Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 grants federal courts of appeals
jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of district
courts, "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court." Title 28 U.S.C. § 1252 provides in its first paragraph for
such a direct appeal from a district court judgment holding an Act
of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action to which the
United States or any of its agencies, or an officer or employee
thereof, is a party. Section 1252 further provides in its second
paragraph that a party who has received notice of an appeal under
the section shall take any subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court,
and that all appeals taken to other courts prior to such notice
shall be treated as taken directly to the Supreme Court. Respondent
filed a class action in Federal District Court against petitioner
Secretary of Health and Human Services, challenging the
constitutionality of § 211(a)(5)(A) of the Social Security Act,
which provides that all gross income and deductions derived from a
family business in community property States shall be attributed to
the husband unless the wife can establish that she exercised
substantially all of the management and control of the business, in
which case all income would be treated as the wife's. Although
petitioner conceded the unconstitutionality of § 211(a)(5)(A)'s
gender-based presumption, the District Court nevertheless rejected
petitioner's claim of mootness, held the statute unconstitutional,
and granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. The court
then found the respondent class entitled retroactively to an
allocation of co-proprietor income between the spouses' earnings
accounts on the basis of labor contributed by each. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, challenging only the District
Court's remedy. The Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion to
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under § 1291, because
direct review could be had in this Court pursuant to § 1252.
Held: A party does not have a right to direct review in
this Court under § 1252 unless the district court's holding of
federal statutory unconstitutionality is in issue, and hence here
the Court of Appeals improperly dismissed petitioner's appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, since only the District Court's remedy was
challenged. Pp.
465 U. S.
876-885.
(a) While a literal reading of § 1252 would seem to give a party
a right to a direct appeal to this Court under the circumstances of
this case, the
Page 465 U. S. 871
natural sense of § 1252 is that the holding of statutory
unconstitutionality, not other issues such as attorney's fees,
remedy, or related state law claims, is what Congress wished this
Court to review in the first instance. Pp.
465 U. S.
877-879.
(b) Section 1252's structure supports this view. The conclusion
inherent in that structure is that not all appeals in a case in
which an Act of Congress has been held unconstitutional must be
taken directly to this Court, the necessary corollary to the second
paragraph of § 1252 being that, in the absence of a notice of
appeal under § 1252, other appeals in the case will follow the
normal route for appellate review. Because direct review is linked
to a court's holding a federal statute unconstitutional, the
logical test of which appeals from a judgment must be brought
directly to this Court and which, standing alone, must follow the
normal route of appellate review, is whether the issue on appeal is
the holding of statutory unconstitutionality. Pp.
465 U. S.
879-880.
(c) The legislative history also supports the view that Congress
considered the jurisdictional predicate for mandatory review by
this Court to be appeal from the constitutional holding. Congress'
concerns in enacting § 1252's predecessor about the separation of
powers and the need for certainty and uniformity in the
administration of federal law are not implicated in cases in which
the Government concedes statutory unconstitutionality by its
decision not to appeal that aspect of the district court's
judgment. The only justification for exerting this Court's
mandatory jurisdiction in a case such as this might be the
considerable ramifications of district court orders, but serious
consequences alone cannot support the exercise of such
jurisdiction. Although remedial aspects of a case are important,
the touchstone of direct appeal under § 1252 is not a party's or
this Court's own judgment of the significance of a decision. In §
1252, Congress mandated direct review not simply for decisions with
impact, but rather for decisions whose impact was predicated upon a
potentially incorrect exercise of judicial review. A construction
of § 1252 that would require this Court to review collateral issues
as independent matters, rather than as pendent to the holding of
statutory unconstitutionality, would undermine the effectiveness of
the direct appeal provision. Pp.
465 U. S.
880-885.
Vacated and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 465 U. S. 872
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises an issue concerning this Court's mandatory
jurisdiction. Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over
appeals from all final decisions of district courts, "except where
a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Section 1252 of Title 28 provides for such a direct appeal from a
United States court's judgment, in a civil proceeding to which the
Government is a party, holding that an Act of Congress is
unconstitutional. The issue before us is whether the Court of
Appeals properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the Secretary
of Health and Human Services' appeal from a proceeding in which a
federal statute was declared unconstitutional, but in which the
Secretary challenged only the District Court's remedy.
