In connection with a flood control project, the United States
filed proceedings in Federal District Court to condemn
approximately 50 acres of land owned by respondent city of
Duncanville, Tex., that had been used as a sanitary landfill. The
court awarded compensation in the amount of the condemned
property's fair market value as determined by the jury, rather than
the larger amount fixed by the jury as the reasonable cost to the
city of acquiring and developing a substitute facility, which was
larger and better than the condemned facility. The court found no
basis for departing from the normal market value standard for
determining the amount of compensation, but the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded.
Held: The Fifth Amendment does not require that the
United States pay a public condemnee compensation measured by the
cost of acquiring a substitute facility that the condemnee has a
duty to acquire, when the market value of the condemned property is
ascertainable and when there is no showing of manifest injustice.
Pp.
469 U. S.
29-36.
(a) "Just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment normally is to
be measured by the market value of the property at the time of the
taking, and this case is not one in which an exception is required
because fair market value is not ascertainable. The testimony at
trial established a fairly robust market for sanitary landfill
properties. Nor is an award of compensation measured by market
value here fundamentally inconsistent with the basic principles of
indemnity embodied in the Just Compensation Clause. Pp.
469 U. S.
29-31.
(b) The text of the Fifth Amendment does not mandate a more
favorable rule of compensation for public condemnees than for
private parties. The reference to "private property" in the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment encompasses the property of state and
local governments when it is condemned by the United States, and
under this construction the same principles of just compensation
presumptively apply to both private and public condemnees. P.
469 U. S.
31.
(c) When the dictum in
Brown v. United States,
263 U. S. 78 --
which is the source of the "substitute facilities doctrine" -- is
read in the context of the decision in that case, it lends no
support to the suggestion that a distinction should be drawn
between public and private condemnees.
Page 469 U. S. 25
Nor does it shed any light on the proper measure of compensation
in this case.
Brown merely indicates that it would have
been constitutionally permissible for the Federal Government to
provide the city with a substitute landfill site instead of
compensating it in cash. Pp.
469 U. S.
31-33.
(d) The city's legal obligation to maintain public services that
are interrupted by a federal condemnation does not justify a
distinction between public and private condemnees for the purpose
of measuring "just compensation." The risk that a private condemnee
might receive a "windfall" if its compensation were measured by the
cost of a substitute facility that was never acquired or was later
sold or converted to another use is not avoided by the city's
obligation to replace the facility. If the replacement facility is
more costly than the condemned facility, it presumably is more
valuable, and any increase in the quality of the facility may be as
readily characterized as a "windfall" as the award of cash proceeds
for a substitute facility that is never built. Moreover, the
substitute facilities doctrine, if applied in this case, would
diverge from the principle that just compensation must be measured
by an objective standard that disregards subjective values which
are only of significance to an individual owner. Pp.
469 U. S.
33-36.
706 F.2d 1356, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which POWELL, J.,
joined,
post,, p.
469 U. S. 37.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fifth Amendment requires that the United States pay "just
compensation" -- normally measured by fair market value [
Footnote 1] -- whenever it takes
private property for public
Page 469 U. S. 26
use. [
Footnote 2] This case
involves the condemnation of property owned by a municipality. The
question is whether a public condemnee is entitled to compensation
measured by the cost of acquiring a substitute facility if it has a
duty to replace the condemned facility. We hold that this measure
of compensation is not required when the market value of the
condemned property is ascertainable.
I
In 1978, as part of a flood control project, the United States
condemned approximately 50 acres of land owned by the city of
Duncanville, Texas. [
Footnote
3] The site had been used since 1969 as a sanitary landfill. In
order to replace the condemned landfill, the city acquired a
113.7-acre site and developed it into a larger and better facility.
[
Footnote 4] In the
condemnation proceedings, the city claimed that it was entitled to
recover all of the costs incurred in acquiring the substitute site
and developing it as a landfill, an amount in excess of $1,276,000.
The United States, however, contended that just compensation should
be determined by the fair market value of the
Page 469 U. S. 27
condemned facility and deposited $199,950 in the registry of the
court as its estimation of the amount due.
