Whilst Florida was a territory, Congress established courts
there, in which cases appropriate to federal and state
jurisdictions were tried indiscriminately.
Florida was admitted into the Union as a state on the 3 March,
1845.
The constitution of the state provided that all officers, civil
and military, then holding their offices under the authority of the
United States, should continue to hold them until superseded under
the state constitution.
But this article did not continue the existence of courts which
had been created as part of the territorial government by
Congress.
In 1845, the legislature of the state passed an act for the
transfer from the territorial to the state courts of all cases
except those cognizance by the federal courts, and in 1847,
Congress provided for the transfer of these to the federal
courts.
Therefore, where the territorial court took cognizance, in 1846,
of a case of libel, it acted without any jurisdiction.
The case of
Hunt v. Palao,
4 How. 589, commented on and explained.
This action originated in the Superior court for the Southern
District of Florida in March, 1846, and was transferred to the
United States District Court for Florida on 14 May, 1847.
On 24 March, 1846, Joseph Y. Porter filed a libel in admiralty
against the appellants in the Superior Court for the Southern
District of the Territory of Florida for the proceeds of the sloop
Texas, charging that he had furnished supplies and stores
to the master at the port of Key West whilst the vessel was engaged
in the business of wrecking.
On 22 May, 1846, the superior court gave judgment for the
libellant for the sum of $1,223.02.
On 14 May, 1847, the cause was transferred to the district court
of the United States and an appeal prayed by the defendants to this
Court.
Upon this appeal the case came up.
Page 50 U. S. 239
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Joseph Y. Porter the appellee, filed a libel in admiralty on 24
March, 1846, against the respondents in the Superior Court for the
Southern District of the Territory of Florida for the proceeds of
the sloop
Texas, charging that he had furnished supplies
and stores to the master at the port of Key West while she was
engaged in the business of wrecking upon the Florida coast and on
the high seas.
The respondents, among other grounds of defense, denied the
jurisdiction of the court. As the conclusion at which we
Page 50 U. S. 240
have arrived upon this branch of the defense disposes of the
case, it will be unnecessary to set out the pleadings at large or
to refer more particularly to the facts.
The territorial government of Florida was established by the Act
of Congress of March 30, 1822, amended by the Act of March 3, 1823,
and the judicial power vested in two superior courts and such
inferior courts and justices of the peace as the legislative
council of the territory might from time to time establish. One of
these courts was held in West and the other in East Florida. The
judges were appointed by the president and senate for the term of
four years, and possessed civil and criminal jurisdiction within
their respective districts, and also the same jurisdiction in all
cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States,
which the Acts of 24 September, 1789, and 7 March, 1793, vested in
the court of the Kentucky district. 3 Stat. 654;
id.
750.
The number of judges was afterwards increased to five, and
original and exclusive cognizance of all cases of admiralty
jurisdiction within the territory in terms conferred upon them. Act
of Cong., May 26, 1824, 4 Stat. 45; Act of Cong., May 15, 1826,
id. 164; Act of Cong., May 23, 1828,
id. 291; Act
of Cong., July 7, 1838, 5 Stat. 294; Thompson's Dig. 585, App'x,
where all the acts of Congress concerning the Territory of Florida
are collected
Exclusive jurisdiction in these cases was specifically conferred
by the Act of May 15, 1826, probably on account of the case of
American Insurance Co. v.
Canter, 1 Pet. 511, in which it was held that the
jurisdiction was not, as originally prescribed, exclusive, but
might be vested by the legislative council of the territory in
subordinate courts. The case arose in 1825.
The court for the Southern District, in which the present case
arose and was decided, was established by the Act of Congress of
May 23, 1828, at Key West, and had conferred upon it all the
jurisdiction within the district which belonged to the other
superior courts of the territory, besides a considerable
enlargement of admiralty powers which became necessary on account
of the numerous wrecks usually happening upon that coast.
The objection to the jurisdiction taken by the respondents,
however, is not that the acts of Congress were insufficient to
confer the power exercised by the courts, but that the acts had
been abrogated and the jurisdiction superseded at the time of the
rendition of the decree by the admission of the Territory of
Florida as a state into the Union, and were no longer in force. The
admission was on 3 March, 1845.
Page 50 U. S. 241
The suit was commenced on March 24, 1846, and the decree in
favor of the libellant pronounced on May 22 of the same year. All
the proceedings, therefore, took place before the court after the
passage of the act of Congress admitting Florida into the Union,
and must be upheld, if upheld at all, upon the ground that the
jurisdiction still continued under the territorial authority
notwithstanding the erection of the territory into a state.
