As a result of a killing and a theft of property, respondent was
indicted by an Ohio grand jury on one count each of murder,
involuntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery, and grand theft. At
his arraignment, the trial court, over the State's objection,
accepted respondent's guilty pleas to involuntary manslaughter and
grand theft, and then granted respondent's motion to dismiss the
remaining charges, to which he had pleaded not guilty, on the
ground that their further prosecution was barred by the double
jeopardy prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the
State from continuing its prosecution of respondent on the murder
and aggravated robbery charges. Pp.
467 U. S.
497-502.
(a) This case does not concern the double jeopardy protection
against multiple punishments for the same offense. That protection
is designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts is
confined to the limits established by the legislature. Here, the
trial court's dismissal of the more serious charges did more than
simply prevent the imposition of cumulative punishments; it halted
completely the proceedings that ultimately would have led to a
verdict of guilt or innocence on these charges. The Double Jeopardy
Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting respondent for
such multiple offenses in a single prosecution. Pp.
467 U. S.
497-500.
(b) Nor would further prosecution of the dismissed counts
violate the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple
prosecutions. No interest of respondent protected by the Double
Jeopardy Clause is implicated by continuing prosecution on these
counts. Respondent only offered to resolve part of the charges
brought against him, while the State objected to disposing of any
of the counts against respondent without a trial. He has not been
exposed to conviction on these counts, nor has the State had the
opportunity to marshal its evidence and resources more than once or
to hone its presentation of its case through a trial. Moreover, the
acceptance of a guilty plea on the lesser included offenses while
the charges on the greater offenses remain pending has none of the
implications of an "implied acquittal" that results from a guilty
verdict on lesser included offenses rendered by a jury charged to
consider both greater and lesser included offenses. Notwithstanding
the trial court's acceptance of respondent's guilty pleas,
respondent should not be entitled to use the
Page 467 U. S. 494
Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent the State from
completing its prosecution on the remaining charges. Pp.
467 U. S.
500-502.
6 Ohio St.3d 420, 453 N.E.2d 595, reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part,
post, p.
467 U. S. 503.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined,
post, p.
467 U. S.
503.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Kenneth Johnson was indicted by an Ohio grand jury
for four offenses, ranging from murder to grand theft, as a result
of the killing of Thomas Hill and the theft of property from Hill's
apartment. Respondent offered to plead guilty to charges of
involuntary manslaughter and grand theft, but pleaded not guilty to
charges of murder and aggravated robbery. Over the State's
objection, the trial court accepted the "guilty" pleas to the
lesser offenses, and then granted respondent's motion to dismiss
the two most serious charges on the ground that, because of his
guilty pleas, further prosecution on the more serious offenses was
barred by the double jeopardy prohibitions of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. This judgment was affirmed on appeal through
the Ohio state courts, and we granted certiorari. 465 U.S. 1004
(1984). We now reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio
and hold that prosecuting respondent on the two more serious
charges would not constitute the type of "multiple prosecution"
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Page 467 U. S. 495
Thomas Hill was shot to death in his apartment in the city of
Mentor-on-the-Lake, a city northeast of Cleveland on Lake Erie.
Several weeks later, a county grand jury indicted respondent on one
count each of murder, [
Footnote
1] involuntary manslaughter, [
Footnote 2] aggravated robbery, [
Footnote 3] and grand theft. [
Footnote 4] Meanwhile,
Page 467 U. S. 496
respondent had left Ohio and was not arraigned on the charges
until nearly two years after the killing. At his arraignment,
respondent offered to plead guilty only to the charges of
involuntary manslaughter and grand theft, while pleading not guilty
to the more serious offenses of murder and aggravated robbery. Over
the State's objection, the trial court accepted the guilty pleas
and sentenced respondent to a term of imprisonment. App.19-21.
Respondent then moved to dismiss the remaining charges against him
on the ground that their further prosecution would violate his
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment not
to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The trial
court granted respondent's motion and dismissed the remaining
charges, finding that, because involuntary manslaughter and grand
theft were, respectively, lesser included offenses of the remaining
charges of murder and aggravated robbery, continued prosecution of
the greater offenses after acceptance of respondent's guilty pleas
on the lesser offenses was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
App. to Pet. for Cert. A24.
