Section 15(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act)
prohibits "any person" from introducing into interstate commerce
goods produced in violation of the minimum wage or overtime pay
provisions of §§ 6 and 7 of the Act. Under a financing agreement
with manufacturer Ely Group, Inc. (Ely), petitioner perfected a
security interest in Ely's inventory. After Ely began to fail
financially, petitioner took possession of the inventory, part of
which was manufactured during a period in which Ely's employees
were not paid. Concluding that such items were "hot goods" under §
15(a)(1), the United States Department of Labor filed suits in two
Federal District Courts, each of which granted a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the transportation or sale of the goods in
interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals affirmed the consolidated
cases.
Held: Section 15(a)(1) applies to secured creditors who
acquire "hot goods" pursuant to a security agreement. Pp.
483 U. S.
32-38.
(a) The goods produced during the period when Ely's employees
were not paid were manufactured in violation of § 6 and/or § 7 of
the Act, and are "hot goods" for the purposes of § 15(a)(1). Pp.
483 U. S.
32-33.
(b) As a corporate entity, petitioner falls within § 15(a)(1)'s
plain language, since that section prohibits "any person" from
introducing "hot goods" into commerce, while the Act defines
"person" to include corporations. Petitioner's argument that §
15(a)(1)'s exemptions for common carriers and good faith purchasers
reflect a congressional intent that the "hot goods" prohibition
should apply only to culpable parties, and not to "innocent"
secured creditors, is not persuasive. Congress' limitation of the
effects of other FLSA provisions to culpable parties indicates that
its failure to do so here was not inadvertent. Rather, § 15(a)(1)'s
exemption of only two narrow categories of "innocent" persons
suggests that all others, whether innocent or not, are covered.
There is no indication that Congress actually considered secured
creditors when it enacted § 15(a)(1), but, by claiming a general
exemption for them, without any duty to ascertain compliance with
the Act, petitioner would put them in a better position than good
faith purchasers, whom Congress did specifically act to protect.
Detailed and particular FLSA exemptions cannot
Page 483 U. S. 28
be enlarged by implication to include persons not plainly and
unmistakably within the Act's terms and spirit. Pp.
483 U. S.
33-35.
(c) By excluding tainted goods from interstate commerce, the
application of § 15(a)(1) to secured creditors furthers the FLSA's
goal of eliminating the competitive advantage enjoyed by goods
produced under substandard labor conditions. Moreover, prohibiting
foreclosing creditors from selling "hot goods" also advances the
Act's purpose of establishing decent wages and hours, since such
creditors will be encouraged to insist that their debtors comply
with the Act's minimum wage and overtime pay requirements. Pp.
483 U. S.
35-38.
(d) Applying § 15(a)(1) to secured creditors does not give
employees a "lien" on, or priority in, "hot goods" superior to that
of the creditors under state law, since creditors' rights in the
goods as against the employer are unchanged by such application,
while the employees acquire no possessory interest in the goods
thereby. Such application is simply an exercise of Congress' power
to exclude contraband from interstate commerce. Pp.
483 U. S.
38-39.
788 F.2d 1200, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, POWELL, O'CONNOR, and
SCALIA, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post p.
483 U. S. 40.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, J.,
joined,
post p.
483 U. S.
40.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 15(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 1068, prohibits "any person" from introducing into
Page 483 U. S. 29
interstate commerce goods produced in violation of the minimum
wage or overtime provisions of the Act. The question in this case
is whether § 15(a)(1) applies to holders of collateral obtained
pursuant to a security agreement.
I
In 1983, petitioner entered into a financing agreement with
Qualitex Corporation, a clothing manufacturer and the corporate
predecessor to Ely Group, Inc., and its subsidiaries Rockford
Textile Mills, Inc., and Ely & Walker, Inc. (collectively Ely).
Under the terms of the financing arrangement, petitioner agreed to
loan up to $11 million to provide working capital for Ely. In
return, Ely granted petitioner a security interest in inventory,
accounts receivable, and other assets. Petitioner perfected its
security interest under applicable state law.
The financing agreement imposed various reporting requirements
on Ely, including the submission to petitioner of a weekly schedule
of inventory, a monthly balance sheet and income statement, and
reports of accounts receivable. Petitioner also monitored the
collateral upon which it made cash advances through a system of
audits and on-site inspections. In the fall of 1984, Ely's sales
began to fall below projections, and the balance on the loan began
to increase, reaching over $9.5 million by February, 1985. Ely
stopped reporting to petitioner in January, 1985. On February 8,
petitioner stopped advancing funds and demanded payment in full. At
the request of Ely's management, however, petitioner did not
immediately foreclose. It gave Ely an opportunity to devise a plan
for continuing its operations, but Ely was unable to do so.
