otherwise altered the
entitlement structure to make it easier for survivors of a deceased
long-term miner to obtain benefits.
See §§ 921(c)(5) and
902(f).
In addition to liberalizing the statutory prerequisites to
benefit entitlement, the BLBRA authorized the DOL to adopt its own
interim regulations for processing part C claims filed before March
31, 1980. In so doing, Congress required that the "[c]riteria
applied by the Secretary of Labor . . . shall not be more
restrictive than the criteria applicable to a claim filed on June
30, 1973." § 902(f)(2).
The Secretary of Labor, pursuant to this authorization, adopted
interim regulations governing the adjudication of part C claims.
These regulations differ significantly from the HEW interim
regulations.
See 20 CFR § 727.203 (1990). The DOL
regulations include two presumption provisions similar to the two
presumption provisions in the HEW interim regulations.
Compare §§ 727.203(a)(1) and (2)
with §§
410.490(b)(1)(i) and (ii). To invoke the presumption of
eligibility
Page 501 U. S. 689
under these two provisions, however, a claimant need not prove
that the "impairment . . . arose out of coal mine employment," as
was required under the HEW interim regulations.
See §
410.490(b)(2).
In addition, the DOL interim regulations add three methods of
invoking the presumption of eligibility not included in the HEW
interim regulations. Specifically, under the DOL regulations, a
claimant can invoke the presumption of total disability due to
pneumoconiosis by submitting blood gas studies that demonstrate the
presence of an impairment in the transfer of oxygen from the lung
alveoli to the blood; by submitting other medical evidence
establishing the presence of a totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment; or, in the case of a deceased miner for whom
no medical evidence is available, by submitting a survivor's
affidavit demonstrating such a disability.
See §§
727.203(a)(3), (4), and (5).
Finally, the DOL interim regulations provide four methods for
rebutting the presumptions established under § 727.203. Two of the
rebuttal provisions mimic those in the HEW regulations, permitting
rebuttal upon a showing that the miner is performing or is able to
perform his coal mining or comparable work.
See §§
727.203(b)(1) and (2). The other two rebuttal provisions are at
issue in these cases. Under these provisions, a presumption of
total disability due to pneumoconiosis can be rebutted if "[t]he
evidence establishes that the total disability or death of the
miner did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine
employment," or if "[t]he evidence establishes that the miner does
not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis."
See §§
727.203(b)(3) and (4).
II
The three cases before us present the question whether the DOL's
interim regulations are "more restrictive than" the HEW's interim
regulations by virtue of the third and fourth rebuttal provisions,
and therefore are inconsistent with the agency's
Page 501 U. S. 690
statutory authority. In No. 89-1714,
Pauley v. BethEnergy
Mines, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
concluded that the DOL interim regulations were not more
restrictive.
BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 890
F.2d 1295 (1989). John Pauley, the now-deceased husband of
petitioner Harriet Pauley, filed a claim for black lung benefits on
April 21, 1978, after he had worked 30 years in the underground
mines of Pennsylvania. Pauley stopped working soon after he filed
his claim for benefits. At a formal hearing on November 5, 1987,
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Pauley had begun to
experience shortness of breath, coughing, and fatigue in 1974, and
that those symptoms had gradually worsened, causing him to leave
his job in the mines. The ALJ also found that Pauley had arthritis
requiring several medications daily, had suffered a stroke in
January, 1987, and had smoked cigarettes for 34 years until he
stopped in 1974.
Because respondent BethEnergy did not contest the presence of
coal workers' pneumoconiosis, the ALJ found that the presumption
had been invoked under § 727.203(a)(1). Turning to the rebuttal
evidence, the judge concluded that Pauley was not engaged in his
usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work, and that
Pauley was totally disabled from returning to coal mining or
comparable employment.
See §§ 727.203(b)(1) and (2). The
judge then weighed the evidence submitted under § 727.203(b)(3),
and determined that respondent BethEnergy had sustained its burden
of establishing that pneumoconiosis was not a contributing factor
in Pauley's total disability and, accordingly, that his disability
did not "arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment." §
727.203(b)(3).
See Carozza v. United States Steel Corp.,
727 F.2d 74 (CA3 1984).
Having determined that Pauley was not entitled to receive black
lung benefits under the DOL interim regulations, the ALJ felt
constrained by Third Circuit precedent to apply the
Page 501 U. S. 691
HEW interim regulations to Pauley's claim. He first concluded
that respondent BethEnergy's concession that Pauley had
pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mining employment was sufficient
to invoke the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis
under § 410.490(b). Because the evidence demonstrated Pauley's
inability to work, and the ALJ interpreted § 410.490(c) as
precluding rebuttal of the presumption by "showing that the
claimant's total disability is unrelated to his coal mine
employment," the judge found that BethEnergy could not carry its
burden on rebuttal, and that Pauley was entitled to benefits.
After the ALJ denied its motion for reconsideration, BethEnergy
appealed unsuccessfully to the Benefits Review Board. It then
sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That
court reversed. It pointed out that the decisions of the ALJ and
the Benefits Review Board created "two disturbing circumstances."
890 F.2d at 1299. First, the court found it "surely extraordinary,"
ibid., that a determination that Pauley was totally
disabled from causes unrelated to pneumoconiosis, which was
sufficient to rebut the presumption under § 727.203(b)(3), would
preclude respondent BethEnergy from rebutting the
presumption under § 410.490(c). Second, the court considered it to
be "outcome-determinative" that the purpose of the Benefits Act is
to provide benefits to miners totally disabled at least in part due
to pneumoconiosis if the disability arises out of coal mine
employment, and that the ALJ had made unchallenged findings that
Pauley's disability did not arise even in part out of such
employment. 890 F.2d at 1299-1300. The court found it to be
"perfectly evident that no set of regulations under [the
Benefits Act] may provide that a claimant who is statutorily barred
from recovery may nevertheless recover."
Id. at 1300.
Asserting that this Court's decision in
Sebben, supra,
was not controlling because that decision concerned only the
invocation of the presumption,
Page 501 U. S. 692
and not its rebuttal, the court then concluded that Congress'
mandate that the criteria used by the Secretary of Labor be not
more restrictive than the criteria applicable to a claim filed on
June 30, 1973, applied only to the criteria for determining whether
a claimant is "totally disabled," not to the criteria used in
rebuttal. Finally, the court pointed out that its result would not
differ if it applied the rebuttal provisions of § 410.490(c) to
Pauley's claim, because subsections (c)(1) and (2) make reference
to § 410.412(a), which refers to a miner's being "totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis." According to the Third Circuit, there would
be no reason for the regulations to include such a reference
"unless it was the intention of the Secretary to permit rebuttal
by a showing that the claimant's disability did not arise at least
in part from coal mine employment."
890 F.2d at 1302.
In the two other cases now before us, No. 90-113,
Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, and No. 90-114,
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down the DOL interim
regulations. John Taylor, a respondent in No. 90-113, applied for
black lung benefits in 1976, after having worked for almost 12
years as a coal loader and roof bolter in underground coal mines.