I
Respondent filed this suit against the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California in October, 1980. On behalf of a nationwide
class of Social Security applicants and recipients, respondent
challenged the constitutionality of § 211(a)(5)(A) of the Social
Security Act, 64 Stat. 502, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(A),
which established a gender-based presumption concerning the
allocation of income from family businesses in community property
States, [
Footnote 1]
Page 465 U. S. 873
In pretrial proceedings, the Secretary argued that the
constitutional ruling sought by the class was unnecessary, because
the Secretary acquiesced in judicial precedents holding the
challenged provision unconstitutional. [
Footnote 2] Indeed, shortly after respondent's complaint
was filed, the Attorney General formally notified Congress that the
Executive would not defend the constitutionality of the section.
[
Footnote 3] The District
Court
Page 465 U. S. 874
nevertheless rejected the Secretary's claim of mootness, and
granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. [
Footnote 4] According to the court, although
the Secretary "essentially conceded the unconstitutionality of §
411(a)(5)(A)," a ruling on the merits was necessary because the
Department was still applying the challenged statutory section.
[
Footnote 5]
Having held the statute unconstitutional, the District Court
turned to the issue of relief. The unconstitutional provision had
provided that all gross income and deductions derived from a
nonpartnership trade or business in community property
jurisdictions should be attributed to the husband unless the wife
could establish that she exercised substantially all of the
management and control of the business, in which case all income
would be treated as the wife's. Having struck down this
gender-based presumption, the court found the respondent class
entitled to an allocation of co-proprietor income between the
spouses' earnings accounts on the basis of the relative amount of
labor contributed by each. Finding that retroactive application of
its holding was appropriate under the tests of
Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97,
404 U. S.
106-107 (1971), the court found that class members "are
entitled to a recomputation of their earnings records, extending
back to the beginning of Social Security if necessary."
Edwards
v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3959 (ND Cal., Jan. 22, 1982). The
court entered judgment March 23, 1982.
Page 465 U. S. 875
The following week, the Secretary filed a notice of appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. [
Footnote 6] In the Secretary's
docketing statement, filed on May 5, 1982, the Secretary listed
only matters concerning the remedy ordered by the District Court,
noting that the Government conceded the unconstitutionality of the
statute. [
Footnote 7]
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Secretary's appeal,
contending that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 "where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." Respondent argued that the Secretary had such a
right to direct review to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252,
because the District Court had held a statute unconstitutional in a
civil action to which a United States officer was a party. In a
one-sentence order dated July 27,
Page 465 U. S. 876
1982, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted
respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, citing
Donovan v. Richland County Assn. for Retarded Citizens,
454 U. S. 389
(1982) (per curiam). The Secretary timely filed a petition for
certiorari to the Ninth Circuit seeking our review of this
dismissal. Because the petition raised an important question
concerning this Court's mandatory docket, we granted certiorari.
459 U.S. 1200 (1983). We conclude that a party does not have a
right to direct review in the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252
unless the holding of federal statutory unconstitutionality is in
issue. We therefore vacate and remand for reinstatement of the
appeal.
II
In the normal course, a party dissatisfied with the judgment of
a United States district court must first appeal to the court of
appeals, and may then petition for a writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court. Recourse to the court of appeals is a matter of
right, 28 U.S.C. § 1291; writs of certiorari are granted at the
discretion of the Supreme Court, § 1254(1). The general rule of
discretionary Supreme Court review is not without exceptions.
Although this Court's mandatory jurisdiction has been minimized
through legislation such as the Judge's Bill of 1925 [
Footnote 8] and the 1976 repeal of most of
the Three Judge District Court Act, [
Footnote 9] Congress has identified a narrow group of
cases that merit the immediate and mandatory attention of this
Court. Section 1252 is such a direct appeal provision.
Page 465 U. S. 877
When a party has a right to pursue a direct appeal to this Court
under § 1252, the normal route for appellate review is blocked, and
a court of appeals is without jurisdiction.