Petitioner waited until February 19, at which time it took
possession of the collateral, including Ely's inventory of finished
goods.
Ely's employees continued to work until February 19, when Ely
ceased all operations and closed its manufacturing facilities.
Because Ely defaulted on its payroll, the employees
Page 483 U. S. 30
did not receive any wages for pay periods between January 27 and
February 19. The Department of Labor concluded that the items
manufactured during these times were produced in violation of §§ 6
and 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§
206 and 207, and that, under § 15(a)(1), they were "hot goods" that
could not be introduced into interstate commerce. [
Footnote 1] Acting on information that
petitioner intended to transport these goods in interstate
commerce, the Secretary of Labor sought to enjoin shipment.
In an action filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, the Secretary moved for a
preliminary injunction and sought a temporary restraining order to
prohibit Ely and petitioner from placing the goods in interstate
commerce. The District Court denied the application for a temporary
restraining order, but, after a hearing, granted the Secretary's
motion for a preliminary injunction.
Donovan v. Rockford
Textile Mills, Inc., 608 F.
Supp. 215 (1985). The Under Secretary of Labor then filed
another complaint against Ely and petitioner, this time in the
United
Page 483 U. S. 31
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.
This complaint was also accompanied by a motion for a preliminary
injunction and application for a temporary restraining order. The
District Court granted the temporary restraining order, and later
granted the Under Secretary's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Ford v. Ely Group, Inc., 621 F.
Supp. 22 (1985).
Both District Courts held that § 15(a)(1), which makes it
unlawful for any person to ship "hot goods" in interstate commerce,
prohibited not only Ely but also petitioner from transporting or
selling items produced by employees who had not been paid in
conformity with §§ 6 and 7 of the FLSA. They found this reading of
§ 15(a)(1) consistent with congressional intent to exclude from
interstate commerce goods produced under substandard labor
conditions. 608 F. Supp. at 217; 621 F. Supp. at 25-26. The courts
concluded that,
"'in light of the purposes of the Act, it would be an unjust and
harsh result for the creditor to get the benefit of the labor of
the employees during the period of time they produced goods and
were not paid as provided by the Act; a benefit which the creditor
would not have without the employees['] labor.'"
Id. at 26 (quoting 608 F.Supp. at 217). [
Footnote 2]
The two cases were consolidated on appeal. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, one judge
dissenting.
Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200
Page 483 U. S. 32
(1986). Following the plain language of § 15(a)(1), the majority
concluded that "any person," as used in that section, applies to
secured creditors.
Id. at 1202-1203. Like the District
Courts, it found this result consistent with the purpose of the
FLSA: to exclude tainted goods from interstate commerce.
Id. at 1203. The Court of Appeals rejected the reasoning
of the Second Circuit in
Wirtz v. Powell Knitting Mills
Co., 360 F.2d 730 (1966), which had held § 15(a)(1)
inapplicable to secured creditors who take possession of goods
produced in violation of the FLSA. 788 F.2d at 1204-1205. The Sixth
Circuit noted that Congress created only two exceptions to the
broad scope of § 15(a)(1), one for common carriers and one for good
faith purchasers,
id. at 1205, and concluded that
"
Powell Knitting Mills created an exception for secured
creditors that Congress did not and has not deemed appropriate."
Id. at 1206. The dissenting judge would have followed
Powell Knitting Mills. He maintained that, in enacting the
"hot goods" provision, Congress was concerned with violations of
the Act occurring in the course of the ongoing production of goods
by a solvent manufacturer, not, as here, by an insolvent
corporation that has ceased operations.
Id. at 1207.
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the
Circuits. [
Footnote 3] 479 U.S.
929 (1986). We now affirm.
II
A
The FLSA mandates the payment of minimum wage and overtime
compensation to covered employees. Section 6(a) provides that every
employer, as defined in the Act, "shall
Page 483 U. S. 33
pay to each of his employees" wages not less than the specified
minimum rate; § 7(a)(1) prohibits employment of any employee in
excess of 40 hours per week "unless such employee receives
compensation" at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the
employee's regular rate. Petitioner does not contest the lower
courts' findings that Ely failed to pay its employees
at
all for several weeks immediately preceding the plant
closings. Consequently, we conclude, as did the Court of Appeals,
that the goods produced during this period were manufactured in
violation of § 6 and/or § 7 of the FLSA, and are "hot goods" for
the purposes of § 15(a)(1). [
Footnote 4]
See 788 F.2d at 1201.