The ALJ found that Taylor properly had invoked the presumption of
eligibility for benefits under § 727.203(a)(3), based on qualifying
arterial blood gas studies demonstrating an impairment in the
transfer of oxygen from his lungs to his blood. The ALJ then
proceeded to weigh the rebuttal evidence, consisting of negative
X-ray evidence, nonqualifying ventilatory study scores, and several
medical reports respectively submitted by Taylor and by his
employer, petitioner Clinchfield Coal Company. In light of this
evidence, the ALJ concluded that Taylor neither suffered from
pneumoconiosis nor was totally disabled. Rather, the evidence
demonstrated that Taylor suffered from chronic bronchitis
caused
Page 501 U. S. 693
by 30 years of cigarette smoking and obesity. The Benefits
Review Board affirmed, concluding that the ALJ's decision was
supported by substantial evidence.
The Court of Appeals reversed.
Taylor v. Clinchfield Coal
Co., 895 F.2d 178 (1990). The court first dismissed the
argument that the DOL interim regulations cannot be considered more
restrictive than HEW's as applied to Taylor because Taylor invoked
the presumption of eligibility based on arterial blood gas studies,
a method of invocation available under the DOL regulations but not
under HEW's, and was therefore unable to use the rebuttal
provisions of the HEW interim regulations as a benchmark.
Id. at 182. The court reasoned that it was a "matter of
indifference" how the claimant invoked the presumption of
eligibility, and rejected the argument that the rebuttal provisions
must be evaluated in light of corresponding invocation
provisions.
"It is the fact of establishment of the presumption and the
substance thereof which is of consequence in this case, not the
number of the regulation which provides for such
establishment."
Ibid.
Focusing on the DOL's rebuttal provisions in isolation, the
Fourth Circuit determined that the third and fourth rebuttal
methods "permit rebuttal of more elements of entitlement to
benefits than do the interim HEW regulations," because the HEW
regulations permit rebuttal "solely through attacks on the element
of total disability," while the DOL regulations
"allow the consideration of evidence disputing both the presence
of pneumoconiosis and the connection between total disability and
coal mine employment."
Ibid. Accordingly, the court concluded that the DOL
interim regulations were more restrictive than those found in §
410.490, and that the application of these regulations violated 30
U.S.C. § 902(f). [
Footnote
3]
Page 501 U. S. 694
One judge dissented. Noting that the panel's decision was in
conflict with the Sixth Circuit in
Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal
Co. v. Milliken, 866 F.2d 195 (1989), and with the Third
Circuit in
Pauley, he concluded that those decisions "do
less violence to congressional intent, and avoid . . . upsetting
the statutory scheme." 895 F.2d at 184.
Albert Dayton, a respondent in No. 90114, applied for black lung
benefits in 1979, after having worked as a coal miner for 17 years.
The ALJ found that Dayton had invoked the presumption of
eligibility based on ventilatory test scores showing a chronic
pulmonary condition. The judge then determined that petitioner
Consolidation Coal Company had successfully rebutted the
presumption under §§ 727.203(b)(2) and (4) by demonstrating that
Dayton did not have pneumoconiosis and, in any event, that Dayton's
pulmonary impairment was not totally disabling. The Benefits Review
Board affirmed, concluding that the medical evidence demonstrated
that Dayton's pulmonary condition was unrelated to coal dust
exposure, but was instead secondary to his smoking and "other
ailments," and that the ALJ had correctly concluded that
Consolidation had rebutted the presumption under § 727.203(b)(4).
[
Footnote 4]
The Fourth Circuit reversed.
Dayton v. Consolidation Coal
Co., 895 F.2d 173 (1990). Relying on its decision in
Taylor, the court held that 30 U.S.C. § 902(f) required
Dayton's claim to be adjudicated "under the less restrictive
rebuttal standards of § 410.490." 895 F.2d at 175. Concluding that
the HEW regulations did not permit rebuttal upon a
Page 501 U. S. 695
showing that the claimant does not have pneumoconiosis, the
court stated that the ALJ's finding that Dayton does not have
pneumoconiosis "is superfluous and has no bearing on the case."
Id. at 176, n. *.
In view of the conflict among the Courts of Appeals, we granted
certiorari in the three cases and consolidated them for hearing in
order to resolve the issue of statutory construction. 498 U.S. 937
(1990). [
Footnote 5]
III
We turn to the statutory text that provides that "[c]riteria
applied by the Secretary of Labor . . . shall not be more
restrictive than the criteria applicable" under the interim HEW
regulations. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2).
See Sebben, 488 U.S.
at
488 U. S. 113.
Specifically, we must determine whether the third and fourth
rebuttal provisions in the DOL regulations render the DOL
regulations more restrictive than were the HEW regulations. These
provisions permit rebuttal of the presumption of eligibility upon a
showing that the miner's disability did not arise in whole or in
part out of coal mine employment or that the miner does not have
pneumoconiosis. [
Footnote
6]
Page 501 U. S. 696
A
In the BLBRA, Congress specifically constrained the Secretary of
Labor's discretion through the directive that the criteria applied
to part C claims could "not be more restrictive than" that applied
to part B claims. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2). The claimants and the
dissent urge that this restriction is unambiguous, and that no
deference is due the Secretary's determination that her interim
regulations are not more restrictive than the HEW's. In the
alternative, both the claimants and the dissent argue that,
regardless of whether the statutory mandate is clear, the only
interpretation of the HEW interim regulations that warrants
deference is the interpretation given those regulations by the
Secretary of HEW. In our view, this position misunderstands the
principles underlying judicial deference to agency interpretations,
as well as the scope of authority delegated to the Secretary of
Labor in the BLBRA.
Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous
provisions of the statutes it is authorized to implement reflects a
sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial
branches.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S. 837,
467 U. S. 866
(1984) ("[F]ederal judges -- who have no constituency -- have a
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do");
see also Silberman,
Chevron -- The Intersection
of Law & Policy, 58 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 821, 822-24 (1990). As
Chevron itself illustrates, the resolution of ambiguity in
a statutory text is often more a question of policy than of law.
See Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 Colum.L.Rev. 2071, 2085-2088 (1990). When
Congress, through express delegation or the introduction of an
interpretive gap in the statutory structure, has delegated
policymaking authority to an administrative agency, the extent of
judicial review of the agency's policy determinations is limited.
Cf. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.
S. 638,
494 U. S. 649
(1990) ("A precondition to deference under
Chevron is a
congressional
Page 501 U. S. 697
delegation of administrative authority");
Chevron, 467
U.S. at
467 U. S.
864-866.
It is precisely this recognition that informs our determination
that deference to the Secretary is appropriate here. The Black Lung
Benefits Act has produced a complex and highly technical regulatory
program. The identification and classification of medical
eligibility criteria necessarily require significant expertise, and
entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns. In
those circumstances, courts appropriately defer to the agency
entrusted by Congress to make such policy determinations.
See
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
499 U. S. 144,
499 U. S.
152-153 (1991);
Aluminum Co. of America v. Central
Lincoln Peoples' Utility District, 467 U.
S. 380,
467 U. S. 390
(1984).
In
Sebben, we declined to defer to the Secretary's
interpretation of the term "criteria" as used in § 902(f)(2), as
including only medical, but not evidentiary, criteria, because we
found Congress' intent to include all criteria in that provision to
be manifest.