Donovan v. Richland
County Assn. for Retarded Citizens, supra, at
454 U. S. 389-390.
Thus, the consequence of an erroneous choice of forum can be to
preclude any court's review, because by the time a party discovers
its error, appeal to the correct forum may be untimely. To avoid
that consequence, litigants ought to be able to apply a clear test
to determine whether, as an exception to the general rule of
appellate review, they must perfect an appeal directly to the
Supreme Court. Such a test, of course, must be crafted "with
precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has
expressed its wishes" in the jurisdictional statute.
Cheng Fan
Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206,
392 U. S. 212
(1968).
The Secretary and respondent offer different tests. Respondent's
position is that, when the "literal requirements of § 1252 are
satisfied," only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
Williams
v. Zbaraz, 448 U. S. 358,
448 U. S. 366
(1980);
see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.
S. 919,
462 U. S. 929
(1983) ("express requisites for an appeal under § 1252 . . . have
been met"). Section 1252 establishes four prerequisites for a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court: the order appealed from must
issue from an enumerated court; the United States or an agency or
officer must be a party; the proceeding must be civil; and the
order must hold an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Those
prerequisites are met in the present case. Therefore, respondent
argues, the Secretary's sole avenue for appellate review of the
judgment was by direct appeal to this Court. Because the Secretary
did not file a notice of appeal to this Court within 30 days of the
District Court's order, 28 U.S.C. § 2101(a), respondent contends
that the Secretary has lost her right to appellate review of any
aspect of the District Court's orders.
The Secretary claims that direct review under § 1252 is
available only when the correctness of the constitutional
holding
Page 465 U. S. 878
is at issue. She argues that a close examination of the statute
and its enactment supports the conclusion that the constitutional
holding must be raised on appeal, and not merely decided below,
before a party must invoke direct review by the Supreme Court.
Under this reading, the Secretary sought review in the proper forum
because she challenged the scope of the District Court's remedy,
and not the correctness of its constitutional ruling. Indeed, by
the Secretary's reasoning, had she filed an appeal in this Court,
we would have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
To articulate a test to resolve the present dispute and to
provide guidance for litigants and courts in future cases, we begin
with the language and structure of the statute itself.
"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory
or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United
States, the United States District Court for the District of the
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands and any court of record of Puerto Rico, holding
an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or
proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or
any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a
party."
"A party who has received notice of appeal under this section
shall take any subsequent appeal or cross appeal to the Supreme
Court. All appeals or cross appeals taken to other courts prior to
such notice shall be treated as taken directly to the Supreme
Court."
28 U.S.C. § 1252. A literal reading of § 1252 tells us that
parties have a right to direct appeal from a "judgment, decree or
order," and not merely a right to direct appeal of a court's
"holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional." Under the literal
language, a party not contesting the constitutional holding would
seem to be required to proceed directly to this Court for review of
other aspects of the court's judgment. That literal reading
Page 465 U. S. 879
gains support from the fact that Congress has not limited our
review under § 1252 to the federal constitutional issue, but has
mandated that, when we have properly asserted jurisdiction under §
1252, the whole case is to come before us. [
Footnote 10]
Section 1252, however, presents a case in which
"to give the surface literal meaning to a jurisdictional
provision . . . would not be consistent with the 'sense of the
thing' and would confer upon this Court a jurisdiction beyond what
'naturally and properly belongs to it.' [
Footnote 11] When Congress created the exceptional
right to bypass the court of appeals, it directly linked that right
to a lower court's invalidation of an Act of Congress. Although it
is in the nature of cases and controversies that the court's
judgment may address not only the issue of statutory
constitutionality, but other issues as well, such as attorney's
fees, remedy, or related state law claims, the natural sense of the
jurisdictional provision is that the holding of statutory
unconstitutionality, not these other issues, is what Congress
wished this Court to review in the first instance. Thus, the sense
of the statute and the literal language are at loggerheads."
