The Clean Water Act (Act) prohibits the discharge of effluents
into navigable waters unless the point source has obtained a permit
from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Act also allows
the State in which the point source is located (the "source State")
to impose more stringent discharge limitations than the federal
ones, and even to administer its own permit program if certain
requirements are met. In contrast, "affected" States that are
subject to pollution originating in source States have only the
right to notice and to comment before the issuance of a federal or
source State permit. The Act also contains a "saving clause"
consisting of § 510, which provides that
"nothing in this chapter shall . . . be construed as impairing .
. . any right . . . of the States with respect to the waters
(including boundary waters) of such States,"
and § 505(e), which states that
"[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person . . . may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief. . . ."
Petitioner operates a paper mill on the New York side of Lake
Champlain and, in the course of its business, discharged effluents
into the lake through a diffusion pipe that ended shortly before
the New York-Vermont border that divided the lake. Respondents,
property owners on the Vermont shore, filed a class action against
petitioner in Vermont state court under the Vermont common law of
nuisance. The action was later removed to Federal District Court.
Petitioner moved for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings
on the ground that the Act preempted respondents' state-1aw suit,
but the District Court denied the motion, holding that the Act's
saving clause preserves actions to redress interstate water
pollution under the law of the State in which the injury occurred.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. The Act preempts the common law of an affected State to the
extent that that law seeks to impose liability on a point source in
another State. Pp.
479 U. S.
487-497.
(a) Since the Act applies to all point sources and virtually all
bodies of water, sets forth detailed procedures for obtaining a
permit, and provides an elaborate set of remedies for its
violation, it is sufficiently comprehensive
Page 479 U. S. 482
to raise a presumption that Congress intended to preempt all
state 1aw suits except those specifically preserved by the Act's
terms. Pp.
479 U. S.
491-492.
(b) The Act's saving clause cannot be read broadly to preserve
the right to bring suit under the law of an affected State. Section
505(e) merely protects state law suits from preemption by the Act's
citizen suit provisions, and does not purport to preclude
preemption by other provisions. Furthermore, § 510 can be read to
preserve a State's authority only with respect to effluent
discharges within that State. Pp.
479 U. S.
492-493.
(c) The application of an affected State's nuisance law to a
point source in another State would constitute a serious
interference with the implementation of the Act. It would
effectively override the EPA's permit requirements and the policy
choices made by source States in adopting their own standards, and
would engender confusion by subjecting point sources to a variety
of often vague and indeterminate common law rules established by
different States along the interstate waterways. Pp.
479 U. S.
494-497.
2. The District Court correctly denied petitioner's motion for
summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. Pp.
479 U. S.
497-500.
(a) The Court's preemption holding does not leave respondents
without a remedy. Since the Act precludes only those suits that
require effluent control standards incompatible with those
established by the Act's procedures, and since the Act's saving
clause specifically preserves other state actions, aggrieved
parties can bring a nuisance claim under the law of the source
State, here, New York. Pp.
479 U. S. 497-500.
(b) The Act preempts laws, not courts, and nothing in its
provisions prevents a court sitting in an affected State from
hearing a common law nuisance suit, provided that jurisdiction
otherwise is proper. A district court sitting in diversity is
competent to apply the law of a foreign State, and, therefore,
Vermont was a proper forum in this case. P.
479 U. S.
500.
776 F.2d 55, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post,
p.
479 U. S. 500.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined,
post, p.
479 U. S.
508.
Page 479 U. S. 483
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the preemptive scope of the Clean Water Act,
86 Stat. 816,
as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
et
seq. (CWA or Act). [
Footnote
1] The question presented is whether the Act preempts a common
law nuisance suit filed in a Vermont court under Vermont law, when
the source of the alleged injury is located in New York.
I
Lake Champlain forms part of the border between the States of
New York and Vermont. Petitioner International
Page 479 U. S. 484
Paper Company (IPC) operates a pulp and paper mill on the New
York side of the lake. In the course of its business, IPC
discharges a variety of effluents into the lake through a diffusion
pipe. The pipe runs from the mill through the water toward Vermont,
ending a short distance before the state boundary line that divides
the lake.
Respondents are a group of property owners who reside or lease
land on the Vermont shore. In 1978, the owners filed a class action
suit against IPC, claiming,
inter alia, that the discharge
of effluents constituted a "continuing nuisance" under Vermont
common law. Respondents alleged that the pollutants made the water
"foul, unhealthy, smelly, and . . . unfit for recreational use,"
thereby diminishing the value of their property. App. 29. The
owners asked for $20 million in compensatory damages, $100 million
in punitive damages, and injunctive relief that would require IPC
to restructure part of its water treatment system. [
Footnote 2] The action was filed in State
Superior Court, and then later removed to Federal District Court
for the District of Vermont.
IPC moved for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings,
claiming that the CWA preempted respondents' state law suit. With
the parties' consent, the District Judge deferred a ruling on the
motion pending the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in a similar case involving Illinois and the city of
Milwaukee. In that dispute, Illinois filed a nuisance action
against the city under Illinois statutory and common law, seeking
to abate the alleged pollution of Lake Michigan.
Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (1984) (
Milwaukee III),
cert. denied,, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985). [
Footnote 3] The Court of Appeals ultimately
remanded the case
Page 479 U. S. 485
for dismissal of Illinois' claim, finding that the CWA precluded
the application of one State's law against a pollution source
located in a different State. The decision was based in part on the
court's conclusion that the application of different state laws to
a single "point source" [
Footnote
4] would interfere with the carefully devised regulatory system
established by the CWA. 731 F.2d at 414. The court also concluded
that the only suits that were not preempted were those alleging
violations of the laws of the polluting, or "source," State.
Id. at 413-414.
IPC argued that the holding in
Milwaukee III was
dispositive in this case. The Vermont District Court disagreed, and
denied the motion to dismiss.
