In 1760 and 1763, respondent Indian Tribe surrendered to Great
Britain its aboriginal territory in return for the right to settle
permanently on a 225-square-mile tract of land now located in South
Carolina. In 1840, the Tribe conveyed the tract to South Carolina
in return for the State's establishing a new reservation for the
Tribe. In 1959, Congress, pursuant to its changed policies
concerning Indian affairs, enacted the Catawba Indian Tribe
Division of Assets Act (Catawba Act) authorizing a division of
Catawba tribal assets. Section 5 of that Act provided for
revocation of the Tribe's constitution, rendered inapplicable to
the Tribe and its members special federal statutory protections for
Indians, and made state laws applicable to the Tribe and its
members in the same way that they apply to all "other persons or
citizens." In 1980, the Tribe brought an action in Federal District
Court against petitioners (South Carolina and other claimants to
the 225-square-mile tract), seeking possession of the tract and
trespass damages for the period of its dispossession on the ground
that the 1840 conveyance to South Carolina was null and void
because the United States never consented to it, as required by the
Nonintercourse Act to make it effective. The District Court granted
summary judgment for petitioners, in part on the ground that the
Tribe's claim was barred by the South Carolina statute of
limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under its
interpretation of the Catawba Act, the state statute of limitations
did not apply.
Held: The explicit redefinition of the relationship
between the Federal Government and respondent Tribe reflected in
the Catawba Act's clear language requires the application of the
state statute of limitations to the Tribe's claim. But whether that
statute bars the claim should be determined by the Court of Appeals
on remand. Pp.
476 U. S.
506-511.
740 F.2d 305, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL
and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
post, p.
476 U. S.
511.
Page 476 U. S. 499
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this litigation is the right to possession of a
"Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles square" described in a 1763 treaty
between the King of England and the Catawba Head Men and Warriors.
[
Footnote 1] The tract,
comprising 144,000 acres and 225 square miles, is located near the
northern border of South Carolina; some 27,000 persons now claim
title to different parcels within the tract. The specific question
presented to us is whether the State's statute of limitations
applies to the Tribe's claim. The answer depends on an
interpretation of a statute enacted by Congress in 1959 to
authorize a division of Catawba tribal assets.
See 25
U.S.C. §§ 931-938.
Page 476 U. S. 500
We hold that the State's statute applies, but we do not reach
the question whether it bars the Tribe's claim.
Simply stated, the Tribe [
Footnote 2] claims that it had undisputed ownership and
possession of the land before the first Nonintercourse Act was
passed by Congress in 1790; [
Footnote 3] that the Nonintercourse Act prohibited any
conveyance of tribal land without the consent of the United States;
and that the United States never gave its consent to a conveyance
of this land. Accordingly, the Tribe's purported conveyance to
South Carolina in 1840 is null and void. Among the defenses
asserted by petitioners [
Footnote
4] is the contention that, even if the Tribe's claim was valid
before passage and enactment of the Catawba Division of Assets Act,
§ 5 of the Act made the state statute of limitations applicable to
the claim. Because that is the only contention that we review, it
is not necessary to describe much of the historical material in the
record.
I
In 1760 and 1763, the Tribe surrendered to Great Britain its
aboriginal territory in what is now North and South Carolina in
return for the right to settle permanently on the "Tract of Land of
Fifteen Miles square" that is now at issue.
Page 476 U. S. 501
For purposes of this summary judgment motion, it is not disputed
that the Tribe retained title to the land when the Nonintercourse
Acts were passed.
By 1840, the Tribe had leased most, if not all, of the land
described in the 1763 treaty to white settlers. In 1840, the Tribe
conveyed its interest in the "Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles
square" to the State of South Carolina by entering into the "Treaty
of Nation Ford." In that treaty, the State agreed, in return for
the "Tract," to spend $5,000 to acquire a new reservation, to pay
the Tribe $2,500 in advance, and to make nine annual payments of
$1,500 in the ensuing years. In 1842, the State purchased a
630-acre tract as a new reservation for the Tribe, which then
apparently had a membership of about 450 persons. [
Footnote 5] This land is still held in trust
for the Tribe by South Carolina.
The Tribe contends that the State did not perform its
obligations under the treaty -- it delayed the purchase of the new
reservation for over 2 1/2 years; it then spent only $2,000 instead
of $5,000 to purchase the new land; and it was not actually "new"
land, because it was located within the original l44,000-acre
tract. Still more importantly, as noted, the Tribe maintains that
this entire transaction was void because the United States did not
consent to the conveyance as required by the Nonintercourse
Act.
At various times during the period between 1900 and 1943,
leaders of the Tribe applied to the State for citizenship and for a
"final settlement of all their claims against the State." [
Footnote 6] Petitioners argue that
these claims merely sought full performance of the State's
obligations under the 1840 treaty, but, for purposes of our
decision, we accept the Tribe's position that it was then asserting
a claim under the Nonintercourse Acts, and thus challenging the
treaty itself. In any
Page 476 U. S. 502
event, both state officials and representatives of the Federal
Government took an interest in the plight of the Tribe. [
Footnote 7]
In response to this concern, on December 14, 1943, the Tribe,
the State, and the Office of Indian Affairs of the Department of
the Interior entered into a Memorandum of Understanding which was
intended to provide relief for the Tribe, but which did not require
the Tribe to release its claims against the State. [
Footnote 8] Pursuant to that agreement, the
State purchased 3,434 acres of land at a cost of $70,000 and
conveyed it to the United States to be held in trust for the Tribe.
[
Footnote 9] The Federal
Government agreed to make annual contributions of available sums
for the welfare of the Tribe and to assist the Tribe with
education, medical benefits, and economic development. For its
part, the Tribe agreed to conduct its affairs on the basis of the
Federal Government's recommendations; it thereafter adopted a
Constitution approved
Page 476 U. S. 503
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Indian
Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476.
In 1953, Congress decided to make a basic change in its policies
concerning Indian affairs. The passage of House Concurrent
Resolution 108 on August 1, 1953, [
Footnote 10] marked the beginning of the "termination
era" -- a period that continued into the mid-1960's, in which the
Federal Government endeavored to terminate its supervisory
responsibilities for Indian tribes. [
Footnote 11] Pursuant to that policy, the Federal
Government identified the Catawba Tribe as a likely candidate for
the withdrawal of federal services. [
Footnote 12] Moreover, members of
Page 476 U. S. 504
the Tribe desired an end to federal restrictions on alienation
of their lands in order to facilitate financing for homes and farm
operations. [
Footnote 13]
Accordingly, after discussions with representatives of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs in which leaders of the Tribe were assured that
any claim they had against the State would not be jeopardized by
legislation terminating federal services, the Tribe adopted a
resolution supporting such legislation and authorizing a
distribution of tribal assets to the members of the Tribe.
[
Footnote 14] After
receiving advice that the Tribe supported legislation authorizing
the disposal of the tribal assets and terminating federal
responsibility for the Tribe and its individual members, Congress
enacted the Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act, 73 Stat.
592, 25 U.S.C. §§ 931-938. The Act provides for the preparation of
a tribal membership roll, § 931; the tribal council's designation
of sites for church, park, playground, and cemetery purposes, §
933(b); and the division of remaining assets among the enrolled
members of the Tribe, § 933(f). The Act also provides for the
revocation of the Tribe's Constitution and the termination of
federal services for the Tribe, § 935. It explicitly states that
state laws shall apply to members of the Tribe in the same manner
that they apply to non-Indians.
Ibid. Pursuant to that
Act, the 3,434-acre reservation that had been acquired as a result
of the 1943 Memorandum of Understanding was distributed to the
members of the Tribe; the Secretary of the Interior revoked the
Tribe's Constitution effective July 1, 1962.