The structure of § 1252 helps resolve this tension, and leads us
towards the common-sense view that the constitutional holding must
be at issue for direct review in this Court to lie. The first
paragraph of § 1252 grants the right of direct appeal from the
judgment holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional; the second
paragraph brings before us the whole case, including appeals filed
before and after the constitutional appeal. [
Footnote 12] The clear implication of the second
paragraph is that
Page 465 U. S. 880
parties may have properly lodged appeals in other courts prior
to a § 1252 filing. Only after a party has filed a notice of direct
appeal pursuant to § 1252 must all other appeals and cross-appeals
in the case be taken here. The necessary corollary is that, in the
absence of such notice, other appeals in the case will follow the
normal route for appellate review. The conclusion inherent in the
structure of § 1252 is that not all appeals in a case in which an
Act of Congress has been held unconstitutional must be taken
directly to this Court. Because direct review is linked to a
court's holding a federal statute unconstitutional, the logical
test of which appeals from a judgment must be brought directly to
this Court and which, standing alone, must follow the normal route
of appellate review, is whether the issue on appeal is the holding
of statutory unconstitutionality.
The history of the enactment of § 1252's statutory predecessor
[
Footnote 13] also guides us
to a conclusion that Congress considered
Page 465 U. S. 881
the jurisdictional predicate for mandatory direct review by the
Supreme Court to be appeal from the constitutional holding.
[
Footnote 14] Three
interrelated justifications for expediting final determinations of
the constitutionality of federal statutes recur in discussions of
the direct appeal provision. First, when a federal judge strikes
down an act of a coequal branch of government, the decision
implicates separation of powers, [
Footnote 15] not only through the original exercise of
judicial review, but also through this Court's exercise of
discretion to hear such a case. By mandating direct review,
Congress asserted its prerogative to define a category of important
cases that the Court is not free to ignore. [
Footnote 16] Second, Congress justified
Page 465 U. S. 882
imposing mandatory jurisdiction on the Supreme Court because of
the need for certainty and uniformity in federal government when an
Act may have been declared unconstitutional. It is significant that
the first paragraph of § 1252 authorizes a direct appeal to this
Court only in civil actions "to which the United States or any of
its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, . . . is a
party"; no direct appeal lies if there are only nonfederal parties
to the suit. That language reveals a congressional purpose to
assure an expeditious means of affirming or removing the restraint
on the Federal Government's administration of the law when it would
be bound by a holding that the law in question is unconstitutional.
[
Footnote 17]
Finally, Congress expressed its sense that declarations of
unconstitutionality have ramifications beyond the interests of
litigants in the particular case. For this reason, the predecessor
statute created the right of intervention by the Attorney General
in cases between private parties when the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress was drawn into question, [
Footnote 18] as well as the right to direct appeal
from a holding
Page 465 U. S. 883
of unconstitutionality. The Senate Report emphasized that
the
"decision of the constitutional question may affect the public
at large, may be in respect of matters which by the Constitution
are entrusted to the care of the Nation, and concerning which the
Nation owes a duty to all the citizens of securing to them their
common rights."
S.Rep. No. 963, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1937). [
Footnote 19]
The first two of these concerns are not implicated in cases in
which the Government concedes statutory unconstitutionality by its
decision not to appeal that aspect of the district court's
judgment. Such cases raise no separation of powers issue, nor do
they implicate the need for certainty and uniformity in the
administration of federal law. In the present case, for example,
the Attorney General, charged with enforcing federal laws, informed
the Congress that he agreed with the courts that the challenged
provision in the Social Security Act was unconstitutional.
[
Footnote 20] Furthermore,
prior to seeking review of the District Court's judgment, the
Secretary had agreed not to enforce the statute anywhere
Page 465 U. S. 884
and the District Court's remedial order was in effect
nationwide. The decision not to raise the issue of statutory
unconstitutionality on appeal obviously was intended to bind the
Secretary in her nationwide administration of the Social Security
Act. When the court and the affected agency reach the same
conclusion, there is no need to resort to direct review under 28
U.S.C. § 1252 in an effort to remove the binding effect on the
Executive Branch's administration of the law.
The only justification for exerting mandatory jurisdiction in
such cases might be the considerable ramifications of district
court orders; here, for example, the District Court's remedy
provided retroactive relief for a nationwide class. We do not
believe that serious consequences alone can support the exercise of
our § 1252 jurisdiction. Congress did not enact an open-ended
"impact" test for determining which cases should come to this Court
for direct review. Although remedial aspects of a case are
important, the touchstone of direct appeal under § 1252 is not a
party's or our own judgment of the significance of a decision. We
exercise that judgment under our discretion to grant certiorari in
any civil or criminal case before, as well as after, rendition of
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1); this Court's Rule 18. In § 1252,
Congress mandated direct review not simply for decisions with
impact, but rather for decisions whose impact was predicated upon a
potentially incorrect exercise of judicial review.