Section 15(a)(1) prohibits "any person" from introducing goods
produced in violation of § 6 or § 7 of the FLSA into interstate
commerce. Section 3(a) defines "person" as "an individual,
partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal
representative, or any organized group of persons." 29 U.S.C. §
203(a). As a corporate entity, petitioner clearly falls within the
plain language of the statute. Section 15(a)(1) contains two
exemptions to the general prohibition on interstate shipment of
"hot goods." The first, enacted as part of the original FLSA,
exempts common carriers from the prohibition on transportation of
such goods. The second, added in 1949, exempts a purchaser who
acquired the goods
Page 483 U. S. 34
for value, without notice of any violation, and "in good faith
in reliance on written assurance from the producer that the goods
were produced in compliance with the requirements" of the Act.
Petitioner does not claim to come within either statutory
exemption. Rather, it argues that the exemptions reflect
congressional intent to limit application of the "hot goods"
provision to culpable parties, and therefore, "innocent" secured
creditors should not be subject to the Act. [
Footnote 5] We disagree. Although §§ 6 and 7 only
require "employers" to pay minimum wage and overtime, § 15(a)(1)
refers to "any person," not "any employer." Congress limited other
provisions of the FLSA as petitioner suggests, [
Footnote 6] which indicates that its failure to do
so in § 15(a)(1) was not inadvertent. That Congress identified only
two narrow categories of "innocent" persons who were not subject to
the "hot goods" provision suggests that all other persons, innocent
or not, are subject to § 15(a)(1). [
Footnote 7] We find no indication that Congress
actually
Page 483 U. S. 35
considered application of the "hot goods" provision to secured
creditors when it enacted the FLSA. By claiming a general exemption
for creditors, without any duty to ascertain compliance with the
FLSA, petitioner is asking us to put creditors in a better position
than good faith purchasers, for whom Congress specifically added an
exemption.
In the past, the Court has refused "[t]o extend an exemption to
other than those plainly and unmistakably within [the FLSA's] terms
and spirit."
A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.
S. 490,
324 U. S. 493
(1945). Similarly, where the FLSA provides exemptions "in detail
and with particularity," we have found this to preclude
"enlargement by implication."
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 607,
322 U. S. 617
(1944).
See also Powell v. United States Cartridge Co.,
339 U. S. 497,
339 U. S. 512
(1950);
Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.
S. 178,
327 U. S.
183-184 (1946). We see no reason to deviate from our
traditional approach in this case.
B
Petitioner urges us to look beyond the plain language of the
statute, citing the often-quoted passage from
Holy
Trinity
Page 483 U. S. 36
Church v. United States, 143 U.
S. 457,
143 U. S. 459
(1892):
"[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers."
According to petitioner, the sole aim of the FLSA was to
establish decent wages and hours for American workers. This goal,
petitioner claims, is not furthered by application of § 15(a)(1) to
creditors who acquire "hot goods" by foreclosure, and are not
themselves responsible for the minimum wage and overtime
violations. However, we conclude that the legislative intent fully
supports the result achieved by application of the plain
language.
While improving working conditions was undoubtedly one of
Congress' concerns, it was certainly not the only aim of the FLSA.
In addition to the goal identified by petitioner, the Act's
declaration of policy, contained in § 2(a), reflects Congress'
desire to eliminate the competitive advantage enjoyed by goods
produced under substandard conditions. [
Footnote 8] 29
Page 483 U. S. 37
U.S.C. § 202(a). This Court has consistently recognized this
broad regulatory purpose.
"The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly .
. . that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of
competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard
labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the
commerce."
United States v. Darby, 312 U.
S. 100,
312 U. S. 115
(1941).
See also Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary
of Labor, 471 U. S. 290,
471 U. S. 296
(1985);
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.
S. 183,
392 U. S. 189
(1968);
Rutherford Food Corp v. McComb, 331 U.
S. 722,
331 U. S. 727
(1947).