Page 476 U. S. 505
In 1980, the Tribe commenced this action seeking possession of
the 225-square-mile tract and trespass damages for the period of
its dispossession. All of the District Judges for the District of
South Carolina recused themselves, and Judge Willson of the Western
District of Pennsylvania was designated to try the case. After the
development of a substantial record of uncontested facts, Judge
Willson granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. His order
of dismissal was initially reversed by a panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 718 F.2d 1291 (1983); sitting en
banc, the full Court of Appeals adopted the panel's opinion. 740
F.2d 305 (1984). Because of the importance of the case, we
requested the views of the Solicitor General of the United States
and granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1134 (1985). We now reverse.
II
Section 5 of the Catawba Act is central to this dispute. As
currently codified, it provides:
"The constitution of the tribe adopted pursuant to sections 461,
462, 463, 464, 465, 466 to 470, 471 to 473, 474, 475, 476 to 478,
and 479 of this title shall be revoked by the Secretary.
Thereafter, the tribe and its members shall not be entitled to any
of the special services performed by the United States for Indians
because of their status as Indians, all statutes of the United
States that affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall
be inapplicable to them, and the laws of the several States shall
apply to them in the same manner they apply to other persons or
citizens within their jurisdiction. Nothing in this subchapter,
however, shall affect the status of such persons as citizens of the
United States."
25 U.S.C. § 935.
This provision establishes two principles in unmistakably clear
language. First, the special federal services and statutory
protections for Indians are no longer applicable to the
Page 476 U. S. 506
Catawba Tribe and its members. Second, state laws apply to the
Catawba Tribe and its members in precisely the same fashion that
they apply to others.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with this reading of the Act. For
it concluded that the word "them" in the second sentence of § 5
could refer to the individual Indians who are members of the Tribe,
and not encompass the Tribe itself. Relying on the canon that
doubtful expressions of legislative intent must be resolved in
favor of the Indians, [
Footnote
15] it thus held that the language in § 5 about the
inapplicability of federal Indian statutes and the applicability of
state laws did not reach the Tribe itself.
The canon of construction regarding the resolution of
ambiguities in favor of Indians, however, does not permit reliance
on ambiguities that do not exist; nor does it permit disregard of
the clearly expressed intent of Congress. [
Footnote 16] It seems clear to us that the
antecedent of the words "them" and "their" in the second sentence
of § 5 is the compound subject of the first clause in the sentence,
namely, "the tribe and its members." To read the provision
otherwise is to give it a contorted construction that abruptly
divorces the first clause from the second and the third, and that
conflicts with the central purpose
Page 476 U. S. 507
and philosophy of the Termination Act. According the statutory
language its ordinary meaning, moreover, is reinforced by the fact
that the first sentence in the section provides for a revocation of
the Tribe's Constitution. It would be most incongruous to preserve
special protections for a tribe whose constitution has been
revoked. while withdrawing protection for individual members of
that tribe. [
Footnote
17]
Without special federal protection for the Tribe, the state
statute of limitations should apply to its claim in this case. For
it is well established that federal claims are subject to state
statutes of limitations unless there is a federal statute of
limitations or a conflict with federal policy. [
Footnote 18] Although federal policy may
preclude the ordinary applicability of a state statute of
limitations for this type of action in the absence of a specific
congressional enactment to the contrary,
County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U. S. 226
(1985), the Catawba Act clearly suffices to reestablish the usual
principle regarding the applicability of the state statute of
limitations. In striking contrast to the situation in
Page 476 U. S. 508
County of Oneida, the Catawba Act represents an
explicit redefinition of the relationship between the Federal
Government and the Catawbas; an intentional termination of the
special federal protection for the Tribe and its members; and a
plain statement that state law applies to the Catawbas as to all
"other persons or citizens."
That the state statute of limitations applies as a consequence
of terminating special federal protections is also supported by the
significance we have accorded congressional action redefining the
federal relationship with particular Indians. We have long
recognized that, when Congress removes restraints on alienation by
Indians, state laws are fully applicable to subsequent claims.
[
Footnote 19] Similarly, we
have emphasized that Termination Acts subject members of the
terminated tribe to "the full sweep of state laws and state
Page 476 U. S. 509
taxation." [
Footnote 20]
These principles reflect an understanding that congressional action
to remove restraints on alienation and other federal protections
represents a fundamental change in federal policy with respect to
the Indians who are the subject of the particular legislation.
The Court of Appeals found support for its conclusion about the
nonapplicability of the state statute of limitations in § 6 of the
Catawba Act, which provides that nothing in the statute affects the
rights of the Tribe under the laws of South Carolina. [
Footnote 21] The thrust of the Court
of Appeals' reasoning was that, if a state law was inapplicable to
the Tribe or its members before the effective date of the Act, its
application after the effective date necessarily violates § 6. But
such a reading contradicts the plain meaning of § 5's reference to
the applicability of state laws. In our view, § 6 was merely
intended to remove federal obstacles to the ordinary application of
state law. Section 6 cannot be read to preserve, of its
Page 476 U. S. 510
own force, a federal tribal immunity from otherwise applicable
state law without defeating a basic purpose of the Act and negating
explicit language in § 5. [
Footnote 22] Most fundamentally, § 6 simply does not
speak to the explicit redefinition of the federal relationship with
the Catawbas that is the basis for the applicability of the state
statute of limitations.
Finally, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the assurance to
the Tribe that the status of any claim against South Carolina would
not be affected by the legislation. [
Footnote 23] Even assuming that the legislative
provisions are sufficiently ambiguous to warrant reliance on the
legislative history, we believe that the Court of Appeals
misconceived the import of this assurance. We do not accept
petitioners' argument that the Catawba Act immediately extinguished
any claim that the Tribe had before the statute became effective.
Rather, we assume that the status of the claim remained exactly the
same immediately before and immediately after the effective date of
the Act, but that the Tribe thereafter had an obligation to proceed
to assert its claim in a timely manner as would any other person or
citizen within the State's jurisdiction. As a result, unlike the
Court of Appeals, we perceive no contradiction between the
applicability of the state statute of limitations and the assurance
that the status of any state claims would not be affected by the
Act.
We thus conclude that the explicit redefinition of the federal
relationship reflected in the clear language of the Catawba
Page 476 U. S. 511
Act requires the application of the state statute of limitations
to the Tribe's claim.
III
The District Court held that respondent's claim is barred by the
South Carolina statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals'
construction of the 1959 federal statute made it unnecessary for
that court to review the District Court's interpretation of state
law. Because the Court of Appeals is in a better position to
evaluate such an issue of state law than we are, [
Footnote 24] we remand the case to that
court for consideration of this issue.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The 1763 Treaty of Fort Augusta was entered into by the Catawbas
and British and colonial officials, and provides, in relevant
part:
"And We the Catawba Head Men and Warriors in Confirmation of an
Agreement heretofore entered into with the White People declare
that we will remain satisfied with the Tract of Land of Fifteen
Miles square a Survey of which by our consent and at our request
has been already begun and the respective Governors and
Superintendent on their Parts promise and engage that the aforesaid
survey shall be compleated and that the Catawbas shall not in any
respect be molested by any of the King's subjects within the said
Lines but shall be indulged in the usual Manner of hunting
Elsewhere."
XI Colonial Records of North Carolina 201-202 (1763), reprinted
in App. 35.
[
Footnote 2]
Respondent, Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., is a nonprofit
corporation organized under the laws of South Carolina in 1975.
Like the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we assume that
respondent is the successor in interest of the Catawba Indian Tribe
of South Carolina. For convenience, we refer to respondent as the
"Tribe" throughout this opinion.
