The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
requires manufacturers of pesticides, as a precondition for
registering a pesticide, to submit research data to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning the product's
health, safety, and environmental effects, and authorizes EPA to
use previously submitted data in considering an application for
registration of a similar product by another registrant
("follow-on" registrant). Section 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) of FIFRA
authorizes EPA to consider certain previously submitted data only
if the "follow-on" registrant has offered to compensate the
original registrant for use of the data, and provides for binding
arbitration if the registrants fail to agree on compensation. The
arbitrator's decision is subject to judicial review only for
"fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct." Appellees, firms
engaged in the development and marketing of chemicals used to
manufacture pesticides, instituted proceedings in Federal District
Court to challenge,
inter alia, the constitutionality of
the arbitration provisions on the ground that they violate Article
III of the Constitution by allocating to arbitrators the functions
of judicial officers and by limiting review by an Article III
court. Appellees alleged that EPA had considered their research
data in support of other registration applications, that one of the
appellees (Stauffer Co.) had invoked the arbitration provisions of
§ 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) against a "follow-on" registrant, and that the
arbitration award fell short of the compensation to which Stauffer
Co. was entitled. The District Court held that the claims
challenging the arbitration provisions were ripe for decision, and
that those provisions violated Article III.
Held:
1. Appellees' Article III claims demonstrate sufficient ripeness
to establish a concrete case or controversy.
Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986,
distinguished. Appellees have an independent right to adjudication
of their compensation claims in a constitutionally proper forum;
their claim does not depend on the outcome of a given arbitration.
It is sufficient for purposes of a claim under Article III
challenging a tribunal's jurisdiction that the claimant demonstrate
it has been or inevitably
Page 473 U. S. 569
will be subjected to an exercise of such unconstitutional
jurisdiction. In addition, the issue here is purely legal, and will
not be clarified by further factual development. Appellees have
standing to contest EPA's issuance of "follow-on" registrations
pursuant to what they contend is an unconstitutional statutory
provision. Pp.
473 U. S.
579-582.
2. Article III does not prohibit Congress from selecting binding
arbitration with only limited judicial review as the mechanism for
resolving disputes among participants in FIFRA's pesticide
registration scheme. Pp.
473 U. S.
582-593
(a) The Constitution does not require every federal question
arising under the federal law to be tried in an Article III court
before a judge enjoying life tenure and protection against salary
reduction. Congress is not barred from acting pursuant to its
Article I powers to vest decisionmaking authority in tribunals that
lack the attributes of Article III courts. Pp.
473 U. S.
582-584.
(b) Any right to compensation from "follow-on" registrants under
§ 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) for EPA's use of data arises under FIFRA, and does
not depend on or replace a right to such compensation under state
law. Thus, the holding in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 --
that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to
adjudicate a traditional contract action arising under state law,
without the litigants' consent, and subject only to ordinary
appellate review -- is not controlling here. Nor do this Court's
decisions support appellees' contentions that Article III
adjudication or review is required because FIFRA confers a "private
right" to compensation (as distinguished from a "public right"), or
that the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the
Federal Government is a party of record. Pp.
473 U. S.
584-586.
(c) Practical attention to substance, rather than doctrinaire
reliance on formal categories, should inform application of Article
III.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22. If
the identity of the parties alone determined the requirements of
Article III, under appellees' theory, the constitutionality of many
quasi-adjudicative activities carried on by administrative agencies
involving claims between individuals would be thrown into doubt. In
essence, the "public rights" doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic
understanding that, when Congress selects a quasijudicial method of
resolving matters that could be conclusively determined by the
Executive and Legislative Branches, the danger of encroaching on
the judicial powers is reduced. Pp.
473 U.S. 586-589.
(d) Several aspects of FIFRA establish that the arbitration
scheme adopted by Congress does not contravene Article III. The
right created by FIFRA as to use of a registrant's data to support
a "follow-on" registration is not a purely "private" right, but
bears many of the characteristics
Page 473 U. S. 570
of a "public" right. Congress has the power, under Article I, to
authorize an agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to
allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the
program without providing an Article III adjudication. The
arbitration scheme is necessary as a pragmatic solution to the
difficult problem of spreading the costs of generating adequate
information regarding the safety, health, and environmental impact
of a potentially dangerous product. Additionally, the scheme
contains its own sanctions and subjects no unwilling defendant to
judicial enforcement power. Given the nature of the right at issue
and the concerns motivating Congress, the arbitration system does
not threaten the independent role of the judiciary in the
constitutional scheme. In the circumstances, the limited Article
III review of the arbitration proceeding preserves the appropriate
exercise of the judicial function. Pp.
473 U.S. 589-593.
3. Appellees' alternative Article I claim that FIFRA's standard
for compensation is so vague as to be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative powers was neither adequately briefed nor
argued to this Court, and was not fully litigated before the
District Court. Therefore, the issue is left open for determination
on remand. P.
473 U. S.
593.
Reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post, p.
473 U. S. 594.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
473 U. S.
602.
Page 473 U. S. 571
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires the Court to revisit the data-consideration
provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), 61 Stat. 163, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 136
et
seq., which was considered last Term in
Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986
(1984).
Monsanto examined whether FIFRA's
data-consideration provision effects an uncompensated taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. In this case, we address whether
Article III of the Constitution prohibits Congress from selecting
binding arbitration with only limited judicial review as the
mechanism for resolving disputes among participants in FIFRA's
pesticide registration scheme. We conclude it does not, and reverse
the judgment below.
I
The Court's opinion in
Monsanto details the development
of FIFRA from the licensing and labeling statute enacted in 1947 to
the comprehensive regulatory statute of the present. This case,
like
Monsanto, concerns the most recent amendment to
FIFRA, the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 819 (1978 Act),
which sought to correct problems created by the Federal
Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 973 (1972
Act), itself a major revision of prior law.
See Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., supra, at
467 U. S.
991-992.
A
As a precondition for registration of a pesticide, manufacturers
must submit research data to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) concerning the product's health, safety, and environmental
effects. The 1972 Act established data-sharing provisions intended
to streamline pesticide registration procedures, increase
competition, and avoid unnecessary duplication of data-generation
costs. S.Rep. No. 92-838, pp. 72-73 (1972) (1972 S.Rep.). Some
evidence suggests that, before 1972, data submitted by one
registrant
Page 473 U. S. 572
had
"as a matter of practice but without statutory authority, been
considered by the Administrator to support the registration of the
same or a similar product by another registrant."
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., supra, at
467 U. S.
1009, n. 14. Such registrations were colloquially known
as "me too" or "follow-on" registrations. Section 3(c)(1)(D) of the
1972 Act provided statutory authority for the use of previously
submitted data, as well as a scheme for sharing the costs of data
generation.
"In effect, the provision instituted a mandatory data-licensing
scheme. The amount of compensation was to be negotiated by the
parties, or, in the event negotiations failed, was to be determined
by the EPA, subject to judicial review upon instigation of the
original data submitter. The scope of the 1972 data-consideration
provision, however, was limited, for any data designated as 'trade
secrets or commercial or financial information' . . . could not be
considered at all by EPA to support another registration unless the
original submitter consented."
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at
467 U. S.
992-993.
Congress enacted the original data-compensation provision in
1972 because it believed "recognizing a limited proprietary
interest" in data submitted to support pesticide registrations
would provide an added incentive beyond statutory patent protection
for research and development of new pesticides. H.R.Rep. No.
95-663, pp. 17-18 (1977); S.Rep. No. 95334, pp. 7, 34-40 (1977)
(1977 S.Rep.). The data submitters, however, contended that basic
health, safety, and environmental data essential to registration of
a competing pesticide qualified for protection as a trade secret.
With EPA bogged down in cataloging data and the pesticide industry
embroiled in litigation over what types of data could legitimately
be designated "trade secrets," new pesticide registrations "ground
to a virtual halt."
Id. at 3.
Page 473 U. S. 573
The 1978 amendments were a response to the "logjam of litigation
that resulted from controversies over data compensation and trade
secret protection."
