Appellee Indian Tribes (the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission
Indians) occupy reservations in Riverside County, Cal. Each Band,
pursuant to its federally approved ordinance, conducts on its
reservation bingo games that are open to the public. The Cabazon
Band also operates a card club for playing draw poker and other
card games. The gambling games are open to the public, and are
played predominantly by non-Indians coming onto the reservations.
California sought to apply to the Tribes its statute governing the
operation of bingo games. Riverside County also sought to apply its
ordinance regulating bingo, as well as its ordinance prohibiting
the playing of draw poker and other card games. The Tribes
instituted an action for declaratory relief in Federal District
Court, which entered summary judgment for the Tribes, holding that
neither the State nor the county had any authority to enforce its
gambling laws within the reservations. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held:
1. Although state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their
reservations if Congress has expressly consented, Congress has not
done so here either by Pub. L. 280 or by the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 (OCCA). Pp.
480 U. S.
207-214.
(a) In Pub.L. 280, the primary concern of which was combating
lawlessness on reservations, California was granted broad criminal
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians within
all Indian country within the State but more limited, nonregulatory
civil jurisdiction. When a State seeks to enforce a law within an
Indian reservation under the authority of Pub.L. 280, it must be
determined whether the state law is criminal in nature, and thus
fully applicable to the reservation, or civil in nature and
applicable only as it may be relevant to private civil litigation
in state court. There is a fair basis for the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that California's statutes which permits bingo games to
be conducted only by certain types of organizations under certain
restrictions, is not a "criminal/prohibitory" statute falling
within Pub.L. 280's grant of criminal jurisdiction, but instead is
a "civil/regulatory" statute not authorized by Pub.L. 280 to be
enforced on Indian reservations. That an otherwise regulatory law
is enforceable (as here) by
Page 480 U. S. 203
criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily convert it
into a criminal law within Pub.L. 280's meaning.
(b) Enforcement of OCCA, which makes certain violations of state
and local gambling laws violations of federal criminal law, is an
exercise of federal, rather than state, authority. There is nothing
in OCCA indicating that the States are to have any part in
enforcing the federal laws or are authorized to make arrests on
Indian reservations that, in the absence of OCCA, they could not
effect. California may not make arrests on reservations and thus,
through OCCA, enforce its gambling laws against Indian tribes. Pp.
480 U. S.
207-212.
2. Even though not expressly authorized by Congress, state and
local laws may be applied to on-reservation activities of tribes
and tribal members under certain circumstances. The decision in
this case turns on whether state authority is preempted by the
operation of federal law. State jurisdiction is preempted if it
interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. The federal
interests in Indian self-government, including the goal of
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development, are
important, and federal agencies, acting under federal laws, have
sought to implement them by promoting and overseeing tribal bingo
and gambling enterprises. Such policies and actions are of
particular relevance in this case, since the tribal games provide
the sole source of revenues for the operation of the tribal
governments, and are the major sources of employment for tribal
members. To the extent that the State seeks to prevent all bingo
games on tribal lands while permitting regulated off-reservation
games, the asserted state interest in preventing the infiltration
of the tribal games by organized crime is irrelevant, and the state
and county laws are preempted. Even to the extent that the State
and county seek to regulate short of prohibition, the laws are
preempted, since the asserted state interest is not sufficient to
escape the preemptive force of the federal and tribal interests
apparent in this case. Pp.
480 U. S. 214-222.
783 F.2d 900, affirmed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR
and SCALIA, JJ., joined,
post, p.
480 U. S.
222.
Page 480 U. S. 204
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians, federally
recognized Indian Tribes, occupy reservations in Riverside County,
California. [
Footnote 1] Each
Band, pursuant to an
Page 480 U. S. 205
ordinance approved by the Secretary of the Interior, conducts
bingo games on its reservation. [
Footnote 2] The Cabazon Band has also opened a card club
at which draw poker and other card games are played. The games are
open to the public, and are played predominantly by non-Indians
coming onto the reservations. The games are a major source of
employment for tribal members, and the profits are the Tribes' sole
source of income. The State of California seeks to apply to the two
Tribes Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987). That statute
does not entirely prohibit the playing of bingo, but permits it
when the games are operated and staffed by members of designated
charitable organizations, who may not be paid for their services.
Profits must be kept in special accounts and used only for
charitable purposes; prizes may not exceed $250 per game. Asserting
that the bingo games on the two reservations violated each of these
restrictions, California insisted that the Tribes comply with state
law. [
Footnote 3] Riverside
Page 480 U. S. 206
County also sought to apply its local Ordinance No. 558,
regulating bingo, as well as its Ordinance No. 331, prohibiting the
playing of draw poker and the other card games.
The Tribes sued the county in Federal District Court, seeking a
declaratory judgment that the county had no authority to apply its
ordinances inside the reservations and an injunction against their
enforcement. The State intervened, the facts were stipulated, and
the District Court granted the Tribes' motion for summary judgment,
holding that neither the State nor the county had any authority to
enforce its gambling laws within the reservations. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 783 F.2d 900 (1986), the
State and the county appealed, and we postponed jurisdiction to the
hearing on the merits. 476 U.S. 1168. [
Footnote 4]
Page 480 U. S. 207
I
The Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain
"attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory,"
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.