[
Footnote 3]
See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 138. The
Act, now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177, states in relevant part:
"No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of
any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same
be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution."
[
Footnote 4]
Petitioners include the State of South Carolina and
approximately 76 other parties who are named as defendants in the
complaint; they were sued as representatives of a class that was
alleged to consist of the approximately 27,000 persons who claim an
interest in the disputed land.
[
Footnote 5]
An 1825 War Department chart indicated that the Catawbas totaled
450 persons. 2 American State Papers 545 (1925).
[
Footnote 6]
See 1920 S.C.Acts 1700, Joint Res. No. 904, § 1.
[
Footnote 7]
In 1930, a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs held hearings in Rock Hill, South Carolina, which is
located in the 144,000-acre tract. Senator Thomas of Oklahoma wrote
that the
"subcommittee . . . found some hundred and seventy-five remnants
of this band located on a tract of practically barren rock and
gradually starving to death."
Division of Tribal Assets of Catawba Indian Tribe, Hearings on
H.R. 6128, before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(unpublished), Insert 5, at 3 (Minutes of State and Federal
Conference, Oct. 21, 1958) (6 Record Ex. 56), quoting Feb. 10,
1932, letter, Senator Thomas to Commissioner Rhoads.
[
Footnote 8]
Preliminary drafts of the Memorandum of Understanding contained
a provision extinguishing the Tribe's reservation claim (6 Record
Ex. 49), but that provision was deleted. The Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior emphasized that the agreement should not
use "a contract under the Johnson-O'Malley Act in order to deprive
the Indian tribe of claims which it might be able to enforce in the
courts." United States Department of the Interior, Office of the
Solicitor, Memorandum for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
Id. Ex. 50, p. 3.
[
Footnote 9]
The State also agreed to appropriate at least $9,500 annually
for three years for the benefit of the Tribe, and to extend to
Catawbas the rights and privileges of all citizens, including
admission to public schools.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 10]
That Resolution declared:
"[I]t is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make
the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States
subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and
responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United
States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to
grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to
American citizenship."
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), 67 Stat.
B132.
[
Footnote 11]
According to one compilation, between 1954 and 1962, Congress
passed 12 separate "Termination Acts," the 11th of which was the
Catawba Act.
See F. Prucha, The Great Father 1048 (1984).
The termination policy has been criticized by various commentators.
See, e.g., Cornell, The New Indian Politics, 10 Wilson Q.
113, 121 (1986); F. Prucha,
supra, at 1046-1069; Wilkinson
& Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 American
Indian L.Rev. 139 (1977); Preloznik & Felsenthal, The Menominee
Struggle to Maintain Their Tribal Assets and Protect Their Treaty
Rights Following Termination, 51 N.D.L.Rev. 53 (1976). The ultimate
legislative wisdom of the termination policy is, of course, not
before the Court.
[
Footnote 12]
In September, 1954, a House Study Subcommittee on Indian Affairs
reported that the Catawba Tribe was one of the groups able to take
responsibility for their affairs, and therefore was ready for
termination of federal services. H.R.Rep. No. 2680, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., 2-3 (1954). In contrast to the report made by Senator Thomas
in 1930,
n 7,
supra,
the Reports accompanying the Act concluded that the Catawbas had
been able to merge into the general community, and had been able to
attain an economic position comparable to that of non-Indians.
See S.Rep. No. 863, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1959) ("The
Catawba Indians have advanced economically . . . during the past 14
years, and have now reached a position that is comparable to their
non-Indian neighbors"); H.R.Rep. No. 910, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2
(1969) (same). Most adult male Catawbas were employed at the time:
47% were in industry, 20% in skilled labor, 7% in the Armed
Services, 15% in odd jobs, 5% retired, and 6% on the welfare rolls.
S.Rep. at 4; H.R.Rep. at 5.
[
Footnote 13]
See 105 Cong.Rec. 5462 (1959) (statement of Rep.
Hemphill); App. 102.
[
Footnote 14]
The resolution adopted at the meeting of the Tribe on January 3,
1959, expressly noted that "nothing in this legislation shall
affect the status of any claim against the State of South Carolina
by the Catawba Tribe."
Id. at 103.
[
Footnote 15]
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.
S. 425,
420 U. S. 444
(1976);
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.
S. 194,
420 U. S.
199-200 (1975);
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.
S. 481,
412 U. S.
504-505 (1973).
[
Footnote 16]
See Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian
Tribe, 473 U. S. 753,
473 U. S. 774
(1985) ("[E]ven though
legal ambiguities are resolved to the
benefit of the Indians,' DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U. S. 425,
420 U. S. 447
(1976), courts cannot ignore plain language that, viewed in
historical context and given a `fair appraisal,' Washington v. Washington
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S.
[658, 443 U. S. 673
(1979)], clearly runs counter to a tribe's later claims"); Rice
v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713,
463 U. S. 732
(1983) (canon of construction regarding certain Indian claims
should not be applied "when application would be tantamount to a
formalistic disregard of congressional intent"); Andrus v.
Glover Construction Co., 446 U. S. 608,
446 U. S.
618-619 (1980); DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. at 420 U. S. 447
("A canon of construction is not a license to disregard clear
expressions of tribal and congressional intent").
[
Footnote 17]
Respondent argues that the scope of the Act was merely to
terminate the specific federal services arising from the 1943
Memorandum of Understanding. Such a limited interpretation cannot
be reconciled with the broader language of the Act ("The tribe and
its members shall not be entitled to
any of the special
services performed by the United States for Indians because of
their status as Indians"; "
all statutes of the United
States that affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall
be inapplicable to them"; "the laws of the several states shall
apply to them
in the same manner they apply to other
persons or citizens within their jurisdiction") (emphasis
added).
[
Footnote 18]
See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.
S. 261,
471 U. S.
266-267 (1985);
Board of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 U. S. 478,
446 U. S.
483-484 (1980);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U. S. 454,
421 U. S. 462
(1975);
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U. S. 696,
383 U. S.
703-704 (1966);
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.
S. 461,
331 U. S. 463
(1947);
Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96,
312 U. S. 97
(1941);
O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.
S. 318,
233 U. S.
322-323 (1914);
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390,
203 U. S.
397-398 (1906);
McClaine v. Rankin,
197 U. S. 154,
197 U. S. 158
(1905);
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.
S. 610,
155 U. S. 617
(1895);
McCluny v.
Silliman, 3 Pet. 270,
28 U. S. 277
(1830).
[
Footnote 19]
See, e.g., Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.
S. 431,
276 U. S. 439
(1928) ("with the issue of the patent, the title not only passed
from the United States but the prior trust and the incidental
restrictions against alienation were terminated. This put an end to
the authority theretofore possessed by the Secretary of the
Interior by reason of the trust and restriction -- so that
thereafter all questions pertaining to the title were subject to
examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in
Nebraska, the land being there");
Dickson v. Luck Land
Co., 242 U. S. 371,
242 U. S. 376
(1917) ("With those restrictions [of Congress] entirely removed and
the fee simple issued, it would seem that the situation was one in
which all questions pertaining to the disposal of the lands
naturally would fall within the scope and operation of the laws of
the State");
United States v. Waller, 243 U.
S. 452,
243 U. S.
461-462 (1917) ("We cannot escape the conviction that
the plain language of this act evidences the intent and purpose of
Congress to make such lands allotted to mixed-blood Indians subject
to alienation with all the incidents and rights which inhere in
full ownership in persons of full capacity");
Schrimpscher v.