Ibid. Congress viewed data-sharing as
essential to the registration scheme,
id. at 7, but
concluded EPA must be relieved of the task of valuation because
disputes regarding the compensation scheme had, "for all practical
purposes, tied up their registration process" and "[EPA] lacked the
expertise necessary to establish the proper amount of
compensation." 123 Cong.Rec. 25709 (1977) (statement of Sen. Leahy,
floor manager of S. 1678). Legislators and the Agency agreed
that
"[d]etermining the amount and terms of such compensation are
matters that do not require active government involvement, [and]
compensation payable should be determined, to the fullest extent
practicable, within the private sector."
Id. at 25710.
Against this background, Congress in 1978 amended § 3(c)(1)(D)
and § 10(b) to clarify that the trade secret exemption from the
data-consideration provision did not extend to health, safety, and
environmental data. In addition, the 1978 amendments granted data
submitters a 10-year period of exclusive use for data submitted
after September 30, 1978, during which time the data may not be
cited without the original submitter's permission. §
3(c)(1)(D)(i).
Regarding compensation for use of data not protected by the
10-year exclusive use provision, the amendment substituted for the
EPA Administrator's determination of the appropriate compensation a
system of negotiation and binding arbitration to resolve
compensation disputes among registrants. Section 3(c)(1)(D)(ii)
authorizes EPA to consider data already in its files in support of
a new registration, permit, or new use, but "only if the applicant
has made an offer to compensate the original data submitter." If
the applicant and data submitter fail to agree, either may invoke
binding arbitration. The arbitrator's decision is subject to
judicial review only for "fraud, misrepresentation, or other
Page 473 U. S. 574
misconduct."
Ibid. [
Footnote 1] The statute contains its own sanctions. Should
an applicant or data submitter fail to comply with the scheme, the
Administrator is required to cancel the
Page 473 U. S. 575
new registration or to consider the data without compensation to
the original submitter. The Administrator may also issue orders
regarding sale or use of existing pesticide stocks.
Ibid.
The concept of retaining statutory compensation but substituting
binding arbitration for valuation of data by EPA emerged as a
compromise. This approach was developed by representatives of the
major chemical manufacturers, who sought to retain the
controversial compensation provision, in discussions with industry
groups representing follow-on registrants, whose attempts to
register pesticides had been roadblocked by litigation since 1972.
Hearings on Extending and Amending FIFRA before the Subcommittee on
Department Investigations, Oversight, and Research of the House
Committee on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 522-523 (1977)
(testimony of Robert Alikonis, General Counsel to Pesticide
Formulators Association).
B
Appellees are 13 large firms engaged in the development and
marketing of chemicals used to manufacture pesticides.
Page 473 U. S. 576
Each has in the past submitted data to EPA in support of
registrations of various pesticides. When the 1978 amendments went
into effect, these firms were engaged in litigation in the Southern
District of New York challenging the constitutionality under
Article I and the Fifth Amendment of the provisions authorizing
data-sharing and disclosure of data to the public. [
Footnote 2] In response to this Court's
decision in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U. S. 50
(1982), appellees amended their complaint to allege that the
statutory mechanism of binding arbitration for determining the
amount of compensation due them violates Article III of the
Constitution. Article III, § 1, provides that "[t]he judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested" in courts whose judges enjoy
tenure "during good Behaviour" and compensation that "shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." Appellees allege
Congress, in FIFRA, transgressed this limitation by allocating to
arbitrators the functions of judicial officers and severely
limiting review by an Article III court.
The District Court granted appellees' motion for summary
judgment on their Article III claims. It found the issues ripe
because the "statutory compulsion to seek relief through
arbitration" raised a constitutionally sufficient case or
controversy.
Page 473 U. S. 577
Although troubled by what appeared a "standardless delegation of
powers," the District Court did not reach the Article I issue
because it held that Article III barred FIFRA's "absolute
assignment of [judicial] power" to arbitrators with only limited
review by Article III judges.
Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 571 F.
Supp. 117, 124 (1983). The District Court, rather than striking
down the statutory limitation on judicial review, enjoined the
entire FIFRA data use and compensation scheme. App. to Juris.
Statement 25a.
Appellant took a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.
S.C. § 1252. We vacated the judgment of the District Court and
remanded for reconsideration in light of our supervening decision
in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.
S. 986 (1984).
Ruckelshaus v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products Co., 468 U.S. 1201 (1984). In
Monsanto, we ruled that FIFRA's data-consideration
provisions may be deemed a "public use" even though the most direct
beneficiaries of the regulatory scheme will be the later
applicants. 467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
1014. Insofar as FIFRA authorizes the Administrator to
consider trade secrets submitted during the period between 1972 and
1978, a period during which the registrant entertained a
reasonable, investment-backed expectation that its trade secret
data would be held confidential, we held it effects a taking. But
the data originator must complete arbitration and, in the event of
a shortfall, exhaust its Tucker Act remedies against the United
States before it can be ascertained whether it has been deprived of
just compensation. The Court distinguished between the "ability to
vindicate [the] constitutional right to just compensation" and the
"ability to vindicate [the] statutory right to obtain compensation
from a subsequent applicant."
Id. at
467 U. S.
1019. But we declined to reach Monsanto's Article III
claim, explaining:
"Monsanto did not allege or establish that it had been injured
by actual arbitration under the statute. While the District Court
acknowledged that Monsanto had received
Page 473 U. S. 578
several offers of compensation from applicants for registration,
it did not find that EPA had considered Monsanto's data in
considering another application. Further, Monsanto and any
subsequent applicant may negotiate and reach agreement concerning
an outstanding offer. If they do not reach agreement, then the
controversy must go to arbitration. Only after EPA has considered
data submitted by Monsanto in evaluating another application and an
arbitrator has made an award will Monsanto's claims with respect to
the constitutionality of the arbitration scheme become ripe."
Ibid. (citation omitted). On remand in this case,
appellees amended their complaint to reflect that EPA had, in fact,
considered their data in support of other registration
applications. The amended complaint also alleged that data
submitted by appellee Stauffer Chemical Company (Stauffer),
originator of the chemicals butylate and EPTC, had been used in
connection with registrations by PPG Industries, Inc. (PPG), and
Drexel Chemical Company of pesticides containing butylate and EPTC
as active ingredients. App. 23. The complaint further alleged
Stauffer had invoked the arbitration provisions of § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii)
against PPG, and appellees entered in evidence the award of the
arbitration panel, handed down on June 28, 1983.
Id. at
42. Stauffer claimed the arbitrators' award fell far short of the
compensation to which it was entitled. [
Footnote 3]
Page 473 U. S. 579
In view of these developments, the District Court concluded
that
"[t]he claims presented by Stauffer challenging the
constitutionality of FIFRA § 3(c)(1)(D) are ripe for resolution
under the criteria established by the Supreme Court"
in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra. The remaining
plaintiffs, the District Court held, were aggrieved by the clear
threat of compulsion to resort to unconstitutional arbitration.
App. to Juris. Statement 1a-4a. The District Court reinstated its
prior judgment enjoining the operation of the data-consideration
provisions as violative of Article III. EPA again took a direct
appeal, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 469 U.S. 1032 (1984).
This Court stayed the judgment pending disposition of the
appeal.
II
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether appellees'
Article III claims demonstrate sufficient ripeness to establish a
concrete case or controversy.
Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U. S. 102,
419 U. S.
138-139 (1974). Appellant contends that the District
Court erred in addressing these claims because the criteria
established in
Monsanto for ripeness remained unsatisfied.
Appellant argues that only one firm, Stauffer, engaged in
arbitration, and it seeks to enforce, rather than challenge, the
award. Appellees counter that they are aggrieved by the threat of
an unconstitutional arbitration procedure which assigns the
valuation of their data to civil arbitrators and prohibits judicial
review of the amount of compensation. Stauffer in particular argues
that it was doubly injured by the arbitration. Although it claimed
a shortfall of some $50 million, it was precluded by §
3(c)(1)(D)(ii) from seeking judicial review of the award against
PPG. While seeking to enforce the award should its Article III
claim fail, Stauffer has consistently challenged the validity of
the entire FIFRA data-consideration scheme both here and in
litigation initiated by PPG.
See n 3,
supra.
We agree that Stauffer has an independent right to adjudication
in a constitutionally proper forum.
