A sentence of condemnation as prize in the circuit court,
although denominated "a final sentence," is not a definitive
sentence in the sense in which that term is used in the convention
between the United States and the French Republic, finally ratified
on 21 December, 1801, and a vessel captured as prize and condemned
by the sentence of the circuit court previous to the signature of
the convention, but from which sentence a writ of error was
prosecuted to this Court and was depending at the time of the
ratification, was restored to the owners under the stipulations of
the fourth article of condemnation.
The obligation of a treaty, the supreme law of the land, must be
admitted by the Court. The execution of the contract between the
two nations is to be demanded from the executive of each nation;
but where a treaty affects the rights of parties litigating in
court, the treaty as much binds those rights, and is as much
regarded by the court as an act of Congress.
It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a
court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which
will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties,
but in great national concerns where individual rights acquired by
war are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract making the
sacrifice ought always to receive a construction conforming to its
manifest import, and if the nation has given up the vested rights
of the citizens, it is not for the court, but for the government,
to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation.
It is in general true that the province of an appellate court is
only to inquire whether a judgment when rendered is erroneous or
not. But if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of
the appellate court a law intervenes and positively changes the
rule which governs, the law must be obeyed if it is obligatory.
Page 5 U. S. 104
The schooner
Peggy was captured as prize by the United
States armed vessel
The Trumbull, David Jewitt, Esq.,
commander, instructed to take any armed vessel or vessels sailing
under the authority or pretense of authority of the French
Republic. The capture was made upon 24 April, 1800, and she was
sent into the District of Connecticut and was there libeled as
prize. The district court ordered the schooner and cargo to be
restored, and the captors appealed to the Circuit Court of the
District of Connecticut for September, 1800. The circuit court
reversed the decree of the district court and condemned the
Peggy and cargo as prize. From this decree the owners of
the
Peggy prosecuted this writ of error.
On 30 September, 1801, a convention between the United States
and the French Republic was signed by the plenipotentiaries of the
two nations at Paris, and on 21 December, 1801, it was finally
ratified by the President of the United States.
The fourth article of the convention provides that
"Property captured and not yet definitively condemned or which
may be captured before the exchange of ratifications (contraband
goods destined to an enemy's port excepted) shall be mutually
restored. This article shall take effect from the date of the
signature of the present convention. And if, from the date of the
said signature, any property shall be condemned contrary to the
intent of the said convention before the knowledge of this
stipulation shall be obtained, the property so considered shall
without delay be restored, or paid."
The question to be decided by the Court was whether, by the
sentence of the Circuit Court of Connecticut of September, the
schooner
Peggy could be considered as definitively
condemned within the meaning of the fourth article of the
convention.
Page 5 U. S. 108
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In this case, the Court is of opinion that the schooner
Peggy is within the provisions of the treaty entered into
with France, and ought to be restored. This vessel is not
considered as being definitively condemned. The argument at the bar
which contends that because the sentence of the circuit court is
denominated a final sentence, therefore its condemnation is
definitive in the sense in which that term is used in the treaty,
is not deemed a correct argument. A decree or sentence may be
interlocutory or final in the court which pronounces it, and
receives its
Page 5 U. S. 109
appellation from its determining the power of that particular
court over the subject to which it applies, or being only an
intermediate order subject to the future control of the same court.
The last decree of an inferior court is final in relation to the
power of that court, but not in relation to the property itself,
unless it be acquiesced under. The terms used in the treaty seem to
apply to the actual condition of the property, and to direct a
restoration of that which is still in controversy between the
parties. On any other construction, the word "definitive" would be
rendered useless and inoperative. Vessels are seldom if ever
condemned but by a final sentence. An interlocutory order for a
sale is not a condemnation. A stipulation, then, for the
restoration of vessels not yet condemned would, on this
construction, comprehend as many cases as a stipulation for the
restoration of such as are not yet definitively condemned. Every
condemnation is final as to the court which pronounces it, and no
other difference is perceived between a condemnation and a final
condemnation than that the one terminates definitively the
controversy between the parties and the other leaves that
controversy still depending. In this case, the sentence of
condemnation was appealed from. It might have been reversed, and
therefore was not such a sentence as in the contemplation of the
contracting parties, on a fair and honest construction of the
contract, was designated as a definitive condemnation.
It has been urged that the Court can take no notice of the
stipulation for the restoration of property not yet definitively
condemned, that the judges can only inquire whether the sentence
was erroneous when delivered, and that if the judgment was correct,
it cannot be made otherwise by anything subsequent to its
rendition.
The Constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be
the supreme law of the land. Of consequence, its obligation on the
courts of the United States must be admitted. It is certainly true
that the execution of a contract between nations is to be demanded
from, and, in the general, superintended by the executive of each
nation, and therefore whatever the decision of this Court may be
relative to the rights of parties litigating before it, the claim
upon the nation, if unsatisfied, may still be asserted.
Page 5 U. S. 110
But yet where a treaty is the law of the land, and as such
affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as
much binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court
as an act of Congress, and although restoration may be an
executive, when viewed as a substantive act, independent of and
unconnected with other circumstances, yet to condemn a vessel the
restoration of which is directed by a law of the land would be a
direct infraction of that law, and of consequence improper.
It is in the general true that the province of an appellate
court is only to inquire whether a judgment when rendered was
erroneous or not. But if subsequent to the judgment and before the
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively
changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed or its
obligation denied. If the law be constitutional, and of that no
doubt in the present case has been expressed, I know of no court
which can contest its obligation. It is true that in mere private
cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard
against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation,
affect the rights of parties; but in great national concerns where
individual rights acquired by war are sacrificed for national
purposes, the contract making the sacrifice ought always to receive
a construction conforming to its manifest import, and if the nation
has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the
court, but for the government, to consider whether it be a case
proper for compensation. In such a case, the court must decide
according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a
judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but
in violation of law, the judgment must be set aside.