S. 544,
419 U. S. 557
(1975), and that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and
subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States,"
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U. S. 134,
447 U. S. 154
(1980). It is clear, however, that state laws may be applied to
tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly so
provided. Here, the State insists that Congress has twice given its
express consent: first in Pub.L. 280 in 1953, 67 Stat. 588,
as
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 ed. and
Supp. III), and second in the Organized Crime Control Act in 1970,
84 Stat. 937, 18 U.S.C. § 1955. We disagree in both respects.
In Pub.L. 280, Congress expressly granted six States, including
California, jurisdiction over specified areas of Indian country
[
Footnote 5] within the States
and provided for the assumption of jurisdiction by other States. In
§ 2, California was granted broad criminal jurisdiction over
offenses committed by or against Indians within all Indian country
within the State. [
Footnote 6]
Section 4's grant of civil jurisdiction was more limited. [
Footnote 7]
Page 480 U. S. 208
In
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.
S. 373 (1976), we interpreted § 4 to grant States
jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation
Indians in state court, but not to grant general civil regulatory
authority.
Id. at
426 U. S. 385,
426 U. S.
388-390. We held, therefore, that Minnesota could not
apply its personal property tax within the reservation. Congress'
primary concern in enacting Pub.L. 280 was combating lawlessness on
reservations.
Id. at
426 U. S.
379-380. The Act plainly was not intended to effect
total assimilation of Indian tribes into mainstream American
society.
Id. at
426 U. S. 387.
We recognized that a grant to States of general civil regulatory
power over Indian reservations would result in the destruction of
tribal institutions and values. Accordingly, when a State seeks to
enforce a law within an Indian reservation under the authority of
Pub.L. 280, it must be determined whether the law is criminal in
nature, and thus fully applicable to the reservation under § 2, or
civil in nature, and applicable only as it may be relevant to
private civil litigation in state court.
The Minnesota personal property tax at issue in
Bryan
was unquestionably civil in nature. The California bingo statute is
not so easily categorized. California law permits bingo
Page 480 U. S. 209
games to be conducted only by charitable and other specified
organizations, and then only by their members who may not receive
any wage or profit for doing so; prizes are limited and receipts
are to be segregated and used only for charitable purposes.
Violation of any of these provisions is a misdemeanor. California
insists that these are criminal laws which Pub.L. 280 permits it to
enforce on the reservations.
Following its earlier decision in
Barona Group of Capitan
Grande Band of Mission Indians, San Diego County, Cal. v.
Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S.
929 (1983), which also involved the applicability of § 326.5 of the
California Penal Code to Indian reservations, the Court of Appeals
rejected this submission. 783 F.2d at 901-903. In
Barona,
applying what it thought to be the civil/criminal dichotomy drawn
in
Bryan v. Itasca County, the Court of Appeals drew a
distinction between state "criminal/prohibitory" laws and state
"civil/regulatory" laws: if the intent of a state law is generally
to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub.L. 280's grant of
criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the
conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as
civil/regulatory, and Pub.L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement
on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is whether the conduct
at issue violates the State's public policy. Inquiring into the
nature of § 326.5, the Court of Appeals held that it was
regulatory, rather than prohibitory. [
Footnote 8] This was the analysis employed, with similar
results,
Page 480 U. S. 210
by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982), which the Ninth
Circuit found persuasive. [
Footnote
9]
We are persuaded that the prohibitory/regulatory distinction is
consistent with
Bryan's construction of Pub.L. 280. It is
not a bright-line rule, however; and, as the Ninth Circuit itself
observed, an argument of some weight may be made that the bingo
statute is prohibitory, rather than regulatory. But in the present
case, the court reexamined the state law and reaffirmed its holding
in
Barona, and we are reluctant to disagree with that
court's view of the nature and intent of the state law at issue
here.
There is surely a fair basis for its conclusion. California does
not prohibit all forms of gambling. California itself operates a
state lottery, Cal.Govt.Code Ann. § 8880
et seq. (West
Supp.1987), and daily encourages its citizens to participate in
this state-run gambling. California also permits parimutuel
horse-race betting. Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code Ann. §§ 19400-19667
(West 1964 and Supp. 1987). Although certain enumerated gambling
games are prohibited under Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 330 (West
Supp.1987), games not enumerated, including the card games played
in the Cabazon card club, are permissible. The Tribes assert that
more than 400 card rooms similar to the Cabazon card club flourish
in California, and the State does not dispute this fact. Brief
for
Page 480 U. S. 211
Appellees 47-48. Also, as the Court of Appeals noted, bingo is
legally sponsored by many different organizations, and is widely
played in California. There is no effort to forbid the playing of
bingo by any member of the public over the age of 18. Indeed, the
permitted bingo games must be open to the general public. Nor is
there any limit on the number of games which eligible organizations
may operate, the receipts which they may obtain from the games, the
number of games which a participant may play, or the amount of
money which a participant may spend, either per game or in total.
In light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount
of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes
gambling through its state lottery, we must conclude that
California regulates, rather than prohibits, gambling in general
and bingo in particular. [
Footnote 10]
California argues, however, that high-stakes, unregulated bingo,
the conduct which attracts organized crime, is a misdemeanor in
California, and may be prohibited on Indian reservations. But that
an otherwise regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as well as
civil means does not necessarily convert it into a criminal law
within the meaning of Pub.L. 280. Otherwise, the distinction
between § 2 and § 4 of that law could easily be avoided, and total
assimilation permitted.
Page 480 U. S. 212
This view, adopted here and by the Fifth Circuit in the
Butterworth case, we find persuasive. Accordingly, we
conclude that Pub.L. 280 does not authorize California to enforce
Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987) within the Cabazon
and Morongo Reservations. [
Footnote 11]
California and Riverside County also argue that the Organized
Crime Control Act (OCCA) authorizes the application of their
gambling laws to the tribal bingo enterprises. The OCCA makes
certain violations of state and local gambling laws violations of
federal law. [
Footnote 12]
The Court of Appeals rejected
Page 480 U. S. 213
appellants' argument, relying on its earlier decisions in
United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (CA9 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981), and
Barona Group
of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians, San Diego County, Cal.
v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (1982). 783 F.2d at 903. The court
explained that whether a tribal activity is "a violation of the law
of a state" within the meaning of OCCA depends on whether it
violates the "public policy" of the State, the same test for
application of state law under Pub.L. 280, and similarly concluded
that bingo is not contrary to the public policy of California.