See
Glidden
Co.
Page 473 U. S. 580
v. Zdanok, 370 U.
S. 530,
370 U. S. 533
(1962). Although appellees contend and the District Court found
that they were injured by the shortfall in the award, it is
sufficient, for purposes of a claim under Article III challenging a
tribunal's jurisdiction, that the claimant demonstrate it has been
or inevitably will be subjected to an exercise of such
unconstitutional jurisdiction.
See Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 56-57,
aff'g 12 B.R. 946
(Minn.1981) (reversing Bankruptcy Court's denial of pretrial motion
to dismiss contract claim).
"[A party] may object to proceeding further with [a] lawsuit on
the grounds that, if it is to be resolved by an agency of the
United States, it may be resolved only by an agency which exercises
'[t]he judicial power of the United States' described by Art. III
of the Constitution."
458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 89
(opinion concurring in judgment). In contrast to the Taking Clause
claim in
Monsanto, appellees' Article III injury is not a
function of whether the tribunal awards reasonable compensation,
but of the tribunal's authority to adjudicate the dispute.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
supra; Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, supra. Thus, appellees state an
independent claim under Article III, apart from any monetary injury
sustained as a result of the arbitration.
"[R]ipeness is peculiarly a question of timing."
Regional
Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, at
419 U. S. 140.
"[I]ts basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements."
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U. S. 136,
387 U. S. 148
(1967). The Article III challenge in
Monsanto was, in this
sense, premature. Monsanto had not alleged that its data had ever
been considered in support of other registrations, much less that
Monsanto had failed to reach a negotiated settlement or been forced
to resort to an unconstitutional arbitration. In fact, no FIFRA
arbitrations had as yet taken place when Monsanto brought its
claim. Monsanto's claim thus involved "contingent future events
that may not
Page 473 U. S. 581
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." 13A C.
Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3532 (1984). By contrast, the FIFRA data-consideration procedures
are now in place, and numerous follow-on registrations have been
issued.
See Brief for Appellees 3, n. 3 (citing Docket
Entry No. 132, p. 2). Each of the appellees in this action has
alleged as yet uncompensated use of its data. App. 23. Stauffer has
engaged in an arbitration lasting many months and consuming 2,700
pages of transcript. There is no doubt that the "effects [of the
arbitration scheme] have [been felt by Stauffer] in a concrete
way."
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at
387 U. S.
148-149.
In addition, "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision"
and "the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration" must inform any analysis of ripeness.
Id.
at
387 U. S. 149.
The issue presented in this case is purely legal, and will not be
clarified by further factual development.
Cf. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190,
461 U. S. 201
(1983). Doubts about the validity of FIFRA's data-consideration and
compensation schemes have plagued the pesticide industry and
seriously hampered the effectiveness of FIFRA's reforms of the
registration process.
"To require the industry to proceed without knowing whether the
[arbitration scheme] is valid would impose a palpable and
considerable hardship."
Id. at
461 U. S.
201-202. At a minimum Stauffer, and arguably each
appellee whose data have been used pursuant to the challenged
scheme, suffers the continuing uncertainty and expense of depending
for compensation on a process whose authority is undermined because
its constitutionality is in question.
See ibid.
"'One does not have to await the consummation of threatened
injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly
impending, that is enough.'"
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at
419 U. S.
143,
Page 473 U. S. 582
quoting
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.
S. 553,
262 U. S. 593
(1923). Nothing would be gained by postponing a decision, and the
public interest would be well served by a prompt resolution of the
constitutionality of FIFRA's arbitration scheme.
Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S.
59,
439 U. S. 82
(1978).
Finally, appellees clearly have standing to contest EPA's
issuance of follow-on registrations pursuant to what they contend
is an unconstitutional statutory provision. They allege an injury
from EPA's unlawful conduct -- the injury of being forced to choose
between relinquishing any right to compensation from a follow-on
registrant or engaging in an unconstitutional adjudication.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737
(1984). Appellees also allege injury which is likely to be
redressed by the relief they request.
Ibid. The use,
registration, and compensation scheme is integrated in a single
subsection that explicitly ties the follow-on registration to the
arbitration.
See § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) (EPA "shall deny" or
"cancel" follow-on registration if arbitration section is not
complied with). It is evident that Congress linked EPA's authority
to issue follow-on registrations to the original data submitter's
ability to obtain compensation. A decision against the provision's
constitutionality, therefore, would support remedies such as
striking down the statutory restrictions on judicial review or
enjoining EPA from issuing or retaining in force follow-on
registrations pursuant to § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii).
III
Appellees contend that Article III bars Congress from requiring
arbitration of disputes among registrants concerning compensation
under FIFRA without also affording substantial review by tenured
judges of the arbitrator's decision. Article III, § 1, establishes
a broad policy that federal judicial power shall be vested in
courts whose judges enjoy life tenure and fixed compensation. These
requirements protect
Page 473 U. S. 583
the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional
scheme of tripartite government and assure impartial adjudication
in federal courts.
United States v. Will, 449 U.
S. 200,
449 U. S.
217-218 (1980);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1,
424 U. S. 122
(1976) (per curiam).
An absolute construction of Article III is not possible in this
area of "frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents."
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 90
(opinion concurring in judgment).
"[N]either this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as
requiring every federal question arising under the federal law . .
. to be tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying life
tenure and protection against salary reduction."
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.
S. 389,
411 U. S. 407
(1973). Instead, the Court has long recognized that Congress is not
barred from acting pursuant to its powers under Article I to vest
decisionmaking authority in tribunals that lack the attributes of
Article III courts.
See, e.g., Walters v. National Assn. of
Radiation Survivors, ante p.
473 U. S. 305
(Board of Veterans' Appeals);
Palmore v. United States,
supra, (District of Columbia courts);
Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932)
(Deputy Commissioner of Employees' Compensation Commission);
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856)
(Treasury accounting officers). Many matters that involve the
application of legal standards to facts and affect private
interests are routinely decided by agency action with limited or no
review by Article III courts.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§
701(a)(1), 701(a)(2);
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.
S. 821,
470 U. S.
837-838 (1985);
United States v. Erika, Inc.,
456 U. S. 201,
456 U. S. 206
(1982) (no review of Medicare reimbursements); Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1,
18 (1983) (administrative agencies can conclusively adjudicate
claims created by the administrative state, by and against private
persons); Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
the
Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 Duke L.J.197
(same).
Page 473 U. S. 584
The Court's most recent pronouncement on the meaning of Article
III is
Northern Pipeline. A divided Court was unable to
agree on the precise scope and nature of Article III's limitations.
The Court's holding in that case establishes only that Congress may
not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render
final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract
action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants,
and subject only to ordinary appellate review. 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 84
(plurality opinion);
id. at
458 U. S. 90-92
(opinion concurring in judgment);
id. at
458 U. S. 92
(BURGER, C.J., dissenting).
A
Appellees contend that their claims to compensation under FIFRA
are a matter of state law, and thus are encompassed by the holding
of
Northern Pipeline. We disagree. Any right to
compensation from follow-on registrants under § 3 (c)(1)(D)(ii) for
EPA's use of data results from FIFRA, and does not depend on or
replace a right to such compensation under state law.
Cf.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co., supra, at
458 U. S. 84
(plurality opinion) (contract claims at issue were matter of state
law);
Crowell v. Benson, supra, at
285 U. S. 39-40
(replacing traditional admiralty negligence action with
administrative scheme of strict liability). As a matter of state
law, property rights in a trade secret are extinguished when a
company discloses its trade secret to persons not obligated to
protect the confidentiality of the information.
See Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
1002, citing R. Milgrim, Trade Secrets § 1.01[2] (1983).
Therefore registrants who submit data with notice of the scheme
established by the 1978 amendments, and its qualified protection of
trade secrets as defined in § 10, can claim no property interest
under state law in data subject to § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii).
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at
467 U. S.
1005-1008.
Cf. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(a)(2),
376(a)(1); 21 CFR § 71.15 (1985); 21 CFR § 171.1(h) (1984) (data
submitted under Food, Drug,
Page 473 U. S. 585
and Cosmetic Act is in public domain, and follow-on registrants
need not submit independent data). Nor do individuals who submitted
data prior to 1978 have a right to compensation under FIFRA that
depends on state law. To be sure, such users might have a claim
that the new scheme results in a taking of property interests
protected by state law.