Stockton, 183 U. S. 290,
183 U. S. 296
(1902) (after a treaty removed restraints from alienation of land
by certain Wyandotte Indians, state statute of limitations ran
against Indians, even though Indians later asserted claim of a
prior federal treaty violation; after removal of restraints on
alienation, the Indian's heirs "were chargeable with the same
diligence in beginning an action for their recovery as other
persons having title to lands").
[
Footnote 20]
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.
S. 373,
426 U. S. 389
(1976).
See also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.
S. 641,
430 U. S. 647,
n. 7 (1977) ("[M]embers of tribes whose official status has been
terminated by congressional enactment are no longer subject, by
virtue of their status, to federal criminal jurisdiction under the
Major Crimes Act");
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U. S. 128
(1972) (terminated members of Tribe must bring action to invalidate
allegedly fraudulent conveyance under same laws as other
citizens).
As the Court of Appeals noted, in
Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U. S. 404
(1968), the Court concluded that the Menominee Termination Act did
not terminate the Tribe's hunting and fishing rights. The Court
emphasized that the Termination Act must be read
in pari
materia with an Act passed in the same Congress that preserved
hunting and fishing rights.
Id. at
391 U. S. 411.
In this case, of course, there is no similar contemporaneous
statute. Moreover, in
Menominee, the Court was concerned
about a "backhanded" abrogation of treaty rights,
id. at
391 U. S. 412;
no comparable abrogation is at issue here.
[
Footnote 21]
As currently codified, § 6 provides:
"Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the rights, privileges,
or obligations of the tribe and its members under the laws of South
Carolina."
25 U.S.C. § 936.
[
Footnote 22]
It is an "elementary canon of construction that a statute should
be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative."
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379,
439 U. S. 392
(1979).
See also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo
of Santa Ana, 472 U. S. 237,
472 U. S. 249
(1985);
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.
S. 528,
348 U. S.
538-539 (1955) ("It is our duty
to give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute,' Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147,
107 U. S. 152,
rather than to emasculate an entire section").
[
Footnote 23]
See 718 F.2d 1291, 1296 (1983) (quoting Bureau of
Indian Affairs official's assurance that "
any claim the
Catawbas had against the State would not be jeopardized by carrying
out a program with the Federal Government'").
[
Footnote 24]
See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.
S. 469,
475 U. S.
484-485, n. 13 (1986);
Regents of University of
Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214,
474 U. S. 224,
n. 10 (1985);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.
S. 341,
426 U. S.
345-347 (1976);
Propper v. Clark, 337 U.
S. 472,
337 U. S.
486-487 (1949).
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE
O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act, 73 Stat. 592,
25 U.S.C. § 931
et seq., was passed by Congress in 1959 to
divide up the Tribe's federally supervised reservation so that
individual Catawbas could sell or mortgage their allotments. The
Court today concludes that the Act also had the incidental effect
of applying a South Carolina statute of limitations to the
Catawbas' preexisting and longstanding claim to lands the State
purported to purchase from the Tribe in 1840. I feel this
interpretation cannot be reconciled with the language of the Act
under this Court's traditional approach to statutes regulating
Indian affairs. I therefore dissent.
I
Too often, we neglect the past. Even more than other domains of
law, "the intricacies and peculiarities of Indian law deman[d] an
appreciation of history." Frankfurter,
Page 476 U. S. 512
Foreword to A Jurisprudential Symposium in Memory of Felix S.
Cohen, 9 Rutgers L.Rev. 355, 356 (1954).
Before the arrival of white settlers, the Catawba Indians
occupied much of what is now North and South Carolina. In the 1760
Treaty of Pine Tree Hill, the Catawbas relinquished the bulk of
their aboriginal territory to Great Britain in exchange for
assurances that they would be allowed to live in peace on a small
portion of that territory, a square of land 15 miles on each side
(144,000 acres), which today surrounds and includes Rock Hill, S.C.
Three years later, in the Treaty of Augusta, the Tribe again agreed
to "remain satisfied with the Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles
square," and the British once more promised that "the Catawba shall
not in any respect be molested by any of the King's subjects within
the said Lines." App. 35. It is the 144,000 acres reserved for the
Catawbas in 1760 and again in 1763 -- "a mere token of the[ir] once
large domain" -- that give rise to this litigation.
See J.
Brown, The Catawba Indians 8 (1966) (Brown).
The historical record suggests that the Catawbas were driven to
the agreements of 1760 and 1763 in large part by the colonists'
repeated and continuing encroachments on tribal lands. [
Footnote 2/1] Some of the land was acquired
by purchase,
see, e.g., id. at 165, but in South Carolina,
as elsewhere, "[f]rom the very beginning, abuses marred the
transfer of land titles from the Indians to individuals among the
English
Page 476 U. S. 513
colonists." F. Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative
Years 6 (1962). Indeed, the South Carolina Provincial Council took
legislative notice in a 1739 statute that lands purchased from
Indians were
"generally obtained . . . by unfair representations, fraud and
circumvention, or by making them gifts or presents of little value,
by which practices, great resentments and animosities have been
created amongst the Indians toward the inhabitants of this
Province."
An Act to restrain and prevent the purchasing Lands from
Indians, 1 The First Laws of the State of South Carolina 160-161
(J. Cushing ed.1981). The 1739 statute therefore barred the private
acquisition of Indian lands without a grant or license from the
Crown or the Governor, but such steps apparently did little to stop
white encroachments on Indian territory.
See Clinton &
Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on
Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims,
31 U.Maine L.Rev. 17, 21 (1979). Recognizing that "great frauds and
abuses have been committed in the purchasing lands of the Indians,"
the Crown, in October, 1763 -- shortly before the signing of the
Treaty of Augusta -- flatly forbade any further private purchases
of land reserved for Indian tribes. Proclamation of 1763, reprinted
in 3 W. Washburn, The American Indian and the United States 2135,
2138 (1973).
The United States, from an early date, followed a similar
policy. Since 1790, the Nonintercourse Act, now codified as
reenacted and amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177, has broadly prohibited
the sale of Indian land without the consent of the Federal
Government. Despite this prohibition -- which in 1793 was extended
to include not only outright purchases but also acquisitions of any
"claim" to protected lands,
see Act of Mar. 1, 1793, § 8,
1 Stat. 330 -- mounting pressures from settlers in the early 18th
century led the State of South Carolina to enact a series of
statutes purporting to authorize the leasing
Page 476 U. S. 514
of Catawba lands to non-Indians. Initially, the leases signed
under these statutes seem to have posed little threat to the Tribe.
According to B. S. Massey, who knew the Catawbas during this time
and later served as South Carolina's agent to the Tribe,
"[t]hey were then strong, and felt themselves in their own
greatness, governed by their own laws, working the best spots of
their lands and leasing out the poorer portions to the white
men."
Report to The Governor of South Carolina on the Catawba Indians
4 (1854), reprinted in 6 Record, Ex. 11.
By the 1830's, however, nearly all of the 144,000 acres reserved
for the Tribe in the Treaty of Augusta had been leased to
non-Indians. This situation proved disastrous, because rents were
"generally paid in old horses, old cows or bed quilts and clothes,
at prices that the whites set on the articles taken."