See Sebben, 488 U.S. at
488 U. S.
113-114. With respect to the phrase "not . . . more
restrictive than," Congress' intent is similarly clear: the phrase
cannot be read except as a delegation of interpretive authority to
the Secretary of Labor.
That Congress intended in the BLBRA to delegate to the Secretary
of Labor broad policymaking discretion in the promulgation of his
interim regulations is clear from the text of the statute and the
history of this provision. Congress declined to require that the
DOL adopt the HEW interim regulations verbatim. Rather, the
delegation of authority requires only that the DOL's regulations be
"not . . . more restrictive than" HEW's. Further, the delegation
was made with the intention that the program evolve as
technological expertise matured. The Senate Committee on Human
Resources stated:
"It is the Committee's belief that the Secretary of Labor should
have sufficient statutory authority . . . to
Page 501 U. S. 698
establish eligibility criteria. . . . It is intended that,
pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of Labor will make every
effort to incorporate within his regulations . . . to the extent
feasible the advances made by medical science in the diagnosis and
treatment of pneumoconiosis . . . since the promulgation in 1972 of
the Secretary of HEW's medical eligibility criteria."
S.Rep. No. 95-209, p. 13 (1977).
In addition, the Conference Report indicated that the DOL's task
was more than simply ministerial when it informed the Secretary
that
"such [new] regulations shall not provide more restrictive
criteria than [the HEW interim regulations],
except that,
in determining claims under such criteria, all relevant medical
evidence shall be considered."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 95-864, p. 16 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1977, pp. 237, 309 (emphasis added). As delegated by
Congress, then, the Secretary's authority to promulgate interim
regulations "not . . . more restrictive than" the HEW interim
regulations necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW's
regulations and the discretion to promulgate interim regulations
based on a reasonable interpretation thereof. From this
congressional delegation derives the Secretary's entitlement to
judicial deference.
The claimants also argue that, even if the Secretary of Labor's
interpretation of the HEW interim regulations is generally entitled
to deference, such deference would not be appropriate in this
instance because that interpretation has changed without
explanation throughout the litigation of these cases. We are not
persuaded. As a general matter, of course, the case for judicial
deference is less compelling with respect to agency positions that
are inconsistent with previously held views.
See Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.
S. 204,
488 U. S.
212-213 (1988). However, the Secretary has held
unswervingly to the view that the DOL interim regulations are
consistent with the statutory mandate and not more restrictive than
the HEW interim regulations. This view obviously informed the
structure of the
Page 501 U. S. 699
DOL's regulations. In response to comments suggesting that the
DOL's proposed interim regulations might violate § 902(f)(2)
because they required that all relevant evidence be considered in
determining eligibility, the Secretary replied that
"the Social Security regulations, while less explicit, similarly
do not limit the evidence which can be considered in rebutting the
interim presumption."
See 43 Fed.Reg. 36,826 (1978). Moreover, this position
has been faithfully advanced by each Secretary since the
regulations were promulgated.
See e.g., Sebben, 488 U.S.
at
488 U. S. 119.
Accordingly, the Secretary's defense of her interim regulations
warrants deference from this Court.
B
Having determined that the Secretary's position is entitled to
deference, we must decide whether this position is reasonable.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
467 U. S. 845.
The claimants and the dissent argue that this issue can be resolved
simply by comparing the two interim regulations. This argument is
straightforward; it reasons that the mere existence of regulatory
provisions permitting rebuttal of statutory elements not rebuttable
under the HEW interim regulations renders the DOL interim
regulations more restrictive than HEW's and, as a consequence
renders the Secretary's interpretation unreasonable.
See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-24. Specifically, the claimants and the dissent
assert that the HEW interim regulations plainly contain no
provision, either in the invocation subsection or in the rebuttal
subsection, that directs factual inquiry into the issue of
disability causation or the existence of pneumoconiosis.
Accordingly, under the claimants' reading of the regulations, there
is no manner in which the DOL interim regulations can be seen to be
"not . . . more restrictive than" the HEW regulations.
The regulatory scheme, however, is not so straightforward as the
claimants would make it out to be. We have noted before the
Byzantine character of these regulations.
See Sebben, 488
U.S. at
488 U. S. 109
(the second presumption is "drafted
Page 501 U. S. 700
in a most confusing manner");
id. at
488 U. S. 129
(dissenting opinion) (assuming that the drafters "promulgated a
scrivener's error"). In our view, the Secretary presents the more
reasoned interpretation of this complex regulatory structure, an
interpretation that has the additional benefit of providing
coherence among the statute and the two interim regulations.
The premise underlying the Secretary's interpretation of the HEW
interim regulations is that the regulations were adopted to ensure
that miners who were disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of
coal mine employment would receive benefits from the black lung
program. Under the Secretary's view, it disserves congressional
intent to interpret HEW's interim regulations to allow recovery by
miners who do not have pneumoconiosis or whose total disability did
not arise, at least in part, from their coal mine employment. We
agree.
See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U. S. 1,
428 U. S. 22, n.
21 (1976) ("[A]n operator can be liable only for pneumoconiosis
arising out of employment in a coal mine");
Mullins Coal Co. v.
Director, OWCP, 484 U. S. 135,
484 U. S. 158
(1987) ("[I]f a miner is not actually suffering from the type of
ailment with which Congress was concerned, there is no
justification for presuming that the miner is entitled to
benefits").
The Secretary and the nonfederal petitioners contend that SSA
adjudications under the HEW interim regulations permitted the
factual inquiry specified in the third and fourth rebuttal
provisions of the DOL regulations. According to the Secretary,
subsection (b)(2) of HEW's invocation provisions, and the
provisions incorporated by reference into that subsection, do the
work of DOL's third and fourth rebuttal methods. Subsection (b)(2)
of the HEW interim regulations provides that, in order to invoke a
presumption of eligibility, the claimant must demonstrate that
the
"impairment established in accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of
this section arose out of coal mine employment (
see §§
410.416 and 410.456)."
20 CFR § 410.490(b)(2) (1990). Section 410.416(a) provides:
Page 501 U. S. 701
"If a miner was employed for 10 years or more in the Nation's
coal mines, and is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis, it
will be presumed, in the absence of persuasive evidence to the
contrary, that the pneumoconiosis arose out of such
employment."
See also § 410.456.
The Secretary interprets the requirement in § 410.490(b)(2) that
the claimant demonstrate that the miner's impairment "arose out of
coal mine employment" as comparable to the DOL's third rebuttal
provision, which permits the mine operator to show that the miner's
disability "did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine
employment." § 727.203(b)(3). With respect to DOL's fourth rebuttal
provision, the Secretary emphasizes that the statute defines
pneumoconiosis as "a chronic dust disease . . . arising out of coal
mine employment."
See 30 U.S.C. § 902(b). Accordingly, she
views the reference to §§ 410.416 and 410.456 in HEW's invocation
provision, and the acknowledgment within these sections that
causation is to be presumed "in the absence of persuasive evidence
to the contrary," as demonstrating that a miner who is shown not to
suffer from pneumoconiosis could not invoke HEW's presumption.
