Having found petitioner guilty of two counts of first-degree
murder and related crimes, the jury sentenced him to death after
considering a presentence report prepared by the State of Maryland.
The report included a victim impact statement (VIS), as required by
state statute. The VIS was based on interviews with the family of
the two victims, and it provided the jury with two types of
information. First, it described the severe emotional impact of the
crimes on the family, and the personal characteristics of the
victims. Second, it set forth the family members' opinions and
characterizations of the crimes and of petitioner. The state trial
court denied petitioner's motion to suppress the VIS, rejecting the
argument that this information was irrelevant, unduly inflammatory,
and therefore violative of the Eighth Amendment. The Maryland Court
of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence, finding
that the VIS did not inject an arbitrary factor into the sentencing
decision. The court concluded that a VIS serves an important
interest by informing the sentencer of the full measure of harm
caused by the crime.
Held: The introduction of a VIS at the sentencing phase
of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth Amendment, and
therefore the Maryland statute is invalid to the extent it requires
consideration of this information. Such information is irrelevant
to a capital sentencing decision, and its admission creates a
constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the
death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Pp.
482 U. S.
503-509.
(a) The State's contention that the presence or absence of
emotional distress of the victims' family and the victims' personal
characteristics are proper sentencing considerations in a capital
case is rejected. In such a case, the sentencing jury must focus on
the background and record of the accused and the particular
circumstances of the crime. The VIS information in question may be
wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant,
and may cause the sentencing decision to turn on irrelevant factors
such as the degree to which the victim's family is willing and able
to articulate its grief, or the relative worth of the victim's
character. Thus, the evidence in question could improperly divert
the jury's attention away from the defendant. Moreover, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to provide a fair opportunity to
Page 482 U. S. 497
rebut such evidence without shifting the focus of the sentencing
hearing away from the defendant. Pp.
482 U. S.
503-507.
(b) The admission of the family members' emotionally charged
opinions and characterizations of the crimes could serve no other
purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the
case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the
defendant. Such admission is therefore inconsistent with the
reasoned decisionmaking required in capital cases. Pp.
482 U. S.
508-509.
306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098, vacated in part and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR
and SCALIA, JJ., joined,
post, p.
482 U. S. 515.
SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
and WHITE and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
post p.
482 U. S.
519.
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the Constitution prohibits a
jury from considering a "victim impact statement" during the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.
I
In 1983, Irvin Bronstein, 78, and his wife Rose, 75, were robbed
and murdered in their West Baltimore home. The murderers, John
Booth and Willie Reid, entered the victims'
Page 482 U. S. 498
home for the apparent purpose of stealing money to buy heroin.
Booth, a neighbor of the Bronsteins, knew that the elderly couple
could identify him. The victims were bound and gagged, and then
stabbed repeatedly in the chest with a kitchen knife. The bodies
were discovered two days later by the Bronsteins' son.
A jury found Booth guilty of two counts of first-degree murder,
two counts of robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. [
Footnote 1] The prosecution requested
the death penalty, and Booth elected to have his sentence
determined by the jury instead of the judge.
See
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 413(b) (1982). Before the sentencing phase
began, the State Division of Parole and Probation (DPP) compiled a
presentence report that described Booth's background, education and
employment history, and criminal record. Under a Maryland statute,
the presentence report in all felony cases [
Footnote 2] also must include a victim impact statement
(VIS), describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his
family. Md.Ann.Code, Art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986). Specifically, the
report shall:
"(i) Identify the victim of the offense;"
"(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a
result of the offense; "
Page 482 U. S. 499
"(iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a
result of the offense along with its seriousness and
permanence;"
"(iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or
familial relationships as a result of the offense;"
"(v) Identity any request for psychological services initiated
by the victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense;
and"
"(vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that the trial court
requires."
§ 4-609(c)(3). Although the VIS is compiled by the DPP, the
information is supplied by the victim or the victim's family.
See §§ 4609(c)(4), (d). The VIS may be read to the jury
during the sentencing phase, or the family members may be called to
testify as to the information.
The VIS in Booth's case was based on interviews with the
Bronsteins' son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter. Many of
their comments emphasized the victims' outstanding personal
qualities, and noted how deeply the Bronsteins would be missed.
[
Footnote 3] Other parts of the
VIS described the emotional and personal problems the family
members have faced as a result of the crimes. The son, for example,
said
Page 482 U. S. 500
that he suffers from lack of sleep and depression, and is
"fearful for the first time in his life." App. 61. He said that, in
his opinion, his parents were "butchered like animals."
Ibid. The daughter said she also suffers from lack of
sleep, and that since the murders she has become withdrawn and
distrustful. She stated that she can no longer watch violent movies
or look at kitchen knives without being reminded of the murders.
The daughter concluded that she could not forgive the murderer, and
that such a person could "[n]ever be rehabilitated."
Id.
at 62. Finally, the granddaughter described how the deaths had
ruined the wedding of another close family member that took place a
few days after the bodies were discovered. Both the ceremony and
the reception were sad affairs, and instead of leaving for her
honeymoon, the bride attended the victims' funeral. The VIS also
noted that the granddaughter had received counseling for several
months after the incident, but eventually had stopped because she
concluded that "no one could help her."