Before trial the Government filed a motion
in limine to
exclude any evidence of the cost of the substitute facility,
arguing that it was not relevant to the calculation of fair market
value. Record, Doc. No. 62. The District Court denied the motion,
noting that this Court had left open the question of the proper
measure of compensation for the condemnation of public property.
See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.
S. 506,
441 U. S. 509,
n. 3 (1979)
(Lutheran Synod). The court concluded that
"a complete factual record should be developed from which an
independent determination of the appropriate measure of
compensation can be made."
Record, Doc. No. 111.
At trial, both parties submitted evidence on the fair market
value of the condemned property [
Footnote 5] and on the cost of the substitute landfill
facility. [
Footnote 6]
Responding to special interrogatories, the jury found that the fair
market value of the
Page 469 U. S. 28
condemned property was $225,000, and that the reasonable cost of
a substitute facility was $723,624.01. Record, Doc. Nos.199, 200.
The District Court entered judgment for the lower amount plus
interest on the difference between that amount and the sum already
paid. [
Footnote 7]
529 F.
Supp. 220 (ND Tex.1981). The District Court explained that the
city had not met its "burden of establishing what would be a
reasonable cost of a substitute facility." [
Footnote 8] In addition, the court was of the view
that
"substitute facilities compensation should not be awarded in
every case where a public condemnee can establish a duty to replace
the condemned property, at least where a fair market value can be
established."
Id. at 222. The court found no basis for departing from
the market value standard in this case, and reasoned that the
application of the substitute facilities measure of compensation
would necessarily provide the city with a "windfall." [
Footnote 9]
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. 706 F.2d 1356 (CA5 1983). It reasoned that the city's
loss attributable to the condemnation was "the amount of money
reasonably spent . . . to create a functionally equivalent
facility."
Id. at 1360. If the city was required, either
as a matter of law or as a matter of practical
Page 469 U. S. 29
necessity, to replace the old landfill facility, the Court of
Appeals believed that it would receive no windfall. The court,
however, held that the amount of compensation should be adjusted to
account for any qualitative differences in the substitute site.
Finding that the trial judge's instructions had not adequately
informed the jury of its duty to discount the costs of the
substitute facility in order to account for its increased capacity
and superior quality,
see n.
4 supra, the Court of Appeals remanded for a new
trial. [
Footnote 10] We
granted the Government's petition for certiorari, [
Footnote 11] 465 U.S. 1098 (1984), and we
now reverse with instructions to direct the District Court to enter
judgment based on the jury's finding of fair market value.
II
The Court has repeatedly held that just compensation normally is
to be measured by "the market value of the property at the time of
the taking contemporaneously paid in money."
Olson v. United
States, 292 U. S. 246,
292 U. S. 255
(1934). "Considerations that may not reasonably be held to affect
market value are excluded."
Id. at
292 U. S. 256.
Deviation from this measure of just compensation has been required
only "when market value has been too difficult to find, or when its
application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public."
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.
S. 121,
339 U. S. 123
(1950);
Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States,
467 U. S. 1,
467 U. S. 10, n.
14 (1984).
Page 469 U. S. 30
This case is not one in which an exception to the normal measure
of just compensation is required because fair market value is not
ascertainable. Such cases, for the most part, involve properties
that are seldom, if ever, sold in the open market. [
Footnote 12] Under those circumstances,
"we cannot predict whether the prices previously paid, assuming
there have been prior sales, would be repeated in a sale of the
condemned property."
Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at
441 U. S. 513.
In this case, however, the testimony at trial established a fairly
robust market for sanitary landfill properties,
see n.
5 supra, and the
jury's determination of the fair market value of the condemned
landfill facility is adequately supported by expert testimony
concerning the sale prices of comparable property.
Cf. 441
U.S. at
441 U. S.
513-514.
The city contends that in this case an award of compensation
measured by market value is fundamentally inconsistent with the
basic principles of indemnity embodied in the Just Compensation
Clause. If the city were a private party rather than a public
entity, however, the possibility that the cost of a substitute
facility exceeds the market value of the condemned parcel would not
justify a departure from the market value measure.