[
Footnote 7]
Petitioners Clinchfield and Consolidation adopt the Third
Circuit's reasoning in
Pauley. The court in
Pauley relied on the reference in the HEW rebuttal
provisions to § 410.412(a)(1), which in turn refers to a miner's
being "totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis." The Third Circuit
reasoned that this reference must indicate
"the intention of the Secretary
Page 501 U. S. 702
[of HEW] to permit rebuttal by a showing that the claimant's
disability did not arise at least in part from coal mine
employment."
890 F.2d at 1302.
The claimants respond that the Secretary has not adopted the
most natural reading of subsection (b)(2). Specifically, the
claimants argue that miners who have 10 years of coal mine
experience and satisfy the requirements of subsection (b)(1)
automatically obtain the presumption of causation that § 410.416 or
§ 410.456 confers, and thereby satisfy the causation requirement
inherent in the Act. In addition, the claimants point out that the
reference in the HEW rebuttal provisions to § 410.412(a)(1) may
best be read as a reference only to the definition of the term
"comparable and gainful work," not to the disability causation
provision of § 410.412(a). While it is possible that the claimants'
parsing of these impenetrable regulations would be consistent with
accepted canons of construction, it is axiomatic that the
Secretary's interpretation need not be the best or most natural one
by grammatical or other standards.
EEOC v. Commercial Office
Products Co., 486 U. S. 107,
486 U. S. 115
(1988). Rather, the Secretary's view need be only reasonable to
warrant deference.
Ibid.; Mullins, 484 U.S. at
484 U. S.
159.
The claimants' assertion that the Secretary's interpretation is
contrary to the plain language of the statute ultimately rests on
their contention that subsections (b)(1)(i) and (ii) of the HEW
interim regulations create a "conclusive" presumption of
entitlement without regard to the existence of competent evidence
demonstrating that the miner does not or did not have
pneumoconiosis or that the miner's disability was not caused by
coal mine employment. This argument is deficient in two respects.
First, the claimants' premise is inconsistent with the text of the
authorizing statute, which expressly provides that the presumptions
in question will be rebuttable,
see 30 U.S.C. §§
921(c)(1), (2), and (4), and requires
Page 501 U. S. 703
the Secretary of HEW to consider all relevant evidence in
adjudicating claims under part B.
See 30 U.S.C. § 923(b).
[
Footnote 8]
Second, the presumptions do not, by their terms, conclusively
establish any statutory element of entitlement. In setting forth
the two rebuttal methods in subsection (c), the Secretary of HEW
did not provide that they would be the exclusive methods of
rebuttal. In fact, the claimants admit that "conclusively presume"
is a term they "coined" for purposes of argument. Tr. of Oral Arg.
34. Although the delineation of two methods of rebuttal may support
an inference that the drafter intended to exclude rebuttal methods
not so specified, such an inference provides no guidance where its
application would render a regulation inconsistent with the purpose
and language of the authorizing statute.
See Sunstein, 90
Colum.L.Rev. at 2109, n. 182 (recognizing that the principle
expressio unius est exclusio alterius "is a questionable
one in light of the dubious reliability of inferring specific
intent from silence");
cf. Commercial Office Products Co.,
486 U.S. at
486 U. S. 120
(plurality opinion) (rejecting the more natural reading of
statutory language because such an interpretation
Page 501 U. S. 704
would lead to "absurd or futile results . . . plainly at
variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole") (internal
quotations omitted).
In asserting that the Secretary's interpretation is untenable,
the claimants essentially argue that the Secretary is not justified
in interpreting the HEW interim regulations in conformance with
their authorizing statute. According to the claimants, the HEW
officials charged with administering the black lung benefits
program and with drafting the HEW interim regulations believed that
it was virtually impossible to determine medically whether a
miner's respiratory impairment was actually caused by
pneumoconiosis or whether his total disability arose out of his
coal mine employment. Faced with such medical uncertainty, and
instructed to ensure the "prompt and vigorous processing of the
large backlog of claims,"
see 20 CFR § 410.490(a) (1990),
the claimants assert that HEW omitted from its criteria factual
inquiries into disability causation and the existence of
pneumoconiosis based on a "cost/benefit" conclusion that such
inquiries would engender inordinate delay, yet generate little
probative evidence. [
Footnote
9] The dissent presents a similar view.
Post at
501 U. S.
716-719.
Page 501 U. S. 705
We recognize that the SSA, under the HEW interim regulations,
appeared to award benefits to miners whose administrative files
contained scant evidence of eligibility.
See The
Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting
Office, Report to Congress: Examination of Allegations Concerning
Administration of the Black Lung Benefits Program 6-10, included in
Hearings on H.R. 10760 and S. 3183 before the Subcommittee on Labor
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 440-444 (1976). We are not, however, persuaded that this
circumstance requires the Secretary to award black lung benefits to
claimants who do not have pneumoconiosis or whose disability did
not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment. As an
initial matter, contemporaneous analyses of claims approved by the
HEW provide little support for the argument that the HEW made a
"cost/benefit" decision to forgo inquiry into disease existence or
disability causation. Rather, many of the claims allegedly awarded
on the basis of insufficient evidence involved miners who were
unable to present sufficient evidence of medical disability, not
those who did not suffer from pneumoconiosis or were disabled by
other causes.
See ibid.; see also The Comptroller General
of the United States, General Accounting Office, Program to Pay
Black Lung Benefits to Miners and Their Survivors -- Improvements
Are Needed, 45-47 (1977); H.R.Rep. No. 95-151, pp. 73-74 (1977)
(Minority Views and Separate Views). Moreover, this argument
ignores entirely the advances in medical technology that have
occurred since the promulgation of the HEW interim regulations,
advances that Congress could not have intended either the HEW or
the DOL to ignore in administering the program.
See S.Rep.
No. 95-209, p. 13 (1977).
Finally, we do not accept the implicit premise of this argument:
that the Secretary cannot prevail unless she is able to
Page 501 U. S. 706
demonstrate that her interpretation of the HEW interim
regulations comports with HEW's contemporaneous interpretation of
those regulations. As is stated above, the Secretary's
interpretation of HEW's interim regulations is entitled to
deference so long as it is reasonable. An interpretation that
harmonizes an agency's regulations with their authorizing statute
is presumptively reasonable, and claimants have not persuaded us
that the presumption is unfounded in this case.
IV
We conclude that the Secretary of Labor has not acted
unreasonably, or inconsistently with § 402(f)(2) of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 as amended by the Black Lung
Benefits Act, in promulgating interim regulations that permit the
presumption of entitlement to black lung benefits to be rebutted
with evidence demonstrating that the miner does not, or did not,
have pneumoconiosis, or that the miner's disability does not, or
did not, arise out of coal mine employment. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the Third Circuit in No. 89-1714. The judgments of
the Fourth Circuit in No. 90-113 and No. 90-114 are reversed, and
those cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. No costs are allowed in any of these cases.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this litigation.