See nn.
15 16 supra.
Not only are Congress' justifications for creating an expedited
method of direct review not present in cases such as this, but a
construction of § 1252 that would require us to review collateral
issues coming to us as independent matters, rather than as pendent
to the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, would undermine
the effectiveness of the direct appeal provision. If we were to
adopt respondent's construction of the language, this Court would
be required to give precedence to issues outside the congressional
definition
Page 465 U. S. 885
of public importance. We would, for example, be obliged to crowd
our docket with appeals concerned solely with attorney's fee awards
or pendent claims arising under state law -- matters that would
typically fail to meet our criteria for discretionary review.
See this Court's Rule 17. Appeals of this sort would
almost certainly be better handled by the courts of appeals, which
is where they will lie under the interpretation of § 1252 that we
adopt today.
III
We conclude, therefore, that § 1252 does not warrant a
construction that would require appeals raising only issues other
than statutory unconstitutionality to be taken directly to this
Court. If the four prerequisites to direct appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1252 are met, and a party seeks review of the court's
holding that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional, that party
should file a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. If a party
does not contest the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, and
seeks review only of another portion of the court's judgment, the
party should file a notice of appeal to the appropriate court of
appeals. Although the formal prerequisites to direct appeal under §
1252 were met in the present case, the Secretary did not contest
the holding of statutory unconstitutionality. Therefore, the
Secretary's appeal belonged in the first instance in the Court of
Appeals, which should not have dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
vacated, and the cause is remanded for reinstatement of the
Secretary's appeal.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The District Court certified a class of
"[a]ll applicants for or recipients of Old Age, Survivors and
Disability Insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 401
et seq., on
their own accounts as wage earners whose applications have been
denied or for whom the monthly benefit amount has been reduced due
to the omission from their earnings records of income earned while
married and operating a trade or business in a community property
state, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(A)."
Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C80-3959 (ND Cal., May 22,
1981). The class was further limited to members who received a
final decision from the Secretary within the 60 days prior to the
filing of the lawsuit or at any time thereafter.
Edwards v.
Schweiker, No. C-80-3959 (ND Cal., Mar.19, 1982).
[
Footnote 2]
In the latter half of 1980, several courts held that the
statutory presumption violated the equal protection element of the
Due Process Clause.
Hester v. Harris, 631 F.2d 53, 55-56
(CA5 1980);
Carrasco v. Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, 628 F.2d 624, 627-631 (CA1 1980);
Becker v.
Harris, 493 F. Supp. 991, 994-996 (ED Cal.1980). These courts
remanded to the Secretary to formulate new standards for crediting
self-employment income in community property States. 631 F.2d at
56-57; 628 F.2d at 631;
493 F.
Supp. at 997.
Although the Secretary had argued that § 211(a)(5)(A) is merely
an eligibility requirement, not a constitutionally suspect
classification based on gender, the Solicitor General later
concluded that the statutory presumption could not be defended
under the standards announced by this Court in
Califano v.
Westcott, 443 U. S. 76 (1979)
(provision that rests on stereotypical gender presumptions, without
more, violates due process), and
Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U. S. 199
(1977) (classification by gender must serve and be substantially
related to important governmental objectives).
[
Footnote 3]
Executive Communication 4772, 126 Cong.Rec. 29377 (1980) (notice
that Solicitor General would not take an appeal from the District
Court's holding in
Becker v. Harris, supra); Executive
Communication 5587, 126 Cong.Rec. 29295 (1980) (same). Congress has
required the Attorney General to notify both Houses of Congress in
any case in which the Attorney General considers an enacted law, at
issue in the case, to be unconstitutional.
See note
following 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1982 ed.).
In July, 1981, the agency's concession that § 211(a)(5)(A) of
the Act is unconstitutional was published as Social Security Ruling
81-17c (C.E.1981) (acquiescing in
Becker v. Harris,
supra).