Lutheran
Synod, 441 U.S. at
441 U. S.
514-517. The question -- which we expressly reserved in
the
Lutheran Synod case [
Footnote 13] -- is whether a substitute facilities
measure of compensation is mandated by the Constitution [
Footnote 14]
Page 469 U. S. 31
when the condemnee is a local governmental entity that has a
duty to replace the condemned facility.
III
The text of the Fifth Amendment certainly does not mandate a
more favorable rule of compensation for public condemnees than for
private parties. To the contrary, the language of the Amendment
only refers to compensation for "private property," and one might
argue that the Framers intended to provide greater protection for
the interests of private parties than for public condemnees. That
argument would be supported by the observation that many public
condemnees have the power of domain, and thus, unlike private
parties, need not rely on the availability of property on the
market in acquiring substitute facilities.
When the United States condemns a local public facility, the
loss to the public entity, to the persons served by it, and to the
local taxpayers may be no less acute than the loss in a taking of
private property. Therefore, it is most reasonable to construe the
reference to "private property" in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment as encompassing the property of state and local
governments when it is condemned by the United States. [
Footnote 15] Under this
construction, the same principles of just compensation
presumptively apply to both private and public condemnees.
IV
The Court of Appeals correctly identified a dictum in
Brown
v. United States, 263 U. S. 78
(1923), as the source
Page 469 U. S. 32
of what has become known as the "substitute facilities
doctrine." [
Footnote 16]
When that passage is read in the context of the Court's decision in
that case, it lends no support to the suggestion that a distinction
should be drawn between public and private condemnees. Nor does it
shed any light on the proper measure of compensation in this
case.
The facts of the
Brown case were, in the Court's word,
"peculiar." [
Footnote 17]
The construction of a reservoir on the Snake River flooded
approximately three-quarters of the town of American Falls, Idaho,
an area of some 640 acres. To compensate both the public and
private owners of the flooded acreage, the Government undertook to
relocate most of the town to the other side of the river. The
owners of a large tract to be included within the limits of the
reconstructed town challenged the Government's power to condemn
their property, contending that the transfer of their property to
other private persons was not a "public use" as required by the
Fifth Amendment.
Cf. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
467 U. S. 229,
467 U. S.
239-244 (1984).
In rejecting that contention, the Court held that the
Government's method of compensating the owners of the flooded
property was legitimate. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft
observed:
"The usual and ordinary method of condemnation of the lots in
the old town, and of the streets and alleys as town property, would
be ill adapted to the exigency. . . . A town is a business center.
It is a unit. If three
Page 469 U. S. 33
quarters of it is to be destroyed by appropriating it to an
exclusive use like a reservoir, all property owners, both those
ousted and those in the remaining quarter, as well as the State,
whose subordinate agency of government is the municipality, are
injured. A method of compensation by substitution would seem to be
the best means of making the parties whole.
The power of
condemnation is necessary to such a substitution."
263 U.S. at
263 U. S. 82-83
(emphasis added). Taken in context, the apparent endorsement of
compensation by substitution is made in support of the Government's
power to condemn the property in
Brown and does not state
the proper measure of compensation in another case.
Lutheran
Synod, 441 U.S. at
441 U. S. 509,
n. 3.
Brown merely indicates that it would have been
constitutionally permissible for the Federal Government to provide
the city with a substitute landfill site instead of compensating it
in cash. Nothing in
Brown implies that the Federal
Government has a duty to provide the city with anything more than
the fair market value of the condemned property.
V
In this case, as in most, the market measure of compensation
achieves a fair "balance between the public's need and the
claimant's loss."