[
Footnote 1]
Pneumoconiosis was identified by the Surgeon General as "a
chronic chest disease caused by the accumulation of fine coal dust
particles in the human lung." S.Rep. No. 95-209, p. 5 (1977). What
he described as simple pneumoconiosis seldom produces significant
ventilation impairment, but it may reduce the ability of the lung
to transfer oxygen to the blood. Complicated pneumoconiosis is a
more serious disease, for the patient "incurs progressive massive
fibrosis as a complex reaction to dust and other factors." In its
complicated stage, pneumoconiosis "usually produces marked
pulmonary impairment and considerable respiratory disability."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2]
Although the 1972 amendments did not direct the Secretary of HEW
to promulgate these new interim regulations, the Report of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare contained a strongly
worded invitation to do so.
See S.Rep. No. 92-743, p. 18
(1972), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 2322
("Accordingly, the Committee expects the Secretary to adopt such
interim evidentiary rules and disability evaluation criteria as
will permit prompt and vigorous processing of the large backlog of
claims consistent with the language and intent of these
amendments").
[
Footnote 3]
In light of this Court's decision in
Sebben, the Court
of Appeals interpreted § 410.490(c) as permitting rebuttal of the
presumption on a showing that the claimant's disability was not
caused by coal mine employment. 895 F.2d at 183. The court
therefore remanded the case for further consideration of that
issue. It appears that the Fourth Circuit has since retreated from
this view, and now considers the HEW interim regulations to permit
only two rebuttal methods.
See Robinette v. Director,
OWCP, 902 F.2d 1566 (CA4 1990) (judgment entry),
cert.
pending, No. 90-172.
[
Footnote 4]
In light of this conclusion, the Board found it unnecessary to
review the determination that Consolidation had successfully
rebutted the presumption under subsection (b)(2) of the DOL interim
regulations.
[
Footnote 5]
In addition to the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has
concluded that the third rebuttal provision of the DOL interim
regulation is not more restrictive than the criteria applied by the
HEW.
See Patrich v. Old Ben Coal Co., 926 F.2d 1482, 1488
(1991). The Seventh Circuit did not address the fourth rebuttal
provision. The Sixth Circuit also has refused to invalidate the
third and fourth rebuttal provisions of the DOL interim regulation,
and continues to apply these provisions to all part C claims,
regardless of whether the presumption is invoked under § 410.490 or
§ 727.203.
See Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken,
866 F.2d 195, 202 (1989).
[
Footnote 6]
In
Sebben, the Court concluded that the DOL interim
regulations were more restrictive than the HEW's to the extent that
the DOL's invocation provision did not permit invocation of the
presumption without 10 years of coal mining experience.
See 488 U.S. at
488 U. S. 113.
The
Sebben Court did not address the issue now before us:
the validity of the third and fourth rebuttal provisions contained
in the DOL interim regulations.
See id. at
488 U. S.
119.
[
Footnote 7]
The Court's conclusion in
Sebben that subsection (b)(2)
of the HEW's interim regulations was not a rebuttal provision does
not foreclose the Secretary's argument, as the
Sebben
Court made clear that that provision was, nonetheless, a
"substantive requirement."
See Sebben, 488 U.S. at
488 U. S. 120.
We agree with the
Patrich court that
"there is no meaningful difference between a procedure which
creates a presumption and then allows evidence to rebut it and one
which denies the presumption in the first place if the same
evidence is offered."
See Patrich, 926 F.2d at 1488.
[
Footnote 8]
That no element of the presumptions at issue was intended to be
conclusive is further indicated by the language of the remaining
two provisions in this section of the statute. In § 921(c)(3),
Congress demonstrated its ability to create an irrebuttable
presumption, applicable to a miner for whom the medical evidence
demonstrates the presence of complicated pneumoconiosis. Perhaps
more telling is § 921(c)(4), the only section of the statute in
which Congress addressed the available methods of rebuttal. In that
section, Congress created a rebuttable presumption of eligibility
applicable to a miner with 15 years or more of coal mine
employment, for whom evidence demonstrates the existence of a
totally disabling respiratory disease but whose X-rays do not
reveal complicated pneumoconiosis. With respect to this
presumption, Congress expressly provided:
"The Secretary may rebut such presumption only by establishing
that (A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or
that (B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out
of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."
Written as a limiting provision, this section indicates
Congress' understanding that these rebuttal methods are among those
permitted with respect to other presumption provisions.
[
Footnote 9]
The claimants support this argument by reference to the HEW's
Coal Miner's Benefits Manual (1979), which they claim represents
the agency's contemporaneous interpretation of its regulation.
Claimants assert that the Manual "nowhere suggests" that the HEW
interim regulations permit factual inquiry into the existence of
pneumoconiosis or disability causation. The Manual, however, does
not demonstrate that HEW understood its interim regulations to
preclude rebuttal with facts similar to DOL's third and fourth
rebuttal provisions. At best, this document is ambiguous with
respect to the statutory elements susceptible of rebuttal.
See Manual § IB6(e) (stating that the presumption of
entitlement to benefits "may be rebutted if . . . (3) Biopsy or
autopsy findings clearly establish that no pneumoconiosis exists").
We find it more revealing that, in outlining the general structure
of the interim regulations, the Manual makes clear that,
"[t]o establish entitlement to benefits on the basis of a coal
miner's total disability due to pneumoconiosis, a claimant must
submit the evidence necessary to establish that he is a coal miner
. . . who is . . . totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, and that
his pneumoconiosis arose out of employment in the Nation's coal
mines."
§ IB1.
JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The disputed regulatory language is
complex, but it is not ambiguous, and I do not think
Chevron deference,
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S. 837
(1984), requires us to accept the strained and implausible
construction advanced by the Department of Labor (DOL). In my
judgment, at least one of the claimants before us is entitled to
benefits under the statute.
Page 501 U. S. 707
I
A
As an initial matter, the Court misconstrues our
Chevron jurisprudence.
Chevron requires that we
defer to an agency's interpretation of its organic statute once we
determine that that statute is ambiguous. No one contends that the
relevant statutory language ("shall not be more restrictive than")
is ambiguous.
See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben,
488 U. S. 105,
488 U. S.
113-114 (1988) (explaining that particular phrase). The
only serious question surrounds the regulations of the then-extant
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to which the
statute refers. I agree that those regulations are complex, perhaps
even "Byzantine,"
ante at
501 U. S. 699,
but that alone is insufficient to invoke
Chevron
deference. Deference is appropriate where the relevant language,
carefully considered, can yield more than one reasonable
interpretation, not where discerning the only possible
interpretation requires a taxing inquiry.
Chevron is a
recognition that the ambiguities in statutes are to be resolved by
the agencies charged with implementing them, not a declaration
that, when statutory construction becomes difficult, we will throw
up our hands and let regulatory agencies do it for us. In my view,
the HEW regulations referred to by the present statute are
susceptible of only one meaning, although they are so intricate
that that meaning is not immediately accessible.
But even if the regulations were ambiguous, it would not follow
that the Secretary of Labor is entitled to deference. Nothing in
our
Chevron jurisprudence requires us to defer to one
agency's interpretation of another agency's ambiguous regulations.
We rejected precisely that proposition in
Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.
S. 144 (1991), in holding that the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission was not entitled to deference in
interpreting the Secretary of Labor's regulations. Having used
Chevron to rebuff OSHRC's incursions
Page 501 U. S. 708
there, it seems a bit greedy for the Secretary to use
Chevron to launch the Labor Department's own cross-border
attack here. In my view, the only legitimate claimant to deference
with regard to the present regulations is the agency that drafted
them.