602 F.
Supp. 264 (1985). The court acknowledged that federal law
normally governs interstate water pollution. It found, however,
that two sections of the CWA explicitly preserve state law rights
of action. First, § 510 of the Act provides:
"Except as expressly provided . . . , nothing in this chapter
shall . . . be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting
any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters
(including boundary waters) of such States."
33 U.S.C. § 1370. In addition, § 505(e) states:
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common
law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or
to seek any other relief. . . ."
33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
The District Court held that these two provisions (together,
"the saving clause") made it clear that federal law did not preempt
entirely the rights of States to control pollution.
Page 479 U. S. 486
Therefore, the question presented, said the court, was which
types of state suits Congress intended to preserve. It
considered three possibilities: [
Footnote 5] first, the saving clause could be construed to
preserve state law only as it applied to waters not covered by the
CWA. But since the Act applies to virtually all surface water in
the country, [
Footnote 6] the
District Court rejected this possibility. Second, the saving clause
might preserve state nuisance law only as it applies to discharges
occurring within the source State; under this view, a claim could
be filed against IPC under New York common law, but not under
Vermont law. This was the position adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in
Milwaukee III. The District
Court nevertheless rejected this option, finding that "there is
simply nothing in the Act which suggests that Congress intended to
impose such limitations on the use of state law." 602 F. Supp. at
269.
The District Court therefore adopted the third interpretation of
the saving clause, and held that a state action to redress
interstate water pollution could be maintained under the law of the
State in which the inijury occurred.
Ibid. The court was
unpersuaded by the concern expressed in
Milwaukee III that
the application of out-of-state law to a point source would
conflict with the CWA. It said there was no interference with the
procedures established by Congress, because a State's
"imposition of compensatory damage awards and other equitable
relief for injuries caused . . . merely
supplement
Page 479 U. S. 487
the standards and limitations imposed by the Act."
602 F. Supp. at 271 (emphasis in original). The court also found
that the use of state law did not conflict with the ultimate goal
of the CWA, since, in each case, the objective was to decrease the
level of pollution.
Ibid.
The District Court certified its decision for interlocutory
appeal,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 ed., Supp.III), and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed for the
reasons stated by the District Court. 776 F.2d 55, 56 (1985) (per
curiam). We granted certiorari to resolve the circuit conflict on
this important issue of federal preemption. 475 U.S. 1081 (1986).
We now affirm the denial of IPC's motion to dismiss, but reverse
the decision below to the extent it permits the application of
Vermont law to this litigation. We hold that, when a court
considers a state law claim concerning interstate water pollution
that is subject to the CWA, the court must apply the law of the
State in which the point source is located.
II
A brief review of the regulatory framework is necessary to set
the stage for this case. Until fairly recently, federal common law
governed the use and misuse of interstate water.
See, e.g.,
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U. S. 92,
304 U. S. 110
(1938) (water apportionment);
Missouri v. Illinois,
200 U. S. 496
(1906) (water pollution). [
Footnote
7] This principle was called into question in the context of
water pollution in 1971, when the Court suggested in dicta that an
interstate dispute between a State and a private company should be
resolved by reference to state nuisance law.
Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493,
401 U. S. 499,
n. 3 (1971) ("[A]n action such as this, if otherwise cognizable
in
Page 479 U. S. 488
federal district court, would have to be adjudicated under state
law") (citing
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64 (1938)).
We had occasion to address this issue in the first of two
Supreme Court cases involving the dispute between Illinois and
Milwaukee. In
Milwaukee I, the State moved for leave to
file an original action in this Court, seeking to enjoin the city
from discharging sewage into Lake Michigan.
Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91
(1972). The Court's opinion in that case affirmed the view that the
regulation of interstate water pollution is a matter of federal,
not state, law, thus overruling the contrary suggestion in
Wyandotte. [
Footnote
8] 406 U.S. at
406 U. S. 102,
n. 3. The Court was concerned, however, that the existing version
of the Act was not sufficiently comprehensive to resolve all
interstate disputes that were likely to arise.
Milwaukee I
therefore held that these cases should be resolved by reference to
federal common law; the implicit corollary of this ruling was that
state common law was preempted.
See id. at
406 U. S. 107,
n. 9;
Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 407. The Court noted,
though, that future action by Congress to regulate water pollution
might preempt federal common law as well. 406 U.S. at
406 U. S.
107.
Congress thereafter adopted comprehensive amendments to the Act.
We considered the impact of the new legislation when Illinois and
Milwaukee returned to the Court several years later. [
Footnote 9]
Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U. S. 304
(1981)
Page 479 U. S. 489
(
Milwaukee II). There the Court noted that the
amendments were a "'complete rewriting"' of the statute considered
in
Milwaukee I, and that they were "
the most
comprehensive and far-reaching'" provisions that Congress ever had
passed in this area. 451 U.S. at 451 U. S.
317-318 (citations to legislative history omitted).
Consequently, the Court held that federal legislation now occupied
the field, preempting all federal common law. The Court left open
the question of whether injured parties still had a cause of action
under state law. Id. at 451 U. S. 310,
n. 4. The case was remanded for further consideration; the result
on remand was the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Milwaukee III, discussed
supra.
One of the primary features of the 1972 amendments is the
establishment of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES), a federal permit program designed to regulate the
discharge of polluting effluents. 33 U.S.C. § 1342;
see
generally EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board, 426 U. S. 200,
426 U. S.
205-208 (1976) (describing NPDES system). Section 301(a)
of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), generally prohibits the discharge
of any effluent into a navigable body of water unless the point
source has obtained an NPDES permit from the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). The permits contain detailed effluent
limitations, and a compliance schedule for the attainment of these
limitations.
The amendments also recognize that the States should have a
significant role in protecting their own natural resources. 33
U.S.C. § 1251(b). The Act provides that the Federal Government may
delegate to a State the authority to administer the NPDES program
with respect to point sources located within the State, if the EPA
Administrator determines that the proposed state program complies
with the requirements set forth at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). The
Administrator retains authority, however, to block the issuance of
any permit to which he objects. § 1342(d). Even if
Page 479 U. S. 490
the Federal Government administers the permit program, the
source State may require discharge limitations more stringent than
those required by the Federal Government.