United States v. Toronto, Hamilton &
Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U. S. 396,
338 U. S. 402
(1949). This view is consistent with our holding in
Lutheran
Synod that fair market value constitutes "just compensation"
for those private citizens who must replace their condemned
property with more expensive substitutes and with our prior
holdings that the Fifth Amendment does not require any award for
consequential damages arising from a condemnation. [
Footnote 18]
Page 469 U. S. 34
The city argues that its responsibility for municipal garbage
disposal justifies a departure from the market value measure in
this case. This responsibility compelled the city to arrange for a
suitable replacement facility or substitute garbage disposal
services. [
Footnote 19] This
obligation to replace a condemned facility, however, is no more
compelling than the obligations assumed by private citizens. Even
though most private condemnees are not legally obligated to replace
property taken by the Government, economic circumstances often
force them to do so. When a home is condemned, for example, its
owner must find another place to live. The city's legal obligation
to maintain public services that are interrupted by a federal
condemnation does not justify a distinction between public and
private condemnees for the purpose of measuring "just
compensation." [
Footnote
20]
Of course, the decision in
Lutheran Synod was based, in
part, on a fear that a private condemnee might receive a "windfall"
if its compensation were measured by the cost of a substitute
facility and "substitute facilities were never acquired, or if
acquired, were later sold or converted to another use." 441 U.S. at
441 U. S. 516.
The Court of Appeals suggested that the city's obligation to
replace the facility avoids this risk, 706 F.2d at 1360, but we do
not agree. If the replacement facility is more costly than the
condemned facility, it presumably is more valuable, [
Footnote 21] and any increase in the
quality
Page 469 U. S. 35
of the facility may be as readily characterized as a "windfall"
as the award of cash proceeds for a substitute facility that is
never built.
The Court of Appeals, however, believed that the risk of any
windfall could be reduced by discounting the cost of the substitute
facility to account for its superior quality.
Id. at
1362-1363. This approach would add uncertainty and complexity to
the valuation proceeding without any necessary improvement in the
process. In order to implement the Court of Appeals' approach, the
factfinder would have to make at least two determinations: (i) the
reasonable (rather than the actual) replacement cost, which would
require an inquiry into the fair market value of the second
facility; and (ii) the extent to which the new facility is superior
to the old, which would require an analysis of the qualitative
differences between the new and the old. It would also be necessary
to determine the fair market value of the old property in order to
provide a basis for comparison. There is a practical risk that the
entire added value will not be calculated correctly; moreover, if
it is correctly estimated, the entire process may amount to nothing
more than a roundabout method of arriving at the market value of
the condemned facility. [
Footnote 22]
Finally, the substitute facilities doctrine, as applied in this
case, diverges from the principle that just compensation must be
measured by an objective standard that disregards subjective values
which are only of significance to an individual owner. As the Court
wrote in
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,
338 U. S. 1,
338 U. S. 5
(1949):
"The value of property springs from subjective needs and
attitudes; its value to the owner may therefore differ widely from
its value to the taker. Most things, however,
Page 469 U. S. 36
have a general demand which gives them a value transferable from
one owner to another. As opposed to such personal and variant
standards as value to the particular owner whose property has been
taken, this transferable value has an external validity which makes
it a fair measure of public obligation to compensate the loss
incurred by an owner as a result of the taking of his property for
public use. In view, however, of the liability of all property to
condemnation for the common good, loss to the owner of
nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property
or idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of
the police power, is properly treated as part of the burden of
common citizenship."
The subjective elements in the formula for determining the cost
of reasonable substitute facilities would enhance the risk of error
and prejudice. [
Footnote 23]
Since the condemnation contest is between the local community and a
National Government that may be thought to have unlimited
resources, the open-ended character of the substitute facilities
standard increases the likelihood that the city would actually
derive the windfall that concerned both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals. [
Footnote
24]
"Particularly is this true where these issues are to be left for
jury determination, for juries should not be given sophistical and
abstruse formulas as the basis for their findings nor be left to
apply even sensible formulas to factors that are too elusive."
Id. at
338 U. S. 20.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Page 469 U. S. 37
[
Footnote 1]
United States v. Miller, 317 U.
S. 369,
317 U. S. 374
(1943) ("what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller").
[
Footnote 2]
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S.Const., Amdt. 5.