B
In any event, the interpretive issue here is, in my view, much
less difficult than the Court suggests. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2)
states:
"Criteria applied by the Secretary of Labor . . . [to Black Lung
claims filed prior to April 1, 1980] shall not be more restrictive
[
i.e., shall not be less favorable to claimants] than the
criteria applicable to a claim filed on June 30, 1973."
The criteria applied by the Secretary of Labor are as
follows:
"§ 727.203 Interim Presumption."
"(a)
Establishing interim presumption. A miner who
engaged in coal mine employment . . . will be presumed to be
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis . . . if one of the
following medical requirements is met:"
"(1) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or autopsy
establishes the existence of pneumoconiosis (
see § 410.428
of this title);"
"(2) Ventilatory studies establish the presence of a chronic
respiratory or pulmonary disease . . ."
"(3) Blood gas studies . . . demonstrate the presence of an
impairment in the transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the
blood . . ."
"(4) Other medical evidence . . . establishes the presence of a
totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment;"
* * * *
"(b)
Rebuttal of interim presumption. In adjudicating a
claim under this subpart, all relevant medical evidence shall be
considered. The presumption in paragraph (a) of this section shall
be rebutted if: "
Page 501 U. S. 709
"(1) The evidence establishes that the individual is, in fact,
doing his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work
(
see § 410.412(a)(1) of this title); or"
"(2) In light of all relevant evidence it is established that
the individual is able to do his usual coal mine work or comparable
and gainful work (
see § 410.412(a)(1) of this title);
or"
"(3) The evidence establishes that the total disability or death
of the miner did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine
employment; or"
"(4) The evidence establishes that the miner does not, or did
not, have pneumoconiosis."
20 CFR § 727.203 (1990).
The criteria governing claims filed on June 30, 1973, were set
forth in HEW interim regulations, 20 CFR § 410.490, which provide
in relevant part:
"(b)
Interim presumption. With respect to a miner who
files a claim for benefits before July 1, 1973 . . . such miner
will be presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis . . .
if:"
"(1) One of the following medical requirements is met:"
"(i) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or autopsy
establishes the existence of pneumoconiosis (
see §
410.428); or"
"(ii) In the case of a miner employed for at least 15 years in
underground or comparable coal mine employment, ventilatory studies
establish the presence of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary
disease"
"(2) The impairment established in accordance with paragraph
(b)(1) of this section arose out of coal mine employment
(
see §§ 410.416 and 410.456)."
* * * *
"(c)
Rebuttal of Presumption. The presumption in
paragraph (b) of this section may be rebutted if: "
Page 501 U. S. 710
"(1) There is evidence that the individual is, in fact, doing
his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work
(
see § 410.412(a)(1)), or"
"(2) Other evidence, including physical performance tests . . .
establish that the individual is able to do his usual coal mine
work or comparable and gainful work (
see §
410.412(a)(1))."
The relationship between the two regulations is apparent because
they use a similar structure and, in large part, similar language.
Both allow claimants to invoke a presumption of disability due to
pneumoconiosis upon the presentation of certain medical evidence
(the HEW regulations provide for two types of medical evidence
while the DOL regulations provide for four). Both specify certain
ways in which that presumption may be rebutted. The HEW
regulations, however, specify only two methods of rebuttal (both
relating to the extent of the disability), while the DOL
regulations authorize four methods (the two expressed in the HEW
regulations plus two more: (1) that pneumoconiosis did not cause
the disability, and (2) that the miner does not have
pneumoconiosis).
Obviously, if the DOL regulations provide more opportunities for
rebuttal, they are less favorable to claimants. I think it quite
apparent that they do. The present case is illustrative. Claimant
Pauley invoked the presumption by submitting X-ray evidence of
pneumoconiosis, pursuant to § 727.203(a)(1). BethEnergy, the
employer, rebutted the presumption by arguing pursuant to §
727.203(b)(3) that, although Pauley had pneumoconiosis, it did not
cause his disability. Had the case proceeded under the HEW
regulations, Pauley's presentation would have been the same, under
§ 410.490(b)(1)(i), the counterpart of § 727.203(a)(1). [
Footnote 2/1]
Page 501 U. S. 711
For BethEnergy, however, things would have been different: §
727.203(b)(3) does not have a counterpart in the HEW regulations.
The only rebuttal expressly contemplated by the HEW regulations is
that the claimant is not in fact disabled -- but Pauley concededly
was. It appears, therefore, that BethEnergy could not have
challenged the causal link between the pneumoconiosis and the
disability under the HEW regulations, and thus would have had no
defense.
In my view, this argument is self-evidently correct, and is
obscured only by the technical complexity of the regulatory
provisions. But the statutory structure, as opposed to the actual
language, is simple. Under the HEW regulations, we assume "x," but
"x" may be rebutted by a showing of "a" or "b." Under the DOL
regulations, we likewise assume "x," but "x" may be rebutted by a
showing of "a" or "b" or "c" or "d." It defies common sense to
argue that, given this structure, the two regulations are in fact
identical, and that Pauley, whose claim could be defeated by a
showing of "c" but not by a showing of "a" or "b," was no worse off
under the latter regime. Yet that is precisely the argument the
Court accepts.
Pauley's common sense reading is further supported by the fact
that there is nothing remarkable about the HEW regulations'
severely limiting rebuttal. The introduction to those regulations
states:
"In enacting the Black Lung Act of 1972, the Congress noted that
adjudication of the large backlog of claims generated by the
earlier law could not await the establishment of facilities and
development of medical tests not presently available to evaluate
disability due to pneumoconiosis, and that such claims must be
handled under
Page 501 U. S. 712
present circumstances in the light of limited medical resources
and techniques. Accordingly, the Congress stated its expectancy
that the Secretary would adopt such interim evidentiary rules and
disability evaluation criteria as would permit prompt and vigorous
processing of the large backlog of claims. . . ."
§ 410.490(a). In this context, the limitation on rebuttal makes
perfect sense. Litigation over the existence of pneumoconiosis was
circumscribed: if the claimants introduced specified types of
medical evidence supporting their claim, that portion of the case
would be deemed established -- thus avoiding the time-consuming
exchange of conflicting medical evidence which, given the
technology and scientific knowledge then available, was likely to
be inconclusive in any event. Similarly, litigation over the causal
link between the disease and the disability -- which poses even
more difficult medical questions -- was eliminated entirely by the
presumption that, if a miner had pneumoconiosis and was disabled,
he was disabled because of pneumoconiosis. On the other hand, the
regulations permitted full litigation as to the existence of a
disability, an area where medical and scientific knowledge was
equal to the task and where agencies (and courts) typically think
themselves able to make reasoned assessments. [
Footnote 2/2] In addition, apparently the interim
regulations were at the time thought to limit rebuttal. Literally
thousands of cases were decided pursuant to these regulations in
the 1970s; neither the Government nor the employers have cited a
single
Page 501 U. S. 713
instance in which the rebuttal allowed by the DOL regulations
was permitted or indeed was even advanced, nor have they cited a
single comment by the Secretary of HEW, any claimant, or any
commentator suggesting that such rebuttal was available. I do not
find that extraordinary. In my view, that is the only reasonable
reading of the regulations, and it is unsurprising that no one
thought to read them otherwise. Indeed, that is precisely how we
read them in
Pittston Coal. Although the question was not
specifically before the Court, in generally describing the two sets
of regulations, we stated:
"[T]he rebuttal provisions of the interim Labor regulation . . .
permi[t] rebuttal
not only on the grounds available in the
interim HEW regulation (§ 410.490(c)),
but also on the
basis that 'the total disability or death of the miner did not
arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment,' or that
'the miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis.'