Application of § 15(a)(1) to secured creditors furthers this
goal by excluding tainted goods from interstate commerce. Had the
Department of Labor not obtained an injunction in this case,
petitioner, as a secured creditor, would have converted several
weeks of labor by the debtor's employees into goods covered by its
security interest; the "hot goods" produced by these uncompensated
employees would have competed with goods produced in conformity
with the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime requirements. Moreover,
prohibiting foreclosing creditors from selling "hot goods" also
advances the goal identified by petitioner. Secured creditors often
monitor closely the operations of employer-borrowers, as petitioner
did in this case. They may be in a position to insist on compliance
with the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime requirements. As the
District Court for the Western District observed:
Page 483 U. S. 38
"[I]f foreclosing creditors are free to ship and sell tainted
goods across state lines, the temptation to overextend credit to
marginal producers is strong, as is the likelihood that such
producers will become unable to meet their payrolls. The reason for
this is that finance companies and institutions stand to reap
financial gain by keeping such producers in business. A holding by
this Court that creditors may not ship and sell in interstate
commerce goods produced in violation of the Act will not only
protect complying manufacturers from the unfair competition of such
tainted goods, but, we submit,
it will also discourage the type
of commercial financing which leads to minimum wage and overtime
violations."
621 F. Supp. at 26 (emphasis added).
C
A literal application of § 15(a)(1) does not grant employees a
priority in "hot goods" superior to that which a secured creditor
has under state law. Petitioner's rights in the collateral as
against Ely are unchanged by our holding. Petitioner still owns the
goods, subject only to the "hot goods" provision, which prevents it
from placing them in interstate commerce. The employees have not
acquired a possessory interest in the goods. [
Footnote 9] Indeed, as the District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee recognized, the Secretary brought
this action
"not to compel the foreclosing creditor to pay the statutory
wages or to put pressure on the defaulting producer to pay such
wages, but to keep tainted goods from entering the channels of
interstate commerce."
Id. at 25-26. That petitioner can cure the employer's
violation of the FLSA by paying the employees the statutorily
required
Page 483 U. S. 39
wages does not give the employees a "lien" on the assets
superior to that of a secured creditor. [
Footnote 10]
In numerous other statutes, Congress has exercised its authority
under the Commerce Clause to exclude from interstate commerce goods
which, for a variety of reasons, it considers harmful. Like the
FLSA, these regulatory measures bar goods not produced in
conformity with specified standards from the channels of commerce.
[
Footnote 11] As the
District Courts in this case recognized, secured creditors take
their security interests subject to the laws of the land.
See 621 F. Supp. at 26; 608 F. Supp. at 217. If, for
example, the goods at issue in this case were fabrics that failed
to meet federal flammability standards and were therefore banned
from interstate commerce under the Flammable Fabrics Act, 67 Stat.
111, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1191
et seq., surely
petitioner could not argue that it had a right to sell the
inventory merely by virtue of its status as a secured creditor.
"Hot goods" are not inherently hazardous, but Congress has
determined that they are contraband nonetheless. We see no reason
for a different result merely because a different form of
contraband is involved.
III
We hold that § 15(a)(1)'s broad prohibition on interstate
shipment of "hot goods" applies to secured creditors who acquire
the goods pursuant to a security agreement. This result is mandated
by the plain language of the statute, and it
Page 483 U. S. 40
furthers the goal of eliminating the competitive advantage
enjoyed by goods produced under substandard labor conditions.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 15(a)(1) of the FLSA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 215(a),
provides in relevant part:
"(a) [I]t shall be unlawful for any person -- "
"(1) to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or
sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that
shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any
goods in the production of which any employee was employed in
violation of section 206 or section 207 of this title, or in
violation of any regulation or order of the Secretary issued under
section 214 of this title; except that no provision of this chapter
shall impose any liability upon any common carrier for the
transportation in commerce in the regular course of its business of
any goods not produced by such common carrier, and no provision of
this chapter shall excuse any common carrier from its obligation to
accept any goods for transportation; and except that any such
transportation, offer, shipment, delivery, or sale of such goods to
a purchaser who acquired them in good faith in reliance on written
assurance from the producer that the goods were produced in
compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and who acquired
such goods for value without notice of any such violation, shall
not be deemed unlawful."
[
Footnote 2]
The District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted
petitioner's motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction
pending appeal. The stay permitted the delivery and sale of Ely's
inventory, on the condition that petitioner place the proceeds in a
separate interest-bearing account to be used to pay the wages of
Ely's former employees in the event that, on appeal, § 15(a)(1) was
held to apply to petitioner. The District Court in the Western
District denied a similar motion for a stay, but the Court of
Appeals granted a stay on the same conditions. The Court of Appeals
subsequently modified its order to permit petitioner to withdraw
all but $1.5 million from the account.
