Arizona's statutory capital sentencing scheme provides that,
after a murder conviction, the trial judge, with no jury, must
conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether death is
the appropriate sentence. The judge must choose between two
options: death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole
for 25 years. The death sentence may not be imposed unless at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance is present, but must be
imposed if there is one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstance sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The
judge must make findings with respect to each of the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the sentencing
hearing involves the submission of evidence and the presentation of
argument, the State having the burden of proving the existence of
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. After a jury
convicted respondent of armed robbery and first-degree murder, the
trial judge conducted the required sentencing hearing and
ultimately found that no aggravating or mitigating circumstances
were present. He ruled, contrary to the State's contention, that
the statutory aggravating circumstance relating to killing for
pecuniary gain applied only to murders for hire, and did not apply
to all murders committed in order to obtain money, such as murders
committed during a robbery. Accordingly, respondent was sentenced
on his murder conviction to life imprisonment without possibility
of parole for 25 years, but he was also sentenced to 21 years'
imprisonment for armed robbery, with the sentences to run
consecutively. Respondent appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court,
challenging the imposition of the consecutive sentences, and the
State filed a cross-appeal, contending that the trial court had
committed an error of law in interpreting the "pecuniary gain"
aggravating circumstance to apply only to contract killings.
Rejecting respondent's challenge to his sentence and ruling for the
State on its cross-appeal, the court set aside the life sentence
and remanded for redetermination of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and for resentencing on the murder conviction. On
remand, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing; rejected
respondent's argument that imposing the death penalty would violate
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430;
found that the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance was
present and that there was no mitigating
Page 467 U. S. 204
circumstance sufficient to call for leniency; and sentenced
respondent to death. On respondent's mandatory appeal, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that, under
Bullington, respondent's
death sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and ordered that the sentence be reduced to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years.
Held: The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits Arizona from
sentencing respondent to death. This case is controlled by
Bullington, which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
applied to Missouri's capital sentencing proceeding -- barring
imposition of the death penalty upon reconviction after an initial
conviction, set aside on appeal, had resulted in rejection of the
death sentence -- because that proceeding was comparable to a trial
on the issue of guilt and the initial sentence of life imprisonment
in effect acquitted the defendant of the death penalty. The capital
sentencing proceeding in Arizona shares the characteristics of the
Missouri proceeding that made it resemble a trial for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, respondent's initial life
sentence constitutes an acquittal of the death penalty, and the
State cannot now sentence respondent to death on his conviction for
first-degree murder. Although the trial court initially relied on a
misconstruction of the statute defining the "pecuniary gain"
aggravating circumstance, reliance on an error of law does not
change the double jeopardy effects of a judgment that amounts to an
acquittal on the merits of the issue in the sentencing proceeding
-- whether death was the appropriate punishment for respondent's
offense.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.
S. 332, distinguished. Pp.
467 U. S.
209-212.
136 Ariz. 166,
665 P.2d 48,
affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
WHITE, J., joined,
post, p.
467 U. S.
213.
Page 467 U. S. 205
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits the State of Arizona from sentencing respondent to death
after the life sentence he had initially received was set aside on
appeal. We agree with the Supreme Court of Arizona that
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430
(1981), squarely controls the disposition of this case. Under the
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause adopted in that
decision, imposition of the death penalty on respondent would be
unconstitutional.
I
An Arizona jury convicted respondent of armed robbery and first
degree murder. The trial judge, with no jury, then conducted a
separate sentencing hearing to determine, according to the
statutory scheme for considering aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703 (Supp.1983-1984),
whether death was the appropriate sentence for the murder
conviction. Petitioner, relying entirely on the evidence presented
at trial, argued that three statutory aggravating circumstances
were present. Respondent, presenting only one witness, countered
that no aggravating circumstances were present, but that several
mitigating circumstances were. One of the principal points of
contention concerned the scope of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(F)(5)
(Supp.1983-1984), which defines as an aggravating circumstance the
murder's commission "as consideration for the receipt, or in
expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value."
Respondent argued that this provision applies only to murders for
hire, whereas petitioner argued that it applies to all murders
committed in order to obtain money.
Several days after the sentencing hearing, the trial judge, who
imposes sentence without the assistance of a jury under the Arizona
scheme, returned a "special verdict" setting forth his findings on
each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The
judge found that no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were
present. App. 53-58. In
Page 467 U. S. 206
particular, with respect to the aggravating circumstance defined
in § 13-703(F)(5), the trial judge found:
"5. The defendant did not commit the offense as consideration
for the receipt or in expectation of the receipt of anything of
pecuniary value."
"In this regard, the Court does not agree with the State's
interpretation of A.R.S. 13-703(F)(5) and
State v. Madsen,
filed March 26, 1980. The Court believes that, when A.R.S.