See 467 U.S. at
467 U. S.
1013-1014. Compensation for any uncompensated taking is
available under the Tucker Act. For purposes of compensation under
FIFRA's regulatory scheme, however, it is the "mandatory licensing
provision" that creates the relationship between the data submitter
and the follow-on registrant, and federal law supplies the rule of
decision.
Cf. Northern Pipeline Construction Co., supra,
at
458 U. S. 90
(opinion concurring in judgment).
Alternatively, appellees contend that FIFRA confers a "private
right" to compensation, requiring either Article III adjudication
or review by an Article III court sufficient to retain "the
essential attributes of the judicial power."
Northern Pipeline
Construction Co., supra, at
458 U. S. 77,
458 U. S. 85-86
(plurality opinion). This "private right" argument rests on the
distinction between public and private rights drawn by the
plurality in
Northern Pipeline. The
Northern
Pipeline plurality construed the Court's prior opinions to
permit only three clearly defined exceptions to the rule of Article
III adjudication: military tribunals, territorial courts, and
decisions involving "public," as opposed to "private," rights.
Drawing upon language in
Crowell v. Benson, supra, at
285 U. S. 50,
the plurality defined "public rights" as
"matters arising between the Government and persons subject to
its authority in connection with the performance of the
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments."
458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 67-68.
It identified "private rights" as "
the liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined.'" Id. at
458 U. S. 69-70,
quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 285 U. S.
51.
This theory that the public rights/private rights dichotomy of
Crowell and
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co.,
Page 473 U. S. 586
18 How. 272 (1856), provides a bright-line test for determining
the requirements of Article III did not command a majority of the
Court in
Northern Pipeline. Insofar as appellees interpret
that case and
Crowell as establishing that the right to an
Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal Government is a
party of record, we cannot agree.
Cf. Northern Pipeline
Construction Co., 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 71
(plurality opinion) (noting that discharge in bankruptcy, which
adjusts liabilities between individuals, is arguably a public
right).
But see id. at
458 U. S. 69, n.
23. Nor did a majority of the Court endorse the implication of the
private right/public right dichotomy that Article III has no force
simply because a dispute is between the Government and an
individual.
Compare id. at
458 U. S. 68, n.
20,
with id. at
458 U. S. 70, n.
23.
B
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court in
Crowell,
expressly rejected a formalistic or abstract Article III inquiry,
stating:
"In deciding whether the Congress, in enacting the statute under
review, has exceeded the limits of its authority to prescribe
procedure . . .
regard must be had, as in other cases where
constitutional limits are invoked, not to mere matters of form, but
to the substance of what is required."
285 U.S. at
285 U. S. 53
(emphasis added).
Crowell held that Congress could replace
a seaman's traditional negligence action in admiralty with a
statutory scheme of strict liability. In response to practical
concerns, Congress rejected adjudication in Article III courts, and
instead provided that claims for compensation would be determined
in an administrative proceeding by a deputy commissioner appointed
by the United States Employees' Compensation Commission.
Id. at
285 U. S. 43.
"[T]he findings of the deputy commissioner, supported by evidence
and within the scope of his authority" were final with respect to
injuries to employees within the purview of the statute.
Id. at
285 U. S. 46.
Although
Page 473 U. S. 587
such findings clearly concern obligations among private parties,
this fact did not make the scheme invalid under Article III.
Instead, after finding that the administrative proceedings
satisfied due process,
id. at
285 U. S. 45-48,
Crowell concluded that the judicial review afforded by the
statute, including review of matters of law, "provides for the
appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of
cases."
Id. at
285 U. S.
54.
The enduring lesson of
Crowell is that practical
attention to substance, rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal
categories, should inform application of Article III.
Cf.
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at
370 U. S.
547-548. The extent of judicial review afforded by the
legislation reviewed in
Crowell does not constitute a
minimal requirement of Article III without regard to the origin of
the right at issue or the concerns guiding the selection by
Congress of a particular method for resolving disputes. In
assessing the degree of judicial involvement required by Article
III in this case, we note that the statute considered in
Crowell is different from FIFRA in significant respects.
Most importantly, the statute in
Crowell displaced a
traditional cause of action and affected a preexisting relationship
based on a common law contract for hire. Thus, it clearly fell
within the range of matters reserved to Article III courts under
the holding of
Northern Pipeline. See 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 70-71,
and n. 25 (plurality opinion) (noting that matters subject to a
"suit at common law or in equity or admiralty" are at "protected
core" of Article III judicial powers);
id. at
458 U. S. 90
(opinion concurring in judgment) (noting that state law contract
actions are "the stuff of the traditional actions at common law
tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789").
If the identity of the parties alone determined the requirements
of Article III, under appellees' theory, the constitutionality of
many quasi-adjudicative activities carried on by administrative
agencies involving claims between individuals would be thrown into
doubt.
See 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 29:23, p. 443
(2d ed.1984) (concept described as
Page 473 U. S. 588
"revolutionary"); Note, A Literal Interpretation of Article III
Ignores 150 Years of Article I Court History:
Marathon Oil
Pipeline Co. v. Northern Pipeline Construction Co., 19 New
England L.Rev. 207, 231-232 (1983) ("public rights doctrine exalts
form over substance"); Note, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96
Harv.L.Rev. 62, 262, n. 39 (1982). For example, in
Switchmen v.
National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297
(1943), cited with approval in
South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,
383 U. S. 333
(1966), the Court upheld as constitutional a provision of the
Railway Labor Act that established a "right" of a majority of a
craft or class to choose its bargaining representative and vested
the resolution of disputes concerning representation solely in the
National Mediation Board, without judicial review. The Court
concluded:
"The Act . . . writes into law the 'right' of the 'majority of
any craft or class of employees' to 'determine who shall be the
representative of the craft or class for purposes of this Act.'
That 'right' is protected by [a provision] which gives the
Mediation Board the power to resolve controversies concerning it. .
. . A review by the federal district courts of the Board's
determination is not necessary to preserve or protect that 'right.'
Congress, for reasons of its own, decided upon the method for
protection of the 'right' which it created."
320 U.S. at
320 U. S.
300-301.
See also Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Price, 360 U. S. 601,
360 U. S. 608
(1959);
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.
S. 111,
322 U. S. 131,
322 U. S. 135
(1944) (Board's conclusions reviewable for rational basis and
warrant in the record).
Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.
S. 184,
358 U. S. 199
(1958), (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (discussing
Switchmen).
The Court has treated as a matter of "public right" an
essentially adversary proceeding to invoke tariff protections
against a competitor, as well as an administrative proceeding to
determine the rights of landlords and tenants.
See Atlas
Page 473 U. S. 589
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U. S. 442,
430 U. S.
454-455 (1977), citing as an example of "public rights"
the federal landlord/tenant law discussed in
Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135
(1921);
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.
S. 438,
279 U. S. 447
(1929) (tariff dispute). These proceedings surely determine
liabilities of individuals. Such schemes would be beyond the power
of Congress under appellees' interpretation of
Crowell. In
essence, the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic
understanding that, when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method
of resolving matters that "could be conclusively determined by the
Executive and Legislative Branches," the danger of encroaching on
the judicial powers is reduced.
Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 68
(plurality opinion), citing
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at
285 U. S.
50.
C
Looking beyond form to the substance of what FIFRA accomplishes,
we note several aspects of FIFRA that persuade us the arbitration
scheme adopted by Congress does not contravene Article III. First,
the right created by FIFRA is not a purely "private" right, but
bears many of the characteristics of a "public" right. Use of a
registrant's data to support a follow-on registration serves a
public purpose as an integral part of a program safeguarding the
public health. Congress has the power, under Article I, to
authorize an agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to
allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the
program without providing an Article III adjudication. It also has
the power to condition issuance of registrations or licenses on
compliance with agency procedures. Article III is not so inflexible
that it bars Congress from shifting the task of data valuation from
the agency to the interested parties.
Cf. United States v.
Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. at
456 U. S. 203
(private insurance carrier assigned task of deciding Medicare
claims);
Crowell v. Benson, supra, at
285 U. S.
50-51.
Page 473 U. S. 590
The 1978 amendments represent a pragmatic solution to the
difficult problem of spreading the costs of generating adequate
information regarding the safety, health, and environmental impact
of a potentially dangerous product. Congress, without implicating
Article III, could have authorized EPA to charge follow-on
registrants fees to cover the cost of data, and could have directly
subsidized FIFRA data submitters for their contributions of needed
data.
See St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States,
298 U. S. 38,
298 U. S. 49-53
(1936) (ratemaking is an essentially legislative function).
Instead, it selected a framework that collapses these two steps
into one, and permits the parties to fix the amount of
compensation, with binding arbitration to resolve intractable
disputes. Removing the task of valuation from agency personnel to
civilian arbitrators, selected by agreement of the parties or
appointed on a case-by-case basis by an independent federal agency,
surely does not diminish the likelihood of impartial
decisionmaking, free from political influence.
See 29 CFR
§ 1404.4, pt. 1440, App. § 7 (1984).
Cf. Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 58 (plurality opinion);
id. at
458 U. S.
115-116 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The near disaster of the FIFRA 1972 amendments and the danger to
public health of further delay in pesticide registration led
Congress to select arbitration as the appropriate method of dispute
resolution. Given the nature of the right at issue and the concerns
motivating the Legislature, we do not think this system threatens
the independent role of the Judiciary in our constitutional
scheme.
"To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the
legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive
method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are
peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an
administrative agency specially assigned to that task."
Crowell v. Benson, supra, at
285 U. S. 46.
Cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. at
411 U. S.
407-408 (the requirements of Art. III must, in proper
circumstances, give way to accommodate plenary
Page 473 U. S. 591
grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to
specialized areas);
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 18 How. at
59 U. S. 282
(citing "[i]mperative necessity" to justify summary tax collection
procedures).
We note as well that the FIFRA arbitration scheme incorporates
its own system of internal sanctions, and relies only tangentially,
if at all, on the Judicial Branch for enforcement.
See
supra at
473 U. S.
574-575. The danger of Congress or the Executive
encroaching on the Article III judicial powers is at a minimum when
no unwilling defendant is subjected to judicial enforcement power
as a result of the agency "adjudication."
See, e.g., Hart,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1362 (1953), reprinted in
P. Bator, P. Mistakin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 330 (2d
ed.1973); Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State,
83 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 16 (1983); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of
Administrative Action 385 (1965) (historically judicial review of
agency decisionmaking has been required only when it results in the
use of judicial process to enforce an obligation upon an unwilling
defendant).
We need not decide in this case whether a private party could
initiate an action in court to enforce a FIFRA arbitration.
But
cf. 29 CFR pt. 1440, App. § 37(c) (1984) (under rules of
American Arbitration Association, parties to arbitration are deemed
to consent to entry of judgment). FIFRA contains no provision
explicitly authorizing a party to invoke judicial process to compel
arbitration or enforce an award.
Compare § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii),
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii), with § 10(c), 7 U.S.C. § 136h(c)
(authorizing applicant or registrant to institute action in
district court to settle dispute with Administrator over trade
secrets); 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (b)(2) (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act provision authorizing parties to arbitration to bring
enforcement action in district court);
Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Price, 360 U.S.
Page 473 U. S. 592
at
360 U. S. 614,
and n. 12 (statute authorized court enforcement of National
Railroad Adjustment Board's money damages award); and
Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. at
285 U. S. 44
(providing for entry of judgment in federal court).
Cf. Utility
Workers v. Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261
(1940) (as award to worker vindicates a "public right," agency
alone has authority to institute enforcement proceeding). In any
event, under FIFRA, the only potential object of judicial
enforcement power is the follow-on registrant who explicitly
consents to have his rights determined by arbitration.
See
40 CFR § 162.9-5(b) (1984) (registration application must contain a
written offer to pay compensation "to the extent required by FIFRA
section 3(c)(1)(D)").
Finally, we note that FIFRA limits, but does not preclude,
review of the arbitration proceeding by an Article III court. We
conclude that, in the circumstances, the review afforded preserves
the "appropriate exercise of the judicial function."
Crowell v.
Benson, supra, at
285 U. S. 54.
FIFRA, at a minimum, allows private parties to secure Article III
review of the arbitrator's "findings and determination" for fraud,
misconduct, or misrepresentation. § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii). This provision
protects against arbitrators who abuse or exceed their powers or
willfully misconstrue their mandate under the governing law.
Cf. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U. S. 593,
363 U. S. 597
(1960) (arbitrator must be faithful to terms of mandate, and does
not sit to administer his "own brand of industrial justice").
Moreover, review of constitutional error is preserved,
see
Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, ante at
473 U. S. 311,
n. 3;
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.
S. 361,
415 U. S.
367-368 (1974), and FIFRA, therefore, does not obstruct
whatever judicial review might by required by due process.
Cf.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at
285 U. S. 46;
id. at
285 U. S. 87
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). We need not identify the extent to
which due process may require review of determinations by the
arbitrator, because the parties stipulated below to
Page 473 U. S. 593
abandon any due process claims. [
Footnote 4]
See n 2,
supra. For purposes of our analysis, it is
sufficient to note that FIFRA does provide for limited Article III
review, including whatever review is independently required by due
process considerations.
IV
Appellees raise Article I as an alternative ground for
sustaining the judgment of the District Court.
Cf. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471,
397 U. S. 475,
n. 6 (1970). Appellees argued below that FIFRA's standard for
compensation is so vague as to be an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative powers.
See A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495
(1935). A term that appears vague on its face "may derive much
meaningful content from the purpose of the Act, its factual
background, and the statutory context."
American Power &
Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90,
329 U. S. 104
(1946). Although FIFRA's language does not impose an explicit
standard, the legislative history of the 1972 and 1978 amendments
is far from silent.
See, e.g., S.Conf.Rep. No. 95-1188, p.
29 (1978); 1977 S.Rep. at 4, 8, 31; 1972 S.Rep. pt. 2, pp. 69,
72-73; Hearings on Extending and Amending FIFRA before the
Subcommittee on Department Investigations, Oversight, and Research
of the House Committee on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
passim (1977). The Article I claim, however, was neither
adequately briefed nor argued to this Court, and was not fully
litigated before the District Court. Without expressing any opinion
on the merits, we leave the issue open for determination on
remand.
V
Our holding is limited to the proposition that Congress, acting
for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional
Page 473 U. S. 594
powers under Article I, may create a seemingly "private" right
that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to
be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited
involvement by the Article III judiciary. To hold otherwise would
be to erect a rigid and formalistic restraint on the ability of
Congress to adopt innovative measures such as negotiation and
arbitration with respect to rights created by a regulatory scheme.
For the reasons stated in our opinion, we hold that arbitration of
the limited right created by FIFRA § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not
contravene Article III. The judgment of the District Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The full text of § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) reads:
"(ii) except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (D)(i) of
this paragraph, with respect to data submitted after December 31,
1969, by an applicant or registrant to support an application for
registration, experimental use permit, or amendment adding a new
use to an existing registration, to support or maintain in effect
an existing registration, or for reregistration, the Administrator
may, without the permission of the original data submitter consider
any such item of data in support of an application by any other
person (hereinafter in this chapter referred to as the 'applicant')
within the fifteen-year period following the date the data were
originally submitted only if the applicant has made an offer to
compensate the original data submitter and submitted such offer to
the Administrator accompanied by evidence of delivery to the
original data submitter of the offer. The terms and amount of
compensation may be fixed by agreement between the original data
submitter and the applicant, or, failing such an agreement, binding
arbitration under this subparagraph. If, at the end of ninety days
after the date of delivery to the original data submitter of the
offer to compensate, the original data submitter and the applicant,
have neither agreed on the amount and terms of compensation nor on
a procedure for reaching an agreement on the amount and terms of
compensation, either person may initiate binding arbitration
proceedings by requesting the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service to appoint an arbitrator from the roster of arbitrators
maintained by such Service. The procedures and rules of the Service
shall be applicable to the selection of such arbitrator and to such
arbitration proceedings, and the findings and determination of the
arbitrator shall be final and conclusive, and no official or court
of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any
such findings and determination, except for fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct by one of the parties to the
arbitration or the arbitrator where there is a verified complaint
with supporting affidavits attesting to specific instances of such
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. The parties to the
arbitration shall share equally in the payment of the fee and
expenses of the arbitrator. If the Administrator determines that an
original data submitter has failed to participate in a procedure
for reaching an agreement or in an arbitration proceeding as
required by this subparagraph, or failed to comply with the terms
of an agreement or arbitration decision concerning compensation
under this subparagraph, the original data submitter shall forfeit
the right to compensation for the use of the data in support of the
application. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
subchapter, if the Administrator determines that an applicant has
failed to participate in a procedure for reaching an agreement or
in an arbitration proceeding as required by this subparagraph, or
failed to comply with the terms of an agreement or arbitration
decision concerning compensation under this subparagraph, the
Administrator shall deny the application or cancel the registration
of the pesticide in support of which the data were used without
further hearing. Before the Administrator takes action under either
of the preceding two sentences, the Administrator shall furnish to
the affected person, by certified mail, notice of intent to take
action and allow fifteen days from the date of delivery of the
notice for the affected person to respond. If a registration is
denied or canceled under this subparagraph, the Administrator may
make such order as the Administrator deems appropriate concerning
the continued sale and use of existing stocks of such pesticide.
