Under Nevada law, a first-time offender convicted of driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUI) faces up to six months of
incarceration or, in the alternative, 48 hours of community work
while identifiably dressed as a DUI offender. In addition, the
offender must pay a fine of up to $1,000, attend an alcohol abuse
education course, and lose his license for 90 days. Penalties
increase for repeat offenders. Petitioners, first-time offenders,
were charged with DUI in separate incidents. The Municipal Court
denied each petitioner's demand for a jury trial. On appeal, the
Judicial District Court again denied petitioner Blanton's request,
but granted petitioner Fraley's. The Nevada Supreme Court remanded
both cases, concluding that the Federal Constitution does not
guarantee a right to a jury trial for a DUI offense.
Held: There is no Sixth Amendment right to a trial by
jury for persons charged under Nevada law with DUI. This Court has
long held that petty crimes or offenses are not subject to the
Sixth Amendment jury trial provision. The most relevant criterion
for determining the seriousness of an offense is the severity of
the maximum authorized penalty fixed by the legislature. Under this
approach, when an offense carries a maximum prison term of six
months or less, as DUI does under Nevada law, it is presumed to be
petty unless the defendant can show that any additional statutory
penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period
of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a
legislative determination that the offense is a "serious" one.
Under this test, it is clear that the Nevada legislature does not
view DUI as a serious offense. It is immaterial that a first-time
DUI offender may face a minimum prison term or that some offenders
may receive the maximum prison sentence, because even the maximum
prison term does not exceed the constitutional demarcation point of
six months. Likewise, the 90-day license suspension is irrelevant
if it runs concurrently with the prison term. The 48 hours of
community service in the specified clothing, while a source of
embarrassment, is less embarrassing and less onerous than six
months in jail. Also, the $1,000 fine is well below the $5,000
level set by Congress in its most recent definition of a petty
Page 489 U. S. 539
offense, while increased penalties for recidivists are
commonplace, and are not faced by petitioners. Pp.
489 U. S.
541-545.
___ Nev. ___,
748 P.2d 494,
affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether there is a constitutional
right to a trial by jury for persons charged under Nevada law with
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Nev.Rev.Stat. §
484.379(1) (1987). We hold that there is not.
DUI is punishable by a minimum term of two days' imprisonment
and a maximum term of six months' imprisonment. §
484.3792(1)(a)(2). Alternatively, a trial court may order the
defendant "to perform 48 hours of work for the community while
dressed in distinctive garb which identifies him as [a DUI
offender]."
Ibid. The defendant also must pay a fine
ranging from $200 to $1,000. § 484.3792(1)(a)(3). In addition, the
defendant automatically loses his driver's license for 90 days, §
483.460(1)(c), [
Footnote 1] and
he must attend, at his own
Page 489 U. S. 540
expense, an alcohol abuse education course. § 484.3792(1)(a)(1).
Repeat DUI offenders are subject to increased penalties. [
Footnote 2]
Petitioners Melvin R. Blanton and Mark D. Fraley were charged
with DUI in separate incidents. Neither petitioner had a prior DUI
conviction. The North Las Vegas, Nevada, Municipal Court denied
their respective pretrial demands for a jury trial. On appeal, the
Eighth Judicial District Court denied Blanton's request for a jury
trial but, a month later, granted Fraley's. Blanton then appealed
to the Supreme Court of Nevada, as did respondent City of North Las
Vegas with respect to Fraley. After consolidating the two cases
along with several others raising the same issue, the Supreme Court
concluded,
inter alia, that the Federal Constitution does
not guarantee a right to a jury trial for a DUI offense, because
the maximum term of incarceration is only six months and the
maximum possible fine is $1,000. ___ Nev. ___,
748 P.2d 494
(1987). [
Footnote 3] We granted
certiorari to consider whether petitioners were entitled to a jury
trial, 487 U.S. 1203 (1988), and now affirm.
Page 489 U. S. 541
It has long been settled "that there is a category of petty
crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury
trial provision."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.
S. 145,
391 U. S. 159
(1968);
see also District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U. S. 617,
300 U. S. 624
(1937);
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.
S. 540,
127 U. S. 557
(1888). [
Footnote 4] In
determining whether a particular offense should be categorized as
"petty," our early decisions focused on the nature of the offense
and on whether it was triable by a jury at common law.
See,
e.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S.
63,
282 U. S. 73
(1930);
Callan, supra, at
127 U. S.
555-557. In recent years, however, we have sought more
"objective indications of the seriousness with which society
regards the offense."
Frank v. United States, 395 U.
S. 147,
395 U. S. 148
(1969). [
Footnote 5] "[W]e have
found the most relevant such criteria in the severity of the
maximum authorized penalty."
Baldwin v. New York,
399 U. S. 66,
399 U. S. 68
(1970) (plurality opinion);
see also Duncan, supra, at
391 U. S. 159.
In fixing the maximum penalty for a crime, a legislature
"include[s] within the definition of the crime itself a judgment
about the seriousness of the offense."