The people of the territory, claiming a right to an admission
into the Union under the pledge given by the sixth article of the
Treaty with Spain of 22 February, 1819, met in convention and
adopted their constitution 11 January, 1839, but it was not acted
upon by Congress till March 3, 1845. It was then accepted, and the
territory admitted, in the language of the act, "into the Union on
an equal footing with the original states in all respects
whatsoever." No conditions were annexed except that she should not
interfere with the disposal of the public lands nor levy any tax on
the same while they remained the property of the United States.
Her Constitution distributed the powers of the government into
three separate and distinct departments -- executive, legislative,
and judicial -- and prescribed the organic law of each. The
judicial power was vested in a supreme court, courts of chancery
circuit courts, and justices of the peace, and the jurisdiction of
each of them either defined or provided for by imposing the duty
upon the general assembly. The state was to be divided into at
least four convenient circuits, and until others were created by
the proper authority, were to be arranged as the Western, Middle,
Eastern, and Southern Circuits, for each of which a circuit judge
was to be appointed. And in order to avoid any inconvenience or
delay in the organization of the government, an ordinance was
adopted, art. 17 of the Constitution,
"That all laws and parts of laws now then in force or which may
hereafter be passed by the Governor and Legislative Council of the
Territory of Florida not repugnant to the provisions of this
Constitution shall continue in force until, by operation of their
provisions or limitation, the same shall cease to be in force or
until the general assembly of this state shall alter or repeal the
same,"
and further that
"All officers, civil and military, now holding their offices and
appointments in the territory under the authority of the United
States or under the authority of the territory shall continue to
hold and exercise their respective offices and appointments until
superseded under this constitution."
It will be seen, therefore, under this ordinance of the
convention,
Page 50 U. S. 242
that on the admission of Florida as a state into the Union, the
organization of the government under the new Constitution became
complete, as every department became filled at once by the adoption
of the territorial laws and appointment of the territorial
functionaries for the time being.
The convention being the fountain of all political power, from
which flowed that which was embodied in the organic law, were, of
course, competent to prescribe the laws and appoint the officers
under the Constitution, by means whereof the government could be
put into immediate operation, and thus avoid an interregnum that
must have intervened if left to an organization according to the
provisions of that instrument. This was accomplished by a few
lines, adopting the machinery of the territorial government for the
time being, and until superseded by the agency and authority of the
Constitution itself.
After the unconditional admission of the territory into the
Union as a state, on 3 March, 1845, with her constitution, and
complete organization of the government under it, by which the
authority of the state was established throughout her limits, it is
difficult to see upon what ground it can be maintained that any
portion of the territorial government or jurisdiction remained
still in force.
The distinction between the federal and state jurisdictions,
under the Constitution of the United States, has no foundation in
these territorial governments, and consequently no such distinction
exists either in respect to the jurisdiction of their courts or the
subjects submitted to their cognizance. They are legislative
governments, and their courts legislative courts, Congress, in the
exercise of its powers in the organization and government of the
territories, combining the powers of both the federal and state
authorities. There is but one system of government, or of laws
operating within their limits, as neither is subject to the
constitutional provisions in respect to state and federal
jurisdiction.
They are not organized under the Constitution, nor subject to
its complex distribution of the powers of government, as the
organic law, but are the creations, exclusively, of the legislative
department, and subject to its supervision and control. Whether or
not there are provisions in that instrument which extend to and act
upon these territorial governments it is not now material to
examine. We are speaking here of those provisions that refer
particularly to the distinction between federal and state
jurisdiction.
We think it clear, therefore, that on the unconditional
admission
Page 50 U. S. 243
of Florida into the Union as a state on 3 March, 1845, the
territorial government was displaced, abrogated, every part of it,
and that no power of jurisdiction existed within her limits except
that derived from the state authority, and that by force and
operation of the federal Constitution and laws of Congress, and,
especially no jurisdiction in federal cases until Congress
interfered and extended the judicial tribunals of the Union over
it.
The only pretext for a different conclusion is that matters of
exclusive federal jurisdiction within the territory, which, under
our system, did not and could not pass under the state authority,
still remained, and that with it, to that extent, and for the
purposes of federal jurisdiction, the territorial organization
continued. But in the view we have already presented, and which
need not be repeated, no such distinction existed in the
territorial government. Matters of this description had been
blended together with those belonging to state jurisdiction, and
were incorporated into, and became part and parcel of, the same
system. The federal causes of action were subject to the same
tribunals as others, and to the same remedies, including writs of
error and appeals to the appellate court of the territory, and
through which alone cases could be brought up for revision to the
Supreme Court of the United States. This appellate court consisted
of the judges of the superior courts of the several judicial
districts.