13-703(F)(4) and (5) are read together, that they are intended to
apply to a contract-type killing situation and not to a robbery,
burglary, etc."
App. 54-55.
Having found no aggravating circumstances, the trial court was
statutorily barred from sentencing respondent to death.
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(E) (Supp.1983-1984); App. to Pet. for
Cert. A-3. The court accordingly sentenced respondent to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years, the
sentence statutorily mandated for first degree murder when the
death penalty is not imposed. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(A)
(Supp.1983-1984). With respect to the armed robbery conviction, the
court found that respondent had committed a "dangerous offense"
involving use of a deadly weapon, and that there was an aggravating
circumstance not outweighed by any mitigating circumstance --
respondent had "planned this robbery . . . in order to obtain what
[he] knew was only a few hundred dollars. . . ." App. 66. As
authorized by Arizona law, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 13-604 and 13-702
(1978 and Supp.1983-1984), the court accordingly sentenced
respondent to 21 years' imprisonment for armed robbery. The prison
terms for the two convictions were to run consecutively.
Respondent appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of
Arizona, arguing that imposition of consecutive sentences in his
case violated both federal and state law. Under Arizona law,
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-4032(4) (1978), respondent's appeal
permitted petitioner to file a cross-appeal from
Page 467 U. S. 207
the life sentence; in that cross-appeal, petitioner contended
that the trial court had committed an error of law in interpreting
the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance to apply only to
contract killings. The State Supreme Court rejected respondent's
challenge to his sentence. It agreed with petitioner, however, that
the trial court had misinterpreted § 13-703(F)(5): "theft committed
in the course of a murder" could constitute an aggravating
circumstance under that section. 130 Ariz. 427, 431,
636 P.2d 1209,
1213 (1981). Because of the trial court's misinterpretation, the
State Supreme Court concluded,
"the sentence of life imprisonment previously imposed will have
to be set aside and the matter remanded for redetermination of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and resentencing."
Id. at 432, 636 P.2d at 1214. The sentence for armed
robbery was left undisturbed.
On remand, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing.
Neither petitioner nor respondent presented any new evidence,
although they had the opportunity to do so. The court heard
argument, however, both on the lawfulness of imposing the death
penalty on resentencing and on the presence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.
Petitioner argued that neither federal nor state law barred
sentencing respondent to death. Petitioner also urged the court to
find the three statutory aggravating circumstances identified at
the first sentencing, largely repeating the arguments it had made
at the first proceeding. App. 78-94. Respondent argued that
imposing the death penalty would violate
Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U. S. 430
(1981),
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.
S. 711 (1969), and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
26.14, which implements the resentencing principles of the
Pearce case. With respect to aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, respondent effectively conceded the presence of the
pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance, thinking the issue
foreclosed by a statement in the opinion of the State Supreme
Court.
See App. 104; 130 Ariz., at 431, 636 P.2d at 1213
("In the instant case, the hope of financial gain was a cause of
the murder . . ."). But
Page 467 U. S. 208
respondent contended that this aggravating circumstance was
outweighed by a statutory mitigating circumstance not among the
five enumerated in the death sentencing statute: according to the
testimony of the jury foreperson, the conviction for first degree
murder was based on the felony murder instruction, not on the
premeditation instruction; thus, respondent contended, to regard
the theft as an aggravating circumstance after using it to elevate
second degree murder into first would be a form of double counting.
App. 94-108.
Several days after the hearing, the trial court returned a
special verdict reciting findings on each of the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and on the one
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance urged by respondent. The court
found to be present only one of the seven statutory aggravating
circumstances, namely, § 13-703(F)(5), concerning commission of the
murder for pecuniary gain. The court also found that none of the
five statutory mitigating circumstances was present, and that the
fact that the murder conviction was for felony murder, if a
mitigating circumstance at all, was not sufficiently substantial to
call for leniency. App. 118-124. Accordingly, as required under
Arizona law, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(E) (Supp.1983-1984), the
court sentenced respondent to death.
In his mandatory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arizona,
respondent argued that imposition of the death sentence on
resentencing, after he had effectively been "acquitted" of death at
his initial sentencing, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.
S. 784 (1969). He also argued that the death sentence
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
interpreted in
North Carolina v. Pearce, supra. The
Supreme Court of Arizona addressed only the first argument. It
concluded that, under this Court's decision in
Bullington v.
Missouri, supra, respondent's sentence violated the
constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. 136 Ariz. 166,
665 P.2d 48
(1983). The court therefore ordered
Page 467 U. S. 209
respondent's sentence for first degree murder reduced to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years.
The State of Arizona filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.
We granted certiorari, 464 U.S. 1038 (1983), and now affirm.