Id. at 63.
The DPP official who conducted the interviews concluded the VIS
by writing:
"It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to
the family members that the murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein is
still such a shocking, painful, and devastating memory to them that
it permeates every aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful that
they will ever be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not
be haunted by the memory of the brutal manner in which their loved
ones were murdered and taken from them."
Id. at 63-64. [
Footnote
4] Defense counsel moved to suppress the VIS on the ground that
this information was both irrelevant and unduly inflammatory, and
that therefore its use in a capital case violated
Page 482 U. S. 501
the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. [
Footnote 5] The Maryland trial court denied
the motion, ruling that the jury was entitled to consider "any and
all evidence which would bear on the [sentencing decision]."
Id. at 6. Booth's lawyer then requested that the
prosecutor simply read the VIS to the jury, rather than call the
family members to testify before the jury. Defense counsel was
concerned that the use of live witnesses would increase the
inflammatory effect of the information. The prosecutor agreed to
this arrangement.
The jury sentenced Booth to death for the murder of Mr.
Bronstein and to life imprisonment for the murder of Mrs.
Bronstein. On automatic appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction and the sentences. 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d
1098 (1986). The court rejected Booth's claim that the VIS injected
an arbitrary factor into the sentencing decision. The court noted
that it had considered this argument in
Lodowski v. State,
302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985),
vacated on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986), and concluded that a VIS serves
an important interest by informing the sentencer of the full
measure of harm caused by the crime. The Court of Appeals then
examined the VIS in Booth's case, and concluded that it is a
"relatively straightforward and factual description of the effects
of these murders on members of the Bronstein family." 306 Md. at
223, 507 A.2d at 1124. It held that the death sentence had not been
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other
arbitrary factors.
See Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 414(e)(1)
(1982).
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering
Page 482 U. S. 502
victim impact evidence. 479 U.S. 882 (1986). We conclude that it
does, and now reverse.
II
It is well settled that a jury's discretion to impose the death
sentence must be "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."
Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U. S. 153,
428 U. S. 189
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.);
California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992,
463 U. S. 999
(1983). Although this Court normally will defer to a state
legislature's determination of what factors are relevant to the
sentencing decision, the Constitution places some limits on this
discretion.
See, e.g., id. at
463 U. S.
1000-1001. Specifically, we have said that a jury must
make an "
individualized determination" whether the
defendant in question should be executed, based on "the character
of the individual and the circumstances of the crime."
Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U. S. 862,
462 U. S. 879
(1983) (emphasis in original).
See also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104,
455 U. S. 112
(1982). And while this Court has never said that the defendant's
record, characteristics, and the circumstances of the crime are the
only permissible sentencing considerations, a state statute that
requires consideration of other factors must be scrutinized to
ensure that the evidence has some bearing on the defendant's
"personal responsibility and moral guilt."
Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U. S. 782,
458 U. S. 801
(1982). To do otherwise would create the risk that a death sentence
will be based on considerations that are "constitutionally
impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process."
See Zant v. Stephens, supra, at
462 U. S.
885.
The VIS in this case provided the jury with two types of
information. First, it described the personal characteristics of
the victims and the emotional impact of the crimes on the family.
Second, it set forth the family members' opinions and
characterizations of the crimes and the defendant. For the reasons
stated below, we find that this information is
Page 482 U. S. 503
irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision, and that its
admission creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the
jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
A
The greater part of the VIS is devoted to a description of the
emotional trauma suffered by the family and the personal
characteristics of the victims. The State claims that this evidence
should be considered a "circumstance" of the crime because it
reveals the full extent of the harm caused by Booth's actions. In
the State's view, there is a direct, foreseeable nexus between the
murders and the harm to the family, and thus it is not "arbitrary"
for the jury to consider these consequences in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty. Although "victim impact" is not an
aggravating factor under Maryland law, [
Footnote 6] the State claims that, by knowing the
extent
Page 482 U. S. 504
of the impact upon and the severity of the loss to the family,
the jury was better able to assess the "
gravity or aggravating
quality'" of the offense. Brief for Respondent 21 (quoting
Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. at 741-742, 490 A.2d at
1254).
While the full range of foreseeable consequences of a
defendant's actions may be relevant in other criminal and civil
contexts, we cannot agree that it is relevant in the unique
circumstance of a capital sentencing hearing. In such a case, it is
the function of the sentencing jury to "express the conscience of
the community on the ultimate question of life or death."
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510,
391 U. S. 519
(1968). When carrying out this task, the jury is required to focus
on the defendant as a "uniquely individual human bein[g]."
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.
S. 280,
428 U. S. 304
(1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.).