See 40 CFR §
122.1(f) (1986). Before the Federal Government may issue an NPDES
permit, the Administrator must obtain certification from the source
State that the proposed discharge complies with the State's
technology-based standards and water-quality-based standards. 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The CWA therefore establishes a regulatory
"partnership" between the Federal Government and the source
State.
While source States have a strong voice in regulating their own
pollution, the CWA contemplates a much lesser role for States that
share an interstate waterway with the source (the affected States).
Even though it may be harmed by the discharges, an affected State
only has an advisory role in regulating pollution that originates
beyond its borders. Before a federal permit may be issued, each
affected State is given notice and the opportunity to object to the
proposed standards at a public hearing. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2);
Milwaukee III, supra, at 412. An affected State has
similar rights to be consulted before the source State issues its
own permit; the source State must send notification, and must
consider the objections and recommendations submitted by other
States before taking action. [
Footnote 10] § 1342(b). Significantly, however, an
affected State does not have the authority to block the issuance of
the permit if it is dissatisfied with the proposed standards. An
affected State's only recourse is to apply to the EPA
Administrator, who then has the discretion
Page 479 U. S. 491
to disapprove the permit if he concludes that the discharges
will have an undue impact on interstate waters. § 1342(d)(2). Also,
an affected State may not establish a separate permit system to
regulate an out-of-state source.
See § 1342(b) (State may
establish permit system for waters "within
its
jurisdiction") (emphasis added),
Lake Erie Alliance for
Protection of Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 526 F.
Supp. 1063, 1074-1075 (WD Pa.1981),
aff'd, 707 F.2d
1392 (CA3),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983);
State
v. Champion International Corp., 709
S.W.2d 569 (Tenn.1986),
cert. pending, No. 86-57. Thus
the Act makes it clear that affected States occupy a subordinate
position to source States in the federal regulatory program.
III
With this regulatory framework in mind, we turn to the question
presented: whether the Act preempts Vermont common law to the
extent that law may impose liability on a New York point source. We
begin the analysis by noting that it is not necessary for a federal
statute to provide explicitly that particular state laws are
preempted.
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707,
471 U. S. 713
(1985). Although courts should not lightly infer preemption,
[
Footnote 11] it may be
presumed when the federal legislation is
"sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference
that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state
regulation."
Ibid. (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U. S. 218,
331 U. S. 230
(1947)). In addition to express or implied preemption, a state law
also is invalid to the extent that it "actually conflicts with a .
. . federal statute."
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U. S. 151,
435 U. S. 158
(1978). Such a
Page 479 U. S. 492
conflict will be found when the state law "
stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.'" Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc., supra, at 471 U. S. 713
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52, 312 U. S. 67
(1941)).
A
As we noted in
Milwaukee II, Congress intended the 1972
Act amendments to "establish an all-encompassing program of water
pollution regulation." 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 318.
We observed that congressional "views on the comprehensive nature
of the legislation were practically universal."
Id. at
451 U. S. 318,
n. 12 (citing legislative history). An examination of the
amendments amply supports these views. The Act applies to all point
sources and virtually all bodies of water, and it sets forth the
procedures for obtaining a permit in great detail. The CWA also
provides its own remedies, including civil and criminal fines for
permit violations, and "citizen suits" that allow individuals
(including those from affected States) to sue for injunctions to
enforce the statute. [
Footnote
12] In light of this pervasive regulation and the fact that the
control of interstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal
law,
Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at
406 U. S. 107,
it is clear that the only state suits that remain available are
those specifically preserved by the Act.
Although Congress intended to dominate the field of pollution
regulation, the saving clause negates the inference that Congress
"left no room" for state causes of action. Respondents read the
language of the saving clause broadly to preserve both a State's
right to regulate its waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, and an injured
party's right to seek relief under "any statute
or common
law," § 1365(e) (emphasis added). They claim that this
language and selected portions of the legislative
Page 479 U. S. 493
history compel the inference that Congress intended to preserve
the right to bring suit under the law of any affected State.
[
Footnote 13] We cannot
accept this reading of the Act.
To begin with, the plain language of the provisions on which
respondents rely by no means compels the result they seek. Section
505(e) merely says that "[n]othing
in this section,"
i.e., the citizen-suit provisions, shall affect an injured
party's right to seek relief under state law; it does not purport
to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act.
Section 510, moreover, preserves the authority of a State "with
respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such Stat[e]."
This language arguably limits the effect of the clause to
discharges flowing
directly into a State's own waters,
i.e., discharges from within the State. The savings
clause, then, does not preclude preemption of the law of an
affected State.
Given that the Act itself does not speak directly to the issue,
the Court must be guided by the goals and policies of the Act in
determining whether it in fact preempts an action based on the law
of an affected State.
Cf. City of Rome v. United States,
446 U. S. 156,
446 U. S. 199
(1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("We resort to legislative
materials only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its
face"). After examining the CWA as a whole, its purposes and its
history, we are convinced that if affected States were allowed to
impose separate discharge standards on a single point source, the
inevitable result would be a serious interference with the
achievement of the "full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Page 479 U. S. 494
See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., supra, at
471 U. S. 713.
Because we do not believe Congress intended to undermine this
carefully drawn statute through a general saving clause, [
Footnote 14] we conclude that the
CWA precludes a court from applying the law of an affected State
against an out-of-state source.
B
In determining whether Vermont nuisance law "stands as an
obstacle" to the full implementation of the CWA, it is not enough
to say that the ultimate goal of both federal and state law is to
eliminate water pollution. A state law also is preempted if it
interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was
designed to reach this goal.
See Michigan Canners &
Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd.,
467 U. S. 461,
467 U. S. 477
(1984). In this case, the application of Vermont law against IPC
would allow respondents to circumvent the NPDES permit system,
thereby upsetting the balance of public and private interests so
carefully addressed by the Act.