[
Footnote 3]
In
Shultz v. Factors, Inc., 65 CCH LC � 32,487 (1971),
the Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
Wirtz v. Powell Knitting Mills Co., 360 F.2d 730 (1966),
but added the requirement "that there be no collusion between the
manufacturer and his financier permitting the introduction into the
market of goods produced in violation of the Act."
See also
Dunlop v. Sportsmaster, Inc., 77 CCH LC � 33,293 (ED
Tenn.1975) (following
Powell Knitting Mills).
[
Footnote 4]
Petitioner appears to suggest that Ely's failure to pay its
employees did not violate the minimum wage and overtime provisions
of the FLSA because §§ 6 and 7 "address wage rates, rather than the
problem of nonpayment due to insolvency." Brief for Petitioner 16.
This ignores the plain language of the Act, which is not limited to
ongoing concerns, and makes no exception for employers who are
financially or otherwise unable to comply with §§ 6 and 7. The
proposition that an employer complies with the FLSA so long as its
promised wage rates equal or exceed the statutory minimum,
regardless of whether employees actually receive any compensation,
would render illusory the Act's protections. As this case
demonstrates, such a rule would also encourage financially unstable
employers to obtain labor when their financial condition indicates
that they are unlikely to be able to pay for it.
[
Footnote 5]
Although it found no evidence of collusion between petitioner
and Ely, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Tennessee found that petitioner knew that it was funding Ely's
payroll and that, when its funding ceased, Ely would be unable to
meet its payroll obligations.
Ford v. Ely Group,
Inc., 621 F. Supp.
22, 23 (1985).
[
Footnote 6]
For example, § 12(a)'s prohibitions against child labor are
enforceable only against "a producer, manufacturer or dealer," 29
U.S.C. § 212(a).
See § 15(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(4).
Under § 16(b), backpay may be sought only from an "employer." 29
U.S.C. § 216(b). And § 16(a) imposes criminal liability only for
willful violations of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a).
[
Footnote 7]
Congress' motive for exempting common carriers does not appear
to have been concern for nonculpable parties, as petitioner
suggests, but a desire
"to prevent a case involving the constitutionality of the act
from arising in a suit between a shipper and a common carrier, to
which the Government was not a party, inasmuch as the common
carrier has no interest in the issue of constitutionality, but only
in its obligation to accept goods for transportation."
H.R.Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 14 (1938).
Nor does the 1949 amendment to the Act provide support for
petitioner's claim that the "hot goods" provision was never
intended to apply to "innocent" secured creditors. To the contrary,
the House Report reflects Congress' understanding that the 1938 law
did not exempt innocent purchasers from the "hot goods"
provision.
"[A] purchaser who ships in commerce goods produced by another
person who violated the wage-and-hour provisions of the act in the
production of such goods, commits an unlawful act."
H.R.Rep. No. 267, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1949). Had Congress
intended the 1938 Act to exempt innocent parties generally,
amendment would have been unnecessary.
The amendment changed existing law only to the extent it made it
"lawful for a purchaser in good faith of goods produced in
violation of the act to sell such goods in commerce," H.R.Conf.Rep.
No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1949), provided he or she
obtained assurances "that the goods in question were produced in
compliance with the act."
Ibid. Thus, for the first time,
Congress gave purchasers a mechanism for protecting themselves from
unwitting violations of the Act, for which they would otherwise
have been liable.
See H.R.Rep. No. 267,
supra, at
39.
[
Footnote 8]
Section 2(a), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 202(a), provides:
"The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in
commerce . . . of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance
of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency,
and general wellbeing of workers (1) causes commerce and the
channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and
perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several
States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in
commerce; (3)
constitutes an unfair method of competition in
commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and
(5)
interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in
commerce."
(Emphasis added).
President Roosevelt's message to Congress, which served as the
inspiration for passage of the Act, makes a similar point:
"Goods produced under conditions which do not meet rudimentary
standards of decency should be regarded as contraband, and ought
not to be allowed to pollute the channels of interstate trade."
H.R. Doc. No. 255, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937).
See
Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.
S. 497,
339 U. S. 516
(1950). The President's message was cited approvingly throughout
the legislative history of the 1938 Act.