Ibid. The Catawbas soon were reduced to "a state of
starvation and distress,"
ibid., and they ultimately gave
in to repeated efforts by the State to purchase their land. In
1840, representatives of the Tribe and the State signed the Treaty
of Nation Ford. Under this "treaty" -- which the United States
never joined or approved -- the Catawbas relinquished all their
land in exchange for two promises. First, the State promised the
sum of $16,000 in a series of resettlement payments. Second, the
State pledged that it would purchase a new reservation "of the
value of five thousand dollars," including 300 acres of "good
arable lands fit for cultivation" in a thinly populated area of
North or South Carolina satisfactory to the Indians. App. 38-39.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Page 476 U. S. 515
The South Carolina Legislature promptly provided for the
transfer of title from the State to the lessees of the 144,000
acres, requiring only that the lessees reimburse the State
proportionately for its advances to the Tribe. Act of Dec. 18,
1840, § 3, 7 S.C. Stats. 103 (1840). Unfortunately, the State
showed less enthusiasm in fulfilling its contractual obligations to
the Indians. After allowing the Catawbas to wander homeless and
uncompensated for 2 1/2 years, the State reportedly spent $2,000 to
buy back 630 agriculturally undesirable acres of the Catawbas'
original 18th-century treaty lands as a "new" reservation for the
Tribe. [
Footnote 2/3] The State
continues to hold these 630 acres for the Catawbas. It is unclear
from the record before us whether the Tribe ever received the
resettlement payments promised by the State.
In the 146 years that have passed since the Nation Ford
agreement, the Catawbas repeatedly have pressed their claim to the
144,000 acres, which they feel were taken from them illegally. In
the early 1900's, the Tribe petitioned both the Federal Government
and the State of South Carolina for relief, arguing that the 1840
transfer was void because the United States had not approved it.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs advised the Catawbas in 1906 and
again in 1909 that the Department of the Interior would not seek
relief on their behalf. He explained that the Catawbas were "state
Indians," for whom the United States had no responsibility, and,
consequently, that the absence of federal participation in
Page 476 U. S. 516
the Treaty of Nation Ford did not void the transaction.
[
Footnote 2/4] In 1908, the South
Carolina Attorney General reached the same conclusion, and advised
the state legislature that the Tribe had no outstanding claim to
any of the 144,000 acres. 1908 Op.S.C.Atty.Gen. 17, 18, 29-32. The
Tribe nonetheless continued to press its claim to the land. A
federal Indian agent visiting the Catawbas in December, 1910, for
example, was asked about the Tribe's prospects for recovering
"their old reservation of 15 miles square"; he told them the
Department of the Interior would not take their case into court. 6
Record, Ex. 21, pp. 11-12 (letter from C. Davis to Comm'r of Indian
Affairs, Jan. 5, 1911).
The seeds of the legislation found dispositive by the Court
today were planted in 1943, when the Tribe, the State of South
Carolina, and the Department of the Interior concluded a Memorandum
of Understanding providing for a new reservation for the Catawbas
and placing the Tribe and the new reservation under federal
supervision. Evidently concerned about the Tribe's continued
grievances concerning the 1840 agreement, South Carolina sought,
unsuccessfully, to include in the Memorandum a waiver of any
outstanding claims the Catawbas had against the State.
Id.
Ex. 48, (letter from Ass't Comm'r of Indian Affairs to S.C. State
Auditor, Aug. 28, 1941). Preliminary drafts of the Memorandum
included such a waiver,
see id. Ex. 49, p. 5, but federal
officials ultimately dropped the provision because they doubted the
legality of using the agreement to deprive the Indians of claims
that otherwise might be enforceable in court,
see App.
Page 476 U. S. 517
43-44 (memorandum from Interior Dept. Solicitor to Comm'r of
Indian Affairs, Jan. 13, 1942).
In 1958, after representatives from the Bureau of Indian Affairs
suggested to the Catawbas that their financial difficulties could
be alleviated by distributing the Tribe's federally supervised
assets and ending federal restrictions on alienation, the Indians
expressed concern about their claims against the State, but they
were assured that the proposal would not jeopardize those claims. 6
Record, Ex. 53, pp. 7-8 (memorandum from program officer to Tribal
Programs Branch Chief, Jan. 30, 1959) (quoted by the Court,
ante at
476 U. S. 510,
n. 23). The Tribe then adopted a resolution calling on its
Congressman, Robert Hemphill, to introduce and secure passage of
legislation to remove restraints on alienation and to distribute
tribal assets; the resolution specifically requested, however, that
"nothing in this legislation shall affect the status of any claim
against the State of South Carolina by the Catawba Tribe." App.
103.
Representative Hemphill asked the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
draft legislation "to accomplish the desires set forth in the
Resolution."
Id. at 50. He then presented the draft bill
to the Catawbas, and told them that it had been "drawn up to carry
out the intent of the resolution."
Id. at 111. After a
majority of the Tribe expressed approval, Representative Hemphill
introduced the bill in Congress, explaining that the Tribe had
given its consent.
See 105 Cong.Rec. 5462 (1959). The
result was the 1959 Division of Assets Act, which the Court today
concludes may bar the Tribe from pursuing its claim to the lands
reserved for it in 1760 and 1763.
In the 1970's, spurred by favorable legal rulings elsewhere in
the country, Catawba leaders renewed their request to the
Department of the Interior to seek relief for the Tribe. In 1977,
the Solicitor of the Department concluded that the rebuffs given
the Catawbas in 1906 and 1909 had been legally unjustified, and
that the Tribe could establish a
prima facie claim to the
144,000 acres. He further concluded that the
Page 476 U. S. 518
Division of Assets Act operated prospectively only, and did not
affect preexisting rights. Accordingly, the Solicitor formally
requested the Department of Justice to institute legal action on
behalf of the Catawbas and to support the settlement discussions
that the Tribe already had initiated with South Carolina officials.
See App. to Brief in Opposition 3a. The litigation request
was later withdrawn in an effort to emphasize that the Interior
Department favored a negotiated settlement if at all possible, and
settlement legislation backed by the Tribe was introduced in
Congress.
See Hearing, at 15-17 (statement of Leo M.
Krulitz, Solicitor of the Department of the Interior). The
legislative efforts apparently proved fruitless, and, in October,
1980, the Tribe filed this suit.
II
The Tribe's complaint asserts a right to possession of the
reserved portion of its aboriginal territory under the
Nonintercourse Act, the Federal Constitution, and the treaties of
1760 and 1763. [
Footnote 2/5] These
are federal claims,
see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U. S. 661,
414 U. S.
666-678 (1974) (
Oneida I), and the statute of
limitations is thus a matter of federal law,
see County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.
S. 226,
470 U. S.
240-244 (1985) (
Oneida II). Where, as here,
Congress has not specified a statute of limitations, federal courts
generally borrow the most closely analogous limitations period
under state law, but only if application of the state limitations
period would not frustrate federal policy.
See, e.g., Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U. S. 261,
471 U. S.
266-267 (1985);
DelCostello v. Teamsters,
462 U. S. 151,
462 U. S.
158-163
Page 476 U. S. 519
(1983);
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.
S. 355,
432 U. S. 367
(1977).
In
Oneida II, the Court recognized that application of
state statutes of limitations to Indian land claims generally would
violate federal policy. The Court noted that a 1950 federal statute
giving New York courts jurisdiction over most civil disputes
involving Indians had been carefully crafted to exempt preexisting
land claims from the operation of a New York statute of
limitations.
See Act of Sept. 13, 1950, 64 Stat. 845, 25
U.S.C. § 233. Furthermore, in a later series of more general
enactments imposing a federal statute of limitations on certain
tort and contract actions brought anywhere in the United States by
Indians or by the United States on behalf of Indians, Congress
specifically excluded from the limitations period all actions "to
establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal
property." 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c). [
Footnote 2/6] The Court in
Oneida II concluded
that
Page 476 U. S. 520
the text and legislative history of these statutes evinced a
congressional belief that actions brought to enforce Indian
property rights were not, and should not be, subject to filing
deadlines other than those provided by federal statute. Borrowing a
state statute of limitations in such a case "would be a violation
of Congress' will." 470 U.S. at
470 U. S.
244.