By establishing a permit system for effluent discharges,
Congress implicitly has recognized that the goal of the CWA --
elimination of water pollution -- cannot be achieved immediately,
and that it cannot be realized without incurring costs. The EPA
Administrator issues permits according to established effluent
standards and water quality standards, that in turn are based upon
available technology, 33 U.S.C. § 1314, and competing public and
industrial uses, § 1312(a). The Administrator must consider the
impact of the discharges on the waterway, the types of effluents,
and the schedule for compliance, each of which may vary widely
Page 479 U. S. 495
among sources. If a State elects to impose its own standards, it
also must consider the technological feasibility of more stringent
controls. Given the nature of these complex decisions, it is not
surprising that the Act limits the right to administer the permit
system to the EPA and the source States.
See §
1342(b).
An interpretation of the saving clause that preserved actions
brought under an affected State's law would disrupt this balance of
interests. If a New York source were liable for violations of
Vermont law, that law could effectively override both the permit
requirements and the policy choices made by the source State. The
affected State's nuisance laws would subject the point source to
the threat of legal and equitable penalties if the permit standards
were less stringent than those imposed by the affected State. Such
penalties would compel the source to adopt different control
standards and a different compliance schedule from those approved
by the EPA, even though the affected State had not engaged in the
same weighing of the costs and benefits. This case illustrates the
problems with such a rule. If the Vermont court ruled that
respondents were entitled to the full amount of damages and
injunctive relief sought in the complaint, at a minimum, IPC would
have to change its methods of doing business and controlling
pollution to avoid the threat of ongoing liability. In suits such
as this, an affected state court also could require the source to
cease operations by ordering immediate abatement. Critically, these
liabilities would attach even though the source had complied fully
with its state and federal permit obligations. The inevitable
result of such suits would be that Vermont and other States could
do indirectly what they could not do directly -- regulate the
conduct of out-of-state sources. [
Footnote 15]
Page 479 U. S. 496
Application of an affected State's law to an out-of-state source
also would undermine the important goals of efficiency and
predictability in the permit system. The history of the 1972
amendments shows that Congress intended to establish "clear and
identifiable" discharge standards.
See S.Rep. No. 92-414,
p. 81 (1971), 2 Leg.Hist. 1499. [
Footnote 16] As noted above, under the reading of the
saving clause proposed by respondents, a source would be subject to
a variety of common law rules established by the different States
along the interstate waterways. These nuisance standards often are
"vague" and "indeterminate." [
Footnote 17] The application of numerous States' laws
would only exacerbate the vagueness and resulting uncertainty. The
Court of Appeals in
Milwaukee III identified the problem
with such an irrational system of regulation:
"For a number of different states to have independent and
plenary regulatory authority over a single discharge would lead to
chaotic confrontation between sovereign states. Dischargers would
be forced to meet not only the statutory limitations of all states
potentially affected by their discharges, but also the common law
standards
Page 479 U. S. 497
developed through case law of those states. It would be
virtually impossible to predict the standard for a lawful discharge
into an interstate body of water. Any permit issued under the Act
would be rendered meaningless."
731 F.2d at 414. It is unlikely -- to say the least -- that
Congress intended to establish such a chaotic regulatory
structure.
Nothing in the Act gives each affected State this power to
regulate discharges. The CWA carefully defines the role of both the
source and affected States, and specifically provides for a process
whereby their interests will be considered and balanced by the
source State and the EPA. This delineation of authority represents
Congress' considered judgment as to the best method of serving the
public interest and reconciling the often competing concerns of
those affected by the pollution. It would be extraordinary for
Congress, after devising an elaborate permit system that sets clear
standards, to tolerate common law suits that have the potential to
undermine this regulatory structure.
Our conclusion that Vermont nuisance law is inapplicable to a
New York point source does not leave respondents without a remedy.
The CWA precludes only those suits that may require standards of
effluent control that are incompatible with those established by
the procedures set forth in the Act. The saving clause specifically
preserves other state actions, and therefore nothing in the Act
bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant
to the law of the source State. By its terms, the CWA allows States
such as New York to impose higher standards on their own point
sources, and, in
Milwaukee II, we recognized that this
authority may include the right to impose higher common law, as
well as higher statutory, restrictions. 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 328
(suggesting that "States may adopt more stringent limitations . . .
through state nuisance law, and apply them to in-state
dischargers");
see also Committee for Jones Falls
Sewage
Page 479 U. S. 498
System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009, and n. 9 (CA4
1976) (CWA preserves common law suits filed in source State).
[
Footnote 18]
An action brought against IPC under New York nuisance law would
not frustrate the goals of the CWA as would a suit governed by
Vermont law. [
Footnote 19]
First, application of the source
Page 479 U. S. 499
State's law does not disturb the balance among federal,
source-state, and affected-state interests. Because the Act
specifically allows source States to impose stricter standards, the
imposition of source-state law does not disrupt the regulatory
partnership established by the permit system. Second, the
restriction of suits to those brought under source-state nuisance
law prevents a source from being subject to an indeterminate number
of potential regulations. Although New York nuisance law may impose
separate standards, and thus create some tension with the permit
system, a source only is required to look to a single additional
authority, whose rules should be relatively predictable. Moreover,
States can be expected to take into account their own nuisance laws
in setting permit requirements. [
Footnote 20]
IPC asks the Court to go one step further and hold that all
state law suits also must be brought in source-state courts. As
petitioner cites little authority or justification for this
position, we find no basis for holding that Vermont is an improper
forum. Simply because a cause of action is preempted does not mean
that judicial jurisdiction over the claim
Page 479 U. S. 500
is affected as well; the Act preempts laws, not courts. In the
absence of statutory authority to the contrary, [
Footnote 21] the rule is settled that a
district court sitting in diversity is competent to apply the law
of a foreign State.
IV
The District Court correctly denied IPC's motion for summary
judgment and judgment on the pleadings. Nothing in the Act prevents
a court sitting in an affected State from hearing a common law
nuisance suit, provided that jurisdiction otherwise is proper. Both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred, however, in
concluding that Vermont law governs this litigation. The
application of affected-state laws would be incompatible with the
Act's delegation of authority and its comprehensive regulation of
water pollution. The Act preempts state law to the extent that the
state law is applied to an out-of-state point source.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The statute also is known as the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act.