The focus of a VIS, however, is not on the defendant, but on the
character and reputation of the victim and the effect on his
family. These factors may be wholly unrelated to the
blameworthiness of a particular defendant. As our cases have shown,
the defendant often will not know the victim, and therefore will
have no knowledge about the existence or characteristics of the
victim's family. Moreover, defendants rarely select their victims
based on whether the murder will have an effect on anyone other
than the person murdered. [
Footnote
7]
Page 482 U. S. 505
Allowing the jury to rely on a VIS therefore could result in
imposing the death sentence because of factors about which the
defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to
kill. This evidence thus could divert the jury's attention away
from the defendant's background and record, and the circumstances
of the crime.
It is true that, in certain cases, some of the information
contained in a VIS will have been known to the defendant before he
committed the offense. As we have recognized, a defendant's degree
of knowledge of the probable consequences of his actions may
increase his moral culpability in a constitutionally significant
manner.
See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.
S. 137,
481 U. S.
157-158 (1987). We nevertheless find that, because of
the nature of the information contained in a VIS, it creates an
impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be
made in an arbitrary manner.
As evidenced by the full text of the VIS in this case,
see 482
U.S. 496app|>Appendix to this opinion, the family members
were articulate and persuasive in expressing their grief and the
extent of their loss. But in some cases, the victim will not leave
behind a family, or the family members may be less articulate in
describing their feelings, even though their sense of loss is
equally severe. The fact that the imposition of the death sentence
may turn on such distinctions illustrates the danger of allowing
juries to consider this information. Certainly the degree to which
a family is willing and able to express its grief is irrelevant to
the decision whether a defendant, who may merit the death penalty,
should live or die.
See 306 Md. at 233, 507 A.2d at 1129
(Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding
that it is arbitrary to make capital sentencing decisions based on
a VIS, "which
Page 482 U. S. 506
vary greatly from case to case depending upon the ability of the
family member to express his grief").
Nor is there any justification for permitting such a decision to
turn on the perception that the victim was a sterling member of the
community, rather than someone of questionable character. [
Footnote 8] This type of information
does not provide a "principled way to distinguish [cases] in which
the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was
not."
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.
S. 420,
446 U. S. 433
(1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
See also Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U. S. 1,
476 U. S. 14-15
(1986) (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment).
We also note that it would be difficult -- if not impossible --
to provide a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence without
shifting the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the
defendant. A threshold problem is that victim impact information is
not easily susceptible to rebuttal. Presumably the defendant would
have the right to cross-examine the declarants, but he rarely would
be able to show that the family members have exaggerated the degree
of sleeplessness, depression, or emotional trauma suffered.
Moreover, if the state is permitted to introduce evidence of the
victim's personal qualities, [
Footnote 9] it cannot be doubted that the defendant
also
Page 482 U. S. 507
must be given the chance to rebut this evidence.
See Garner
v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349,
430 U. S. 362
(1977) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (due process requires that
defendant be given a chance to rebut presentence report).
See
also Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 413(c)(v) (1982). Putting aside
the strategic risks of attacking the victim's character before the
jury, in appropriate cases the defendant presumably would be
permitted to put on evidence that the victim was of dubious moral
character, was unpopular, or was ostracized from his family. The
prospect of a "mini-trial" on the victim's character is more than
simply unappealing; it could well distract the sentencing jury from
its constitutionally required task -- determining whether the death
penalty is appropriate in light of the background and record of the
accused and the particular circumstances of the crime. We thus
reject the contention that the presence or absence of emotional
distress of the victim's family, or the victim's personal
characteristics, are proper sentencing considerations in a capital
case. [
Footnote 10]
Page 482 U. S. 508
B
The second type of information presented to the jury in the VIS
was the family members' opinions and characterizations of the
crimes. The Bronsteins' son, for example, stated that his parents
were "butchered like animals," and that he "doesn't think anyone
should be able to do something like that and get away with it."
App. 61. The VIS also noted that the Bronstein's daughter
"could never forgive anyone for killing [her parents] that way.
She can't believe that anybody could do that to someone. The
victims' daughter states that animals wouldn't do this. [The
perpetrators] didn't have to kill, because there was no one to stop
them from looting. . . . The murders show the viciousness of the
killers' anger. She doesn't feel that the people who did this could
ever be rehabilitated, and she doesn't want them to be able to do
this again, or put another family through this."
Id. at 62.
One can understand the grief and anger of the family caused by
the brutal murders in this case, and there is no doubt that jurors
generally are aware of these feelings. But the formal presentation
of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to
inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the
relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. As we
have noted, any decision to impose the death sentence must "be, and
appear to be, based on reason, rather than caprice or emotion."
Gardner v. Florida, supra, at
430 U. S. 358
(opinion of STEVENS, J.). The admission of these emotionally
charged opinions as to what conclusions the jury should draw from
the evidence clearly
Page 482 U. S. 509
is inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking we require in
capital cases. [
Footnote
11]
III
We conclude that the introduction of a VIS at the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth Amendment, and
therefore the Maryland statute is invalid to the extent it requires
consideration of this information. [
Footnote 12] The decision of the Maryland Court of
Appeals is vacated to the extent that it affirmed the capital
sentence. The case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Booth's accomplice, Willie Reid, was convicted and sentenced to
death as a principal in the first degree to the murder of Mrs.
Bronstein. His conviction was affirmed, and his sentence is
currently under review.
