Section 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides that a participant or beneficiary may
bring a civil action to,
inter alia, recover benefits due
him under the terms of an employee benefit plan. Under 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a), any civil action brought in state court of which the
federal district courts have original jurisdiction may be removed
by the defendant to the appropriate federal district court.
Petitioner insurer underwrites an ERISA-covered plan set up by
petitioner employer to pay benefits to salaried employees disabled
by sickness or accident. After petitioners' doctors found that
respondent employee was fit to resume working, his plan benefits
were discontinued, his supplemental claim for benefits was denied,
and his employment was terminated when he refused to return to
work. He then filed suit in state court for reimplementation of his
benefits and for related common law contract and tort claims, but
petitioners removed the suit to federal court, alleging federal
question jurisdiction over the disability claim by virtue of ERISA
and pendent jurisdiction over the remaining claims. The District
Court found the case properly removable, and granted summary
judgment for petitioners on the merits. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed on the ground that the District Court lacked
removal jurisdiction, finding that the complaint purported to state
only state law causes of action, and that the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule, under which a cause of action "arises under"
federal law for jurisdictional purposes only when the plaintiff's
well-pleaded complaint raises federal law issues, did not allow
removal predicated on the basis that the state law claims were
subject to the federal defense of ERISA preemption. The court also
held that the doctrine of
Avco Corp. v. Machinists,
390 U. S. 557,
which permits the removal of cases purporting to state only state
law causes of action in labor cases preempted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), did not apply to this
case.
Page 481 U. S. 59
Held:
1. Under
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, ante p.
481 U. S. 41,
respondent's common law contract and tort claims are preempted by
ERISA, and this lawsuit falls directly under § 502(a)(1)(B), which
provides an exclusive federal cause of action for resolution of
suits by beneficiaries to recover benefits from a covered plan. Pp.
481 U. S.
62-63.
2. Common law causes of action filed in state court that are
preempted by ERISA and come within the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B) are
removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The
Avco doctrine applies in this situation to recharacterize
a state law complaint displaced by § 502(a)(1)(B) as an action
arising under federal law, even though the defense of ERISA
preemption does not appear on the face of the complaint, as is
normally required for removal by the "well-pleaded complaint" rule.
That Congress meant to so completely preempt this subject area that
any claim is necessarily federal in character is established by the
language of § 502's jurisdictional subsection (f), which closely
parallels that of § 301 of the LMRA, and statements in ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions' legislative history, which indicate
that § 502(a)(1)(B) suits should be regarded as "arising under"
federal law in the same manner as § 301 suits. Respondent's
contention that removal was improper because it was not "obvious"
when he filed suit that his common law action was both preempted
and displaced by ERISA is not persuasive, since the touchstone of
federal courts' removal jurisdiction is not the "obviousness" of
the preemption defense, but the intent of Congress. Pp.
481 U. S.
63-67.
763 F.2d 216, reversed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined,
post, p.
481 U. S.
67.
Page 481 U. S. 60
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, ante p.
481 U. S. 41, the
Court held that state common law causes of action asserting
improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee
benefit plan regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
et
seq., are preempted by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a). The
question presented by this litigation is whether these state common
law claims are not only preempted by ERISA, but also displaced by
ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B), [
Footnote 1] to
the extent that complaints filed in state courts purporting to
plead such state common law causes of action are removable to
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
I
General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation whose
principal place of business is in Michigan, has set up an employee
benefit plan subject to the provisions of ERISA for its salaried
employees. The plan pays benefits to salaried employees disabled by
sickness or accident, and is insured by the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company (Metropolitan).
General Motors employed Michigan resident Arthur Taylor as a
salaried employee from 1959-1980. In 1961, Taylor was involved in a
job-related automobile accident, and sustained a back injury.
Taylor filed a workers' compensation claim for this injury, and he
eventually returned to work. In May, 1980, while embroiled in a
divorce and child custody dispute, Taylor took a leave of absence
from his work on account of
Page 481 U. S. 61
severe emotional problems. Metropolitan began paying benefits
under General Motors' employee benefit plan, but asked Taylor to
submit to a psychiatric examination by a designated psychiatrist.
He did so, and the psychiatrist determined that Taylor was
emotionally unable to work. Six weeks later, after a followup
examination, however, Metropolitan's psychiatrist determined that
Taylor was now fit for work; Metropolitan stopped making payments
as of July 30, 1980.
Meanwhile, Taylor had filed a supplemental claim for benefits,
alleging that his back injuries disabled him from continuing his
work. Metropolitan again sent Taylor to be examined, this time by
an orthopedist. The physician found no orthopedic problems, and
Metropolitan subsequently denied the supplemental disability claim.
On October 31, General Motors requested that Taylor report to its
medical department for an examination. That examination took place
on November 5, and a General Motors physician concluded that Taylor
was not disabled. When Taylor nevertheless refused to return to
work, General Motors notified him that his employment had been
terminated.