[
Footnote 13]
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has rejected this
view.
United States v. Dakota, 796 F.2d 186 (1986).
[
Footnote 14] Since the OCCA
standard is simply whether the gambling business is being operated
in "violation of the law of a State," there is no basis for the
regulatory/prohibitory distinction that it agreed is suitable in
construing and applying Pub.L. 280. 796 F.2d at 188. And because
enforcement of OCCA is an exercise of federal, rather than state,
authority, there is no danger of state encroachment on Indian
tribal sovereignty.
Ibid. This latter observation exposes
the flaw in appellants' reliance on OCCA. That enactment is indeed
a federal law that, among other things, defines certain federal
crimes over which the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 15] There is
nothing in OCCA indicating that the States
Page 480 U. S. 214
are to have any part in enforcing federal criminal laws or are
authorized to make arrests on Indian reservations that, in the
absence of OCCA, they could not effect. We are not informed of any
federal efforts to employ OCCA to prosecute the playing of bingo on
Indian reservations, although there are more than 100 such
enterprises currently in operation, many of which have been in
existence for several years, for the most part with the
encouragement of the Federal Government. [
Footnote 16] Whether or not, then, the Sixth Circuit
is right and the Ninth Circuit wrong about the coverage of OCCA, a
matter that we do not decide, there is no warrant for California to
make arrests on reservations, and thus, through OCCA, enforce its
gambling laws against Indian tribes.
II
Because the state and county laws at issue here are imposed
directly on the Tribes that operate the games, and are not
expressly permitted by Congress, the Tribes argue that the judgment
below should be affirmed without more. They rely on the statement
in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.
S. 164,
411 U. S.
170-171 (1973), that
"'[s]tate laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on
an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided
that State laws shall apply'"
(quoting United States Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law
845 (1958)). Our cases, however, have not established an inflexible
per se rule precluding
Page 480 U. S. 215
state jurisdiction over tribes and tribal members in the absence
of express congressional consent. [
Footnote 17]
"[U]nder certain circumstances, a State may validly assert
authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation, and .
. . in exceptional circumstances, a State may assert jurisdiction
over the on-reservation activities of tribal members."
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.
S. 324,
462 U. S.
331-332 (1983) (footnotes omitted). Both
Moe v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.
S. 463 (1976), and
Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.
S. 134 (1980), are illustrative. In those decisions, we
held that, in the absence of express congressional permission, a
State could require tribal smokeshops on Indian reservations to
collect state sales tax from their non-Indian
Page 480 U. S. 216
customers. Both cases involved nonmembers entering and
purchasing tobacco products on the reservations involved. The
State's interest in assuring the collection of sales taxes from
non-Indians enjoying the off-reservation services of the State was
sufficient to warrant the minimal burden imposed on the tribal
smokeshop operators. [
Footnote
18]
This case also involves a state burden on tribal Indians in the
context of their dealings with non-Indians, since the question is
whether the State may prevent the Tribes from making available high
stakes bingo games to non-Indians coming from outside the
reservations. Decision in this case turns on whether state
authority is preempted by the operation of federal law; and
"[s]tate jurisdiction is preempted . . . if it interferes or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal
law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify
the assertion of state authority."
Mescalero, 462 U.S. at
462 U. S. 333,
462 U. S. 334.
The inquiry is to proceed in light of traditional notions of Indian
sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-government,
including its "overriding goal" of encouraging tribal
self-sufficiency and economic development.
Id. at
462 U. S.
334-335. [
Footnote
19]
See also
Page 480 U. S. 217
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, ante, p.
480 U. S. 9;
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.
S. 136,
448 U. S. 143
(1980).
These are important federal interests. They were reaffirmed by
the President's 1983 Statement on Indian Policy. [
Footnote 20] More specifically, the
Department of the Interior, which has the primary responsibility
for carrying out the Federal Government's trust obligations to
Indian tribes, has sought to implement these policies by promoting
tribal bingo enterprises. [
Footnote 21] Under the Indian Financing Act of 1974,
25
Page 480 U. S. 218
U.S.C. § 1451
et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), the
Secretary of the Interior has made grants and has guaranteed loans
for the purpose of constructing bingo facilities.
See
S.Rep. No. 99-493, p. 5 (1986);
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v.
McGuigan, 626 F.
Supp. 245, 246 (Conn.1986). The Department of Housing and Urban
Development and the Department of Health and Human Services have
also provided financial assistance to develop tribal gaming
enterprises.
See S.Rep. No. 99-493,
supra, at 5.
Here, the Secretary of the Interior has approved tribal ordinances
establishing and regulating the gaming activities involved.
See H.R.Rep. No. 99-488, p. 10 (1986). The Secretary has
also exercised his authority to review tribal bingo management
contracts under 25 U.S.C. § 81, and has issued detailed guidelines
governing that review. [
Footnote
22] App. to Motion to Dismiss Appeal or Affirm Judgment
63a-70a.
These policies and actions, which demonstrate the Government's
approval and active promotion of tribal bingo enterprises, are of
particular relevance in this case. The Cabazon and Morongo
Reservations contain no natural resources which can be exploited.
The tribal games at present provide the sole source of revenues for
the operation of the tribal governments
Page 480 U. S. 219
and the provision of tribal services. They are also the major
sources of employment on the reservations. Self-determination and
economic development are not within reach if the Tribes cannot
raise revenues and provide employment for their members. The
Tribes' interests obviously parallel the federal interests.