See Reid v. State, 305 Md. 9, 501
A.2d 436 (1985).
[
Footnote 2]
When the statute was enacted, it was unclear whether a VIS was
admissible in a capital case.
See § 4-609(c)(2)(i) (1986)
(VIS required if victim suffered
injury, whereas, for a
misdemeanor, VIS required if victim suffers injury
or
death);
Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 761, 490 A.2d
1228, 1264 (1985) (Cole, J., concurring),
vacated on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986). In 1983, the Maryland General
Assembly amended the VIS provision to provide that:
"In any case in which the death penalty is requested . . . a
presentence investigation, including a victim impact statement,
shall be completed by the Division of Parole and Probation, and
shall be considered by the court or jury before whom the separate
sentencing proceeding is conducted. . . ."
§ 4-609(d) (1986).
[
Footnote 3]
The VIS stated:
"[T]he victims' son reports that his parents had been married
for fifty-three years and enjoyed a very close relationship,
spending each day together. He states that his father had worked
hard all his life and had been retired for eight years. He
describes his mother as a woman who was young at heart and never
seemed like an old lady. She taught herself to play bridge when she
was in her seventies. The victims' son relates that his parents
were amazing people who attended the senior citizens' center and
made many devout friends."
App. 69.
"As described by their family members, the Bronsteins were
loving parents and grandparents whose family was most important to
them. Their funeral was the largest in the history of the Levinson
Funeral Home, and the family received over one thousand sympathy
cards, some from total strangers."
Id. at 63.
[
Footnote 4]
The complete VIS is reprinted in the
482
U.S. 496app|>Appendix to this opinion.
[
Footnote 5]
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." The prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment
apply to the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
See Robinson v. California,
370 U. S. 660,
370 U. S. 666
(1962).
[
Footnote 6]
Before the jury may impose a capital sentence, it must find that
at least one of the following aggravating circumstances are
present:
"(1) The victim was a law enforcement officer who was murdered
while in the performance of his duties."
"(2) The defendant committed the murder at a time when he was
confined in any correctional institution."
"(3) The defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an
escape or an attempt to escape from or to evade the lawful custody,
arrest, or detention of or by an officer or guard of a correctional
institution or by a law enforcement officer."
"(4) The victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the course
of a kidnapping or abduction, or an attempt to kidnap or
abduct."
"(5) The victim was a child abducted in violation of § 2 of this
article."
"(6) The defendant committed the murder pursuant to an agreement
or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration to
commit the murder."
"(7) The defendant engaged or employed another person to commit
the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or
contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration."
"(8) At the time of the murder the defendant was under sentence
of death or imprisonment for life."
"(9) The defendant committed more than one offense of murder in
the first degree arising out of the same incident."
"(10) The defendant committed the murder while committing or
attempting to commit a robbery, arson, or rape, or sexual offense
in the first degree."
See Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 413(d) (1982 and
Supp.1986). Because the impact of the crime on the victim is not a
statutorily defined aggravating circumstance, it would not be
sufficient, standing alone, to support a capital sentence. §
413(f).
[
Footnote 7]
As one state court has noted:
"We think it obvious that a defendant's level of culpability
depends not on fortuitous circumstances such as the composition of
his victim's family, but on circumstances over which he has
control. A defendant may choose, or decline, to premeditate, to act
callously, to attack a vulnerable victim, to commit a crime while
on probation, or to amass a record of offenses. . . . In contrast,
the fact that a victim's family is irredeemably bereaved can be
attributable to no act of will of the defendant other than his
commission of homicide in the first place. Such bereavement is
relevant to damages in a civil action, but it has no relationship
to the proper purposes of sentencing in a criminal case."
People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App.
3d 500, 516-517,
203 Cal. Rptr.
276, 287-288 (1984).
[
Footnote 8]
We are troubled by the implication that defendants whose victims
were assets to their community are more deserving of punishment
than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy. Of
course, our system of justice does not tolerate such distinctions.
Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238,
408 U. S. 242
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 9]
See n 3,
supra. The Maryland sentencing statute does not expressly
permit evidence of the victim's character and community status to
be included in the VIS. The Maryland Court of Appeals, however,
apparently has determined that the statute only establishes the
minimum amount of information that must be provided. Consideration
of other information in the VIS is subject to the trial judge's
discretion.
See Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 820-821, 490
A.2d 1289, 1294 (1985).
This type of information is not unique to the VIS in Booth's
case. In
Lodowski v. State, the trial court admitted a VIS
based on an interview with the victim's wife that said in part:
"[The victim] was the perfect family person, he was totally
devoted to his family. It was like a miracle to find a man like him
-- we had something very special. We had created a love that could
withstand anything in life. We were not only husband and wife, but
best friends."
302 Md. at 766, 490 A.2d at 1266 (Cole, J., concurring). The
court in
Lodowski found that VIS evidence in general is
not constitutionally proscribed, and is relevant to a capital
sentencing determination.
Id. at 751, 752, 490 A.2d at
1259.