II
In
Bullington v. Missouri, this Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause applies to Missouri's capital sentencing
proceeding, and thus bars imposition of the death penalty upon
reconviction after an initial conviction, set aside on appeal, has
resulted in rejection of the death sentence. The Court identified
several characteristics of Missouri's sentencing proceeding that
make it comparable to a trial for double jeopardy purposes. The
discretion of the sentencer -- the jury in Missouri -- is
restricted to precisely two options: death, and life imprisonment
without possibility of release for 50 years. In addition, the
sentencer is to make its decision guided by substantive standards
and based on evidence introduced in a separate proceeding that
formally resembles a trial. Finally, the prosecution has to prove
certain statutorily defined facts beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to support a sentence of death. 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 438.
For these reasons, when the Missouri sentencer imposes a sentence
of life imprisonment in a capital sentencing proceeding, it has
determined that the prosecution has failed to prove its case.
Because the Court believed that the anxiety and ordeal suffered by
a defendant in Missouri's capital sentencing proceeding are the
equal of those suffered in a trial on the issue of guilt, the Court
concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State from
resentencing the defendant to death after the sentencer has in
effect acquitted the defendant of that penalty.
The capital sentencing proceeding in Arizona shares the
characteristics of the Missouri proceeding that make it resemble a
trial for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The sentencer --
the trial judge in Arizona -- is required to choose between two
options: death, and life imprisonment
Page 467 U. S. 210
without possibility of parole for 25 years. The sentencer must
make the decision guided by detailed statutory standards defining
aggravating and mitigating circumstances; in particular, death may
not be imposed unless at least one aggravating circumstance is
found, whereas death must be imposed if there is one aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency. The sentencer must make findings
with respect to each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and the sentencing hearing involves the submission
of evidence and the presentation of argument. The usual rules of
evidence govern the admission of evidence of aggravating
circumstances, and the State must prove the existence of
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
See
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703 (Supp.19831984); 136 Ariz., at 171-172,
665 P.2d at 53-54. As the Supreme Court of Arizona held, these
characteristics make the Arizona capital sentencing proceeding
indistinguishable for double jeopardy purposes from the capital
sentencing proceeding in Missouri.
Id. at 171-174, 665
P.2d at 53-56. That the sentencer in Arizona is the trial judge,
rather than the jury, does not render the sentencing proceeding any
less like a trial.
See United States v. Morrison,
429 U. S. 1,
429 U. S. 3 (1976)
(Double Jeopardy Clause treats bench and jury trials alike). Nor
does the availability of appellate review, including reweighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, make the appellate
process part of a single continuing sentencing proceeding. The
Supreme Court of Arizona noted that its role is strictly that of an
appellate court, not a trial court. Indeed, no appeal need be taken
if life imprisonment is imposed, and the appellate reweighing can
work only to the defendant's advantage. 136 Ariz., at 173-174, 665
P.2d at 55-56. In short, a sentence imposed after a completed
Arizona capital sentencing hearing is a judgment like the sentence
at issue in
Bullington v. Missouri, which this Court held
triggers the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Page 467 U. S. 211
The double jeopardy principle relevant to respondent's case is
the same as that invoked in
Bullington: an acquittal on
the merits by the sole decisionmaker in the proceeding is final,
and bars retrial on the same charge. Application of the
Bullington principle renders respondent's death sentence a
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because respondent's
initial sentence of life imprisonment was undoubtedly an acquittal
on the merits of the central issue in the proceeding -- whether
death was the appropriate punishment for respondent's offense. The
trial court entered findings denying the existence of each of the
seven statutory aggravating circumstances, and, as required by
state law, the court then entered judgment in respondent's favor on
the issue of death. That judgment, based on findings sufficient to
establish legal entitlement to the life sentence, amounts to an
acquittal on the merits and, as such, bars any retrial of the
appropriateness of the death penalty.
In making its findings, the trial court relied on a
misconstruction of the statute defining the pecuniary gain
aggravating circumstance. Reliance on an error of law, however,
does not change the double jeopardy effects of a judgment that
amounts to an acquittal on the merits.
"[T]he fact that 'the acquittal may result from erroneous
evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal
principles' . . . affects the accuracy of that determination, but
it does not alter its essential character."
United States v. Scott, 437 U. S.
82,
437 U. S. 98
(1978) (quoting
id. at
437 U. S. 106
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting)). Thus, this Court's cases hold that an
acquittal on the merits bars retrial even if based on legal
error.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.