Frank, supra, at
395 U. S. 149.
The judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness
for that of a legislature, which is
"far better equipped to perform the task, and [is] likewise more
responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable to the
Page 489 U. S. 542
recognition and correction of their misperceptions in this
respect."
Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209 (CA5 1988) (en
banc),
cert. pending, No. 88-5043.
In using the word "penalty," we do not refer solely to the
maximum prison term authorized for a particular offense. A
legislature's view of the seriousness of an offense also is
reflected in the other penalties that it attaches to the offense.
See United States v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 474, and n. 3
(CA4),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986). We thus examine
"whether the length of the authorized prison term
or the
seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself to require
a jury trial."
Duncan, supra, at
391 U. S. 161
(emphasis added);
see also Frank, 395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 152
(three years' probation is not "onerous enough to make an otherwise
petty offense
serious'"). [Footnote 6] Primary emphasis, however, must be placed on
the maximum authorized period of incarceration. Penalties such as
probation or a fine may engender "a significant infringement of
personal freedom," id. at 395 U. S. 151,
but they cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a
prison term entails. Indeed, because incarceration is an
"intrinsically different" form of punishment, Muniz v.
Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454,
422 U. S. 477
(1975), it is the most powerful indication of whether an offense is
"serious."
Following this approach, our decision in
Baldwin
established that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial whenever
the offense for which he is charged carries a maximum authorized
prison term of greater than six months. 399 U.S. at
399 U. S. 69;
see id. at
399 U. S. 74-76
(Black, J., concurring in judgment). The possibility of a sentence
exceeding six months, we determined, is "sufficiently severe by
itself" to require the opportunity for a jury trial.
Id.
at
399 U. S. 69, n.
6. As for a prison term of six months or less, we recognized that
it will seldom be viewed by the defendant as "trivial or
petty.'" Id. at 399 U. S. 73.
But we
Page 489 U. S. 543
found that the disadvantages of such a sentence, "onerous though
they may be, may be outweighed by the benefits that result from
speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications."
Ibid.; see also
Duncan, supra, at
391 U. S.
160.
Although we did not hold in
Baldwin that an offense
carrying a maximum prison term of six months or less automatically
qualifies as a "petty" offense, [
Footnote 7] and decline to do so today, we do find it
appropriate to presume for purposes
Page 489 U. S. 544
of the Sixth Amendment that society views such an offense as
"petty." A defendant is entitled to a jury trial in such
circumstances only if he can demonstrate that any additional
statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum
authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly
reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is
a "serious" one. This standard, albeit somewhat imprecise, should
ensure the availability of a jury trial in the rare situation where
a legislature packs an offense it deems "serious" with onerous
penalties that nonetheless "do not puncture the 6-month
incarceration line." Brief for Petitioners 16. [
Footnote 8]
Applying these principles here, it is apparent that petitioners
are not entitled to a jury trial. The maximum authorized prison
sentence for first-time DUI offenders does not exceed six months. A
presumption therefore exists that the Nevada Legislature views DUI
as a "petty" offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
Considering the additional statutory penalties as well, we do not
believe that the Nevada Legislature has clearly indicated that DUI
is a "serious" offense.
In the first place, it is immaterial that a first-time DUI
offender may face a minimum term of imprisonment. In settling on
six months' imprisonment as the constitutional demarcation point,
we have assumed that a defendant convicted of the offense in
question would receive the maximum authorized prison sentence. It
is not constitutionally determinative, therefore, that a particular
defendant may be required to serve some amount of jail time less
than six months. Likewise, it is of little moment that a defendant
may receive the maximum prison term because of the prohibitions on
plea bargaining and probation. As for the 90-day license
suspension, it, too, will be irrelevant if it runs concurrently
with the prison sentence, which we assume for present purposes to
be the maximum of six months. [
Footnote 9]
We are also unpersuaded by the fact that, instead of a prison
sentence, a DUI offender may be ordered to perform 48 hours of
community service dressed in clothing identifying him as a DUI
offender. Even assuming the outfit is the source of some
embarrassment during the 48-hour period, [
Footnote 10] such a penalty will be less embarrassing
and less onerous than six months in jail. As for the possible
$1,000 fine, it is well below the $5,000 level set by Congress in
its most recent definition of a "petty" offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1
(1982 ed.,
Page 489 U. S. 545
Supp. IV), and petitioners do not suggest that this
congressional figure is out of step with state practice for
offenses carrying prison sentences of six months or less. [
Footnote 11] Finally, we ascribe
little significance to the fact that a DUI offender faces increased
penalties for repeat offenses. Recidivist penalties of the
magnitude imposed for DUI are commonplace and, in any event,
petitioners do not face such penalties here. [
Footnote 12]
Viewed together, the statutory penalties are not so severe that
DUI must be deemed a "serious" offense for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment. It was not error, therefore, to deny petitioners jury
trials. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nevada
is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
A restricted license may be issued after 45 days which permits
the defendant to travel to and from work, to obtain food and
medicine, and to receive regularly scheduled medical care. §
483.490(2).