In determining whether the 1959 Division of Assets Act exempts
the Catawbas' claim from this general principle, analysis must
begin with the firmly established rule -- which the Court today
implicitly reaffirms,
see ante at
476 U. S. 506
-- that ambiguities in statutes regulating Indian affairs are to be
construed in the Indians' favor.
See, e.g., Oneida II, 470
U.S. at
470 U. S.
247-248;
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.
S. 373,
426 U. S. 392
(1976);
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast,
425 U. S. 649,
425 U. S. 655,
n. 7 (1976);
DeCoteau v. District County Court,
420 U. S. 425,
420 U. S. 444
(1975);
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co.,
314 U. S. 339,
314 U. S.
353-354 (1941);
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U. S. 78,
248 U. S. 89
(1918);
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665,
224 U. S. 675
(1912);
see generally F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 221-225 (1982). This rule is not simply a method of breaking
ties; it reflects an altogether proper reluctance by the judiciary
to assume that Congress has chosen further to disadvantage a people
whom our Nation long ago reduced to a state of dependency. The rule
is particularly appropriate when the statute in question was passed
primarily for the benefit of the Indians, as was the 1959 Division
of Assets Act. Absent "clear and plain" language to the contrary,
Santa Fe Pacific, 314 U.S. at
314 U. S. 353,
it must be assumed that Congress did not intend to belie its
Page 476 U. S. 521
"avowed solicitude" for the Indians,
id. at
314 U. S. 354,
with a "backhanded" abrogation or limitation of their rights,
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.
S. 404,
391 U. S. 412
(1968).
The Court today evidently finds in § 5 of the Division of Assets
Act "the clearly expressed intent of Congress,"
ante at
476 U. S. 506,
that the Catawbas' tribal land claim was to be subject to South
Carolina's statute of limitations. The Court relies largely on two
provisions of § 5. The first renders inapplicable to the Catawbas
all "special services performed by the United States for Indians
because of their status as Indians," and "all statutes of the
United States that affect Indians because of their status as
Indians." The second provides that state laws shall "apply to [the
Catawbas] in the same manner they apply to other persons or
citizens." 25 U.S.C. § 935. Neither of these provisions, in my
view, is able to bear the weight the Court places upon it.
A
The first provision merely renders federal Indian "services" and
"statutes" inapplicable to the Catawbas. I agree with the Court
that this provision makes the Nonintercourse Act, along with other
Indian statutes, inapplicable both to individual Catawbas and to
the Tribe.
See ante at
476 U. S.
505-509. But that simply means that, after the Division
of Assets Act went into effect, the Tribe no longer was statutorily
barred from selling or leasing its land. The services-and-statutes
clause of the Act does not expressly abrogate or place procedural
conditions on any preexisting claims the Catawbas may have had, and
the broad federal policy against application of state statutes of
limitations to Indian land claims is neither a "service" nor a
"statute."
The majority nonetheless asserts that this Court has "long
recognized that, when Congress removes restraints on alienation by
Indians, state laws are fully applicable to subsequent claims."
Ante at
476 U. S. 508.
The cases it cites for that proposition all were decided well
before the emergence during the
Page 476 U. S. 522
past 35 years of a clear congressional policy against the
application of state statutes of limitations to Indian land claims.
See Oneida II, 470 U.S. at
470 U. S.
240-244. More importantly, all the cases cited by the
majority involve lands for which patents had been issued to
individual Indians, not lands alleged to remain tribal property.
This Court made clear in
Oneida I that claims arising
under such patents are not federal claims at all, because, "[o]nce
patent issues, the incidents of ownership are, for the most part,
matters of local property law, to be vindicated in local courts."
414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 676.
In this case, however, as in
Oneida I,
"the assertion of a federal controversy does not rest solely on
the claim of a right to possession derived from a federal grant of
title whose scope will be governed by state law. Rather, it rests
on the substantial claim that federal law now protects, and has
continuously protected from the time of the formation of the United
States, possessory right to tribal lands, wholly apart from the
application of state law principles which normally and separately
protect a valid right of possession."
Id. at
414 U. S. 677.
Here, as in
Oneida I, the complaint thus "asserts a
present right to possession under federal law."
Id. at
414 U. S.
675.
I do not see how a statute removing restraints on alienation can
fairly be said to signal unambiguously a congressional intent to
subject preexisting tribal land claims arising under federal law to
state statutes of limitations. But even if I agreed with the
majority that the removal of restraints on alienation should
trigger the application of state limitations periods, the 1959 Act
lifted only
statutory restrictions on the alienation of
Catawba land, and the requirement that the Federal Government
approve any transfer of the property at issue in this case did not,
and does not, stem solely from any federal statute. The land set
aside for the Catawbas in 1760 and 1763 was within the Tribe's
aboriginal territory, [
Footnote
2/7] and
Page 476 U. S. 523
their claim to the land thus derives from original title
[
Footnote 2/8] as well as from the
18th-century treaties. [
Footnote
2/9] With respect to original title, at least, the
Nonintercourse Act merely
"'put in statutory form what was or came to be the accepted rule
-- that the extinguishment of Indian title required the consent of
the United States.'"
Oneida II, 470 U.S. at
470 U. S. 240,
quoting
Oneida I, 414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 678.
[
Footnote 2/10]
There is nothing in the 1959 legislation that indicates that
Congress intended to exempt the Catawbas from this
Page 476 U. S. 524
common law protection of undistributed tribal property as well
as from its statutory codification. Nor is there anything to
indicate that Congress meant to abrogate the protection promised to
the Tribe under the treaties of 1760 and 1763, which the Tribe
claims provide an independent source of continuing federal
protection. Indeed, in rejecting an argument that a similar
provision of the Menominee Termination Act destroyed treaty rights
to hunt and fish, this Court noted: "The use of the word
statutes' is potent evidence that no treaty was in
mind." Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 412
(emphasis in original). In the same way, Congress' use in 1959 of
the terms "services" and "statutes" suggests, if anything, that the
Division of Assets Act was not intended to remove other sources of
protection. Surely the selection of these terms provides no support
for the view that Congress meant to impose new procedural
requirements on preexisting tribal land claims based not only on
statutory provisions, but also on treaty rights and federal common
law. [Footnote 2/11]
Page 476 U. S. 525
B
The second provision of the 1959 Act relied on by the Court
directs that "the laws of the several States shall apply to them in
the same manner they apply to other persons or citizens within
their jurisdiction." I agree with the Court that the word "them"
must be understood to refer not only to individual Catawbas, but
also to the Tribe.
See ante at
476 U. S.
506-507. Clearly, however, "them" does not refer to
claims brought by the Catawbas; the term encompasses the
plaintiff in this case, but not the cause of action.
This distinction is critical. The "laws of the several States"
provision of the Division of Assets Act placed the Catawbas on the
same footing as non-Indians with regard to the application of state
law. Just as a non-Indian's action based on South Carolina law must
be brought within the time specified by the State, so a state law
action brought by a Catawba -- or by the Catawba Tribe -- must meet
the same requirement. If a non-Indian in South Carolina brings a
federal claim, however, the limitations period is determined by
federal law. The same must hold for the federal claims raised by
the Catawbas in this litigation.