[
Footnote 3]
The United States initiated the condemnation proceedings by
filing a declaration of taking under 40 U.S.C. § 258a. Under that
procedure the Government deposits the estimated value of the land
in the registry of the court.
"Title and right to possession thereupon vest immediately in the
United States. In subsequent judicial proceedings, the exact value
of the land (on the date the declaration of taking was filed) is
determined, and the owner is awarded the difference (if any)
between the adjudicated value of the land and the amount already
received by the owner, plus interest on that difference."
Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States,
467 U. S. 1,
467 U. S. 5
(1984).
[
Footnote 4]
The new landfill site is larger in acreage than the old facility
and because of superior soil and water table conditions it can be
excavated to a greater depth. As a result, the capacity of the new
facility is 2,100,000 cubic yards while the remaining capacity of
the old facility was 650,000 cubic yards. The new facility is
expected to remain in service for 41.6 years, or 28.8 years longer
than the condemned facility would have remained in service. Tr.
395-397, 399, 402.
[
Footnote 5]
Experts for both the United States and the city agreed that a
market for landfill properties existed in the area. A Government
witness, for example, testified that there are
"private owners of solid waste companies in the market for land
for their own solid waste disposal sites. You've got the major
corporations in the marketplace securing sites for landfill
operations and then you've got all of your City Governments,
they're seeking locations to deposit solid waste. And all of these
people at one time or another are in the marketplace looking for a
site for solid waste disposal."
Id. at 297.
Based on their evaluation of the recent sale prices of
comparable parcels, the experts for the city estimated the value of
the condemned facility as between $367,500 and $370,000; experts
for the United States estimated its value as between $160,410 and
$190,000.
Id. at 173, 182, 276, 353.
[
Footnote 6]
The city's Director of Public Works admitted on
cross-examination that the city had condemnation powers, but did
not use them in acquiring the land for the new facility. Nor did
the city bargain over the seller's asking price or have the land
appraised prior to the acquisition: "This was the price that he had
asked for, what we ended up paying for it."
Id. at 93-94.
The Government's expert witnesses testified that the city paid
considerably more than fair market value for the new land.
Id. at 282, 321,357.
[
Footnote 7]
The District Court awarded interest at the statutory rate of six
percent, 40 U.S.C. § 258a, because the city had not offered any
evidence indicating that a higher rate of interest prevailed.
529 F.
Supp. 220, 223-224 (ND Tex.1981).
[
Footnote 8]
Id. at 221.
[
Footnote 9]
Relying on JUSTICE WHITE's concurring opinion in
United
States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.
S. 506,
441 U. S. 518
(1979)
(Lutheran Synod), the District Court wrote:
"When the doctrine of cost of substitute facilities is applied,
a windfall
necessarily accrues to the condemnee who is
awarded an amount sufficient to replace ancient or depleted
facilities with brand new facilities. [141 U.S. at
141 U. S.
517] (JUSTICE WHITE concurring).
See also [United
States v.] 564.54 Acres, 576 F.2d 983, 996-1000 (3d Cir.1978)
(Judge Stern concurring). By definition, a market value represents
approximately what it would cost to purchase the same or similar
property in the marketplace."
529 F. Supp. at 222 (emphasis in original).
[
Footnote 10]
"In light of [the remand for a new trial]," the Court of Appeals
instructed the District Court to allow the city a second
opportunity to present evidence on whether the rate of interest on
the condemnation award should exceed the statutory rate of six
percent. 706 F.2d at 1364. In view of our disposition of the case,
the Court of Appeals' rationale for a new hearing on that issue is
no longer valid.
[
Footnote 11]
We denied the petition for certiorari filed by the city
challenging the order of a new trial and seeking the entry of
judgment on the jury's finding of the cost of the substitute
facility.
City of Duncanville v. United States, 65 U.S.
1022 (1984).
[
Footnote 12]
"This might be the case, for example, with respect to public
facilities such as roads or sewers."
Lutheran Synod, 441
U.S. at
441 U. S.
513.
[
Footnote 13]
"This Court has not passed on the propriety of substitute
facilities compensation for public condemnees. . . . In light of
our disposition of this case, we express no opinion on the
appropriate measure of compensation for publicly owned
property."