California seeks to diminish the weight of these seemingly
important tribal interests by asserting that the Tribes are merely
marketing an exemption from state gambling laws. In
Washington
v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. at
447 U. S. 155,
we held that the State could tax cigarettes sold by tribal
smokeshops to non-Indians, even though it would eliminate their
competitive advantage and substantially reduce revenues used to
provide tribal services, because the Tribes had no right "to market
an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do
their business elsewhere." We stated that
"[i]t is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the
smokeshops to persons coming from outside is not generated on the
reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant
interest."
Ibid. Here, however, the Tribes are not merely
importing a product onto the reservations for immediate resale to
non-Indians. They have built modern facilities which provide
recreational opportunities and ancillary services to their patrons,
who do not simply drive onto the reservations, make purchases and
depart, but spend extended periods of time there enJoying the
services the Tribes provide. The Tribes have a strong incentive to
provide comfortable, clean, and attractive facilities and well run
games in order to increase attendance at the games. [
Footnote 23] The tribal bingo enterprises
are
Page 480 U. S. 220
similar to the resort complex, featuring hunting and fishing,
that the Mescalero Apache Tribe operates on its reservation through
the "concerted and sustained" management of reservation land and
wildlife resources.
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
462 U.S. at
462 U. S. 341.
The Mescalero project generates funds for essential tribal services
and provides employment for tribal members. We there rejected the
notion that the Tribe is merely marketing an exemption from state
hunting and fishing regulations, and concluded that New Mexico
could not regulate on-reservation fishing and hunting by
non-Indians.
Ibid. Similarly, the Cabazon and Morongo
Bands are generating value on the reservations through activities
in which they have a substantial interest.
The State also relies on
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.
S. 713 (1983), in which we held that California could
require a tribal member and a federally licensed Indian trader
operating a general store on a reservation to obtain a state
license in order to sell liquor for off-premises consumption. But
our decision there rested on the grounds that Congress had never
recognized any sovereign tribal interest in regulating liquor
traffic, and that Congress, historically, had plainly anticipated
that the States would exercise concurrent authority to regulate the
use and distribution of liquor on Indian reservations. There is no
such traditional federal view governing the outcome of this case,
since, as we have explained, the current federal policy is to
promote precisely what California seeks to prevent.
The sole interest asserted by the State to justify the
imposition of its bingo laws on the Tribes is in preventing the
infiltration of the tribal games by organized crime. To the extent
that the State seeks to prevent any and all bingo
Page 480 U. S. 221
games from being played on tribal lands while permitting
regulated, off-reservation games, this asserted interest is
irrelevant, and the state and county laws are preempted.
See n 3,
supra. Even to the extent that the State and county seek
to regulate short of prohibition, the laws are preempted. The State
insists that the high stakes offered at tribal games are attractive
to organized crime, whereas the controlled games authorized under
California law are not. This is surely a legitimate concern, but we
are unconvinced that it is sufficient to escape the preemptive
force of federal and tribal interests apparent in this case.
California does not allege any present criminal involvement in the
Cabazon and Morongo enterprises, and the Ninth Circuit discerned
none. 783 F.2d at 904. An official of the Department of Justice has
expressed some concern about tribal bingo operations, [
Footnote 24] but, far from any
action being taken evidencing this concern -- and surely the
Federal Government has the authority to forbid Indian gambling
enterprises -- the prevailing federal policy continues to support
these tribal enterprises, including those of the Tribes involved in
this case. [
Footnote 25]
We conclude that the State's interest in preventing the
infiltration of the tribal bingo enterprises by organized crime
does not justify state regulation of the tribal bingo
enterprises
Page 480 U. S. 222
in light of the compelling federal and tribal interests
supporting them. State regulation would impermissibly infringe on
tribal government, and this conclusion applies equally to the
county's attempted regulation of the Cabazon card club. We
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The Cabazon Reservation was originally set apart for the
"permanent use and occupancy" of the Cabazon Indians by Executive
Order of May 15, 1876. The Morongo Reservation also was first
established by Executive Order. In 1891, in the Mission Indian
Relief Act, 26 Stat. 712, Congress declared reservations "for the
sole use and benefit" of the Cabazon and Morongo Bands. The United
States holds the land in trust for the Tribes. The governing bodies
of both Tribes have been recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior. The Cabazon Band has 25 enrolled members and the Morongo
Band has approximately 730 enrolled members.
[
Footnote 2]
The Cabazon ordinance authorizes the Band to sponsor bingo games
within the reservation "[i]n order to promote economic development
of the Cabazon Indian Reservation and to generate tribal revenues,"
and provides that net revenues from the games shall be kept in a
separate fund to be used "for the purpose of promoting the health,
education, welfare and wellbeing of the Cabazon Indian Reservation
and for other tribal purposes." App. to Brief for Appellees 1b-3b.
The ordinance further provides that no one other than the Band is
authorized to sponsor a bingo game within the reservation, and that
the games shall be open to the public, except that no one under 18
years old may play. The Morongo ordinance similarly authorizes the
establishment of a tribal bingo enterprise and dedicates revenues
to programs to promote the health, education, and general welfare
of tribal members.
Id. at 1a-6a. It additionally provides
that the games may be conducted at any time, but must be conducted
at least three days per week, that there shall be no prize limit
for any single game or session, that no person under 18 years old
shall be allowed to play, and that all employees shall wear
identification.
[
Footnote 3]
The Tribes admit that their games violate the provision
governing staffing and the provision setting a limit on jackpots.