[
Footnote 10]
Our disapproval of victim impact statements at the sentencing
phase of a capital case does not mean, however, that this type of
information will never be relevant in any context. Similar types of
information may well be admissible because they relate directly to
the circumstances of the crime. Facts about the victim and family
also may be relevant in a noncapital criminal trial. Moreover,
there may be times that the victim's personal characteristics are
relevant to rebut an argument offered by the defendant.
See,
e.g., Fed.Rule Evid. 404(a)(2) (prosecution may show peaceable
nature of victim to rebut charge that victim was aggressor). The
trial judge, of course, continues to have the primary
responsibility for deciding when this information is sufficiently
relevant to some legitimate consideration to be admissible, and
when its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect.
Cf. Fed.Rule Evid. 403.
[
Footnote 11]
The same problem is presented by the VIS summary written by the
DPP that might be viewed by the jury as representing the views of
the State. As noted
supra at
482 U. S. 500,
the writer concluded that the crimes had a "shocking, painful, and
devast[at]ing" effect on the family, and that "[i]t is doubtful
that they will ever be able to fully recover." App. 63-64.
See 482
U.S. 496app|>Appendix to this opinion.
[
Footnote 12]
We note, however, that our decision today is guided by the fact
death is a "punishment different from all other sanctions,"
see
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280,
428 U. S.
303-304,
428 U. S. 305
(1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.),
and that therefore the considerations that inform the sentencing
decision may be different from those that might be relevant to
other liability or punishment determinations. At least 36 States
permit the use of victim impact statements in some contexts,
reflecting a legislative judgment that the effect of the crime on
victims should have a place in the criminal justice system.
See National Organization for Victim Assistance, Victim
Rights and Services: A Legislative Directory 32-33 (1985) (chart);
McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 Crim.L.Bull. 501,
507, and n. 22 (1986). Congress also has provided for victim
participation in federal criminal cases.
See Fed.Rule
Crim.Proc. 32(c)(2)(C). We imply no opinion as to the use of these
statements in noncapital cases.
|
482
U.S. 496app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
"
VI
CTIM IMPACT STATEMENT"
"[The Victim Impact Statement in this case was prepared by the
Maryland Division of Parole and Probation.
See n 2,
supra.] "
Page 482 U. S. 510
"Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein's son, daughter, son-in-law, and
granddaughter, were interviewed for purposes of the Victim Impact
Statement. There are also four other grandchildren in the family.
The victims' son reports that his parents had been married for
fifty-three years, and enjoyed a very close relationship, spending
each day together. He states that his father had worked hard all
his life, and had been retired for eight years. He describes his
mother as a woman who was young at heart, and never seemed like an
old lady. She taught herself to play bridge when she was in her
seventies. The victims' son relates that his parents were amazing
people who attended the senior citizens' center and made many
devout friends. He indicates that he was very close to his parents,
and that he talked to them every day. The victims' daughter also
spent lots of time with them."
"The victims' son saw his parents alive for the last time on May
18th. They were having their lawn manicured, and were excited by
the onset of spring. He called them on the phone that evening, and
received no answer. He had made arrangements to pick Mr. Bronstein
up on May 20th. They were both to be ushers in a granddaughter's
wedding, and were going to pick up their tuxedos. When he arrived
at the house on May 20th, he noticed that his parents' car wasn't
there. A neighbor told him that he hadn't seen the car in several
days, and he knew something was wrong. He went to his parents'
house and found them murdered. He called his sister, crying, and
told her to come right over because something terrible had happened
and their parents were both dead."
"The victims' daughter recalls that, when she arrived at her
parents' house, there were police officers and television crews
everywhere. She felt numb and cold. She was not allowed to go into
the house and so she went to a neighbor's home. There were people
and reporters everywhere, and all she could feel was cold. She
called her older daughter and told her what had happened. She told
her daughter to get
Page 482 U. S. 511
her husband and then tell her younger daughter what had
happened. The younger daughter was to be married two days
later."
"The victims' granddaughter reports that, just before she
received the call from her mother, she had telephoned her
grandparents and received no answer. After her mother told her what
happened, she turned on the television and heard the news reports
about it. The victims' son reports that his children first learned
about their grandparents death from the television reports."
"Since the Jewish religion dictates that birth and marriage are
more important than death, the granddaughter's wedding had to
proceed on May 22nd. She had been looking forward to it eagerly,
but it was a sad occasion, with people crying. The reception, which
normally would have lasted for hours, was very brief. The next day,
instead of going on her honeymoon, she attended her grandparents'
funerals. The victims' son, who was an usher at the wedding, cannot
remember being there or coming and going from his parents' funeral
the next day. The victims' granddaughter, on the other hand,
vividly remembers every detail of the days following her
grandparents' death. Perhaps she described the impact of the
tragedy most eloquently when she stated that it was a completely
devastating and life-altering experience."