See note following 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
[
Footnote 2]
The complaint also sought monetary and injunctive relief for air
pollution allegedly caused by the IPC mill. App. 36-36. This claim
is not before the Court.
[
Footnote 3]
The decisions in
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S.
91 (1972) (
Milwaukee I), and
Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U. S. 304
(1981) (
Milwaukee II), are discussed in Part II,
infra.
[
Footnote 4]
A "point source" is defined by the CWA as "any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or
may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14);
see 40 CFR §
122.2 (1986). It is not disputed that IPC is a point source within
the meaning of the Act.
[
Footnote 5]
For a discussion of each of the three interpretations of the
saving clause,
see Note,
City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois: The Demise of the Federal Common Law of Water
Pollution, 1982 Wis.L.Rev. 627, 664-671.
[
Footnote 6]
While the Act purports to regulate only "navigable waters," this
term has been construed expansively to cover waters that are not
navigable in the traditional sense.
See United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U. S. 121
(1985); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining navigable waters as "waters
of the United States"); 118 Cong.Rec. 33756-33757 (1972), 1
Legislative History of Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public
Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, p. 250, (1973)
(hereinafter Leg.Hist.).
[
Footnote 7]
Accord, North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.
S. 365 (1923);
cf. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U. S. 230
(1907) (air pollution);
see also Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at
406 U. S.
104-107; Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal
Remedies for Pollution, 134 U.Pa.L.Rev. 121, 152-155 (1985); Note,
1982 Wis.L.Rev. at 630-636.
[
Footnote 8]
Cf United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.
S. 109,
466 U. S. 115
(1984) (warrantless test of white powder; "[t]he reasonableness of
an official invasion of the citizen's privacy must be appraised on
the basis of the facts as they existed at the time that invasion
occurred").
[
Footnote 9]
In
Milwaukee I, the Court denied a motion to file an
original action, but ruled that Illinois could maintain an action
in federal district court. The State then filed suit in Illinois
District Court, alleging that the city was liable for creating a
public nuisance under both federal and Illinois common law. The
complaint also alleged a violation of the State Environmental
Protection Act.
See Milwaukee II, supra, at
451 U. S. 310,
and n. 4;
Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 404.
[
Footnote 10]
For a more detailed description of the permit system,
see R. Zener, Guide to Federal Environmental Law 61-88
(1981).
At one point, IPC was operating under a federal NPDES permit.
App. 29-30. A draft of the permit was submitted to Vermont as an
affected State, and Vermont as well as other interested parties
objected to the proposed discharge standards.
Id. at
65-66. Thereafter, New York obtained permitting authority under 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b) and it now administers the permit.
[
Footnote 11]
See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.
S. 218,
331 U. S. 230
(1947) ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress");
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 312;
see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.
S. 238,
464 U. S. 255
(1984).
[
Footnote 12]
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a), 1365(a), (h);
see
generally Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1,
453 U. S. 13-14
(1981) (discussing "elaborate" remedial provisions).
[
Footnote 13]
A Senate Report accompanying the amendments states:
"[I]f damages could be shown, other remedies [in addition to a
citizen suit] would remain available. Compliance with requirements
under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for
pollution damages."
S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971), 2 Leg.Hist. 1499. Respondents
also note that, after reviewing the legislative history, the
District Court found no evidence that Congress intended to alter
the traditional tort law principle that a party may bring suit in
the State where the injury occurred.
See Young v. Masci,
289 U. S. 253,
289 U. S.
258-259 (1933).
[
Footnote 14]
We noted in
Milwaukee II:
"The fact that the language of [the saving clause] is repeated
in haec verba in the citizen-suit provisions of a vast
array of environmental legislation . . . indicates that it does not
reflect any considered judgment about what other remedies were
previously available or continue to be available under any
particular statute."
451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 329,
n. 22.
[
Footnote 15]
The interpretation of the Act adopted by the courts below also
would have the result of allowing affected States effectively to
set discharge standards without consulting with the source State,
even though source States are required by the Act to give affected
States an opportunity to be heard and a chance to comment before
issuing a permit.
[
Footnote 16]
"The citizen suit provision [§ 506] is consistent with
principles underlying the . . . Act, [which are] the development of
clear and identifiable requirements. Such requirements should
provide manageable and precise benchmarks for performance."
S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971), 2 Leg.Hist. 1499.
[
Footnote 17]
See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 317;
see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 616 (5th ed. 1984) ("There is
perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that
which surrounds the word
nuisance'"). The possibility that a
source will have to meet a number of different standards is
relatively small in this case, since Vermont is the only State that
shares Lake Champlain with New York. But consider, for example, a
plant that discharges effluents into the Mississippi River. A
source located in Minnesota theoretically could be subject to the
nuisance laws of any of the nine downstream States.
[
Footnote 18]
Nothing in our decision, of course, affects respondents' right
to pursue remedies that may be provided by the Act. If, as was also
alleged in respondents' complaint, IPC is violating the terms of
its permit, respondents may bring a citizen suit to compel
compliance. 33 U.S.C. §1366. Respondents also had the opportunity
to protect their interests before the fact by commenting and
objecting to the proposed standard.
See Milwaukee II,
supra, at
451 U. S. 326
(Act provides "ample" opportunity for affected States to protect
their rights).
[
Footnote 19]
The District Court concluded that the interference with the Act
is insignificant, in part because respondents are seeking to be
compensated for a specific harm, rather than trying to "regulate"
IPC.
602 F.
Supp. 264, 271-272 (Vt. 1985). The Solicitor General, on behalf
of the United States as
amicus curiae, adopts only a
portion of this view. He acknowledges that suits seeking
punitive or
injunctive relief under
affected-state law should be preempted because of the interference
they cause with the CWA. The Government asserts that
compensatory damages actions, however, may be brought
under the law of the State where the injury occurred. The Solicitor
General reasons that compensatory damages only require the source
to pay for the external costs created by the pollution, and thus do
not "regulate" in a way inconsistent with the Act. The Government
cites
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.