The position taken in support of the jurisdiction assumes that
the admission of the state, and consequent transfer of all actions
and causes of action belonging to the state authorities, had the
effect not only to separate the federal from the state subjects of
jurisdiction, but also to remodel the judicial system of the
territory itself and adapt its jurisdiction to the trial of federal
causes -- assumptions that need only to be stated to carry with
them their refutation. And besides, were this admitted, and we
could suppose that the jurisdiction of the courts was left
untouched as it respected the federal cases pending or accruing,
nothing would be gained in the argument in favor of its
validity.
The admission of the state into the Union brought the territory
under the full and complete operation of the federal Constitution,
and the judicial power of the Union could be exercised only in
conformity to the provisions of that instrument. By art. 3, §
1,
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish. The judges both of the supreme and
inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior.
"
Page 50 U. S. 244
Congress must not only ordain and establish inferior courts
within a state and prescribe their jurisdiction, but the judges
appointed to administer them must possess the constitutional tenure
of office before they can become invested with any portion of the
judicial power of the Union. There is no exception to this rule in
the Constitution. The territorial courts therefore were not courts
in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the
federal government could be deposited. They were incapable of
receiving it, as the tenure of the incumbents was but for four
years.
26 U. S. 1 Pet.
546. Neither were they organized by Congress under the
Constitution, as they were invested with powers and jurisdiction
which that body were incapable of conferring upon a court within
the limits of a state.
Another answer, also, to the ground taken is that Congress on
the same day on which the act passed admitting Florida as a state
organized the state into a judicial district, to be called the
District of Florida, and ordained and established a district court
within the same, and conferred upon it the judicial powers
belonging to the general government within the state. The act also
provided for the appointment of a judge, together with other
officers necessary to its complete and efficient organization. The
laws of the United States not locally inapplicable were also
extended over the state. Act of Congress, March 3, 1845, 5 Stat.
788.
It is true the judge was not appointed to fill the office until
8 July, 1846, a year and five months afterwards, but the court was
established, and invested with jurisdiction over the federal cases.
The powers remained in abeyance until the office was
constitutionally filled. The vesting of the judicial power did not
depend upon the appointment of the officer to administer it, as the
grant in the Constitution to Congress to ordain and establish
inferior courts and to invest them with the judicial power of the
Union, is complete in itself, and they had acted and established
the court and invested it with the power without condition or
qualification.
Without, then, pursuing the examination further, we are
satisfied that in any aspect in which the question can be viewed,
whether we look at the effect of the act of Congress admitting the
Territory of Florida as a state into the Union, with her
constitution and organized government under it, alone or in
connection with the establishment of a federal court within her
limits, her admission immediately and by constitutional necessity
displaced the territorial government and abrogated all its powers
and jurisdiction. The state authority was destructive
Page 50 U. S. 245
of the territorial, and in connection with the establishment of
the federal jurisdiction, the organization of the government, state
and federal, under the Constitution of the Union became complete
throughout her limits. No place was left unoccupied for the
territorial organization.
We have chosen to place the decision upon the effect of the
admission of the state with a government already organized under he
Constitution and prepared to go into immediate operation, because
such is the case presented on the record; but we do not thereby
intend to imply or admit that a different conclusion would have
been reached if it had been otherwise and the state had come into
the Union with nothing but her organic law, leaving the
organization of her government under it to a future period.
We conclude therefore that the court below possessed no
jurisdiction of the case, and that the decree must be reversed.
Neither the act of Congress admitting the Territory of Florida
as a state into the Union nor the one organizing the district court
within it made any provision for the transfer into the district
court of the cases of federal jurisdiction pending at the time in
the territorial courts. Those cases were therefore left in the
state in which they stood at the change of government until the Act
of Congress of 22 February, 1847, Sess.Laws, ch. 17. That act
provided for a transfer to the district court, and also for a
review of the judgments and final decrees on writs of error, or
appeal, as the case might be, in the proper cases, to this Court.
It also provided for a review of the judgments or final decrees
that had been rendered in federal cases in the territorial courts
after the change of government, upon the idea that this
jurisdiction still continued. And when the District Court for the
Southern District of the State of Florida was established by an Act
of Congress, 23 February, 1847 Sess.Laws, ch. 20, the like transfer
was made to that court of all cases pending in that district, with
like power to review, on writ of error or appeal, judgments and
final decrees rendered by the territorial courts after the change
of government.
The case now before us was brought up for review by virtue of
the authority of these acts, which have removed the objections that
existed to our jurisdiction in the case of
Hunt v.
Palao, 4 How. 589. Provision was made by the
ordinance of the convention of Florida for the transfer of all
actions at law or suits in chancery pending in the territorial
courts at the time of her admission into such court of the state as
had jurisdiction of the subject matter. In pursuance of this
injunction,
Page 50 U. S. 246
the general assembly of the state passed an Act, 22 July, 1845,
transferring all cases to the proper courts of the state except
cases cognizable by the federal courts. Acts of General Assembly, 1
Sess., 9, §§ 5, 8, and 13, §§ 13, 14.