"Once published, a ruling is binding on all components of the
Social Security Administration in accordance with [20 CFR pt. 422].
Rulings do not have the force and effect of the law or regulations,
but are to be relied upon as precedents in determining other cases
where the facts are basically the same. A ruling may be superseded,
modified, or revoked by later legislation, regulations, court
decisions or rulings."
Social Security Rulings iii (C.E.1981).
Neither Congress nor the agency had modified the statute or
implementing regulations at the time this case was argued.
[
Footnote 4]
Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3969 (ND Cal., May 22,
1981). Petitioner did not file an appeal challenging the ruling
that the statute was unconstitutional. The jurisdictional statute
at issue in this case permits, but does not require, an
interlocutory appeal from a holding of unconstitutionality. 28
U.S.C. § 1252;
see United States v. Clark, 45 U.
S. 23,
46 U. S. 26-27,
n. 2 (1980) (Government need not appeal before final judgment is
entered).
[
Footnote 5]
Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3959, p. 2, n. 2 (ND
Cal., Jan. 22, 1982) (referring to order of May 22, 1981).
[
Footnote 6]
The notice of appeal from the judgment of March 23, 1982, does
not state the ground of appeal, nor is it its function to do so.
See Fed.Rule App. Proc. 3(c).
[
Footnote 7]
The relevant portion of the docketing statement provided:
"H. Brief Description of Nature of Action and Result Below:"
"Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.
411(a)(5)(A), which requires that where both the husband and wife
worked in a family business in a community property State, all of
the self-employment income must be allocated to the husband. The
government conceded the statute's unconstitutionality, and the
remaining issues concerned relief, in particular, the standard to
apply in place of the invalid statutory standard. The district
court certified a class action, and ordered that the Secretary
recompute benefits on the principle that the self-employment income
of the business be split between husband and wife on the basis of
their relative amounts of labor."
"I. Issues to be raised on Appeal:"
"The issues on appeal may include: (1) whether the district
court's standard based on relative amount of labor should be
applied, rather than the Secretary's standard based on whether
there was a true partnership between the spouses; (2) whether it
was error to apply the new rule to earnings records dating back to
the beginning of the self-employment program; (3) whether it was
error to require that no individual lose benefits as a result of
the recomputation required under the order; and (4) whether the
notice that the court required be sent to potential class members
is appropriate. "
[
Footnote 8]
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936.
See Gonzalez v.
Automatic Employee Credit Union, 419 U. S.
90,
419 U. S. 98,
and n. 16 (1974).
[
Footnote 9]
Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub.L. 94-381, §§ 1, 2, 90 Stat. 1119
(repealing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282 (1970 ed.), amending §§ 2284,
2403). For a discussion of classes of cases that have been removed
from the Court's mandatory jurisdiction since 1971,
see
Tushnet, The Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court -- Some
Recent Developments, 46 U.Cin.L.Rev. 347, 359(1977).
[
Footnote 10]
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (party may appeal a court of
appeals' invalidation of a state statute on federal grounds, but
review on appeal "shall be restricted to the Federal questions
presented").
[
Footnote 11]
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen,
362 U. S. 73,
362 U. S. 94
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting
American Security
& Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U.
S. 491,
224 U. S. 495
(1912)).
[
Footnote 12]
For cases discussing our jurisdiction over the whole case when a
direct appeal is properly filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252,
see United States v. American Friends Service Committee,
419 U. S. 7,
419 U. S. 12, n.
7 (1974) (per curiam);
United States v. Raines,
362 U. S. 17,
362 U. S. 27, n.
7 (1960). When we consider the whole case, we are not only
implementing Congress' jurisdictional intent expressed in paragraph
two of 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We are also exercising judicial discretion
to administer our caseload to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of actions. Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 1. But
neither paragraph two of § 1252 nor our principle of case
management should come into play unless we have established first
that the Court has appellate jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 13]
Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 2, 50 Stat. 752, provided:
"In any suit or proceeding in any court of the United States to
which the United States, or any agency thereof, or any officer or
employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party, or in
which the United States has intervened and become a party, and in
which the decision is against the constitutionality of any Act of
Congress, an appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of
the United States by the United States or any other party. . .