"The victims' son states that he can only think of his parents
in the context of how he found them that day, and he can feel their
fear and horror. It was 4:00 p.m. when he discovered their bodies,
and this stands out in his mind. He is always aware of when 4:00
p.m. comes each day, even when he is not near a clock. He also
wakes up at 4:00 a.m. each morning. The victims' son states that he
suffers from lack of sleep. He is unable to drive on the streets
that pass near his parents' home. He also avoids driving past his
father's favorite restaurant, the supermarket where his parents
shopped, etc. He is constantly reminded of his parents. He sees his
father coming out of synagogues, sees his parents'
Page 482 U. S. 512
car, and feels very sad whenever he sees old people. The
victims' son feels that his parents were not killed, but were
butchered like animals. He doesn't think anyone should be able to
do something like that and get away with it. He is very angry, and
wishes he could sleep and not feel so depressed all the time. He is
fearful for the first time in his life, putting all the lights on
and checking the locks frequently. His children are scared for him
and concerned for his health. They phone him several times a day.
At the same time, he takes a fearful approach to the whereabouts of
his children. He also calls his sister every day. He states that he
is frightened by his own reaction of what he would do if someone
hurt him or a family member. He doesn't know if he'll ever be the
same again."
"The victims' daughter and her husband didn't eat dinner for
three days following the discovery of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein's
bodies. They cried together every day for four months, and she
still cries every day. She states that she doesn't sleep through a
single night, and thinks a part of her died too when her parents
were killed. She reports that she doesn't find much joy in
anything, and her powers of concentration aren't good. She feels as
if her brain is on overload. The victims' daughter relates that she
had to clean out her parents' house, and it took several weeks. She
saw the bloody carpet, knowing that her parents had been there, and
she felt like getting down on the rug and holding her mother. She
wonders how this could have happened to her family, because they're
just ordinary people. The victims' daughter reports that she had
become noticeably withdrawn and depressed at work, and is now
making an effort to be more outgoing. She notes that she is so
emotionally tired because she doesn't sleep at night, that she has
a tendency to fall asleep when she attends social events such as
dinner parties or the symphony. The victims' daughter states that,
wherever she goes, she sees and hears her parents. This happens
every day. She cannot look at kitchen knives without being
reminded
Page 482 U. S. 513
of the murders, and she is never away from it. She states that
she can't watch movies with bodies or stabbings in it. She can't
tolerate any reminder of violence. The victims' daughter relates
that she used to be very trusting, but is not any longer. When the
doorbell rings, she tells her husband not to answer it. She is very
suspicious of people, and was never that way before."
"The victims' daughter attended the defendant's trial and that
of the co-defendant, because she felt someone should be there to
represent her parents. She had never been told the exact details of
her parents' death, and had to listen to the medical examiner's
report. After a certain point, her mind blocked out and she stopped
hearing. She states that her parents were stabbed repeatedly with
viciousness, and she could never forgive anyone for killing them
that way. She can't believe that anybody could do that to someone.
The victims' daughter states that animals wouldn't do this. They
didn't have to kill, because there was no one to stop them from
looting. Her father would have given them anything. The murders
show the viciousness of the killers' anger. She doesn't feel that
the people who did this could ever be rehabilitated, and she
doesn't want them to be able to do this again, or put another
family through this. She feels that the lives of her family members
will never be the same again."
"The victims' granddaughter states that, unless you experience
something like this, you can't understand how it feels. You are in
a state of shock for several months, and then a terrible depression
sets in. You are so angry, and feel such rage. She states that she
only dwells on the image of their death when thinking of her
grandparents. For a time, she would become hysterical whenever she
saw dead animals on the road. She is not able to drive near her
grandparents' house, and will never be able to go into their
neighborhood again. The victims' granddaughter also has a tendency
to turn on all the lights in her house. She goes into a panic
if
Page 482 U. S. 514
her husband is late coming home from work. She used to be an
avid reader of murder mysteries, but will never be able to read
them again. She has to turn off the radio or T.V. when reports of
violence come on, because they hit too close to home. When she gets
a newspaper, she reads the comics and throws the rest away. She
states that it is the small everyday things that haunt her
constantly, and always will. She saw a counselor for several
months, but stopped because she felt that no one could help
her."
"The victims' granddaughter states that the whole thing has been
very hard on her sister, too. Her wedding anniversary will always
be bittersweet, and tainted by the memory of what happened to her
grandparents. This year on her anniversary, she and her husband
quietly went out of town. The victims' granddaughter finds that she
is unable to look at her sister's wedding pictures. She also has a
picture of her grandparents, but had to put it away because it was
too painful to look at it."
"The victims' family members note that the trials of the
suspects charged with these offenses have been delayed for over a
year, and the postponements have been very hard on the family
emotionally. The victims' son notes that he keeps seeing news
reports about his parents' murder which show their house and the
police removing their bodies. This is a constant reminder to him.
The family wants the whole thing to be over with, and they would
like to see swift and just punishment."
"As described by their family members, the Bronsteins were
loving parents and grandparents whose family was most important to
them. Their funeral was the largest in the history of the Levinson
Funeral Home, and the family received over one thousand sympathy
cards, some from total strangers. They attempted to answer each
card personally. The family states that Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein were
extremely good people who wouldn't hurt a fly. Because of their
loss, a terrible void has been put into their lives, and
Page 482 U. S. 515
every day is still a strain just to get through. It became
increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to the family
members that the murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein is still such a
shocking, painful, and devastating memory to them that it permeates
every aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful that they will
ever be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not be haunted
by the memory of the brutal manner in which their loved ones were
murdered and taken from them."