Registration action by the Administrator shall not be delayed
pending the fixing of compensation."
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii).
[
Footnote 2]
Following the 1978 amendments, appellees amended their
complaints to allege that the data-consideration and disclosure
provisions effected a taking of their property without just
compensation and without due process of law. The District Court
granted a preliminary injunction against use of data submitted
prior to 1978,
Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Costle, 481 F.
Supp. 195 (1979), but the Second Circuit reversed for want of a
showing of likelihood of success, and this Court denied appellees'
petition for a writ of certiorari.
Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 1014 (1980),
cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981). Appellees then amended their
complaint to allege that the lack of valuation standards rendered
the arbitration provision an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority in violation of Article I. At the same time,
they stipulated to dismissal, without prejudice to a Court of
Claims action, of their due process claims. Record, Doc. Nos. 1,
15, 19.
[
Footnote 3]
Shortly after the award was handed down, PPG filed an action
against Stauffer and EPA in the District Court for the District of
Columbia to set aside the award. Stauffer cross-claimed against EPA
seeking to have the entire FIFRA data-compensation scheme
invalidated as violative of Article III, and counterclaimed against
PPG seeking damages in the amount of the award should the statute
be struck down or, in the alternative, enforcement of the award.
PPG Industries, Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., Civil
Action No. 83-1941 (DC, filed July 7, 1983); Record, Doc. No. 35.
Should the scheme be upheld, Stauffer argues it is entitled to the
award as the only option possible under FIFRA absent fraud or
misconduct.
[
Footnote 4]
As noted
supra at
473 U. S. 585,
appellees retain Tucker Act claims in the District Courts or in the
United States Claims Court with review in the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit for any shortfall between the arbitration award
and the value of trade secrets submitted between 1972 and 1978.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join, concurring in the judgment.
Our cases of both recent and ancient vintage have struggled to
pierce through the language of Art. III of the Constitution to the
full meaning of the deceptively simple requirement that
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."
Art. III, § 1. We know that those who framed our Constitution
feared the tyranny of "accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands," The Federalist No.
47, p. 300 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison), and sought to guard
against it by dispersing federal power to three interdependent
branches of Government. Each branch of Government was intended to
exercise a distinct but limited power, and function as a check on
any aggrandizing tendencies in the other branches.
See Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1,
424 U. S. 122
(1976) (per curiam). The salary and tenure guarantees of Art. III--
reflecting Hamilton's observation that "a power over a man's
subsistence amounts
Page 473 U. S. 595
to a power over his will," The Federalist No. 79, p. 491 (H.
Lodge ed. 1888) -- were thought essential to the Judiciary's
ability to function effectively as a check on Congress and the
Executive. It is thus clear that, when Congress establishes courts
pursuant to Art. III, the judges presiding in those courts must
receive salary and tenure guarantees. The difficult question is to
what extent the need to preserve the Judiciary's checking function
requires Congress to assign the Federal Government's decisionmaking
authority to independent tribunals so constituted.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U. S. 50
(1982), is the Court's most recent attempt at defining the limits
Art. III places on the power of Congress to assign adjudicative
authority to decisionmakers not protected by tenure and salary
guarantees. We faced the question whether, under the federal
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549, a federal bankruptcy court
whose decisionmaker did not benefit from those guarantees could be
empowered to render the entire initial adjudication of a state
common law cause of action. The issue was, in other words, whether
Art. III permitted assignment of any essential attributes of the
"judicial Power" to a non-Art. III federal decisionmaker when state
law prescribed the rule of decision in a dispute between private
parties. The Court invalidated the congressional action, but a
majority did not agree upon a common rationale. The plurality would
have held that this allocation of decisional authority could not be
justified as a proper exercise of either the congressional power to
create Art. I legislative courts or the congressional power to
create adjuncts to Art. III courts. 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 63-87.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, in a concurring opinion joined by JUSTICE
O'CONNOR, would simply have held that Congress may not assign the
power to adjudicate a traditional state common law action to a
non-Art. III tribunal even given the "traditional appellate review"
by an Art. III court afforded under the challenged bankruptcy
statute.
Id. at
458 U. S.
90-91.
Page 473 U. S. 596
Because the appellees in
Northern Pipeline had argued
that bankruptcy court jurisdiction over state law contract claims
could be justified as an exercise of Congress' Art. I power to
create legislative courts, the plurality examined the basis and
scope of that congressional power as it has been explicated in our
precedents. The plurality concluded that, notwithstanding the
commands of Art. III, Congress could create such legislative courts
for three categories of cases: territorial courts, courts-martial,
and courts that adjudicate public rights disputes. The only serious
question in
Northern Pipeline was whether the disputed
bankruptcy court jurisdiction fell into the third category.
The plurality opinion concluded that public rights cases, as
that concept had come to be understood, involved disputes arising
from the Federal Government's administration of its laws or
programs. [
Footnote 2/1] 458 U.S.
at
458 U. S. 68-69.
The plurality
Page 473 U. S. 597
expressly disclaimed any intention to provide a generally
applicable definition of "public rights," but concluded that, at a
minimum, public rights disputes must arise "
between the
Government and others.'" Id. at 458 U. S. 69,
quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.
S. 438, 279 U. S. 458
(1929). The dispute at issue in Northern Pipeline was
found by the plurality not to fall into the public rights category,
because state law created the right and provided the rule of
decision as between the private parties litigating the dispute,
irrespective of the existence of the federal bankruptcy scheme. 458
U.S. at 458 U. S. 72, n.
26 ("Even in the absence of the federal scheme, the plaintiff would
be able to proceed against the defendant on the state law
contractual claims"). In no sense could the dispute be said to be
about the propriety or accuracy of a determination made by an organ
of the Federal Government in administration or execution of a
federal regulatory scheme. Whatever the precise scope of the public
rights doctrine, that case was clearly outside it, and therefore
adjudication before an Art. III decisionmaker or properly
constituted adjunct was required. [Footnote 2/2] Because the challenged bankruptcy
jurisdiction could not be sustained on the alternative rationale
that it was a proper adjunct to an Art. III court, id. at
458 U. S. 77-86
(plurality opinion); id. at 458 U. S. 91
(REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment), the statute embodying the
jurisdictional grant was declared unconstitutional.
Page 473 U. S. 598
Analysis of the present case properly begins with the
recognition that it differs substantially from the issue in
Northern Pipeline. The present case arises entirely within
the regulatory confines of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136
et seq. This
federal statute prescribes both the terms of compensation and the
procedures for arriving at the proper amount of compensation in any
given case.