."
As in the current version, appeal could be taken from an
interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order. Congress mandated
that such appeals
"shall be heard by the Supreme Court of the United States at the
earliest possible time and shall take precedence over all other
matters not of a like character."
Ibid. The whole thrust of the bill was its focus on the
special importance of lower court invalidations of federal
statutes.
[
Footnote 14]
Floor debate affirms that Congress understood that the predicate
to direct appeal was that a party would seek review of the holding
that a statute was unconstitutional. The bill's sponsor,
Representative Sumners, explicated the section to mean that the
Government "may appeal directly to the Supreme Court in order to
expedite the determination of the constitutional question." 81
Cong.Rec. 3272 (1937);
see also id. at 3260 (remarks of
Rep. Sumners) (case would come up to Court just on question of
constitutionality);
id. at 3257 (remarks of Rep. Michener)
(bill affects only constitutional questions);
id. at 3256
(remarks of Rep. Brewster) (bill eliminates delays in determining
constitutional question). The sponsor emphasized the "good,
practical common sense" in having "just as little delay between the
enactment of Congress and the determination [of its
constitutionality] as can be arranged."
Id. at 3268
(remarks of Rep. Sumners).
[
Footnote 15]
The impetus in the mid-1930's to establish expedited appeal of
holdings of statutory unconstitutionality was courts' response to
much of the New Deal legislation, such as enjoining operation of
the newly created Tennessee Valley Authority.
See, e.g.,
Appeals from Federal Courts, Hearings on S. 2176 before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong, 1st Sess., 13-16 (1935).
[
Footnote 16]
As then Senator Hugo L. Black, sponsor in the 74th Congress of a
bill for direct appeal from injunctions preventing the effectuation
of Acts of Congress explained:
"I see no reason why . . . we should not say to the Supreme
Court,"
" . . . [i]t is not for you to determine whether you will take
the case or not. Those who are charged primarily with enforcing the
law in this country are bound to be in closer contact with the
necessity for a speedy decision than you are in your courtroom, and
they have determined that this is a case of such great national
moment and importance that it must be decided at once."
Id. at 20.
One commentator suggests that the existence and current
definition of § 1252 mandatory jurisdiction rests on a policy of
separation of powers. Tushnet, 46 U.Cin.L.Rev. at 358-365.
Congressional enactment of mandatory jurisdiction provisions
incorporates what the author refers to as the "importance"
standard. Thus, the impact of a ruling regarding a statute is
recognized as having particularly broad impact.
[
Footnote 17]
See, e.g., McLuca v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S.
21,
421 U. S. 31
(1975) (§ 1252 language permits appeal where the Government has
participated in litigation "and thus will be bound by a holding of
unconstitutionality").
[
Footnote 18]
The 1937 Act provided for notice to the Attorney General of
private litigation "whenever the constitutionality of any Act of
Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question," and
intervention by the United States as of right "for presentation of
evidence . . . and argument upon the question of the
constitutionality of such Act." Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, 50
Stat. 751. The current version of this portion of the original bill
appears at 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a).
[
Footnote 19]
See also 81 Cong.Rec. 3268 (1937) (remarks of Rep.
Michener) ("If," "when," and "[w]here the constitutionality [of
Acts of Congress] is questioned, more than the rights of individual
litigants in the suit are involved. The rights of all the people
who might be affected by the laws are involved, and in these days,
time is of the essence in many of these important cases coming
before the Supreme Court");
id. at 3265 (remarks of then
Rep. Fred M. Vinson) (When the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress has been drawn into question, that question "affects not
only the litigants in the particular case, but it affects many
others. It ought to be decided right in the public interest").
[
Footnote 20]
See n 4,
supra. Such concurrence of views between the Executive
Branch and the Judiciary does not necessarily preclude a case or
controversy over the constitutionality of a federal statute. In
INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919
(1983), for example, the agency and the private party agreed that a
federal provision was unconstitutional. Congress, however, had
intervened as a party, and contested the holding. The
constitutionality of the one-House legislative veto was therefore
squarely presented on direct appeal to this Court. But that is not
the situation in the present case.