S. 238 (1984), for the proposition that, in certain
circumstances, a court may find preemption of some remedies and not
others.
We decline the Government's invitation to draw a line between
the types of relief sought. There is no suggestion of such a
distinction in either the Act or the legislative history. As the
Court noted in
Silkwood, unless there is evidence that
Congress meant to "split" a particular remedy for preemption
purposes, it is assumed that the full cause of action under state
law is available (or as in this case, preempted).
Id. at
464 U. S. 255.
We also think it would be unwise to treat compensatory damages
differently under the facts of this case. If the Vermont court
determined that respondents were entitled only to the requested
compensatory relief, IPC might be compelled to adopt different or
additional means of pollution control from those required by the
Act, regardless of whether the purpose of the relief was
compensatory or regulatory.
See Perez v. Campbell,
402 U. S. 637,
402 U. S.
651-652 (1971) (effect rather, than purpose, of a state
statute governs preemption analysis). As discussed, this result
would be irreconcilable with the CWA's exclusive grant of authority
to the Federal Government and the source State.
Cf. Chicago
& North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile
Co., 450 U. S. 311,
450 U. S.
324-325 (1981).
[
Footnote 20]
ALTHOUGH we conclude that New York law generally controls this
suit, we note that the preemptive scope of the CWA necessarily
includes all laws that are inconsistent with the "full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
See Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707,
471 U. S. 713
(1985). We therefore do not agree with the dissent that Vermont
nuisance law still may apply if the New York choice-of-law doctrine
dictates such a result.
Post at
479 U. S.
507-508. As we have discussed,
supra, the
application of affected-state law would frustrate the carefully
prescribed CWA regulatory system. This interference would occur, of
course, whether affected-state law applies as an original matter,
or whether it applies pursuant to the source State's choice-of-law
principles. Therefore if, and to the extent, the law of a source
State requires the application of affected-state substantive law on
this particular issue, it would be preempted as well.
[
Footnote 21]
Cf. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(1) (citizen suit to enforce
permit must be brought in judicial district where source is
located).
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur wholeheartedly in the Court's judgment that the Clean
Water Act (Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1251
et seq., does not
preempt a private nuisance suit filed in a Vermont court when the
source of the alleged injury is located in New York. I disagree
only with the Court's view that a Vermont court must apply New York
nuisance law.
I
The question presented is whether the District Court properly
denied International Paper Company's motion to dismiss.
Page 479 U. S. 501
The Court concludes that a federal district court, sitting in
the State where the injury occurred, may hear a common law nuisance
suit to redress interstate water pollution, and that the district
court must apply the law of the State in which the point source is
located. The Court improperly reaches out to decide the latter
issue. As far as the parties and the Court know, "Vermont law and
New York law are identical on the question of private nuisance."
Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. Moreover, Vermont is the only State to share
Lake Champlain with New York. Thus, the nuisance laws of New York
and Vermont are the sole candidates for application in the present
case, and they do not conflict. The respondents do not base their
claims on any particular state law -- "[t]he Complaint in this
matter does not specify the jurisdiction of the common law it
invokes or make a choice of law." Plaintiffs' Supplemental
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in
No. 78-163, p. 4. Given these facts, I find it necessary only to
affirm the denial of International Paper Company's motion to
dismiss.
II
Even were I to reach the issue of the state law applicable in
this case, I would not interpret the Act to require a court sitting
in the State where the injury has occurred (affected State) to
apply the nuisance law of the State from which the pollution
emanates (source State). Nothing in the Act preempts the usual
two-step analysis undertaken by federal district courts to
determine which state tort law should be applied in interstate tort
suits. First, the district court must apply the conflict-of-law
rules of the State in which the court sits.
See Day &
Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U. S.
3,
423 U. S. 4
(1975);
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,
313 U. S. 487,
313 U. S. 496
(1941) (holding that
Erie doctrine applies to
conflict-of-law rules). Thus, the Vermont District Court should
apply the conflict-of-law rules of Vermont, the affected State.
Second, these conflict-of-law principles must
Page 479 U. S. 502
be interpreted by the district court to determine whether the
tort law of the source State or the affected State should be
applied. Today the Court finds that the application of Vermont's
nuisance law is preempted even if Vermont's conflict-of-law rules
determine that Vermont's tort law should be applied.
The Act provides no support for deviation from well settled
conflict-of-law principles. Under conflict-of-law rules, the
affected State's nuisance law may be applied when the purpose of
the tort law is to ensure compensation of tort victims. [
Footnote 2/1] "[I]t is beyond dispute" that
affected States have "a significant interest in redressing injuries
that actually occur within the State."
Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770,
465 U. S. 776
(1984);
see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.
S. 302,
449 U. S. 307
(1981);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.
S. 440,
362 U. S. 442
(1960). This traditional interest of the affected State, involving
the health and safety of its citizens, is protected by providing
for application of the affected State's own tort laws in suits
against the source State's polluters.
See Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U. S. 325,
411 U. S. 343
(1973);
Watson v. Employers Liability
Assurance
Page 479 U. S. 503
Corp., 348 U. S. 66,
348 U. S. 72-73
(1954);
Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253,
289 U. S.
258,-259 (1933). The State's interest in applying its
own tort laws cannot be superseded by a federal act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.
See Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238,
464 U. S. 248,
464 U. S. 255
(1984);
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.
S. 304,
451 U. S. 316
(1981) (
Milwaukee II).
Here, Congress preserved the rights of source States and
affected States alike to enforce state common law claims. Section
510 provides:
"Except as
expressly provided . . . . nothing in this
chapter shall . . . be construed as impairing or
in any manner
affecting any right or jurisdiction
of the States with
respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such
States."
33 U.S.C. § 1370 (emphasis added). In preserving the right to
seek traditional common law relief, the Act draws no distinction
between interstate and intrastate disputes; § 505(e) states:
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common
law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or
to seek any other relief."
