The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358,
397 U. S. 364.
Petitioner Cage was convicted in Louisiana of first-degree murder
and was sentenced to death. In his trial's guilt phase, the jury
was instructed that guilt must be found beyond a reasonable doubt,
that reasonable doubt was "such doubt as would give rise to a grave
uncertainty" and "an actual substantial doubt," and that what was
required was a "moral certainty." In affirming Cage's conviction,
the State Supreme Court rejected his argument that,
inter
alia, the instruction violated the Due Process Clause, and
concluded that, "taking the charge as a whole," reasonable persons
would understand the reasonable doubt definition.
Held: The instruction was contrary to the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" requirement articulated in
Winship. The
words "substantial" and "grave" suggest a higher degree of doubt
than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.
When those statements are then considered with the reference to
"moral," rather than evidentiary, certainty, a reasonable juror,
taking the charge as a whole, could have interpreted the
instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof
below that required by the Due Process Clause.
Certiorari granted;
554 So. 2d
39, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are
granted.
In state criminal trials, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358,
397 U. S. 364
(1970);
see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.
S. 307,
443 U. S.
315-316 (1979). This reasonable doubt standard "plays a
vital role in the American
Page 498 U. S. 40
scheme of criminal procedure."
Winship, 397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 363.
Among other things, "[i]t is a prime instrument for reducing the
risk of convictions resting on factual error."
Ibid. The
issue before us is whether the reasonable doubt instruction in this
case complied with
Winship.
Petitioner was convicted in a Louisiana trial court of
first-degree murder, and was sentenced to death. He appealed to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, arguing,
inter alia, that the
reasonable doubt instruction used in the guilt phase of his trial
was constitutionally defective. The instruction provided in
relevant part:
"If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element
necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to
give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not
guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of
guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must be a
reasonable one; that is one that is founded upon a real tangible
substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture.
It
must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty,
raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of
the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere
possible doubt.
It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a
doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is
required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a
moral certainty."
State v. Cage, 554 So. 2d
39, 41 (La.1989) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected petitioner's argument.
The court first observed that the use of the phrases "grave
certainty" and "moral certainty" in the instruction, "if taken out
of context, might overstate the requisite degree of uncertainty and
confuse the jury."
Ibid. But "taking the charge as a
whole," the court concluded that "reasonable persons of ordinary
intelligence would understand
Page 498 U. S. 41
the definition of
reasonable doubt.'" Ibid. It is
our view, however, that the instruction at issue was contrary to
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement articulated in
Winship.
In construing the instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors
could have understood the charge as a whole.
Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U. S. 307,
471 U. S. 316
(1985). The charge did at one point instruct that, to convict,
guilt must be found beyond a reasonable doubt; but it then equated
a reasonable doubt with a "grave uncertainty" and an "actual
substantial doubt," and stated that what was required was a "moral
certainty" that the defendant was guilty. It is plain to us that
the words "substantial" and "grave," as they are commonly
understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for
acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. When those
statements are then considered with the reference to "moral
certainty," rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear
that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to
allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that
required by the Due Process Clause.
*
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
* Similar attempts to define reasonable doubt have been widely
criticized by the Federal Courts of Appeals.
See, e.g., Monk v.
Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 889-890 (CA10 1990);
United States v.
Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (CA4 1985);
United States v.
Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 720-721 (CA 1 1980);
United States
v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 575 (CA2 1965);
see also Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478,
436 U. S. 488
(1978).