The case of
Hunt v. Palao, already referred to, was one
that had been transferred by this act of the general assembly from
the territorial court in which the judgment had been rendered to
the supreme court of the state, and we held on an application for a
writ of error to review the judgment that we possessed no power
over it without further legislation by Congress, for the reason
that the territorial court in which the judgment was rendered no
longer existed, and that the state court to which it had been
transferred could exercise no judicial power over it, as the law of
the state directing the transfer of the record could not make it a
record of the court nor authorize any proceedings upon it.
The subsequent legislation of Congress respecting the transfer
of these records to the district courts, to which we have referred,
grew out of this decision. That was a case of federal jurisdiction,
which the state government, confessedly, had no power over; but the
language of the court was general, and applicable to all cases
pending in the territorial courts at the change of government.
We perceive no ground for qualifying the opinion expressed on
that occasion, believing it sound and incontrovertible; but it may
be proper to state with a little more fullness the effect of it, as
it respects cases of state jurisdiction. The territorial courts
were the courts of the general government, and the records in the
custody of their clerks the records of that government, and it
would seem to follow necessarily from these premises that no one
could legally take the possession or custody of the same without
the assent, express or implied, of Congress. Such assent is
essential, upon the plainest principles, to an authorized change of
their custody.
On the admission of a territorial government into the Union as a
state, the concurrence of both the federal and state governments
would seem to be required in the transfer of the records, in cases
of appropriate state jurisdiction, from the old to the new
government. An act of Congress would be incapable of passing them
under the state jurisdiction, as would be an act of the legislature
of the state to take the records out of the custody of the federal
government. Both should concur.
The like concurrent legislation would also seem to be required
in respect to cases pending in this Court for review on writs of
error or appeal from the territorial courts, which
appropriately
Page 50 U. S. 247
belonged to state jurisdiction, to enable us to send down the
mandate to the proper state tribunal for any further proceedings
that might be necessary in the cause. Otherwise Congress itself
should specially provide for the execution of the mandate.
We have said that the assent of Congress was essential to the
authorized transfer of the records of the territorial courts, in
suits pending at the time of the change of government, to the
custody of state tribunals. It is proper to add, to avoid
misconstruction, that we do not mean thereby to imply or express
any opinion on the question whether or not, without such assent,
the state judicatures would acquire jurisdiction. That is
altogether a different question. And besides, the acts of Congress
that have been passed in several instances on the admission of a
state, providing for the transfers of the federal causes to the
district court, as in the case of the admission of Florida, already
referred to, and saying nothing at the time in respect to those
belonging to state authority, may very well imply an assent to the
transfer of them by the state to the appropriate tribunal. Even the
omission on the part of Congress to interfere at all in the matter
may be subject to a like implication. And a subsequent assent would
doubtless operate upon past acts of transfer by the state
authority.
It is to be regretted that proper provision has not always been
made by Congress, upon a change of government, in respect to the
pending business in the territorial tribunals, so as to remove all
embarrassment and perplexity on the subject.
From the examination we have given to the legislation upon the
admission of several of the new states into the Union, we have
found but few instances of any provision's having been made in
respect to the cases pending in the old government, and those are
limited to the transfer of the federal cases to the district court
organized in the new state. In some of the constitutions of the
states provision had been made for the pending business of
appropriate state jurisdiction, but not in all of them. A very
slight attention to the subject by Congress at the time would
remove all the difficulties that have occurred in several of the
states recently admitted.
Upon the whole, we are satisfied that the territorial government
of Florida became superseded on the unconditional admission of the
territory into the Union as a state on 3 March, 1845, and
consequently, that the court below, whose authority depended upon
the government, had no jurisdiction to render the decree in the
case, and that the decree must be reversed.
Page 50 U. S. 248
A doubt was suggested on the argument as to the proper
disposition of the case in the event of our arriving at the
conclusion that the jurisdiction of the court below ceased at the
termination of the territorial government. But the Acts of Congress
of February 22 and 23, 1847, Sess.Laws, ch. 17, § 8, and ch. 20, §
7, which provided specially for a review of this class of cases in
this Court have also provided for the execution of any judgment
that may be given in them by directing that the mandate shall be
issued to the district court of the state into which the same acts
had already transferred the records.
The case therefore can take the usual direction in cases where
this Court determines that the court below acted without
jurisdiction in the matters before it, and that is, to
Reverse the decree and remit the case with directions that
the court dismiss the proceedings, which direction is given
accordingly.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the District Court of the United States for the District of
Florida and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is
now here ordered and decreed by this Court that the decree of the
said district court in this cause be and the same is hereby
reversed and annulled for the want of jurisdiction in that court,
and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to the said
district court with directions to dismiss the libel in this
cause.