See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (providing
for negotiation followed by binding arbitration to set amounts
"follow-on" registrants must pay in compensation for use of test
data). Thus, the question for decision here is whether fixing the
amount of compensation for test data under FIFRA can be
characterized as a public rights dispute that need not be
adjudicated from the outset in an Art. III court or a properly
constituted adjunct to such a court. [
Footnote 2/3] Should it be concluded that this is such a
dispute, the further issue must be confronted of whether some form
of appellate oversight by an Art. III court is nonetheless
required,
see Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U. S. 442,
430 U. S. 455,
n. 13 (1977), and, if so, whether this statute's provision of
review only for "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct"
suffices. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii).
I agree with the Court that the determinative factor with
respect to the proper characterization of the nature of the dispute
in this case should not be the presence or absence of the
Government as a party.
See ante at
473 U.S. 586. Despite the Court's
contrary suggestions, the plurality opinion in
Northern
Pipeline suggests neither that "the right to an Article III
forum is absolute unless the Federal Government is a party of
record" nor that "Article III has no force simply because a dispute
is between the Government and an individual."
Page 473 U. S. 599
Ante at
473 U.S.
586. Properly understood, the analysis elaborated by the
plurality in
Northern Pipeline does not place the Federal
Government in an Art. III straitjacket whenever a dispute
technically is one between private parties. We recognized that a
bankruptcy adjudication, though technically a dispute among private
parties, may well be properly characterized as a matter of public
rights. 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 50. The
plurality opinion's reaffirmation of the constitutionality of the
administrative scheme at issue in
Crowell v. Benson,
285 U. S. 22
(1932), similarly suggests that a proper interpretation of Art. III
affords the Federal Government substantial flexibility to rely on
administrative tribunals.
See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S.
at
458 U. S. 69, n.
22,
458 U. S. 78-80.
The plurality opinion should not be read to imply that reliance on
administrative agencies for ratemaking or other forms of regulatory
adjustments of private interests is necessarily suspect.
Cf.
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184,
358 U. S. 191
(1958) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
Nor does the approach of the
Northern Pipeline
plurality opinion permit Congress to sap the Judiciary of all its
checking power whenever the Government is a party. The opinion made
clear that
"the presence of the United States as a proper party to the
proceeding is . . . not [a] sufficient means of distinguishing
'private rights' from 'public rights.'"
458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 69, n.
23. At a minimum, Art. III must bar Congress from assigning to an
Art. I decisionmaker the ultimate disposition of challenges to the
constitutionality of Government action, either legislative or
executive.
Cf. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.
S. 667,
447 U. S.
708-712 (1980) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Also, the
plurality opinion was careful to leave open the question whether
and to what extent even the resolution of public rights disputes
might require some eventual review in an Art. III court in the
exercise of its responsibility to check an impermissible
accumulation of power in the other branches of Government. 458 U.S.
at
458 U. S. 70, n.
23;
see also id. at
458 U. S. 115
(WHITE, J., dissenting) ("[A] scheme of
Page 473 U. S. 600
Art. I courts that provides for appellate review by Art. III
courts should be substantially less controversial than a
legislative attempt entirely to avoid judicial review in a
constitutional court");
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, supra, at
430 U. S. 455,
n. 13. Because the approach of the plurality opinion in
Northern Pipeline is sufficiently flexible to accommodate
the demands of contemporary Government while preserving the
constitutional system of checks and balances, I adhere to it as the
proper analysis for resolving the present case.
Though the issue before us in this case is not free of doubt, in
my judgment, the FIFRA compensation scheme challenged in this case
should be viewed as involving a matter of public rights as that
term is understood in the line of cases culminating in
Northern
Pipeline. In one sense, the question of proper compensation
for a follow-on registrant's use of test data is, under the FIFRA
scheme, a dispute about "the liability of one individual to another
under the law as defined,"
Crowell v. Benson, supra, at
285 U. S. 51
(defining matters of private right). But the dispute arises in the
context of a federal regulatory scheme that virtually occupies the
field. Congress has decided that effectuation of the public
policies of FIFRA demands not only a requirement of compensation
from "follow-on" registrants in return for mandatory access to
data, but also an administrative process -- mandatory negotiation
followed by binding arbitration -- to ensure that unresolved
compensation disputes do not delay public distribution of needed
products. This case, in other words, involves not only the
congressional prescription of a federal rule of decision to govern
a private dispute, but also the active participation of a federal
regulatory agency in resolving the dispute. Although a compensation
dispute under FIFRA ultimately involves a determination of the duty
owed one private party by another, at its heart, the dispute
involves the exercise of authority by a Federal Government
arbitrator in the course of administration of FIFRA's comprehensive
regulatory
Page 473 U. S. 601
scheme. As such, it partakes of the characteristics of a
standard agency adjudication.
Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, supra,
at
358 U. S. 191
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). [
Footnote
2/4]
Given that this dispute is properly understood as one involving
a matter in which Congress has substantial latitude to make use of
Art. I decisionmakers, the question remains whether the
Constitution nevertheless imposes some requirement of Art. III
supervision of the arbitrator's decisions under this scheme. In
this case, Congress has provided for review of arbitrators'
decisions to ensure against "fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct." The Court therefore need not reach the difficult
question whether Congress is always free to cut off all judicial
review of decisions respecting such exercises of Art. I
authority.
The review prescribed under FIFRA encompasses the authority to
invalidate an arbitrator's decision when that decision exceeds the
arbitrator's authority or exhibits a manifest disregard for the
governing law.
See Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U. S. 593,
363 U. S. 597
(1960);
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427,
346 U. S.
436-437 (1953). Such review preserves the judicial
authority over questions of law in the present context.
Cf.
Crowell v. Benson, supra, at
285 U. S. 54. In
essence, the FIFRA scheme delegates a significant case-
1473 U.S. 602
by-case lawmaking function to the arbitrator in compensation
disputes. So long as this delegation is constitutionally
permissible -- an issue left open on remand -- and judicial review
to ensure that the arbitrator's exercise of authority in any given
case does not depart from the mandate of the delegation, the
Judiciary will exercise a restraining authority sufficient to meet
whatever requirements Art. III might impose in the present context.
[
Footnote 2/5]
For these reasons, I agree with the Court that the FIFRA
arbitration scheme does not violate the mandates of Art. III, and I
would therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court and
remand for further proceedings.
Page 473 U. S. 602
[
Footnote 2/1]
In
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.
S. 438 (1929), public rights disputes were described as
those "which may be . . . committed exclusively to executive
officers."
Id. at
279 U. S. 458. In this regard, it is worth noting that
early cases recognizing a public rights doctrine typically involved
either challenges to Government action affecting private interests
in which at the time no constitutional claim of entitlement was
recognized,
e.g., United States v. Babcock, 250 U.
S. 328,
250 U. S. 331
(1919);
Decatur v.
Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (1840), or challenges by one
private party seeking exercise of the Federal Government's
enforcement authority against another private party not before the
court,
e.g., Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra. The original
theory would seem to have been that, because Congress had absolute
power to dispose of such issues as it saw fit, without resort to
the Judiciary, it could assign decisionmaking authority to Art. I
courts.
The underpinnings of the original theory, of course, have not
survived intact. We now recognize an entitlement in certain forms
of government assistance.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254 (1970). And we have recently made clear that
government is not free to dispose of individual claims of
entitlement in any manner it deems fit.
Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532
(1985). Also, such reasoning is not consistent with the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.
See Speiser v. Randall,
357 U. S. 513
(1958). The erosion of these underpinnings does not, however,
mandate the conclusion that disputes arising in the administration
of federal regulatory programs may not be resolved through Art. I
adjudication. The term "public rights," as now understood,
encompasses those
"matters arising between the Government and persons subject to
its authority in connection with the performance of the
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments,"
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
458 U. S. 67-68,
that need not be fully adjudicated in an Art. III forum or a
properly constituted adjunct to such a forum.
[
Footnote 2/2]
"What clearly remains subject to Art. III are all private
adjudications in federal courts within the States -- matters from
their nature subject to a 'suit at common law or in equity or
admiralty.' . . . There is no doubt that, when the Framers assigned
the 'judicial Power' to an independent Art. III Branch, these
matters lay at what they perceived to be the protected core of that
power."
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., supra, at
458 U. S. 70-71,
n. 25.