Six months later, Taylor filed suit against General Motors and
Metropolitan in Michigan state court praying for judgment for
"compensatory damages for money contractually owed Plaintiff,
compensation for mental anguish caused by breach of this contract,
as well as immediate reimplementation of all benefits and insurance
coverages Plaintiff is entitled to,"
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-688, pp. 28a-29a. Taylor also
asserted claims for wrongful termination of his employment and for
wrongfully failing to promote him in retaliation for the 1961
worker's compensation claim.
Id. at 25a-26a. General
Motors and Metropolitan removed the suit to federal court, alleging
federal question jurisdiction over the disability benefits claim by
virtue of ERISA and pendent jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
Id. at 30a. The District Court found the case properly
removable, and granted
Page 481 U. S. 62
General Motors and Metropolitan summary judgment on the merits.
588 F.
Supp. 562 (ED Mich.1984).
The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the District
Court lacked removal jurisdiction. 763 F.2d 216 (CA6 1985). Noting
a split in authority on the question among the federal courts,
[
Footnote 2] the Court of
Appeals found that Taylor's complaint stated only state law causes
of action subject to the federal defense of ERISA preemption, and
that the "well-pleaded complaint" rule of
Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149
(1908), precluded removal on the basis of a federal defense. 763
F.2d at 219. The Court of Appeals further held that the established
doctrine permitting the removal of cases purporting to state only
state law causes of action in labor cases preempted by § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29
U.S.C. § 185, did not apply to this case. 763 F.2d at 220. We
granted certiorari, 475 U.S. 1009 (1986), and now reverse.
II
Under our decision in
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
ante p.
481 U. S. 41,
Taylor's common law contract and tort claims are preempted by
ERISA. This lawsuit "relate[s] to [an] employee benefit plan." §
514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). It is based upon common law of general
application that is not a law regulating insurance.
See Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, ante at
481 U. S. 48-51.
Accordingly, the suit is preempted by § 514(a), and is not saved by
§ 514(b)(2)(A).
Ante at
481 U. S. 48.
Moreover, as a suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from
Page 481 U. S. 63
a covered plan, it falls directly under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA,
which provides an exclusive federal cause of action for resolution
of such disputes.
Ante at
481 U. S.
56.
The century-old jurisdictional framework governing removal of
federal question cases from state into federal courts is described
in JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion for a unanimous Court in
Franchise
Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for
Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1 (1983).
By statute,
"any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending."
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). One category of cases over which the
district courts have original jurisdiction are "federal question"
cases; that is, those cases "arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It is
long-settled law that a cause of action arises under federal law
only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of
federal law.
Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.
S. 109 (1936);
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Mottley, supra. The "well-pleaded complaint rule" is the basic
principle marking the boundaries of the federal question
jurisdiction of the federal district courts.
Franchise Tax
Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern
Cal., supra, at 9-12.
Federal preemption is ordinarily a federal defense to the
plaintiff's suit. As a defense, it does not appear on the face of a
well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, does not authorize removal
to federal court.
Gully v. First National Bank, supra. One
corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule developed in the case
law, however, is that Congress may so completely preempt a
particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group
of claims is necessarily federal
Page 481 U. S. 64
in character. For 20 years, this Court has singled out claims
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA for such special treatment.
Avco
Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U. S. 557
(1968).
"The necessary ground of decision [in
Avco] was that
the preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace
entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization.' Any such suit is
purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that
state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of §
301."
Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., supra, at
463 U. S. 23
(footnote omitted).
There is no dispute in this litigation that Taylor's complaint,
although preempted by ERISA, purported to raise only state law
causes of action. The question therefore resolves itself into
whether or not the
Avco principle can be extended to
statutes other than the LMRA in order to recharacterize a state law
complaint displaced by § 502(a)(1)(B) as an action arising under
federal law. In
Franchise Tax Board, the Court held that
ERISA preemption, without more, does not convert a state claim into
an action arising under federal law.
Franchise Tax Board of
Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern
Cal., 463 U.S. at
463 U. S. 25-27.
The court suggested, however, that a state action that was not only
preempted by ERISA, but also came "within the scope of § 502(a) of
ERISA" might fall within the
Avco rule.
Id. at
463 U. S. 24-25.
The claim in this case, unlike the state tax collection suit in
Franchise Tax Board, is within the scope of § 502(a), and
we therefore must face the question specifically reserved by
Franchise Tax Board.
In the absence of explicit direction from Congress, this
question would be a close one. As we have made clear today in
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, ante at
481 U. S.
54,
"[t]he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would
be completely undermined if ERISA plan participants and
beneficiaries
Page 481 U. S. 65
were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress
rejected in ERISA."
Cf. Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. at
463 U. S. 25-26
("Unlike the contract rights at issue in
Avco, the State's
right to enforce its tax levies is not of central concern to the
federal statute"). Even with a provision such as § 502(a)(1)(B)
that lies at the heart of a statute with the unique preemptive
force of ERISA,
id. at
463 U. S. 24, n.
26, however, we would be reluctant to find that extraordinary
preemptive power, such as has been found with respect to § 301 of
the LMRA, that converts an ordinary state common law complaint into
one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded
complaint rule. But the language of the jurisdictional subsection
of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions closely parallels that of §
301 of the LMRA. Section 502(f) says:
"The district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction, without respect to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to grant the relief provided for in
subsection (a) of this section in any action."