The Ohio Court of Appeals and then the Supreme Court of Ohio
affirmed the decision of the trial court. 6 Ohio St.3d 420, 453
N.E.2d 595 (1983). The State Supreme Court held that, in these
circumstances, aggravated robbery was an "allied offens[e] of
similar import" to theft,
id. at 422, 453 N.E.2d at 598,
[
Footnote 5] and reasoned that,
since state law permitted conviction on only one of these charges,
acceptance of respondent's guilty plea to the charge of theft
prevented conviction for the charge of aggravated robbery. The
crime of involuntary manslaughter was held to be distinguishable
from the
Page 467 U. S. 497
offense of murder only by the mental states required to commit
each offense, but that, in any one killing, an offender could only
be convicted of involuntary manslaughter or murder, but not both
crimes. [
Footnote 6]
We think the Supreme Court of Ohio was mistaken in its
observation that "this case concerns the third double jeopardy
protection prohibiting multiple punishments for the same offense."
Id. at 421, 453 N.E.2d at 598. [
Footnote 7] The Double
Page 467 U. S. 498
Jeopardy Clause, of course, affords a defendant three basic
protections:
"'[It] protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense.'"
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161,
432 U. S. 165
(1977), quoting
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.
S. 711,
395 U. S. 717
(1969). As we have explained on numerous occasions, the bar to
retrial following acquittal or conviction ensures that the State
does not make repeated attempts to convict an individual, thereby
exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxiety,
Page 467 U. S. 499
and expense, while increasing the risk of an erroneous
conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332,
420 U. S. 343
(1975);
Green v. United States, 355 U.
S. 184,
355 U. S.
187-188 (1957).
In contrast to the double jeopardy protection against multiple
trials, the final component of double jeopardy -- protection
against cumulative punishments -- is designed to ensure that the
sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits
established by the legislature. Because the substantive power to
prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the
legislature,
United States v.
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76,
18 U. S. 93
(1820), the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether
punishments are "multiple" is essentially one of legislative
intent,
see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.
S. 359,
459 U. S.
366-368 (1983). [
Footnote 8] But where a defendant is retried following
conviction, the Clause's third protection ensures that, after a
subsequent conviction, a defendant receives credit for time already
served.
North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, at
395 U. S.
718.
We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court's determination
that the Ohio Legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for
the two pairs of crimes involved here. But before respondent can
ever be punished for the offenses of murder and aggravated robbery,
he will first have to be found guilty of those offenses. The trial
court's dismissal of these more serious charges did more than
simply prevent the imposition of cumulative punishments; it halted
completely the proceedings that ultimately would have led to a
verdict of
Page 467 U. S. 500
guilt or innocence on these more serious charges. Presumably the
trial court, in the event of a guilty verdict on the more serious
offenses, will have to confront the question of cumulative
punishments as a matter of state law, but because of that court's
ruling preventing even the trial of the more serious offenses, that
stage of the prosecution was never reached. While the Double
Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant against cumulative
punishments for convictions on the same offense, the Clause does
not prohibit the State from prosecuting respondent for such
multiple offenses in a single prosecution.
Respondent urges, as an alternative basis for affirming the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio, that further prosecution of
the counts which were dismissed would violate the double jeopardy
prohibition against multiple prosecutions. Brief for Respondent
17-18. He concedes that, on the authority of our decision in
Brown v. Ohio, supra, the State is not prohibited by the
Double Jeopardy Clause from charging respondent with greater and
lesser included offenses and prosecuting those offenses in a single
trial. Brief for Respondent 7. But, he argues, his conviction and
sentence on the charges of involuntary manslaughter and grand theft
mean that further prosecution on the remaining offenses will
implicate the double jeopardy protection against a second
prosecution following conviction. The court below never had
occasion to address this argument. [
Footnote 9]
The answer to this contention seems obvious to us. Respondent
was indicted on four related charges growing out of
Page 467 U. S. 501
a murder and robbery. The grand jury returned a single
indictment, and all four charges were embraced within a single
prosecution. Respondent's argument is apparently based on the
assumption that trial proceedings, like amoebae, are capable of
being infinitely subdivided, so that a determination of guilt and
punishment on one count of a multicount indictment immediately
raises a double jeopardy bar to continued prosecution on any
remaining counts that are greater or lesser included offenses of
the charge just concluded. We have never held that, and decline to
hold it now.
Previously we have recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits prosecution of a defendant for a greater offense when he
has already been tried and acquitted or convicted on the lesser
included offense.
See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.
S. 161 (1977). In
Brown, the State first
charged the defendant with "joyriding," that is, operating an auto
without the owner's consent. The defendant pleaded guilty to this
charge, and was sentenced. Subsequently, the State indicted the
defendant for auto theft and joyriding, charges which this Court
held were barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, since the defendant
had previously been convicted in a separate proceeding of
joyriding, which was a lesser included offense of auto theft.
Brown v. Ohio, supra, at
432 U. S.
169.