§ 1365(e). [
Footnote 2/2] This
provision contains no "express" restriction on the normal operation
of state law, reflecting the Act's policy
"to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution. . . ."
§ 1251(b).
By contrast, where Congress wanted to affect state common law
rights, it expressly stated this intent in the Act. Congress chose
to preempt state law
"only where the situation warranted it based upon the urgent
need for uniformity
Page 479 U. S. 504
such as in section 312(f) relating to marine sanitation
devices."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-911, p. 136 (1972), 1 Legislative History of the
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for
the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress),
Ser. No. 93-1, p. 823 (1973) (hereinafter Leg.Hist.).
I find that the Act's plain language clearly indicates that
Congress wanted to leave intact the traditional right of the
affected State to apply its own tort law when its residents are
injured by an out-of-state polluter.
III
The Court argues that, although the Act does not explicitly
state that the affected States' laws are preempted here, applying
the law of an affected State against an out-of-state source stands
as an obstacle to the full implementation of the Act. The Court
contends application of an affected State's common law is contrary
to subsidiary objectives of the Act: (1) establishing the right of
source States to set effluent standards for in-state polluters,
ante at
479 U. S.
489-490; and (2) establishing clear and identifiable
discharge standards,
ante at
479 U. S. 496.
The Court concludes that the affected State's common law is
preempted by implication because of these conflicts. Although the
Court plausibly argues that it is offering a better administrative
approach, I do not believe that Congress meant to alter state law
in this manner.
As a threshold matter, the Court's opinion assumes that, in
enacting the Act, Congress valued administrative efficiency more
highly than effective elimination of water pollution. Yet there is
no evidence that Congress ever made such a choice. Instead, the Act
reflects Congress' judgment that a rational permit system,
operating in tandem with existing state common law controls, would
best achieve the Act's primary goal of controlling water pollution.
I base this conclusion on four important considerations.
Page 479 U. S. 505
First, since Congress preserved state common law rights
"[e]xcept as
expressly provided,"
supra at
479 U.S. 503, the Court's
reliance upon preemption by
implication cannot justify its
conclusion.
Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra, at
464 U. S. 255
("Congress assumed that traditional principles of state tort law
would apply with full force unless they were expressly
supplanted").
Second, the legislative history of the Act indicates that
Congress saw no peril to the Act in permitting the application of
traditional principles of state law. The Senate Committee Report
noted that Congress meant
"specifically [to] preserve any rights or remedies under any
other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would
remain available.
Compliance with requirements under this Act
would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution
damages."
S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971), 2 Leg.Hist. 1499 (emphasis
added). The majority's concern that tort liability might undercut
permit requirements was thus not shared by Congress.
In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
interpretation is consistent with Congress' view that state tort
remedies were supplemental and wholly preserved under the Act. The
regulations promulgated by the EPA recognize that meeting the
source State's minimum effluent limits does not convey "any
exclusive privilege." 40 CFR § 122.5(b) (1986). The EPA did not
interpret the Act to modify state or local law:
"The issuance of a permit does not authorize any injury to
persons or property or invasion of other private rights, or any
infringement of State or local law or regulations."
§ 122.5(c).
Third, we have refused to preempt a State's law, even when it is
contrary to subsidiary objectives concerning administration, if the
State's law furthers the federal statute's primary purpose and is
consistent with the Act's saving of States' authority in an area
traditionally regulated by States.
See
Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation
Page 479 U. S. 506
and Development Comm'n, 461 U.
S. 190,
461 U. S.
221-223 (1983). Subjecting polluters to state common law
liability simultaneously promotes the main federal goal of
eliminating water pollution entirely, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), and
obeys the congressional command to leave state common law intact.
Here Congress intended to stand by its federal regulatory scheme
and the State's traditional liability laws "and to tolerate
whatever tension there was between them."
Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. at
464 U. S.
256.
"Given this statutory scheme, it is for Congress to rethink the
division of regulatory authority in light of its possible exercise
by States to undercut a federal objective. The courts should not
assume the role which our system assigns to Congress."
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Comm'n, supra, at
461 U. S.
223.
Finally, the Court overstates any conflict between the affected
State's nuisance law and the subsidiary objectives of the Act. The
Court contends that applying the affected State's law would violate
the source State's right to set effluent standards for in-state
polluters. But if traditional conflict-of-law rules require the
application of the affected State's nuisance law, there is no
"conflict" with the source State's ability to set the
minimum standards required under the Act. Congress
considered state common law rights to be supplementary to, and not
in conflict with, the Act unless they embodied a "less stringent"
standard for polluters than the federal effluent standards.
See H.R.Rep. No. 92-911, pp. 169-170 (1972), 1 Leg.Hist.
856-857. The application of an affected State's common law remedies
to an out-of-state polluter does not conflict with the Act, because
it is possible for the polluter to redress the injuries suffered by
the victims of the pollution and to obey the source State's
effluent standards. By complying with the most stringent
requirement -- either under the Act or the affected State's law --
the polluter necessarily complies with the more lenient standards.
See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra, at
464 U. S.
257.
Page 479 U. S. 507
The Court also argues that application of an affected State's
law to an out-of-state source would undermine the important goals
of efficiency and predictability in the permit system. But Congress
set out to establish "clear and identifiable" discharge standards,
S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971), 2 Leg.Hist. 1499; it did not
intend to reform the "impenetrable jungle" of state nuisance law,
see ante at
479 U. S. 496,
n. 17. As both legislative history and EPA regulations indicate,
compliance with effluent standards is not a defense to state tort
suits,
see ante at
479 U. S. 496,
and the affected State's nuisance law is no more "vague" and
"indeterminate" than the source State's nuisance law. In fact, in
the instant case, Vermont and New York nuisance law are apparently
identical.
See supra at
479 U. S. 501.
While Congress intended to impose identifiable federal discharge
standards upon polluters, we must have much more explicit evidence
before assuming that, in enacting such a provision, Congress meant
to revolutionize state conflict-of-law or tort law principles.