[
Footnote 2]
A second DUI offense is punishable by 10 days to six months in
prison. § 484.3792(1)(b). The second-time offender also must pay a
fine ranging from $500 to $1,000,
ibid., and he loses his
driver's license for one year. § 483.460(1)(b)(5). A third DUI
offense is punishable by a minimum term of one year's imprisonment
and a maximum term of six years' imprisonment. § 484.3792(1)(c).
The third-time offender also must pay from $2,000 to $5,000,
ibid., and he loses his driving privileges for three
years. § 483.460(1)(a)(2).
A prosecutor may not dismiss a DUI charge "in exchange for a
plea of guilty or
nolo contendere to a lesser charge or
for any other reason unless he knows or it is obvious" that there
is insufficient evidence to prove the offense. § 484.3792(3). Trial
courts may not suspend sentences or impose probation for DUI
convictions.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 3]
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada remanded Blanton's case
with instructions to proceed without a jury trial. Because Fraley
pleaded guilty to DUI before he took an appeal to the District
Court, the Supreme Court remanded his case with instructions to
reinstate his conviction.
[
Footnote 4]
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U. S. 145
(1968).
[
Footnote 5]
Our decision to move away from inquiries into such matters as
the nature of the offense when determining a defendant's right to a
jury trial was presaged in
District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U. S. 617,
300 U. S. 628
(1937), where we stated:
"Doubts must be resolved, not subjectively by recourse of the
judge to his own sympathy and emotions, but by objective standards
such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the community
taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments."
Our adherence to a common law approach has been undermined by
the substantial number of statutory offenses lacking common law
antecedents.
See Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201,
1209-1210 (CA5 1988) (en banc),
cert. pending, No.
88-5043;
United States v. Woods, 450 F.
Supp. 1335, 1345 (Md.1978); Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 18.
[
Footnote 6]
In criminal contempt prosecutions,
"where no maximum penalty is authorized, the severity of the
penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness
of the particular offense."
Frank 395 U.S. at 149.
[
Footnote 7]
We held
"
only that a potential sentence in excess of six
months' imprisonment is sufficiently severe by itself to take the
offense out of the category of 'petty.'"
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66,
399 U. S. 69, n.
6 (1970) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added);
see also
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506,
418 U. S. 512,
n. 4 (1974).
[
Footnote 8]
In performing this analysis, only penalties resulting from state
action,
e.g., those mandated by statute or regulation,
should be considered.
See Note, The Federal Constitutional
Right to Trial by Jury for the Offense of Driving While
Intoxicated, 73 Minn.L.Rev. 122, 149-150 (1988) (nonstatutory
consequences of a conviction "are speculative in nature, because
courts cannot determine with any consistency when and if they will
occur, especially in the context of society's continually shifting
moral values").
[
Footnote 9]
It is unclear whether the license suspension and prison sentence
in fact run concurrently.
See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 483.460(1)
(1987). But even if they do not, we cannot say that a 90-day
license suspension is that significant as a Sixth Amendment matter,
particularly when a restricted license may be obtained after only
45 days.
Compare Frank v. United States, 395 U.
S. 147 (1969). Furthermore, the requirement that an
offender attend an alcohol abuse education course can only be
described as
de minimis.
[
Footnote 10]
We are hampered in our review of the clothing requirement
because the record from the state courts contains neither a
description of the clothing nor any details as to where and when it
must be worn.
[
Footnote 11]
We have frequently looked to the federal classification scheme
in determining when a jury trial must be provided.
See, e.g.,
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454,
422 U. S.
476-477 (1975);
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at
399 U. S. 71;
Duncan, 391 U.S. at
391 U. S. 161.
Although Congress no longer characterizes offenses as "petty," 98
Stat. 2027, 2031, 99 Stat. 1728 (repealing 18 U.S.C. § 1), under
the current scheme, 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (1982 ed., Supp. V), an
individual facing a maximum prison sentence of six months or less
remains subject to a maximum fine of no more than $5,000. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(b)(6) (1982 ed., Supp. V).
We decline petitioners' invitation to survey the statutory
penalties for drunken driving in other States. The question is not
whether other States consider drunken driving a "serious" offense,
but whether Nevada does.
Cf. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.
S. 228,
480 U. S. 236
(1987). Although we looked to state practice in our past decisions,
we did so chiefly to determine whether there was a nationwide
consensus on the potential term of imprisonment or amount of fine
that triggered a jury trial regardless of the particular offense
involved.
See, e.g., Baldwin, 399 U.S. at
399 U. S. 70-73;
Duncan, 391 U.S. at
391 U. S.
161.
[
Footnote 12]
In light of petitioners' status as first-time offenders, we do
not consider whether a repeat offender facing enhanced penalties
may state a constitutional claim because of the absence of a jury
trial in a prior DUI prosecution.