We do not believe, however, that the principles of finality and
prevention of prosecutorial overreaching applied in
Brown
reach this case. No interest of respondent protected by the Double
Jeopardy Clause is implicated by continuing prosecution on the
remaining charges brought in the indictment. Here, respondent
offered only to resolve part of the charges against him, while the
State objected to disposing of any of the counts against respondent
without a trial. Respondent has not been exposed to conviction on
the charges to which he pleaded not guilty, nor has the State had
the opportunity to marshal its evidence and resources more than
once or to hone its presentation of its case through a trial. The
acceptance of a guilty plea to lesser included offenses while
charges on the greater offenses remain pending, moreover,
Page 467 U. S. 502
has none of the implications of an "implied acquittal" which
results from a verdict convicting a defendant on lesser included
offenses rendered by a jury charged to consider both greater and
lesser included offenses.
Cf. Price v. Georgia,
398 U. S. 323,
398 U. S. 329
(1970);
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at
355 U. S. 191.
There simply has been none of the governmental overreaching that
double jeopardy is supposed to prevent. On the other hand, ending
prosecution now would deny the State its right to one full and fair
opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497,
434 U. S. 509
(1978).
We think this is an even clearer case than
Jeffers v. United
States, 432 U. S. 137
(1977), where we rejected a defendant's claim of double jeopardy
based upon a guilty verdict in the first of two successive
prosecutions, when the defendant had been responsible for insisting
that there be separate, rather than consolidated, trials. Here,
respondent's efforts were directed to separate disposition of
counts in the same indictment where no more than one trial of the
offenses charged was ever contemplated. Notwithstanding the trial
court's acceptance of respondent's guilty pleas, respondent should
not be entitled to use the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to
prevent the State from completing its prosecution on the remaining
charges.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not prohibit the State from continuing its prosecution
of respondent on the charges of murder and aggravated robbery.
[
Footnote 10] Accordingly,
the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court is reversed, and the case
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Page 467 U. S. 503
[
Footnote 1]
The elements of murder in Ohio are:
"(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another."
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder, and
shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised
Code."
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2903. 02 (1982).
[
Footnote 2]
The elements of the crime of involuntary manslaughter are:
"(A) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate
result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a
felony."
"(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate
result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a
misdemeanor."
"(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. Violation of division (A) of this section is a felony
of the first degree. Violation of division (B) of this section is a
felony of the third degree."
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2903.04 (1982 and Supp.1983).
[
Footnote 3]
The Ohio statutory elements of the crime of aggravated robbery
are:
"(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense as
defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing
immediately after such attempt or offense, shall do either of the
following:"
"(1) Have a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance . . . on or
about his person or under his control;"
"(2) Inflict, or attempt to inflict serious physical harm on
another."
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated
robbery, a felony of the first degree."
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2911.01 (1982 and Supp.1983).
[
Footnote 4]
The crime of grand theft in Ohio is defined as follows:
"(A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or
services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either:"
"(1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to
give consent:"
"(2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the
owner or person authorized to give consent;"
"(3) By deception;"
"(4) By threat."
"(B) . . . If the value of the property or services stolen is
one hundred fifty dollars or more, or if the property stolen is any
of the property listed in section 2913.71 of the Revised Code, or
if the offender has previously been convicted of a theft offense, a
violation of this section is grand theft, a felony of the fourth
degree."
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2913.02 (1982 and Supp.1983).
[
Footnote 5]
The term "allied offense," has been interpreted to mean that two
crimes share common elements such that the commission of one crime
will necessitate commission of the other.
State v. Logan,
60 Ohio St.2d 126, 128, 397 N.E.2d 1345, 1347 (1979).
[
Footnote 6]
We agree with respondent that the most logical interpretation of
the holding below is that the court found involuntary manslaughter
to be a lesser included offense of murder. In one sentence of the
opinion, however, the mental states of the two crimes are
considered mutually exclusive, which would suggest that conviction
on one is inconsistent with conviction on the other.
See 6
Ohio St.3d at 424, 453 N.E.2d at 599. In the very next sentence,
however, the opinion states that the two offenses are the same
under the
Blockburger test,
i.e., involuntary
manslaughter is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder.
This interpretation accords with the statement in the opinion that
the principles of collateral estoppel applied in
Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U. S. 436
(1970), have no relevance to this case.
[
Footnote 7]
We face at the threshold an attack on our jurisdiction to review
the decision below. Respondent seizes upon the Ohio Supreme Court's
reference to state law in its syllabus and in the accompanying
opinion to argue that the decision below rested on an adequate and
independent state ground. Ordinarily, we have jurisdiction to
review a state court judgment if the decision "appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal
law," or if the "adequacy and independence of any possible state
law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion."
Michigan
v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032,
463 U. S.
1040-1041 (1983).
Here, that presumption must be applied in light of the syllabus
rule of the Ohio Supreme Court, which provides that the holding of
the case appears in the syllabus, since that is the only portion of
the opinion on which a majority of the court must agree.