They dispute the State's assertion that they do not maintain
separate funds for the bingo operations. At oral argument, counsel
for the State asserted, contrary to the position taken in the
merits brief and contrary to the stipulated facts in this case,
App. 65, � 24, 82-83, � 15, that the Tribes are among the
charitable organizations authorized to sponsor bingo games under
the statute. It is therefore unclear whether the State intends to
put the tribal bingo enterprises out of business, or only to impose
on them the staffing, jackpot limit, and separate fund
requirements. The tribal bingo enterprises are apparently
consistent with other provisions of the statute: minors are not
allowed to participate, the games are conducted in buildings owned
by the Tribes on tribal property, the games are open to the public,
and persons must be physically present to participate.
[
Footnote 4]
The Court of Appeals
"affirm[ed] the summary judgment and the permanent injunction
restraining the County and the State from applying their gambling
laws on the reservations."
783 F.2d at 906. The judgment of the District Court declared
that the state statute and county ordinance were of no force and
effect within the two reservations, that the State and the county
were without jurisdiction to enforce them, and that they were
therefore enjoined from doing so. Since it is now sufficiently
clear that the state and county laws at issue were held, as applied
to the gambling activities on the two reservations, to be "invalid
as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), the case is
within our appellate jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 5]
"Indian country," as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151, includes
"all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation."
This definition applies to questions of both criminal and civil
jurisdiction.
DeCoteau v. District County Court,
420 U. S. 425,
420 U. S. 427,
n. 2 (1975). The Cabazon and Morongo Reservations are thus Indian
country.
[
Footnote 6]
Section 2(a),
codified at 18 U.S.C. §, 1162(a),
provides:
"Each of the States . . . listed in the following table shall
have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in
the areas of Indian country listed . . . to the same extent that
such State . . . has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere
within the State . . and the criminal laws of such State . . .
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as
they have elsewhere within the State . . . :"
"
* * * *"
"California . . . . . . . . . All Indian country within the
State."
[
Footnote 7]
Section 4(a), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982 ed. and
Supp. III) provides:
"Each of the States listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to
which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian
country listed . . . to the same extent that such State has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil
laws of such State that are of general application to private
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the
State:"
"
* * * *"
"California . . . . . . . . . All Indian country within the
State."
[
Footnote 8]
The Court of Appeals questioned whether we indicated disapproval
of the prohibitory/regulatory distinction in
Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U. S. 713
(1983). We did not. We rejected in that case an asserted
distinction between state "substantive" law and state "regulatory"
law in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1161, which provides that certain
federal statutory provisions prohibiting the sale and possession of
liquor within Indian country do not apply
"provided such act or transaction is in conformity both with the
laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with
an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over
such area of Indian country. . . ."
We noted that nothing in the text or legislative history of §
1161 supported the asserted distinction, and then contrasted that
statute with Pub.L. 280.
"In the absence of a context that might possibly require it, we
are reluctant to make such a distinction.
Cf. Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U. S. 373,
426 U. S.
390 (1976) (grant of civil jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. §
1360 does not include regulatory jurisdiction to tax in light of
tradition of immunity from taxation)."
463 U.S. at
463 U. S. 734,
n. 18.
[
Footnote 9]
Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth was an action by the
Seminole Tribe for a declaratory judgment that the Florida bingo
statute did not apply to its operation of a bingo hall on its
reservation.
See also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v.
McGuigan, 626 F.
Supp. 245 (Conn.1986);
Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin
v. Wisconsin, 518 F.
Supp. 712 (WD Wis. 1981).
[
Footnote 10]
Nothing in this opinion suggests that cockfighting, tattoo
parlors, nude dancing, and prostitution are permissible on Indian
reservations within California.
See post at
480 U. S. 222.
The applicable state laws governing an activity must be examined in
detail before they can be characterized as regulatory or
prohibitory. The lower courts have not demonstrated an inability to
identify prohibitory laws. For example, in
United States v.
Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1363-1365 (CA9 1977), the Court of
Appeals adopted and applied the prohibitory/regulatory distinction
in determining whether a state law governing the possession of
fireworks was made applicable to Indian reservations by the
Assimilative Crimes Statute, 62 Stat. 686, 18 U.S.C. § 13. The
court concluded that, despite limited exceptions to the statute's
prohibition, the fireworks law was prohibitory in nature.
See
also United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (CA9 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981), discussed in n. 13,
infra.
[
Footnote 11]
Nor does Pub.L. 280 authorize the county to apply its gambling
ordinances to the reservations. We note initially that it is
doubtful that Pub.L. 280 authorizes the application of any local
laws to Indian reservations. Section 2 of Pub.L. 280 provides that
the criminal laws of the "State" shall have the same force and
effect within Indian country as they have elsewhere. This language
seems clearly to exclude local laws. We need not decide this issue,
however, because, even if Pub.L. 280 does make local
criminal/prohibitory laws applicable on Indian reservations, the
ordinances in question here do not apply. Consistent with our
analysis of Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987) above, we
conclude that Ordinance No. 558, the bingo ordinance, is regulatory
in nature. Although Ordinance No. 331 prohibits gambling on all
card games, including the games played in the Cabazon card club,
the county does not prohibit municipalities within the county from
enacting municipal ordinances permitting these card games, and two
municipalities have in fact done so. It is clear, therefore, that
Ordinance No. 331 does not prohibit these card games for purposes
of Pub.L. 280.
[
Footnote 12]
OCCA, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs,
or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined
not more that $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both."
"(b) As used in this section -- "
"(1) 'illegal gambling business' means a gambling business which
-- "
"(i) is a
violation of the law of a State or political
subdivision in which it is conducted;"
"(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance,
manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business;
and"
"(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation
for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of
$2,000 in any single day."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 13]
In
Farris, in contrast, the court had concluded that a
gambling business, featuring blackjack, poker, and dice, operated
by tribal members on the Puyallup Reservation violated the public
policy of Washington; the United States, therefore, could enforce
OCCA against the Indians.