Of course, the real question in this case is not whether federal
law governs the limitations question, but whether federal law
should borrow South Carolina's period of limitations,
notwithstanding the general federal policy against such borrowing
in the context of Indian land claims. My point here is that this
question is not answered by the statutory instruction to apply
state law to the Catawbas "in the same manner" as it is applied to
non-Indians. Subjecting a group of Indians to state law to the same
extent as other citizens is far different from subjecting their
unique federal claims to a state statute of limitations. For
non-Indians as well as Indians,
Page 476 U. S. 526
the decision whether to apply a state limitations period to a
federal claim depends on whether such application is deemed
contrary to federal policy. And nothing in § 5 of the Division of
Assets Act unambiguously directs that, as a matter of federal
policy, the Catawbas' unsettled tribal claims should be treated any
differently for statute of limitations purposes from other tribal
land claims. Indeed, there is no indication that Congress thought
about such claims at all. [
Footnote
2/12]
C
The Court does not rely exclusively on the terms of the two
provisions discussed above; it also emphasizes that the Division of
Assets Act as a whole represented an "explicit redefinition of the
relationship between the Federal Government and the Catawbas,"
terminating "special federal protection" for the Tribe and its
members.
Ante at
476 U. S. 508;
see also ante at
476 U. S. 510.
[
Footnote 2/13] But if we take
seriously the "eminently sound and vital canon" that all
ambiguities in statutes passed for the benefit of Indians are to be
construed in the Indians' favor,
Northern Cheyenne Tribe,
425 U.S. at
425 U. S. 655,
n. 7, then surely the effect of such an "explicit redefinition"
must be limited to its explicit terms. The Court recognized as much
in
Menominee Tribe, supra, when it refused to read into
the Menominee Termination Act an abrogation of the Menominees'
Page 476 U. S. 527
treaty rights to hunt and fish. Regardless of the general
thinking behind the termination policy of the 1950's, we are faced
here with a particular statute, and we should not "
strain to
implement [an assimilationist] policy Congress has now rejected.'"
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 389,
n. 14, quoting Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County,
532 F.2d 655, 663 (CA9 1975).
Such straining is particularly inappropriate in this case, where
the statute in question was passed at the Indians' behest, was
apparently intended to carry out the Indians' wishes, and received
the Indians' support based on federal assurances that it would not
"affect the status" of their claim against the State. One, of
course, can distinguish formally, as the majority does,
see
ante at
476 U. S. 510,
between preserving the "status" of the claim and preserving the
claim's immunity from the state statute of limitations. But the
distinction smacks of the kind of semantic trap that this Court
consistently has attempted to avoid when construing governmental
agreements with Indians and statutes ostensibly passed for the
benefit of Indians. In cases involving Indian treaties, for
example, it has long been the rule not only that doubtful
expressions must be construed in the Indians' favor, but also that
the entire treaty must be interpreted as the Indians would have
understood it.
See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,
397 U. S. 620,
397 U. S. 631
(1970);
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1,
175 U. S. 11
(1899);
Worcester v.
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515,
31 U. S. 582
(1832).
The Catawbas were assured in unqualified terms that the 1959
legislation would not jeopardize their century-old grievance
against the State of South Carolina. The Act itself said nothing
about the claim, and nothing about statutes of limitations. No one
told the Indians or the voting Members of Congress that the statute
might someday prevent the Tribe from pursuing its claim in court.
The Court nevertheless concludes today that the 1959 Act bars the
Catawbas' claim if the limitations period under South Carolina law
expired between
Page 476 U. S. 528
the passage of the Act and the initiation of this lawsuit in
1980, and that this interpretation of the statute comports with the
promises made to the Catawbas in the 1950's. I cannot agree with
either conclusion. In my view, this decision breaks faith once
again with the Tribe, and it does so in a way the statute does not
require. Nothing in the text or legislative history of the Act
evinces a congressional desire to mislead the Indians, or an
understanding that the Act sometime might be construed as it is by
the Court today.
III
Apparently, there no longer are any full-blood Catawbas, and no
one now speaks the Catawba language.
See Charlotte
Observer, Mar. 6, 1977, p. 1C, reprinted in Hearing, at 420. Of the
1,200 or so persons currently on the tribal roll, only about 5 or
10 percent live on the 630-acre reservation still held for the
Tribe by the State of South Carolina. [
Footnote 2/14] The reservation itself does not differ
conspicuously from other rural neighborhoods in South Carolina.
Indeed, "[a]n unobservant tourist may well drive through the
reservation unawares, and many do." C. Hudson, The Catawba Nation 3
(1970). For the most part, modern-day Catawbas "think and live like
ordinary Americans of the Southeast."
Ibid.
When an Indian Tribe has been assimilated and dispersed to this
extent -- and when, as the majority points out, thousands of people
now claim interests in the Tribe's ancestral homeland,
see
ante at
476 U. S.
499-500, and n. 4 -- the Tribe's claim to that land may
seem ethereal, and the manner of the Tribe's dispossession may seem
of no more than historical interest. But the demands of justice do
not cease simply because a wronged people grow less distinctive, or
because the rights of innocent third parties must be taken into
account in fashioning
Page 476 U. S. 529
a remedy. Today's decision seriously handicaps the Catawbas'
effort to obtain even partial redress for the illegal expropriation
of lands twice pledged to them, and it does so by attributing to
Congress, in effect, an unarticulated intent to trick the Indians a
century after the property changed hands. From any perspective,
there is little to be proud of here.
Because I do not believe that Congress in 1959 expressed an
unambiguous desire to encumber the Catawbas' claim to their
18th-century treaty lands, and because I agree with Justice Black
that "[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their word,"
FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U. S.
99,
362 U. S. 142
(1960) (dissenting opinion), I do not join the judgment of the
Court.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In letters written in 1754 to the Catawbas and to the President
of the Council of North Carolina, Governor Glen of South Carolina
noted that the Catawbas repeatedly had complained about whites'
settling too close to them. 6 Record, Exs. 1 and 2. In response to
these complaints, Governor Glen forbade whites to settle within 30
miles of Catawba towns,
ibid., but that prohibition was
frequently ignored.
See C. Hudson, The Catawba Nation 49
(1970). For general discussions of early colonial encroachments on
Catawba land,
see Brown, at 163-166; P. Dammann, D.
Miller, & D. Israel, A History of the Catawba Tribe and its
Reservation Lands, reprinted in Settlement of the Catawba Indian
Land Claims, Hearing before the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs on H.R. 3274, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 135, 151-153
(1979) (Hearing).
[
Footnote 2/2]
According to Massey, the Indians "were driven to" this
agreement
"by being surrounded by white men, [who] cheat[ed] them out of
their rights, and [by] partaking of the vices of the whites and but
few of their virtues."
Report to The Governor of South Carolina on the Catawba Indians
5 (1864), reprinted in 6 Record, Ex. 11. The "vices" to which
Massey referred may have included the consumption of alcohol; the
Catawbas later charged that state representatives negotiated the
treaty by setting out a whiskey barrel and tin cups and inviting
the Indians to help themselves. This charge was reported to the
Department of the Interior in a 1908 memorandum by Catawba tribal
attorney Chester Howe.
See Plaintiffs' Response to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in No. 80-2050-6 (CA4) p. 23, n. 30,
citing Record Group 75, National Archives Central Files 1907-1939,
BIA File No. 1753-1906.
[
Footnote 2/3]
See Brown, at 317, 320-322. Assuming this account is
correct, the new reservation was less than one-half of one percent
of the Tribe's 1763 treaty lands. The price paid by the State for
the new reservation -- which works out to roughly $3.17 per acre --
contrasts strikingly with the price paid for the same land when
purchased from the Indians 2 1/2 years earlier -- the approximate
equivalent of 15 cents per acre payable in installments over 10
years.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Record, Exs. 18, 20.
But see United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432,
271 U. S. 442
(1926) (construing the term "Indian Tribe" in the Nonintercourse
Act to refer to any "
body of Indians of the same or a similar
race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and
inhabiting a particular though sometime ill-defined territory,'"
quoting Montoya v. United States, 180 U.