App. 59-64.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE O'CONNOR,
and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.
"[T]he decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate
sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to
humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of
death."
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153,
428 U. S. 184
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). The
affront to humanity of a brutal murder such as petitioner committed
is not limited to its impact on the victim or victims; a victim's
community is also injured, and in particular the victim's family
suffers shock and grief of a kind difficult even to imagine for
those who have not shared a similar loss. Maryland's legislature
has decided that the jury should have the testimony of the victim's
family in order to assist it in weighing the degree of harm that
the defendant has caused and the corresponding degree of punishment
that should be inflicted. This judgment is entitled to particular
deference; determinations of appropriate sentencing considerations
are "
peculiarly questions of legislative policy,'" id.
at 428 U. S. 176
(quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.
S. 386, 357 U. S. 393
(1958)), and the Court should recognize that, "`[i]n a democratic
society, legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to
the will, and consequently the moral values, of the people,'" 428
U.S. at 428 U. S. 175
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.
S. 238, 408 U. S. 383
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). I cannot agree that there was
anything "cruel or unusual" or otherwise
Page 482 U. S. 516
unconstitutional about the legislature's decision to use victim
impact statements in capital sentencing hearings.
The Court's judgment is based on the premises that the harm that
a murderer causes a victim's family does not in general reflect on
his blameworthiness, and that only evidence going to
blameworthiness is relevant to the capital sentencing decision.
Many if not most jurors, however, will look less favorably on a
capital defendant when they appreciate the full extent of the the
harm he caused, including the harm to the victim's family. There is
nothing aberrant in a juror's inclination to hold a murderer
accountable not only for his internal disposition in committing the
crime but also for the full extent of the harm he caused; many if
not most persons would also agree, for example, that someone who
drove his car recklessly through a stoplight and unintentionally
killed a pedestrian merits significantly more punishment than
someone who drove his car recklessly through the same stoplight at
a time when no pedestrian was there to be hit. I am confident that
the Court would not overturn a sentence for reckless homicide by
automobile merely because the punishment exceeded the maximum
sentence for reckless driving; and I would hope that the Court
would not overturn the sentence in such a case if a judge
mentioned, as relevant to his sentencing decision, the fact that
the victim was a mother or father. But if punishment can be
enhanced in noncapital cases on the basis of the harm caused,
irrespective of the offender's specific intention to cause such
harm, [
Footnote 2/1] I fail to
see
Page 482 U. S. 517
why the same approach is unconstitutional in death cases. If
anything, I would think that victim impact statements are
particularly appropriate evidence in capital sentencing hearings:
the State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating
evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in,
see, e.g.,
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104
(1982), by reminding the sentencer that, just as the murderer
should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society, and in
particular to his family.
The Court is
"troubled by the implication that defendants whose victims were
assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than
those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy,"
and declares that "our system of justice does not tolerate such
distinctions."
Ante at
482 U. S. 506,
n. 8. It is no doubt true that the State may not encourage the
sentencer to rely on a factor such as the victim's race in
determining whether the death penalty is appropriate.
Cf.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279
(1987). But I fail to see why the State cannot, if it chooses,
include as a sentencing consideration the particularized harm that
an individual's murder causes to the rest of society, [
Footnote 2/2] and in particular to his
family. To the extent that the Court is concerned that sentencing
juries might be moved by victim impact statements to rely on
impermissible factors such as the race of the victim, there is no
showing that the statements in this case encouraged this, nor
should we lightly presume such misconduct on the jury's part.
Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, supra.
The Court's reliance on the alleged arbitrariness that can
result from the differing ability of victims' families to
articulate
Page 482 U. S. 518
their sense of loss is a makeweight consideration: no two
prosecutors have exactly the same ability to present their
arguments to the jury; no two witnesses have exactly the same
ability to communicate the facts; but there is no requirement in
capital cases that the evidence and argument be reduced to the
lowest common denominator.
The supposed problems arising from a defendant's rebuttal of
victim impact statements are speculative, and unconnected to the
facts of this case. No doubt a capital defendant must be allowed to
introduce relevant evidence in rebuttal to a victim impact
statement, but Maryland has in no wise limited the right of
defendants in this regard. Petitioner introduced no such rebuttal
evidence, probably because he considered, wisely, that it was not
in his best interest to do so. [
Footnote 2/3] At bottom, the Court's view seems to be
that it is somehow unfair to confront a defendant with an account
of the loss his deliberate act has caused the victim's family and
society. I do not share that view, but even if I did, I would be
unwilling to impose it on States that see matters differently.