S. 332 (1975), held that the prosecution could appeal
from a judgment of acquittal entered by the trial judge after the
jury had returned a verdict of guilty. But that holding has no
application to this case. No double jeopardy problem was presented
in
Wilson, because the appellate court, upon reviewing
asserted legal errors
Page 467 U. S. 212
of the trial judge, could simply order the jury's guilty verdict
reinstated; no new factfinding would be necessary, and the
defendant therefore would not be twice placed in jeopardy. By
contrast, in respondent's initial capital sentencing, there was
only one decisionmaker and only one set of findings of fact, all
favorable to respondent. The trial court "acquitted" respondent of
the death penalty, and there was no verdict of "guilty" for the
appellate court to reinstate. The Supreme Court of Arizona
accordingly "remanded for redetermination of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and resentencing," 130 Ariz., at 432, 636
P.2d at 1214 -- that is, for a second sentencing proceeding similar
to the first. Whereas the defendant in
Wilson was not to
be subjected to a second trial after an acquittal at his first,
that is precisely what has happened to respondent.
III
Bullington v. Missouri held that double jeopardy
protections attach to Missouri's capital sentencing proceeding
because that proceeding is like a trial. The capital sentencing
proceeding in Arizona is indistinguishable for double jeopardy
purposes from the proceeding in Missouri. Under
Bullington, therefore, respondent's initial sentence of
life imprisonment constitutes an acquittal of the death penalty,
and the State of Arizona cannot now sentence respondent to death on
his conviction for first degree murder.
Petitioner has invited the Court to overrule
Bullington, decided only three years ago. We decline the
invitation. Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required
in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of
stare decisis demands special justification.
See,
e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.
S. 111,
382 U. S. 116
(1965);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.
S. 649,
321 U. S. 665
(1944). Petitioner has suggested no reason sufficient to warrant
our taking the exceptional action of overruling
Bullington.
Page 467 U. S. 213
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is therefore
Affirmed.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins,
dissenting.
Today the Court affirms the decision of the Arizona Supreme
Court vacating the death sentence imposed on respondent for a
murder committed in the course of an armed robbery. Applying the
interpretation given the Double Jeopardy Clause by a bare majority
of this Court in
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.
S. 430 (1981), the Court concludes that, in this case,
the first sentencing also amounted to an implied acquittal of
respondent's eligibility for the death penalty. I continue to
believe that
Bullington was wrongly decided for the
reasons expressed in JUSTICE POWELL's dissent in that case. But
even apart from those views, I do not believe that the reasoning
underlying
Bullington applies to this remand for
resentencing to correct a legal error. Accordingly, I dissent.
The central premise of the Court's holding today is that the
trial court's first finding -- that there were no aggravating and
no mitigating circumstances, and therefore only a life sentence
could be imposed -- amounted to an "implied acquittal" on the
merits of respondent's eligibility for the death sentence, thereby
barring the possibility of an enhanced sentence upon resentencing
by virtue of the Double Jeopardy Clause. But the Court's continued
reliance on the "implied acquittal" rationale of
Bullington is simply inapt. Unlike the jury's decision in
Bullington, where the jury had broad discretion to decide
whether capital punishment was appropriate, the trial judge's
discretion in this case was carefully confined and directed to
determining whether certain specified aggravating factors existed.
Compare Mo.Rev.Stat. § 565.008 (1979)
with
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(E)
Page 467 U. S. 214
(Supp.1983-1984). It is obvious from the record that the State
established at the first hearing that respondent murdered his
victim in the course of an armed robbery, a fact which was
undisputed at sentencing. In no sense can it be meaningfully argued
that the State failed to "prove" its case -- the existence of at
least one aggravating circumstance. It is hard to see how there has
been an "implied acquittal" of a statutory aggravating circumstance
when the record explicitly establishes the factual basis that such
an aggravating circumstance existed. But for the trial judge's
erroneous construction of governing state law, the judge would have
been required to impose the death penalty.
If, as a matter of state law, the Arizona Supreme Court had
simply corrected the erroneous sentence itself without remanding,
there could be no argument that
Bullington would prevent
the imposition of the death sentence. That much was made clear in
our decision in
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.
S. 332 (1975). After stating the well-settled rule that
an appellate court's order reversing a conviction is subject to
further review without subjecting a defendant to double jeopardy,
we wrote:
"It is difficult to see why the rule should be any different
simply because the defendant has gotten a favorable postverdict
ruling of law from the District Judge, rather than from the Court
of Appeals, or because the District Judge has relied to some degree
on evidence presented at trial in making his ruling. Although
review of any ruling of law discharging a defendant obviously
enhances the likelihood of conviction and subjects him to
continuing expense and anxiety, a defendant has no legitimate claim
to benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected
without subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of
fact."
Id. at
420 U. S. 345.
The fact that, in this case, the legal error was ultimately
corrected by the trial court did not mean that the State sought to
marshal the same or additional evidence against a
Page 467 U. S. 215
capital defendant which had proved insufficient to prove the
State's "case" against him the first time. There is no logical
reason for a different result here simply because the Arizona
Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose
of correcting the legal error, particularly when the resentencing
did not constitute the kind of "retrial" which the
Bullington Court condemned. Accordingly, I would reverse
the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in this case.