See
§§ 727.203(b)(1) (4)."
488 U.S. at
488 U. S. 111
(emphasis added).
II
Although I think the HEW regulations clear (albeit complex) on
their face, I turn now to the specific arguments why they should
nevertheless not be read to limit rebuttal opportunities.
A
First, the Government contends that the HEW rebuttal provisions
actually include the two new rebuttal provisions apparently added
by DOL. The principal claim here centers upon subsection (b)(2) of
the HEW regulations. That provision states that the claimant must
demonstrate that the "impairment established in accordance with
paragraph (b)(1) of this section arose out of coal mine
employment." 20 CFR § 410.490(6)(2) (1990). This requirement, the
Government insists, is comparable to DOL's third rebuttal
provision, which permits the employer to show that the miner's
disability
Page 501 U. S. 714
did not arise from coal mine employment. That argument might be
correct if "impairment" in subsection (b)(2) of the HEW regulations
meant the same as "disability" in the DOL regulations. It does not.
Subsection (b)(2) of the HEW regulations refers to the "impairment"
established in subsection (b)(1); that subsection discusses proof
of the existence of pneumoconiosis. The (b)(2) "impairment," then,
is the disease itself. Thus, it is open to the employer under the
HEW regulations to show, for example, that Pauley's
pneumoconiosis did not arise from coal mine employment.
But here everyone agrees that it did -- the relevant question is
whether Pauley's
disability arose from his pneumoconiosis.
That is where DOL diverges from HEW, for DOL's regulations allow
proof that the
disability did not arise from the disease,
and thus from coal mine employment; the HEW regulations require
only a showing that the
impairment --
i.e., the
pneumoconiosis -- arose from coal mine employment, and presume the
causal link between the impairment and the disability.
The Government contends that subsection (b)(2) of the HEW
regulations also equates with the fourth rebuttal provision of the
DOL regulations. The fourth rebuttal provision allows rebuttal on
the ground that the claimant does not have pneumoconiosis. I think
the Government's argument is partially correct -- but only
partially. As the Government notes, proof of pneumoconiosis
involves proof of two elements: (1) a chronic dust
Page 501 U. S. 715
disease, which (2) arose from coal mine employment. Subsection
(b)(1) of the HEW regulations says the claimant must prove the
first point, and says how to do it (by submitting the specified
medical evidence, and thereby raising the presumption). Subsection
(b)(2) says that the claimant must also prove the second point (to
which the presumption is irrelevant). To contest a finding of
pneumoconiosis, the employer may wish to argue either (1) that the
miner has a chronic dust disease but it did not arise from coal
mine employment; or (2) that the miner does not have a chronic dust
disease. Subsection (b)(2) of the HEW regulations allows the
employer to argue the former, but it says nothing about the latter;
and subsection (b)(1) bars the latter argument, via the
presumption, if the miner offers the specified medical evidence.
DOL's fourth rebuttal allows the employer to argue either point --
and thus, impermissibly, offers additional recourse to the
employer.
The employers offer yet another contortion of the statute to the
same effect. Section 410.490(c) states that rebuttal may be made
through "evidence that the individual is, in fact, doing his usual
coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (
see §
410.412(a)(1))." The provision incorporated by reference reads as
follows:
"(a) A miner shall be considered totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis if:"
"(1) His pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful
work in the immediate area of his residence requiring the skills
and abilities comparable to those of any work in a mine or mines in
which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a
substantial period of time. . . ."
Because this provision begins with references to the miner's
disability due to pneumoconiosis, the employers believe it would be
reasonable to construe it as authorizing the argument either that
the miner does not have the disease or that the disease is not
causing the disability. I do not find this a plausible explanation
of the reference to § 410.412(a)(1). The logical reason for
cross-referencing that provision was to include within the explicit
rebuttal provision the more complete definition of "gainful work"
that the incorporated section affords. Had HEW intended to create
additional rebuttal provisions, it would simply have done so,
explicitly and in parallel with the other rebuttal provisions,
rather than backhandedly, through the incorporation by
reference.
The Court apparently concedes that the companies'
cross-reference argument is not the most natural reading of the
Page 501 U. S. 716
statute, but concludes that "the Secretary's view need be only
reasonable to warrant deference."
Ante at
501 U. S. 702.
While I do not even think the foregoing argument reasonable (nor do
I think the Secretary entitled to deference,
see supra at
501 U. S.
707-708), I note that the Secretary herself does not
advance it. Certainly private parties' speculation as to what the
Secretary could have thought warrants no deference.
B
The Government's second line of attack centers upon its claim
that the HEW regulations, if read to limit rebuttal, would violate
the Black Lung Benefits Act. That argument has potential force, for
we are more willing to depart from the natural import of language
when adhering to it would render a regulation unauthorized or a
statute unconstitutional. It is important to note at the outset,
however, that the Government has a heavy burden in this regard. Had
the HEW regulations been challenged before this Court as
inconsistent with the statute, we would have owed
Chevron
deference to the Secretary (of HEW). The Government's present
argument depends on a showing not that a natural reading of the HEW
regulations produces less than the best reading of the statute, but
that it produces an
unreasonable one.
The Government argues, and the Court accepts, that
"it disserves Congressional intent to interpret HEW's interim
regulations to allow recovery by miners who do not have
pneumoconiosis or whose total disability did not arise, at least in
part, from their coal mine employment,"
ante at
501 U. S. 700,
and thus HEW must have permitted rebuttal on these grounds even if
its regulations did not say so. I think that most unlikely. Any
adjudication of claims necessarily involves a trade-off between the
speed and the accuracy of adjudication. As discussed above, the HEW
presumptions were avowedly designed to enhance speed at the expense
of accuracy,
see § 410.490(a), pending the development of
more
Page 501 U. S. 717
reliable procedures. As with all presumptions, their preclusion
of full litigation of some issues left open the possibility that
some claimants would receive benefits to which, in a perfect world,
they would not be entitled. That is a necessary consequence of
attempting to resolve complex and possibly indeterminate claims
with a minimum of delay. I cannot say that, in striking such a
balance, HEW violated a clear policy of Congress, for Congress
itself had taken up the Black Lung issue in 1972 in part because of
a perception that adjudication of claims was moving too slowly.
It is next argued that certain specific provisions of the
authorizing statute mandate the methods of rebuttal later adopted
by DOL. Specifically, according to the Court,
"the authorizing statute . . . expressly provides that the
presumptions in question will be rebuttable,
see 30 U.S.C.
§§ 921(c)(1), (2), and (4), and requires the Secretary of HEW to
consider all relevant evidence in adjudicating claims. . . .