See, e.g., S.Rep.
No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-3 (1937); H.R.Rep. No. 1452, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., 5-7 (1937); H.R.Rep. No. 2182,
supra, at
5.
Despite these expansive indications of legislative purpose,
petitioner insists that Congress was concerned about competition
only to the extent that competition from "chiselers" had the effect
of driving down wages and working conditions. Brief for Petitioner
24-25. However, based on the statute, its legislative history, and
our prior decisions, we conclude that exclusion from interstate
commerce of goods produced under substandard conditions is not
simply a means to enforce other statutory goals; it is itself a
central purpose of the FLSA.
[
Footnote 9]
Of course, under state law, the employees may have a lien on the
employer's property superior to petitioner's lien.
See
Tenn.Code Ann. § 66-13-101 (1982) (creating statutory wage lien on
"corporate or firm property of every character and description").
However, any such lien would exist independent of the application
of the FLSA to petitioner.
[
Footnote 10]
Petitioner also argues that application of the "hot goods"
prohibition to secured creditors will interfere with the operation
of the Bankruptcy Code. Because Ely has not filed for bankruptcy,
however, this issue is not before us.
[
Footnote 11]
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1192 (fabrics failing to conform
to flammability standards); 15 U.S.C. § 1211 (household
refrigerators without prescribed safety devices); 15 U.S.C. §§
1263(a)-(c), (f) (misbranded or banned hazardous substances); 21
U.S.C. §§ 331(a)-(d) (adulterated or misbranded food, drugs, and
cosmetics); 21 U.S.C. §§ 458(a)(2)-(4) (adulterated, misbranded, or
uninspected poultry products).
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring.
While I would affirm the Court of Appeals even if I agreed with
petitioner that "the sole aim of the FLSA was to establish decent
wages and hours for American workers,"
ante at
483 U.S. 36, and that this
goal "is not furthered by application of § 15(a)(1)" to secured
creditors,
ibid., I do not disagree with the Court's
conclusions in Part II-B, and therefore join its opinion in
full.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, dissenting.
The statute that the Court construes today was enacted during
the Great Depression. Although business failures were an everyday
occurrence in 1938, nothing in the language or history of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act) suggests that Congress intended
that Act to address the unfortunate situation that arises when an
employer is unable to pay his employees for the final days of work
that produced the inventory at hand when the plant was forced to
close.
Indeed, if there is one conclusion that both parties before us,
and every court that has ever considered this matter, agree upon,
it is that Congress did not "actually conside[r] application of the
hot goods' provision to secured creditors when it enacted the
FLSA." Ante at 483 U. S. 34-35.
This historical fact carries much weight in this case. The subjects
of bankruptcy and secured transactions constitute discrete bodies
of law, which are generally governed by the Federal Bankruptcy Code
and by state law, respectively. [Footnote 2/1] Instead of interpreting
Page 483 U. S. 41
Congress' silence as evincing intent to invade these areas with
an Act whose purposes do not fit nicely into these contexts,
[
Footnote 2/2] I would interpret
Congress' utter silence as showing that Congress never intended to
apply the FLSA to these unique areas of the law. [
Footnote 2/3]
See Kelly v. Robinson,
479 U. S. 36,
479 U. S. 47
(1986).
Page 483 U. S. 42
Even were I not confident in that conclusion, however, I
certainly believe that the arguments in favor of petitioner's
construction are substantial enough to warrant our adherence to
settled precedent. During the 28 years from the enactment of the
FLSA through 1966, it appears that no Secretary of Labor ever
sought an injunction against the sale of "hot goods" in
circumstances such as these.
See Wirtz v. Powell Knitting Mills
Co., 360 F.2d 730, 733 (CA2 1966). When a Secretary did
attempt to use the statute in this novel way, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit summarily rejected his interpretation,
explaining:
"We believe that there was no Congressional intent that concerns
in [the creditor's] position be within § 15. The purpose of forcing
payment of wages should not apply to the creditor who advanced
funds long before the default in wages, and who merely forecloses
his lien, at least where the value of the goods acquired does not
exceed the debt left unpaid. Since [the creditor] is not giving
present consideration, it can neither force [the employer] to make
payment nor withhold wages from its payment and pay the wage
earners itself. It already provided [the employer] with cash, part
of which no doubt went for wages that were paid. Since the only
reason to give effect to § 15 would be to force [the creditor] to
pay the wages, § 15 ought not apply to it, in a backhanded way of
attacking its secured position."