See
State ex rel. Donahey v. Edmondson, 89 Ohio St. 93, 105 N.E.
269 (1913);
see also Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co., 342 U. S. 437,
342 U. S.
441-442 (1952). But Ohio courts do not suggest that the
opinion is not germane to interpreting the court's holding as
expressed in its syllabus.
Hart v. Andrews, 103 Ohio St.
218, 221, 132 N.E. 846, 847 (1921). Indeed, where the grounds of
the decision are not clearly predicated on state law, we have felt
compelled to examine the opinion below to determine whether the
Ohio Supreme Court may have ruled differently if it "had felt free,
under our decisions, to do so."
Perkins, supra, at
342 U. S.
443.
A review of the court's syllabus indicates that the court did
not articulate an independent state law ground for the decision.
The first part of the syllabus refers to state law in determining
that, as allied offenses, the State may only obtain convictions on
either aggravated robbery or grand theft, but not both. But the
syllabus does not explain why the State may not continue to press
forward with its prosecution of respondent for aggravated robbery,
since the multicount statute that bars multiple convictions for
allied offenses plainly admits to the possibility that the State
may prosecute allied offenses in a single prosecution.
See
Ohio Rev.Code.Ann. § 2941.25 (1982 and Supp.1983). A look at the
opinion accompanying the syllabus, however, shows that the judge
writing the opinion believed that continued prosecution of
respondent on the remaining charges was proscribed by the double
jeopardy protection against multiple punishments. 6 Ohio St.3d at
421, 453 N.E.2d at 597. The federal ground for the court's decision
affirming the dismissal of the murder charge is much easier to
discern, since the text of the court's syllabus refers directly to
the prohibition against double jeopardy. Although the court's
reference to double jeopardy might arguably be to the Ohio version,
see Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10, the failure to indicate
clearly that state double jeopardy protection was being invoked,
when coupled with the references in the opinion to our decisions in
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.
S. 711 (1969), and
Ashe v. Swenson, supra,
convinces us that the Ohio Supreme Court based its decision on its
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
[
Footnote 8]
In the federal courts, the test established in
Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U. S. 299,
284 U. S. 304
(1932), ordinarily determines whether the crimes are indeed
separate, and whether cumulative punishments may be imposed.
See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.
S. 333,
450 U. S. 337
(1981);
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.
S. 684,
445 U. S. 691
(1980). As should be evident from our decision in
Missouri v.
Hunter, however, the
Blockburger test does not
necessarily control the inquiry into the intent of a state
legislature. Even if the crimes are the same under
Blockburger, if it is evident that a state legislature
intended to authorize cumulative punishments, a court's inquiry is
at an end.
[
Footnote 9]
Respondent also argues that prosecution on the remaining charges
is barred by the principles of collateral estoppel enunciated by
this Court in
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.
S. 436 (1970). Even if the two were mutually exclusive
crimes,
see n 6,
supra, the taking of a guilty plea is not the same as an
adjudication on the merits after full trial, such as took place in
Ashe v. Swenson. Moreover, in a case such as this, where
the State has made no effort to prosecute the charges
seriatim, the considerations of double jeopardy protection
implicit in the application of collateral estoppel are
inapplicable.
[
Footnote 10]
We see no need to address the manner in which the trial court
should resolve the question of the existing guilty pleas if the
case proceeds to trial, the issue appearing to involve construction
of state law and the jurisdiction of Ohio courts to fashion
appropriate relief.
See Ohio Rule Crim.Proc. 32.1 (1982);
cf. Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323,
398 U. S. 332
(1970).
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In my view, the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court with respect
to the aggravated robbery charge rests on independent and adequate
state grounds. I agree with the Court, however, that continued
prosecution of respondent on the charge of murder after respondent
pleaded guilty to the charge of involuntary manslaughter was not
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
A conviction based on a plea of guilty has the same legal effect
as a conviction based on a jury's verdict. The conviction in this
case authorized the State of Ohio to place respondent in prison for
several years. As the Court expressly recognizes,
"the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecution of a defendant
for a greater offense when he has already been . . . convicted on
the lesser included offense."
Ante at
467 U. S. 501.
That statement fits this case precisely. Since it is a correct
statement of the law, I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Ohio insofar as it denied the State the right to prosecute
respondent on the charge of murder.
*
* As far as the charge of aggravated robbery is concerned, it is
perfectly obvious that the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court rests
on the adequate and independent state ground that it was an "allied
offense of similar import" to theft within the meaning of the Ohio
rule that precludes prosecution for two such offenses. The Court's
cavalier disregard for the state law basis for this aspect of the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is totally unprecedented.