[
Footnote 14]
In
Dakota, the United States sought a declaratory
judgment that a gambling business, also featuring the playing of
blackjack, poker, and dice, operated by two members of the Keweenaw
Bay Indian Community on land controlled by the community, and under
a license issued by the community, violated OCCA. The Court of
Appeals held that the gambling business violated Michigan law and
OCCA.
[
Footnote 15]
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides:
"The district courts of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all
offenses against the laws of the United States."
[
Footnote 16]
See S.Rep. No. 99-493, p. 2 (1986). Federal law
enforcement officers have the capability to respond to violations
of OCCA on Indian reservations, as is apparent from
Farris
and
Dakota. This is not a situation where the
unavailability of a federal officer at a particular moment would
likely result in nonenforcement. OCCA is directed at large-scale
gambling enterprises. If state officers discover a gambling
business unknown to federal authorities while performing their
duties authorized by Pub.L. 280, there should be ample time for
them to inform federal authorities, who would then determine
whether investigation or other enforcement action was appropriate.
A federal police officer is assigned by the Department of the
Interior to patrol the Indian reservations in southern California.
App. to Brief for Appellees D-1-D-7.
[
Footnote 17]
In the special area of state taxation of Indian tribes and
tribal members, we have adopted a
per se rule. In
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.
S. 759 (1985), we held that Montana could not tax the
Tribe's royalty interests in oil and gas leases issued to
non-Indian lessees under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938. We
stated:
"In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian affairs,
Congress can authorize the imposition of state taxes on Indian
tribes and individual Indians. It has not done so often, and the
Court consistently has held that it will find the Indians'
exemption from state taxes lifted only when Congress has made its
intention to do so unmistakably clear."
Id. at
471 U. S. 765.
We have repeatedly addressed the issue of state taxation of tribes
and tribal members and the state, federal, and tribal interests
which it implicates. We have recognized that the federal tradition
of Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong, and that the
state interest in taxation is correspondingly weak. Accordingly, it
is unnecessary to rebalance these interests in every case. In
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.
S. 145,
411 U. S. 148
(1973), we distinguished state taxation from other assertions of
state jurisdiction. We acknowledged that we had made repeated
statements
"to the effect that, even on reservations, state laws may be
applied unless such application would interfere with reservation
self-government or would impair a right granted or reserved by
federal law. . . . Even so,
in the special area of state
taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal
statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority
for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from
activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation, and
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, [
411 U.S.
164 (1973)], lays to rest any doubt in this respect by holding
that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional
consent."
Ibid. (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 18]
JUSTICE STEVENS appears to embrace the opposite presumption --
that state laws apply on Indian reservations absent an express
congressional statement to the contrary. But, as we stated in
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.
S. 136,
448 U. S. 151
(1980), in the context of an assertion of state authority over the
activities of non-Indians within a reservation, "[t]hat is simply
not the law." It is even less correct when applied to the
activities of tribes and tribal members within reservations.
[
Footnote 19]
In
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at
462 U. S. 335,
n. 17, we discussed a number of the statutes Congress enacted to
promote tribal self-government. The congressional declarations of
policy in the Indian Financing Act of 1974,
as amended, 25
U.S.C. § 1451
et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), and in the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,
as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 450
et seq. (1982 ed. and
Supp. III), are particularly significant in this case:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress . . . to
help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human,
to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for
the utilization and management of their own resources and where
they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive
efforts comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring
communities."
25 U.S.C. § 1451. Similarly,
"[t]he Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of
the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with
and responsibility to the Indian people through the establishment
of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit
an orderly transition from Federal domination of programs for and
services to Indians to effective and meaningful participation by
the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of
those programs and services."
25 U.S.C. § 450a(b).
[
Footnote 20]
"It is important to the concept of self-government that tribes
reduce their dependence on Federal funds by providing a greater
percentage of the cost of their self-government."
19 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 99 (1983).
[
Footnote 21]
The Court of Appeals relied on the following official
declarations. 783 F.2d at 904-906. A policy directive issued by the
Assistant Secretary of the Interior on March 2, 1983, stated that
the Department would "strongly oppose" any proposed legislation
that would subject tribes or tribal members to state gambling
regulation.
"Such a proposal is inconsistent with the President's Indian
Policy Statement of January 24, 1983. . . . A number of tribes have
begun to engage in bingo and similar gambling operations on their
reservations for the very purpose enunciated in the President's
Message. Given the often limited resources which tribes have for
revenue-producing activities, it is believed that this kind of
revenue-producing possibility should be protected and
enhanced."
The court also relied on an affidavit submitted by the Director
of Indian Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs, on behalf of the
Tribes' position:
"It is the department's position that tribal bingo enterprises
are an appropriate means by which tribes can further their economic
self-sufficiency, the economic development of reservations and
tribal self-determination. All of these are federal goals for the
tribes. Furthermore, it is the Department's position that the
development of tribal bingo enterprises is consistent with and in
furtherance of President Reagan's Indian Policy Statement of
January 24, 1983."
[
Footnote 22]
Among other things, the guidelines require that the contract
state that no payments have been made or will be made to any
elected member of the tribal government or relative of such member
for the purpose of obtaining or maintaining the contract. The
contractor is required to disclose information on all parties in
interest to the contract and all employees who will have day-to-day
management responsibility for the gambling operation, including
names, home and business addresses, occupations, dates of birth,
and Social Security numbers. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
must conduct a name-and-record check on these persons before a
contract may be approved. The guidelines also specify accounting
procedures and cash management procedures which the contractor must
follow.