"The Secretary stresses the point that, when the Congress
desired to protect bona fide purchasers from the strict wording of
the Act it found it easy to do so by
Page 483 U. S. 43
amending the Act with appropriate safeguards. This would indeed
be persuasive if there were indications that the present problem of
the foreclosing secured creditor had been brought to the attention
of the Congress. The argument loses force because this was
apparently never done, and the Secretary's present contention is
much weakened by the fact that, since the enactment of the Act in
1938, neither he nor his predecessors appear to have so read the
Act, in spite of the myriad of instances in which similar security
titles must have been enforced."
Id. at 733.
I would have subscribed to this reasoning in 1966, and certainly
do now. In the more than 20 years since the Second Circuit's
decision, its construction of the statute has not been called into
question by the courts that have addressed the issue, except in the
decisions now on review.
See Shultz v. Factors, Inc., 65
CCH LC � 32,487 (CA4 1971);
Dunlop v. Sportsmasters, Inc.,
77 CCH LC � 33,293 (ED Tenn.1975). Given the Secretary's practice
prior to the
Powell Knitting decision, the judicial
acceptance of that decision, and the fact that Congress has not
seen fit to amend the statute in light of these decisions,
[
Footnote 2/4] I believe that the
Powell Knitting construction should be retained until
Congress rejects it.
See Commissioner v. Fink, post at
483 U. S.
102-103 (STEVENS, J., dissenting);
Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220,
482 U. S. 268
(1987) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The FLSA was enacted to prevent employers from paying
substandard wages. Section 15 (a)(1) is designed to prevent
employers from producing goods at such low cost that they could
undersell competitors who paid what Congress deemed to be a decent
wage. The concern of the statute was the ongoing business, with its
continuing impact on both the labor market and the commercial
market. It was not remotely concerned with the perennial problem of
distress sales that follow in the wake of a business failure. Under
the Court's novel reading of the Act, any such sale -- whether by a
secured creditor, a trustee in bankruptcy, or even by a creditor's
committee trying to raise funds to meet a shortage in the final
payroll -- would be a sale of "hot goods," and therefore
illegal.
[
Footnote 2/2]
As Judge Engel explained in dissent from the Court of Appeals'
decision:
"The practical effect of the majority's decision is not to
remove any tainted goods from competition, for, as happened here,
almost always the result will be that the goods are sold, if not in
foreclosure, then in bankruptcy, or by other attaching creditors.
As here, the goods will go out in the market, but whether they are
sold for competitively destructive prices will not depend on the
cost of their production, but upon the manner of their sale in any
event. The real effect of the majority's interpretation is simply
to create a judicial lien superior to the otherwise lawful lien
which Citicorp possessed in the goods. In my view, this kind of
pressure is the only motivation in the government in its present
construction of the Act. Had it intended to create a federal lien
law, Congress no doubt could have done so, but it did not. State
laws governing creditors' rights, state laws protecting employees
from nonpayment of wages and bankruptcy laws generally, provide a
great deal of relief for the protection of employees of defunct and
insolvent corporations. It seems to me that, in this special area
of concern, the operation of these more traditional sources of law
was intended by Congress to be sufficient. It is my opinion,
therefore, that, under a common sense application of section
15(a)(1), Congress was looking instead at application of the Act in
the course of the ongoing production of goods, and not at the
situation obtaining here and in the like cases in the Second and
Fourth Circuits."
Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 1200, 1207
(1986).
[
Footnote 2/3]
Aside from my conclusion that secured creditors such as Citicorp
are not barred from selling "hot goods," I also have doubts about
whether the employees who participated in the production of the
goods at issue in this case were "employed in violation of [the
FLSA]" within the meaning of § 15(a)(1) of the Act at the time the
goods were produced.
See ante at
483 U. S. 30, n.
1. The terms of their employment complied with the statute, and,
when they performed their services, everyone expected and intended
that they would be paid in full. It may well be true that the
employer committed a violation of the Act when it was subsequently
unable to meet its payroll, but I am not sure the inventory can be
branded "hot goods" because of that subsequent event.
[
Footnote 2/4]
The FLSA has been amended on at least four occasions since the
Powell Knitting decision.
See, e.g., Pub.L.
99-150, 99 Stat. 787 (1985); Pub.L. 95-151, 91 Stat. 1245 (1977);
Pub.L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974); Pub.L. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830
(1966).