[
Footnote 2/3]
As the Court correctly concludes, there is no tenable argument
that appellees in this case will be forced to undergo an Art. I
adjudication of a state law claim that arises between private
parties, as was the case in
Northern Pipeline. See
ante at
473 U. S.
584-585.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Although the essential function of the Judiciary is to "say what
the law is,"
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
5 U. S. 177
(1803), the exercise of this power with respect to the
interpretation of federal statutory law may not be the power that
constrains the actions of the Legislative Branch. Congress is
always free to reject this Court's interpretation of a federal
statute by passing a new law. It may rather be that the exercise of
the Court's power of judicial review to ensure constitutionality is
what restrains the exercise of legislative power. The power to
interpret federal statutory law could be seen as acting as a check
on the exercise of the executive power -- or the power of
administrative agencies whether or not they are considered as under
the head of executive authority -- given that what courts do when
they review agency action, both rulemaking and adjudication, is
ensure that the reviewed action has not departed from congressional
intent.
[
Footnote 2/5]
It is also important to note that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment imposes, as the Court correctly notes, independent
constraints on the ability of Congress to establish particular
forums for dispute resolution under Art. I.
See ante at
473 U. S. 592.
Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at
285 U. S. 87
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
This appeal presents a question under Article III, but one which
differs from that addressed by the Court and whose answer prevents
me from reaching the merits of appellees' claims.
Appellees, plaintiffs in the District Court, challenge the
constitutionality of an "arbitration procedure that [allegedly]
violates their right to an adjudication that complies with" Article
III insofar as it empowers civilian arbitrators to determine the
amount of compensation they are entitled to receive for use of
their research data. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and
Injunction �� 20-21, App. 23-24. The relief they claim against the
Environmental Protection Agency and its Administrator (collectively
referred to as the agency, EPA, or the Administrator) is a
declaration of unconstitutionality and an injunction against use of
their data in the agency's processing of applications filed by
third parties.
See id. at 24.
Page 473 U. S. 603
In § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, [
Footnote 3/1]
Congress provided appellees with a contingent form of protection
against the EPA's use of certain of their research data:
"[T]he Administrator may, without the permission of the original
data submitter, consider any such item of data in support of an
application by any other person (hereinafter in this subparagraph
referred to as the 'applicant') . . .
only if the
applicant has made an offer to compensate the original data
submitter. . . ."
92 Stat. 821, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (emphasis added).
Appellees' research data may not be used to process a third party's
application unless that party offers to compensate appellees in an
amount that is "fixed by agreement between the original data
submitter and the applicant, or, failing such agreement, binding
arbitration."
Ibid. But if the third party consents to
this procedure for determining the appropriate compensation, there
is no statutory restraint on EPA's use of the data. [
Footnote 3/2]
Page 473 U. S. 604
Appellees make no claim that the Administrator has used any of
their data without obtaining the consent required by the statute.
Thus, the statute provides no basis for any relief against EPA. And
if we should declare § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) unconstitutional, there is no
other basis of which I am aware
Page 473 U. S. 605
for interfering with the agency's use of appellees' data.
See ante at
473 U. S.
584-585;
Ruckelshaus v. Monsato Co.,
467 U. S. 986,
467 U. S.
1016-1019 (1984). Therefore, whether or not the
arbitration provision is constitutional, there is no basis for
enjoining EPA's use of appellees' research data.
For a party to have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court "relief from the injury must be
likely' to follow
from a favorable decision." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.
S. 737, 468 U. S. 751
(1984); accord, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.
S. 464, 454 U. S. 472
(1982); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U. S. 26,
426 U. S. 38,
426 U. S. 43-46
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490,
422 U. S. 507
(1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.
S. 614, 410 U. S.
618-619 (1973). Because § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not give
appellees any legal basis for claiming that they have been harmed
by anything EPA did or threatened to do, a decision that FIFRA's
arbitration provisions violate Article III could not support an
injunction against the Administrator's use of appellees' data.
Accordingly, appellees do not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) in this action. [Footnote 3/3] For this reason, I agree that
the judgment of the District Court must be reversed.
[
Footnote 3/1]
The text of § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) is quoted in full
ante at
473 U. S.
574-575, n. 1.
[
Footnote 3/2]
Under appellees' reading of § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii), compensation is a
condition precedent to EPA's use of their research data to evaluate
applications by third parties.
See Amended Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and Injunction � 20, App. 23. Because the
statutorily required arbitration procedure violates Article III,
they reason, compensation cannot be awarded and the condition
precedent to EPA's use of data cannot be fulfilled. Ergo, an
injunction must issue against the agency.
Appellees, however, misread the statute. Section 3(c)(1)(D)(ii)
conditions the Administrator's use of their data on a third party's
"
offer to compensate," not upon actual compensation. 92
Stat. 821, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (emphasis added);
accord, § 3(c)(1)(D)(iii), 92 Stat. 822, 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(1)(D)(iii). Indeed, the same section later provides that
"[r]egistration action by the Administrator shall not be delayed
pending the fixing of compensation." 92 Stat. 822, 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(1)(D)(ii). A straightforward reading of this section
demonstrates that EPA is not disabled from using research data to
process "follow-on" registrations pending compensation of
appellees. I find nothing in the legislative history that
contradicts this interpretation, and it is consistent with
Congress' "vie[w] [of] data-sharing as essential to the
registration scheme,"
ante at
473 U. S. 573,
and with the Legislature's consequent desire to break "the
logjam of litigation that resulted from controversies over data
compensation and trade secret protection,'" ibid. (quoting
S.Rep. No. 95-334, P. 3 (1977)). See id. at 3 ("The single
largest problem is the fact that the registration and
reregistration process has ground to a virtual halt. . . . Since
registration is critical, this program must be made to work").
Congress surely desired both that EPA have use of appellees' data
and that appellees be compensated for such use. But there is no
evidence to indicate that Congress intended these complementary
provisions to be mutually dependent. See § 30, 92 Stat.
836, 7 U.S.C. § 136x ("If any provision of this [Act] . . . is held
invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions . . .
which can be given effect without regard to the invalid provision .
. . and to this end the provisions of this [Act] are severable");
cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919,
462 U. S.
931-935 (1983).
The sentence the Court believes "ties the follow-on registration
to the arbitration,"
ante at
473 U. S. 582,
is beside the point. Section 3(C)(1)(D)(ii) requires the
Administrator to "deny the application or cancel the registration
of the pesticide" if the third-party "follow-on" applicant
"has failed to participate in a procedure for reaching an
agreement or in an arbitration proceeding as required by this
subparagraph, or failed to comply with the terms of an agreement or
arbitration decision concerning compensation."
92 Stat. 821, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii). This sentence is
obviously addressed to defaults by third-party "follow-on"
applicants in the registration process, and hardly suggests that
Congress would have scrapped the entire data-use provision if the
compensation component was found unconstitutional. To restate the
obvious, Congress undoubtedly intended that EPA have use of
original applicants' research data,
and that such use be
recompensed -- the statute, after all, provides for both. But the
Legislature's unequivocal intention to facilitate pesticide
registrations, and the presence of an express severability
provision (accompanied by the traditional duty "to save and not to
destroy,"
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 672,
403 U. S. 684
(1971)), makes it rather unlikely that Congress gambled the entire
pesticide registration process on the constitutionality of a
provision for arbitrable compensation. I therefore conclude that,
even if we invalidated the compensation clauses, appellees would
have no right to an injunction against EPA's use of appellees'
research data.
[
Footnote 3/3]
The District Court held that appellees had standing to challenge
FIFRA's arbitration provisions because "plaintiffs' injuries here
would be the direct product of the statutory plan."
Union
Carbide Agricultural Products Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 571 F.
Supp. 117, 123, n. 2 (SDNY 1983). This analysis is incomplete:
"The injury must be
fairly' traceable to the challenged action,
and relief from the injury must be `likely' to follow from
a favorable decision." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at
468 U. S. 751
(emphasis added); accord, Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. at 454 U. S. 472.
These two components of the Article III causation requirement are
distinct: the "fairly traceable" component "examines the causal
connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged
injury"; the "redressability" component "examines the causal
connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief
requested." Allen v. Wright, supra, at 468 U. S. 753,
n.19. "[I]t is important to keep the inquiries separate."
Ibid.