Id. at
441 U. S. 509,
n. 3.
[
Footnote 14]
Congress, of course, has the power to authorize compensation
greater than the constitutional minimum.
See United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373,
323 U. S. 382
(1945);
see, e.g., Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1894, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4601
et seq. (requiring the payment of relocation
assistance to specified persons and businesses displaced as a
result of federal and federally assisted programs).
[
Footnote 15]
See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.
S. 230,
329 U. S. 242
(1946):
"[W]hen the Federal Government . . . takes for a federal public
use the independently held and controlled property of a state or of
a local subdivision, the Federal Government recognizes its
obligation to pay just compensation for it and it is conceded in
this case that the Federal Government must pay just compensation
for the land condemned."
See also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University
and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273,
461 U. S. 291
(1983).
[
Footnote 16]
See, e.g., United States v. Certain Property in Borough of
Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800, 803 (CA2 1968);
United States v.
Board of Education of Mineral County, 253 F.2d 760, 763 (CA4
1958).
[
Footnote 17]
"An important town stood in the way of a necessary improvement
by the United States. Three-quarters of its streets, alleys and
parks and of its buildings, public and private, would have to be
abandoned. . . . American Falls is a large settlement for that
sparsely settled country and it was many miles from a town of any
size in any direction. It was a natural and proper part of the
construction of the dam and reservoir to make provision for a
substitute town as near as possible to the old one."
263 U.S. at
263 U. S.
81.
[
Footnote 18]
See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at
323 U. S. 382;
see generally J. Gelin & D. Miller, Federal Law of
Eminent Domain § 2.4(B) (192).
[
Footnote 19]
The Court of Appeals left open the question whether the city
was, in fact, under an obligation to replace its landfill facility,
706 F.2d at 1360, n. 6, but for purposes of our decision we assume
that it was obligated to do so.
[
Footnote 20]
In holding that the substitute facilities measure of
compensation was appropriate in this case, the Court of Appeals did
not rely solely on the city's legal obligations to arrange for
garbage disposal within the municipality, but also on "any
practical, economic or logistical advantages of the city's
operation and control of its own sanitary landfill."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 21]
"Obviously, replacing the old with a new facility will cost more
than the value of the old, but the new facility itself will be more
valuable and last longer."
Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at
441 U. S. 518
(WHITE, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 22]
Indeed, one might infer from the record that this would be the
result here.
See nn.
1
and |
1 and S. 24fn6|>6,
supra. The District Court, in fact, found that an award of
fair market value would place the city "in as good a position
pecuniarily as if its property had not been taken." 529 F. Supp. at
223.
[
Footnote 23]
Cf. R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 402 (2d
ed.1977) ("The vogue of cost-benefit analysis has created inflated
notions of the effectiveness of analytical techniques in resolving
questions of cost and demand").
[
Footnote 24]
Of course, we express no view on the admissibility of testimony
on reproduction cost when it is offered on the issue of fair market
value.
Cf. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,
339 U. S. 121,
339 U. S. 126
(1950). The admissibility of such evidence must be evaluated under
the generally applicable rules of evidence.
E.g.,
Fed.Rules Evid. 401-403, 701-705.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins,
concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that, on the facts
of this case, the city of Duncanville is justly compensated by the
payment of the market value for the sanitary landfill that was
condemned by the Government. I write separately to note that I do
not read the Court's opinion to preclude a municipality or other
local governmental entity from establishing that payment of market
value in a particular case is manifestly unjust and therefore
inconsistent with the Just Compensation Clause.
See ante
at
469 U. S. 29.
When a local governmental entity can prove that the market value of
its property deviates significantly from the make-whole remedy
intended by the Just Compensation Clause and that a substitute
facility must be acquired to continue to provide an essential
service, limiting compensation to the fair market value in my view
would be manifestly unjust. Because the city of Duncanville did not
establish that the market value in this case deviated significantly
from the indemnity principle, I agree that the decision of the
Court of Appeals should be reversed.