See 30 U.S.C. § 923(b)."
Ante at
501 U. S.
702-703. I see nothing in § 921, however, that
contradicts HEW's limitation on rebuttal. Section 921(c)(1)
provides:
"If a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was
employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out
of such employment."
That provision is simply irrelevant to the issue of whether
rebuttal must be allowed as to either the existence of
pneumoconiosis or the causal link between the disease and the
disability. The HEW regulations do not purport to establish an
irrebuttable presumption relating to the link between the disease
and employment in coal mines.
Slightly more on point is § 921(c)(2), which provides:
"If a deceased miner was employed for ten years or more in one
or more coal mines and died from a respirable disease there shall
be a rebuttable presumption that his death was due to
pneumoconiosis."
It is plausible to read that section as foreclosing HEW from
establishing an irrebuttable presumption of causation based solely
on death after 10 years' service.
Page 501 U. S. 718
But that is not what the HEW regulations do. Rather, they
establish an
irrebuttable presumption based upon 10 years'
service plus substantial additional medical evidence. It is not
inconsistent to say that certain evidence establishes a rebuttal
presumption and additional, more persuasive evidence establishes an
irrebuttable presumption.
Section 921(c)(4) is the most relevant, for it establishes a
presumption of disability based upon a showing of pneumoconiosis.
It then states in relevant part that "[t]he Secretary
may
rebut such presumption only by establishing that (A) such miner
does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis. . . ." (Emphasis added).
It is true that this rebuttal provision tracks the fourth rebuttal
provision of the DOL regulations. However, § 921(c)(4) is
permissive. It establishes the ways in which the Secretary
may rebut a presumption, but does not
require
that the Secretary use them. It is not inconsistent with the
statute for the Secretary to decide that such rebuttal attempts
would involve more administrative expense than they could justify,
and thus to adopt regulations declining to exercise the option.
In my view, the only colorable claim to a statutory conflict is
based on § 923(b), which provides in part that, "[i]n determining
the validity of claims under this part, all relevant evidence shall
be considered." The Government argues with some force that this
precludes the use of presumptions that do not allow the
introduction of all relevant evidence. That is an unanswerable
argument with respect to evidence offered
by the
claimants. I think it reasonably maintainable, however, that the
preclusion does not apply to evidence offered
against
them. At the time the interim regulations were adopted, HEW, not
the employers, paid the benefits required under the Act. In
adopting its presumptions, HEW was limiting the evidence it could
offer to sustain its own position. The presumption provisions were,
in effect, a waiver -- which may well have been based upon
compelling considerations of administrative efficiency. I think the
statute
Page 501 U. S. 719
is at least ambiguous as to whether the Secretary could elect
not to contest claims based on certain evidence. Since we owe the
Secretary (of HEW)
Chevron deference in construing the
statute, I cannot say that, if the Secretary had taken that
position (as he apparently did in promulgating the regulations), we
would not have accepted it as a permissible interpretation.
C
The Government's final argument is that the HEW regulations do
not expressly preclude rebuttal on grounds other than those
specified. Thus, even if expanded rebuttal is not specifically
provided for, neither is it foreclosed; the statute adopting the
HEW regulations is simply ambiguous as to its availability, and we
should defer to DOL's view that it should exist. It is true that
the HEW regulations do not say that these are the
only two
ways to rebut the presumption. That is, however, the reasonable
implication, as is suggested by the hoary canon of construction,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. When a provision
sets forth a general rule followed by specific exceptions to that
rule, one must assume -- absent other evidence -- that no further
exceptions are intended. The Court argues that the principle of
expressio unius is not absolute, and may be rejected where
its application "would render a regulation inconsistent with the
purpose and language of the authorizing statute."
Ante at
501 U. S. 703.
That is assuredly true; it is only one of many possible indications
of meaning.
Cf. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S.
501 U. S.
136-138 (1991) (invocation of
expressio unius
inappropriate where it would lead to absurd and arguably
unconstitutional results). It is a strong indication, however, and
the problem here is that there are no others. As discussed above,
limitation of rebuttal is not contrary to the text or purpose of
the authorizing statute, and neither the Government nor the Court
offers any other reason for thinking that the listed exceptions are
not exclusive.
Page 501 U. S. 720
III
In sum, the DOL regulations impermissibly exceed the HEW
regulations in at least two respects: (1) they allow employers to
argue that a miner who has pneumoconiosis and is disabled is
nevertheless not disabled due to the pneumoconiosis, and (2) where
a miner has submitted specified evidence of a chronic dust disease,
they allow the employer to challenge not only whether the disease
is coal-related, but whether the disease exists. That was the view
of these regulations we expressed in
Pittston Coal, see
488 U.S. at
488 U. S. 111,
and I see no reason to reconsider. [
Footnote 2/3] As to claimant Pauley, that divergence is
conclusive, at least as far as the statute is concerned. (I do not
address constitutional challenges to the statute, as these were not
passed upon below.) The employer's only defense was that Pauley's
pneumoconiosis was not the cause of his disability, and that
defense was foreclosed under the HEW regulations. Thus I would
reverse in No. 89-1714. Claimant Dayton presents a more difficult
case. He submitted ventilation studies showing a disease resembling
pneumoconiosis. The employer wishes to argue that he does not have
pneumoconiosis. As I read the regulations, the employer may not
challenge the conclusion that Dayton has a pneumoconiosis-like
disease, but may (depending upon the effect of other provisions not
argued here) claim that the disease did not arise from coal mine
employment. Since it is not clear on the present record which of
these positions the employer is advocating, I would remand in No.
90-114. Finally, I agree with the Court that claimant Taylor is
entitled to no relief. Taylor invoked the presumption of disability
via a blood gas test, § 727.203(a)(3). That was not an approved
method of invoking the presumption under the HEW regulations.
Taylor cannot complain that DOL has treated him less well than HEW
would have in allowing the
Page 501 U. S. 721
presumption to be rebutted, since, under the HEW regulations, he
would not have been entitled to the presumption in the first place.
Accordingly, I would reverse in No. 90-113.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The HEW regulations also contain a separate provision that would
have required Pauley to show that his medical condition arose from
working in a coal mine. § 410.490(b)(2). While that requirement is
not set forth as a separate provision in the DOL regulations, it is
presumably a part of § 727.203(b)(4), which requires that the miner
have pneumoconiosis. Pneumoconiosis is specifically defined as a
disease arising from work in a coal mine. 30 U.S.C. § 902(b). It is
not contested that Pauley's pneumoconiosis arose from work in the
mine -- only that it, rather than his other ailments, was the cause
of his disability.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In its permanent regulations HEW did not use the § 410.490
interim presumption. Significantly, the permanent regulations also
outlined an extensive procedure for contesting the link between a
miner's pneumoconiosis and his disabilities.
See §
410.426. The fact that this provision was not contained in the
interim procedures suggests that HEW thought disability causation
would not be an issue there -- and conforms to the view,
see § 410.490(a), that the interim presumptions would
serve as a blunt instrument for adjudication until full evidentiary
procedures could be developed.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Even if the Secretary of Labor were the proper party to claim
Chevron deference in interpreting these regulations, I
find her arguments to the contrary so implausible that I would not
accept them in any event.