29 U.S.C. § 1132(f).
Cf. § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C. § 185(a). The presumption that similar language in two labor
law statutes has a similar meaning is fully confirmed by the
legislative history of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. The
Conference Report on ERISA describing the civil enforcement
provisions of § 502(a) says:
"[W]ith respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under the
plan or to recover benefits under the plan which do not involve
application of the title I provisions, they may be brought not only
in U.S. district courts but also in State courts of competent
jurisdiction.
All such actions in Federal or State courts are
to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in
similar fashion to
Page 481 U. S. 66
those brought under section 501 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 327 (1974) (emphasis added). No
more specific reference to the
Avco rule can be expected,
and the rest of the legislative history consistently sets out this
clear intention to make § 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by
participants or beneficiaries federal questions for the purposes of
federal court jurisdiction in like manner as § 301 of the LMRA.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, ante at
481 U. S. 54-55.
For example, Senator Williams, a sponsor of ERISA, emphasized that
the civil enforcement section would enable participants and
beneficiaries to bring suit to recover benefits denied contrary to
the terms of the plan and that, when they did so,
"[i]t is intended that such actions will be regarded as arising
under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those
brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act."
120 Cong.Rec. 29933 (1974).
See also id. at 29942
(remarks of Sen. Javits) (federal substantive law to "deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and
pension plans").
Taylor argues strenuously that this action cannot be removed to
federal court, because it was not "obvious" at the time he filed
suit that his common law action was both preempted by § 514(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a), and also displaced by the civil enforcement
provisions of § 502(a).
See Brief for Respondent 14-21.
But the touchstone of the federal district court's removal
jurisdiction is not the "obviousness" of the preemption defense,
but the intent of Congress. Indeed, as we have noted, even an
"obvious" preemption defense does not, in most cases, create
removal jurisdiction. In this case, however, Congress has clearly
manifested an intent to make causes of action within the scope of
the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) removable to federal
court. Since we have found Taylor's cause of action to be within
the scope of § 502(a), we must honor that intent, whether
preemption was obvious or not at the time this suit was filed.
Page 481 U. S. 67
Accordingly, this suit, though it purports to raise only state
law claims, is necessarily federal in character by virtue of the
clearly manifested intent of Congress. It, therefore, "arise[s]
under the . . . laws . . . of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
and is removable to federal court by the defendants, 28 U.S.C. §
1441(b). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
* Together with No. 85-688,
General Motors Corp. v.
Taylor, also on certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides:
"A civil action may be brought -- "
"(1) by a participant or beneficiary -- "
"
* * * *"
"(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."
[
Footnote 2]
Compare Clorox Co. v. United States District Court, 779
F.2d 517, 521 (CA9 1985);
Roe v. General American Life Ins.
Co., 712 F.2d 450, 452 (CA10 1983);
Leonardis v. Local 282
Pension Trust Fund, 391 F.
Supp. 554, 556-557 (EDNY 1975);
Tolson v. Retirement
Committee of the Briggs & Stratton Retirement
Plan, 566 F.
Supp. 1503, 1504 (ED Wis.1983) (all finding removal
jurisdiction),
with Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 763
F.2d 216, 219-220 (CA6 1985);
Powers v. South Central United
Food & Commercial Workers Unions, 719 F.2d 760, 763-767
(CA5 1983) (no removal jurisdiction).
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
concurring.
I write separately only to note that today's holding is a narrow
one. The Court rejects the position, urged by respondent, that
removal jurisdiction exists only when the complaint states a claim
that is "obviously" preempted by state law -- that is, when a
federal statute has obviously preempted state law, or when a
decision of this Court has construed an ambiguous federal statute
to preempt state law. The Court instead focuses on the "intent of
Congress,"
ante at
481 U. S. 66, to
make respondent's cause of action removable to federal court. This
intent to preempt became effective when ERISA became law.
Consequently, although preemption was not obvious under
respondent's standard at the time of removal,* the District Court
did in fact have jurisdiction over respondent's preempted
claim.
While I join the Court's opinion, I note that our decision
should not be interpreted as adopting a broad rule that any defense
premised on congressional intent to preempt state law is sufficient
to establish removal jurisdiction. The Court holds only that
removal jurisdiction exists when, as here,
Page 481 U. S. 68
"Congress has
clearly manifested an intent to make
causes of action . . .
removable to federal court."
Ibid. (emphasis added). In future cases involving other
statutes, the prudent course for a federal court that does not find
a
clear congressional intent to create removal
jurisdiction will be to remand the case to state court.
* In the understated words of a prior case which this Court
repeats today, the preemption provisions of ERISA "
perhaps are
not a model of legislative drafting,'" Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, ante at 481 U. S. 46,
quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U. S. 724,
471 U. S. 739
(1985). Accordingly, before today's decision in Pilot
Life, the answer to the question whether ERISA preempted state
claims of the sort at issue here was not obvious.