The Court's concern that the grief and anger of a victim's
family will "inflame the jury,"
ante at
482 U. S. 508,
is based in large part on its view that the loss which such
survivors suffer is irrelevant to the issue of punishment -- a view
with which I have already expressed my disagreement. To the extent
that the Court determines that, in this case, it was inappropriate
to allow the victims' family to express their opinions on, for
example, whether petitioner could be rehabilitated, that is
obviously not an inherent fault in all victim impact statements,
and no reason to declare the practice of admitting
Page 482 U. S. 519
such statements at capital sentencing hearings
per se
unconstitutional. I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Congress considers the effect of crime on its victims a relevant
sentencing consideration. Thus, presentence reports prepared
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2) must
include
"information concerning any harm, including financial, social,
psychological, and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any
victim of the offense. . . ."
This Court's cases also indicate that the harm caused by an
offense may be the basis for punishment even if the offender lacked
the specific intent to commit that harm.
See, e.g., United
States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671
(1975) (conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 111 for assaulting a federal
officer does not require proof that the defendant knew the victim's
status).
[
Footnote 2/2]
I doubt that the Court means to suggest that there is any
constitutional impediment, for example, to authorizing the death
sentence for the assassination of the President or Vice President,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1751, 1111, a Congressman, Cabinet
official, Supreme Court Justice, or the head of an executive
department, 18 U.S.C. § 351, or the murder of a policeman on active
duty,
see Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 413(d)(1) (1982).
[
Footnote 2/3]
The possibility that the jury would be distracted by rebuttal
evidence is purely hypothetical, since petitioner introduced no
such evidence. It is also unclear how distracting (as opposed to
offending) the jury would disadvantage the defendant, and why, if
there were some disadvantage to the defendant in pressing too hard
a rebuttal to a victim impact statement, he should be heard to
complain of the consequences of his tactical decisions.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The Court holds that, because death is a "
punishment
different from all other sanctions,'" ante at 482 U. S. 509,
n. 12 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.
S. 280, 428 U. S.
303-304 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, POWELL,
and STEVENS, JJ.)), considerations not relevant to "the defendant's
`personal responsibility and moral guilt'" cannot be taken into
account in deciding whether a defendant who is eligible for the
death penalty should receive it, ante at 482 U. S. 502
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.
S. 782, 458 U. S. 801
(1982)). It seems to me, however -- and, I think, to most of
mankind -- that the amount of harm one causes does bear upon the
extent of his "personal responsibility." We may take away the
license of a driver who goes 60 miles an hour on a residential
street, but we will put him in jail for manslaughter if, though his
moral guilt is no greater, he is unlucky enough to kill someone
during the escapade.
Nor, despite what the Court says today, do we depart from this
principle where capital punishment is concerned. The Court's
opinion does not explain why a defendant's
eligibility for
the death sentence can (
and always does) turn upon
considerations not relevant to his moral guilt. If a bank robber
aims his gun at a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target,
he may be put to death. If the gun unexpectedly misfires, he may
not. His moral guilt in both cases is identical, but his
responsibility in the former is greater. Less than two months ago,
we held that two brothers who planned and assisted in their
father's escape from prison could be sentenced to death because, in
the course of the escape, their father and an accomplice murdered a
married couple and two children.
Tison v. Arizona,
481 U. S. 137
(1987). Had their father allowed the victims to live, the brothers
could not be put to death; but because he decided to kill, the
brothers may.
Page 482 U. S. 520
The difference between life and death for these two defendants
was thus a matter "wholly unrelated to the[ir] blameworthiness."
Ante at
482 U. S. 504.
But it was related to their personal responsibility,
i.e.,
to the degree of harm that they had caused. In sum, the principle
upon which the Court's opinion rests -- that the imposition of
capital punishment is to be determined solely on the basis of moral
guilt -- does not exist, neither in the text of the Constitution,
nor in the historic practices of our society, nor even in the
opinions of this Court.
Recent years have seen an outpouring of popular concern for what
has come to be known as "victims' rights" -- a phrase that
describes what its proponents feel is the failure of courts of
justice to take into account in their sentencing decisions not only
the factors mitigating the defendant's moral guilt, but also the
amount of harm he has caused to innocent members of society. Many
citizens have found one-sided, and hence unjust, the criminal trial
in which a parade of witnesses comes forth to testify to the
pressures beyond normal human experience that drove the defendant
to commit his crime, with no one to lay before the sentencing
authority the full reality of human suffering the defendant has
produced -- which (and not moral guilt alone) is one of the reasons
society deems his act worthy of the prescribed penalty. Perhaps
these sentiments do not sufficiently temper justice with mercy, but
that is a question to be decided through the democratic processes
of a free people, and not by the decrees of this Court. There is
nothing in the Constitution that dictates the answer, no more in
the field of capital punishment than elsewhere.
To require, as we have, that all mitigating factors which render
capital punishment a harsh penalty in the particular case be placed
before the sentencing authority, while simultaneously requiring, as
we do today, that evidence of much of the human suffering the
defendant has inflicted be suppressed, is in effect to prescribe a
debate on the appropriateness of the capital penalty with one side
muted. If that penalty
Page 482 U. S. 521
is constitutional, as we have repeatedly said it is, it seems to
me not remotely unconstitutional to permit both the pros and the
cons in the particular case to be heard.