S. 261, 180 U. S. 266
(1901); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 376-378 (CA1 1975) (applying
Nonintercourse Act to Tribe lacking federal recognition)).
[
Footnote 2/5]
Although the complaint asks in part that the Tribe "be restored
to immediate possession" of virtually the entire 144,000 acres,
App. 25, the available remedies, even if the Tribe prevailed, well
might be limited by equitable considerations.
See Yankton Sioux
Tribe v. United States, 272 U. S. 351,
272 U. S. 357
(1926). The question currently before the Court, of course, is not
whether part or all of the land claimed by the Catawbas should be
given back to them, but whether the Tribe's ability to seek any
judicial relief at all is governed by South Carolina's statute of
limitations.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The federal statute of limitations for certain tort and contract
actions brought by the United States on behalf of Indian Tribes was
first adopted in 1966; the limitations period was not applied to
suits brought by Indians themselves until 1982.
"In 1972 and again in 1977, 1980, and 1982, as the statute of
limitations was about to expire for pre-1966 claims, Congress
extended the time within which the United States could bring suits
on behalf of the Indians."
Oneida II, 470 U.S. at
470 U. S. 242.
The debates over these amendments to § 2415 indicate that Congress
extended the filing deadline in part to allow additional time for
preparation and negotiation of tort claims for trespass damages
arising from allegedly illegal expropriations of tribal lands --
including the 144,000 acres claimed by the Catawbas.
See,
e.g., 123 Cong.Rec. 22166-22167 (1977) (Rep. Cohen, discussing
Catawba claim and others);
id. at 22168 (Rep. Walsh);
id. at 22170 (Rep. Hanley); 126 Cong.Rec. 5748-6749 (1980)
(Rep. Holland, discussing Catawba claim);
id. at 5750
(Rep. Udall). Members of Congress emphasized repeatedly that Indian
land claims were difficult to research, that Indians historically
had lacked adequate legal assistance and administrative resources,
and that the United States had not played its proper role in
bringing suits on the Indians' behalf.
See, e.g., 123
Cong.Rec. 22170 (1977) (Rep. Collins);
id. at 22171 (Rep.
Johnson); 126 Cong.Rec. 3289 (1980) (Sen. Cranston);
id.
at 6745-5746 (Rep. Clausen);
id. at 5747 (Rep. Danielson);
id. at 5750 (Rep. Swift).
See also 123 Cong.Rec.
22171 (1977) (Rep. Weiss) ("[A]s a result of the numerous
injustices suffered by American Indians during the last 150 years
-- many at the hands of the American Government -- it is incumbent
on the United States to give these people -- our country's first
inhabitants -- a full chance to redress their grievances"); 126
Cong.Rec. 3287 (1980) (Sen. Melcher) (failure to extend statute of
limitations could lead to "mass injustices"). Similar
considerations presumably motivated Congress' decision to exempt
entirely all claims for title or possession from the limitations
period prescribed in § 2415.
[
Footnote 2/7]
John Stuart, the King's Superintendent of Indian Affairs, who
had negotiated the Treaty of Augusta, noted in a 1772 letter to the
South Carolina Governor that the 144,000 acres reserved for the
Catawbas in that treaty were,
"as well as a very considerable Extent of Country besides[,]
possessed by them when the Subjects of England first settled in
this part of the World."
6 Record, Ex. 7, p. 1.
[
Footnote 2/8]
See generally F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law
486-493 (1982); Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn.L.Rev. 28
(1947); Note, Indian Title: The Rights of American Natives in Lands
They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 Colum.L.Rev. 655
(1975).
[
Footnote 2/9]
This Court long has respected grants of land to Indian tribes by
prior governments.
See, e.g., United States v. Title Insurance
& Trust Co., 265 U. S. 472,
265 U. S. 484
(1924), quoting
Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.
S. 481,
181 U. S.
491-492 (1901) ("'There is an essential difference
between the power of the United States over lands to which it has
had full title, and of which it has given to an Indian tribe a
temporary occupancy, and that over lands which were subjected by
the action of some prior government to a right of permanent
occupancy, for in the latter case the right, which is one of
private property, antecedes and is superior to the title of this
government, and limits necessarily its powers of disposal'");
Mitchel v. United
States, 9 Pet. 711 (1835).
[
Footnote 2/10]
The federal common law rule against alienation of aboriginal
title without the consent of the sovereign was recognized as early
as 1823 in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in
Johnson v.
McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543,
21 U. S.
673-674 (1823), and it is reflected in the
Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which
made "Indian relations . . . the exclusive province of federal
law,"
Oneida II, 470 U.S. at
470 U. S. 234,
and n. 4.
See Clinton & Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement
of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins
of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 U.Maine L.Rev. 17, 28-29 (1979). In
Oneida II, the Court rejected a suggestion that Indian
common law rights to tribal lands were somehow swallowed up or
preempted by the Nonintercourse Act; it made clear that the common
law still furnishes an independent basis for legal relief.
See 470 U.S. at
470 U. S.
236-240.
[
Footnote 2/11]
The Tribe's complaint requests relief under the treaties of 1760
and 1763, the Nonintercourse Act, the Indian Commerce Clause, Art.
I, § 8, cl. 3, and the constitutional prohibition against state
treaties, Art. I, § 10, cl. 1. App. 24. Reading the complaint
liberally "so . . . as to do substantial justice," Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 8(f), I would conclude that the constitutional references
suffice to invoke the rule that original Indian title may not be
alienated without federal approval.
Cf. Brief for United
States as
Amicus Curiae in
Connecticut v. Mohegan
Tribe, O.T. 1980, No. 80-1365, p. 7 (describing the rule as
"constitutionally based"). A narrower construction of the complaint
would be especially inappropriate because the Tribe adopted the
United States' brief in
Mohegan Tribe as part of its
response in the District Court to the defendants' motion to
dismiss, making clear that the constitutional claims raised in the
complaint were to be read to embrace the common law rule.
See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave
to File Supplemental Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum, 1
Record, Ex. 15.
Because, under my view, the Tribe's treaty claims add nothing
material for present purposes to its common law claim, I would not
decide at this time whether the 1760 and 1763 treaties
independently required the United States, as successor to Great
Britain, to approve any sale or lease of the 144,000 acres. Why the
majority finds no need to discuss this question, or the issue of
common law restraints on alienation, is harder to understand.
[
Footnote 2/12]
The Senate and House Reports both explained that the purpose of
the 1959 legislation was "to distribute the bulk of the [Catawbas']
tribal assets" among the members of the Tribe. S.Rep. No. 863, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1959); H.R.Rep. No. 910, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., 2 (1959). Each Report contained a list of the Tribe's
assets; the list made no mention of the Catawbas' claim to their
18th-century treaty lands.
See S.Rep. No. 863, at 3;
H.R.Rep. No. 910, at 4.
[
Footnote 2/13]
The majority rightly places little weight on the fact that § 5
of the 1959 Act revoked the Tribe's Constitution. The Catawbas had
no tribal constitution until 1944, when they adopted one pursuant
to the 1943 Memorandum of Understanding.
See, e.g.,
H.R.Rep. No. 910, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1959). Revocation of
the Constitution therefore can hardly be understood as a statement
that the Tribe should cease existence or lose any preexisting
claims.
[
Footnote 2/14]
See, e.g., Hearing, at 20 (statement of Leo M. Krulitz,
Interior Department Solicitor);
id. at 39 (statement of
Claude Ayres, Member, Catawba Indian Nation Land Claim Committee);
Proposed Catawba Indian Reservation Land Use Analysis 4 (1977),
reprinted in Hearing, at 251, 258.