IV
Even if the Court's conclusion that New York
law should
apply is correct, it does not logically follow that New York
nuisance law must be applied in this case. In its haste to
reach this result, the Court assumes that the imposition of the New
York nuisance standard would be required by New York law in a suit
where the alleged injury occurred in Vermont:
"Because the Act specifically allows source States to impose
stricter standards, the imposition of source-state
law
does not disrupt the regulatory partnership established by the
permit system. . . . New York
nuisance law may impose
separate standards. . . ."
Ante at
479 U. S. 499
(emphasis added).
Whether New York law requires the application of New York or
Vermont nuisance law depends on an interpretation
Page 479 U. S. 508
of New York law
pertaining to conflict of laws.
[
Footnote 2/3]
"A state has the same freedom to adopt its own rules of Conflict
of Laws as it has to adopt any other rules of law. Conflict of Laws
rules, when adopted, become as definitely a part of the law as any
other branch of the state's law."
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 5, Comment
a, p. 9 (1971). The Court reasons that a source State must
have the primary role in regulating its own pollution discharges.
Under this logic, nothing prevents a source State's legislature or
courts from choosing to impose, under conflict-of-law principles,
the affected State's nuisance law in a case such as this. A source
State is free to adopt an affected State's standards as its own
standards,
ante at
479 U. S. 490
(noting that source State can accept advice of affected State).
The District Court correctly denied the petitioner's motion for
summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons
indicated above, I would affirm without reaching the question of
the state law applicable in this case.
[
Footnote 2/1]
States have adopted two different conflict-of-law approaches to
determine which state tort law should be applied. The traditional
rule of
lex loci delicti requires the application of the
tort law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred.
See 19 N.Y. Jur.2d Conflict of Laws § 39, p. 623 (1982);
E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Law § 17.7, pp. 560-561 (1982).
The rationale for the traditional rule is that the affected State
possesses a strong interest in redressing injuries to its citizens.
The modern rule, followed by the majority of States, employs an
interest-analysis approach.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U. S. 302,
449 U. S. 309
(1981). Under this analysis, if the primary purpose of the tort
rule is to control the tortfeasor's conduct -- such as the setting
of pollution discharge standards -- then the source State's tort
law may be applied. Alternatively, if the main purpose of the tort
rule is compensating victims of the tort, a court may apply the
affected State's tort law. Other relevant considerations include
the locations of the parties and where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.
See Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws § 145, and Comment
c, pp. 414-416
(1971).
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court dismisses the importance of § 505(e) because that
section
"merely says that '[n]othing
in this section,' i.e.,
the citizen suit provisions, shall affect an injured party's right
to seek relief under state law; it does not purport to preclude
preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act."
Ante at
479 U. S. 493.
But Congress used this language because this is the only section of
the Act that expressly implicates private suits. Congress was
reemphasizing that a State's authority over private suits,
involving state common law, was not affected by the Act.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The respondents contend that, under both New York and Vermont
conflict-of-law principles, Vermont common law would apply to this
action. Brief for Respondents 12. Petitioner does not contest this
view. If this issue need be determined, it should, in my view, be
remanded to the Court of Appeals.
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague, 449 U.S. at
449 U. S. 307;
Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v.
Challoner, 423 U. S. 3,
423 U. S. 5 (1975)
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring);
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co., 313 U. S. 487, 492
(1941) [see printed version for argument of counsel]. It is
sufficient for the sake of argument to note that several cases
suggest that New York conflict-of-law principles may require that
Vermont law be applied in this instance.
See, e.g., Bing v.
Halstead, 495 F.
Supp. 517, 520 (SDNY 1980) ("Where tortious conduct occurs in
one jurisdiction and injury in another, as is the case here, the
law of the place of injury applies");
Cousins v. Instrument
Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 699, 376 N.E.2d 914, 915 (1978)
("It is true that
lex loci delicti remains the general
rule in tort cases, to be displaced only in extraordinary
circumstances").
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
In affirming the denial of International Paper Company's motion
to dismiss, the Court concludes that nothing in the
Page 479 U. S. 509
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
et seq., deprives a
Federal District Court of the diversity jurisdiction it would
otherwise have to entertain a common law nuisance suit brought
against a point source located in another State and based on an
injury allegedly suffered in the forum State. I agree with that
holding and find it sufficient to decide this case.
The Court, however, goes further, and ventures its opinion on
whether the District Court must apply the substantive law of the
State in which the source of water pollution is located. Perhaps
the Court is responding to the District Court's observation,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the Clean Water Act
"authorizes actions to redress injury caused by water pollution
of interstate waters under the common law of the state in which the
injury occurred."
602 F.
Supp. 264, 274 (Vt. 1985). But since the District Court has not
yet been asked to decide -- or decided -- which substantive law
will govern this particular suit, there is no dispute between the
parties on this issue, and the Court has no business discussing it
at this stage of the litigation. In its rush to express the opinion
that the substantive law of the source State must govern, the Court
broadly asserts that "[t]he Act preempts state law to the extent
that the state law is applied to an out-of-state point source."
Ante at
479 U. S. 500.
But on this record, the Court does not even know whether Vermont
state law, including its choice-of-law rules, would look to the New
York law of nuisance to govern a nuisance suit based on an alleged
source in New York.
The Court's opinion is thus partially advisory for three
reasons. The question of the applicable state law it addresses has
not yet arisen in this litigation; when it does arise, the District
Court may well conclude that Vermont's choice-of-law rules require
it to apply New York's substantive law; and, as JUSTICE BRENNAN
points out,
ante at
479 U. S. 501,
there is no reason to believe that there is any difference between
the relevant New York and Vermont law in any event. One cannot help
but wonder what has happened to the once respected doctrine of
judicial restraint. Just as this Court does not sit
Page 479 U. S. 510
to edit the opinions of lower courts,
see Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797,
472 U. S. 823
(1985) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), it
also does not sit to draft advisory opinions for the possible
future guidance of other courts.
I
therefore respectfully dissent from that part of the Court's
opinion holding that the Clean Water Act requires the District
Court to apply the nuisance law of the source State.