[
Footnote 23]
An agent of the California Bureau of Investigation visited the
Cabazon bingo parlor as part of an investigation of tribal bingo
enterprises. The agent described the clientele as follows:
"In attendance for the Monday evening bingo session were about
300 players. . . . On row 5, on the front left side, were a
middle-aged latin couple, who were later joined by two young latin
males. These men had to have the game explained to them. The middle
table was shared with a senior citizen couple. The aisle table had
2 elderly women, 1 in a wheelchair, and a middle-aged woman. . . .
A goodly portion of the crowd were retired age to senior
citizens."
App. 176. We are unwilling to assume that these patrons would be
indifferent to the services offered by the Tribes.
[
Footnote 24]
Hearings on H.R. 4566 before the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 15-39, 66-75 (1984); App.
197-205.
[
Footnote 25]
JUSTICE STEVENS' assertion,
post at
480 U. S. 226,
that the State's interest in restricting the proceeds of gambling
to itself, and the charities it favors, justifies the prohibition
or regulation of tribal bingo games is indeed strange. The State
asserted no such discriminatory economic interest, and it is pure
speculation that, in the absence of tribal bingo games, would-be
patrons would purchase lottery tickets or would attend
state-approved bingo games instead. In any event, certainly
California has no legitimate interest in allowing potential lottery
dollars to be diverted to non-Indian owners of card clubs and horse
tracks while denying Indian tribes the opportunity to profit from
gambling activities. Nor is California necessarily entitled to
prefer the funding needs of state-approved charities over the
funding needs of the Tribes, who dedicate bingo revenues to
promoting the health, education, and general welfare of tribal
members.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR and JUSTICE SCALIA
join, dissenting.
Unless and until Congress exempts Indian-managed gambling from
state law and subjects it to federal supervision, I believe that a
State may enforce its laws prohibiting high-stakes gambling on
Indian reservations within its borders. Congress has not preempted
California's prohibition against high-stakes bingo games, and the
Secretary of the Interior plainly has no authority to do so. While
gambling provides needed employment and income for Indian tribes,
these benefits do not, in my opinion, justify tribal operation of
currently unlawful commercial activities. Accepting the majority's
reasoning would require exemptions for cockfighting, tattoo
parlors, nude dancing, houses of prostitution, and other illegal
but profitable enterprises. As the law now stands, I believe tribal
entrepreneurs, like others who might derive profits from catering
to non-Indian customers, must obey applicable state laws.
In my opinion, the plain language of Pub.L. 280, 67 Stat. 588,
as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 ed.
and Supp. III), authorizes California to enforce its prohibition
against commercial gambling on Indian reservations. The State
prohibits bingo games that are not operated by members of
designated charitable organizations or which offer prizes in excess
of $250 per game. Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987). In
§ 2 of Pub.L. 280, Congress
Page 480 U. S. 223
expressly provided that the criminal laws of the State of
California "shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
country as they have elsewhere within the State." 18 U.S.C. §
1162(a). Moreover, it provided in § 4(a) that the civil laws of
California
"that are of general application to private persons or private
property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
country as they have elsewhere within the State."
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III).
It is true that, in
Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U. S. 373
(1976), we held that Pub.L. 280 did not confer civil jurisdiction
on a State to impose a personal property tax on a mobile home that
was owned by a reservation Indian and located within the
reservation. Moreover, the reasoning of that decision recognizes
the importance of preserving the traditional aspects of tribal
sovereignty over the relationships among reservation Indians. Our
more recent cases have made it clear, however, that commercial
transactions between Indians and non-Indians -- even when conducted
on a reservation -- do not enjoy any blanket immunity from state
regulation. In
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.
S. 713 (1983), respondent, a federally licensed Indian
trader, was a tribal member operating a general store on an Indian
reservation. We held that the State could require Rehner to obtain
a state license to sell liquor for off-premises consumption. The
Court attempts to distinguish
Rice v. Rehner as resting on
the absence of a sovereign tribal interest in the regulation of
liquor traffic to the exclusion of the States. But as a necessary
step on our way to deciding that the State could regulate all
tribal liquor sales in Indian country, we recognized the State's
authority over transactions, whether they be liquor sales or
gambling, between Indians and non-Indians:
"If there is any interest in tribal sovereignty implicated by
imposition
Page 480 U. S. 224
of California's alcoholic beverage regulation, it exists only
insofar as the State attempts to regulate Rehner's sale of liquor
to other members of the Pala Tribe on the Pala Reservation."
Id. at
463 U. S. 721.
Similarly, in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134
(1980), we held that a State could impose its sales and cigarette
taxes on non-Indian customers of smokeshops on Indian
reservations.
Today the Court seems prepared to acknowledge that an Indian
tribe's commercial transactions with non-Indians may violate "the
State's public policy."
Ante at
480 U. S. 209.
The Court reasons, however, that the operation of high-stakes bingo
games does not run afoul of California's public policy, because the
State permits some forms of gambling and, specifically, some forms
of bingo. I find this approach to "public policy" curious, to say
the least. The State's policy concerning gambling is to authorize
certain specific gambling activities that comply with carefully
defined regulation and that provide revenues either for the State
itself or for certain charitable purposes, and to prohibit all
unregulated commercial lotteries that are operated for private
profit. [
Footnote 2/1] To argue
that the tribal bingo games comply with the public policy of
California because the State permits some other gambling is
tantamount to arguing that driving over 60 miles an hour is
consistent
Page 480 U. S. 225
with public policy because the State allows driving at speeds of
up to 55 miles an hour.
In my view, Congress has permitted the State to apply its
prohibitions against commercial gambling to Indian tribes. Even if
Congress had not done so, however, the State has the authority to
assert jurisdiction over appellees' gambling activities. We
recognized this authority in
Washington v. Confederated Tribes,
supra; the Court's attempt to distinguish the reasoning of our
decision in that case is unpersuasive. In
Washington v.
Confederated Tribes, the Tribes contended that the State had
no power to tax on-reservation sales of cigarettes to non-Indians.
The argument that we rejected there has a familiar ring:
"The Tribes contend that their involvement in the operation and
taxation of cigarette marketing on the reservation ousts the State
from any power to exact its sales and cigarette taxes from
nonmembers purchasing cigarettes at tribal smokeshops. The primary
argument is economic. It is asserted that smokeshop cigarette sales
generate substantial revenues for the Tribes which they expend for
essential governmental services, including programs to combat
severe poverty and underdevelopment at the reservations. Most
cigarette purchasers are outsiders attracted onto the reservations
by the bargain prices the smokeshops charge by virtue of their
claimed exemption from state taxation. If the State is permitted to
impose its taxes, the Tribes will no longer enjoy any competitive
advantage
vis-a-vis businesses in surrounding areas."
Id. at
447 U. S.
154.
"What the smokeshops offer these customers, and what is not
available elsewhere, is solely an exemption from state
taxation."
Id. at
447 U. S.
155.
In
Confederated Tribes, the tribal smokeshops offered
their customers the same products, services, and facilities that
other tobacconists offered to their customers. Although
Page 480 U. S. 226
the smokeshops were more modest than the bingo palaces involved
in this case, presumably they were equally the product of tribal
labor and tribal capital. What made them successful, however, was
the value of the exemption that was offered to non-Indians "who
would normally do their business elsewhere."
Id. at
447 U. S.
155.
Similarly, it is painfully obvious that the value of the Tribe's
asserted exemption from California's gambling laws is the primary
attraction to customers who would normally do their gambling
elsewhere. The Cabazon Band of Mission Indians has no tradition or
special expertise in the operation of large bingo parlors.
See Declaration of William J. Wallace, � 2, App. 153, 171.
Indeed, the entire membership of the Cabazon Tribe -- it has only
25 enrolled members -- is barely adequate to operate a bingo game
that is patronized by hundreds of non-Indians nightly. How this
small and formerly impoverished Band of Indians could have
attracted the investment capital for its enterprise without benefit
of the claimed exemption is certainly a mystery to me.
I am entirely unpersuaded by the Court's view that the State of
California has no legitimate interest in requiring appellees'
gambling business to comply with the same standards that the
operators of other bingo games must observe. The State's interest
is both economic and protective. Presumably the State has
determined that its interest in generating revenues for the public
fisc and for certain charities outweighs the benefits from a total
prohibition against publicly sponsored games of chance. Whatever
revenues the Tribes receive from their unregulated bingo games
drain funds from the state-approved recipients of lottery revenues
-- just as the tax-free cigarette sales in the Confederated Tribes
case diminished the receipts that the tax collector would otherwise
have received.
Moreover, I am unwilling to dismiss as readily as the Court does
the State's concern that these unregulated high-stakes bingo games
may attract organized criminal infiltration.
Page 480 U. S. 227
Brief for Appellants 25-26, 29; Reply Brief for Appellants 12.
Comprehensive regulation of the commercial gambling ventures that a
State elects to license is obviously justified as a prophylactic
measure even if there is presently no criminal activity associated
with casino gambling in the State. Indeed, California regulates
charitable bingo, horse racing, and its own lottery. The State of
California requires that charitable bingo games may only be
operated and staffed by members of designated charitable
organizations, and that proceeds from the games may only be used
for charitable purposes. Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 326.5 (West Supp.
1987). These requirements for staffing and for dispersal of profits
provide bulwarks against criminal activity; neither safeguard
exists for bingo games on Indian reservations. [
Footnote 2/2] In my judgment, unless Congress
authorizes and regulates these commercial gambling ventures
catering to non-Indians, the State has a legitimate law enforcement
interest in proscribing them.
Appellants and the Secretary of the Interior may well be
correct, in the abstract, that gambling facilities are a sensible
way to generate revenues that are badly needed by reservation
Indians. But the decision to adopt, to reject, or to define the
precise contours of such a course of action, and thereby to set
aside the substantial public policy concerns of a sovereign State
should be made by the Congress of the United States. It should not
be made by this Court, by the temporary occupant of the Office of
the Secretary of the Interior, or by non-Indian entrepreneurs who
are experts in gambling management, but not necessarily dedicated
to serving the future well being of Indian tribes.
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court holds that Pub.L. 280 does not authorize California to
enforce its prohibition against commercial gambling within the
Cabazon and Morongo Reservations.
Ante at
480 U. S. 212.
The Court reaches this conclusion by determining that § 4(a) of
Pub.L. 280, 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a), withholds from the States general
civil regulatory authority over Indian tribes, and that the State's
rules concerning gambling are regulatory, rather than prohibitory.
In its opinion, the Court dismisses the State's argument that
high-stakes, unregulated bingo is prohibited with the contention
that an otherwise regulatory law does not become a prohibition
simply because it "is enforceable by criminal as well as civil
means."
Ante at
480 U. S. 211.
Aside from the questionable merit of this proposition, it does not
even address the meaning of § 2(a) of Pub.L. 280, 18 U.S.C. 1162(a)
(1982 ed., Supp. III), a provision which is sufficient to control
the disposition of this case.
See supra at
480 U. S.
222.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Cabazon Band's bingo room was operated under a management
agreement with an outside firm until 1986; the Morongo Band
operates its bingo room under a similar management agreement. App.
to Brief for Appellees, C-l to C-3; Morongo Band of Mission Indians
Tribal Bingo Enterprise Management Agreement, � 4B, App. 97-98.