Respondent, a Negro male, after being discharged by petitioner
employer in 1977, filed a discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which, on November 9,
1978, upon finding no reasonable cause to believe the charge was
true, sent respondent a Notice of Right to Sue pursuant to § 706(f)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Previously, while
respondent's charge was still pending before the EEOC, two other
Negro males formerly employed by petitioner had filed a class
action against petitioner in Federal District Court, alleging
employment discrimination and purporting to represent a class of
which respondent was a member. Subsequently, on September 4, 1980,
the District Court denied the named plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, and the action then proceeded as an individual
action. Within 90 days thereafter, but almost two years after
receiving his Notice of Right to Sue, respondent filed an action
under Title VII against petitioner in Federal District Court,
alleging that his discharge was racially motivated. The District
Court granted summary judgment for petitioner on the ground that
respondent had failed to file his action within 90 days of
receiving his Notice of Right to Sue as required by § 706(f)(1).
The Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: The filing of the class action tolled the statute
of limitations for respondent and other members of the putative
class. Since respondent did not receive his Notice of Right to Sue
until after the class action was filed, he retained a full 90 days
in which to bring suit after class certification was denied, and
hence his suit was timely filed. Pp.
462 U. S.
349-354.
(a) While
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah,
414 U. S. 538,
concerned only intervenors in a class action, the holding of that
case -- that the filing of a class action tolls the running of the
applicable statute of limitations for all asserted members of the
class -- is to be read as not being limited to intervenors, but as
extending to class members filing separate actions. Otherwise,
class members would be led to file individual actions prior to
denial of class certification in order to preserve their rights.
The result would be a needless multiplicity of actions -- precisely
the situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the
tolling rule of
American Pipe were designed to avoid. Pp.
462 U. S.
349-351.
(b) Failure to apply
American Pipe to class members
filing separate actions would also be inconsistent with this
Court's reliance on
American
Page 462 U. S. 346
Pipe in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U. S. 156,
where it was held that Rule 23(c)(2) required individual notice to
class members so that each of them could decide whether to "opt
out" of the class and thereby preserve his right to pursue his own
lawsuit. A class member would be unable to pursue his own lawsuit
if the limitations period had expired while the class action was
pending. Pp.
462 U. S.
351-352.
(c) A tolling rule for class actions is not inconsistent with
the purposes served by statutes of limitations of putting
defendants on notice of adverse claims and of preventing plaintiffs
from sleeping on their rights. These ends are met when a class
action is filed. Class members who do not file suit while the class
action is pending cannot be accused of sleeping on their rights.
And a class complaint notifies the defendants not only of the
claims against them, but also of the number and generic identities
of the potential plaintiffs. Pp.
462 U. S.
352-353.
(d) Once the commencement of a class action suspends the
applicable statute of limitations as to all putative members of the
class, it remains suspended until class certification is denied.
Pp.
462 U. S.
353-354.
677 F.2d 391, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REHNQUIST and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
post, p.
462 U. S.
354.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question that confronts us in this case is whether the
filing of a class action tolls the applicable statute of
limitations, and thus permits all members of the putative class to
file individual actions in the event that class certification
is
Page 462 U. S. 347
denied, provided, of course, that those actions are instituted
within the time that remains on the limitations period.
I
Respondent Theodore Parker, a Negro male, was discharged from
his employment with petitioner Crown, Cork & Seal Company,
Inc., in July, 1977. In October of that year, he filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging
that he had been harassed and then discharged on account of his
race. On November 9, 1978, the EEOC issued a Determination Letter
finding no reasonable cause to believe respondent's discrimination
charge was true, and, pursuant to § 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Act), 78 Stat. 260, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f),
sent respondent a Notice of Right to Sue. App. 5A, 7A.
Two months earlier, while respondent's charge was pending before
the EEOC, two other Negro males formerly employed by petitioner
filed a class action in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland.
Pendleton v. Crown, Cork & Seal
Co., Civ. No. M-78-1734. The complaint in that action alleged
that petitioner had discriminated against its Negro employees with
respect to hiring, discharges, job assignments, promotions,
disciplinary actions, and other terms and conditions of employment,
in violation of Title VII of the Act, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. The named plaintiffs purported to
represent a class of
"black persons who have been, continue to be and who in the
future will be denied equal employment opportunities by defendant
on the grounds of race or color."
App. to Brief for Petitioner 2a. It is undisputed that
respondent was a member of the asserted class.
In May, 1979, the named plaintiffs in
Pendleton moved
for class certification. Nearly a year and a half later, on
September 4, 1980, the District Court denied that motion. App. to
Brief for Petitioner 7a. The court ruled that the named plaintiffs'
claims were not typical of those of the class, that
Page 462 U. S. 348
the named plaintiffs would not be adequate representatives, and
that the class was not so numerous as to make joinder
impracticable. Thereafter,
Pendleton proceeded as an
individual action on behalf of its named plaintiffs. [
Footnote 1]
On October 27, 1980, within 90 days after the denial of class
certification but almost two years after receiving his Notice of
Right to Sue, respondent filed the present Title VII action in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging
that his discharge was racially motivated. Respondent moved to
consolidate his action with the pending
Pendleton case,
but petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the two cases
were at substantially different stages of preparation. The motion
to consolidate was denied. The District Court then granted summary
judgment for petitioner, ruling that respondent had failed to file
his action within 90 days of receiving his Notice of Right to Sue,
as required by the Act's § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
514 F.
Supp. 122 (1981).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed. 677 F.2d 391 (1982). Relying on
American Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538
(1974), the Court of Appeals held that the filing of the
Pendleton class action had tolled Title VII's statute of
limitations for all members of the putative class. Because the
Pendleton suit was instituted before respondent received
his Notice, and because respondent had filed his action within 90
days after the denial of class certification, the Court of Appeals
concluded that it was timely.
Two other Courts of Appeals have held that the tolling rule of
American Pipe applies only to putative class members who
seek to intervene after denial of class certification, and not
Page 462 U. S. 349
to those who, like respondent, file individual actions.
[
Footnote 2] We granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict. 459 U.S. 986 (1982).
II
A
American Pipe was a federal antitrust suit brought by
the State of Utah on behalf of itself and a class of other public
bodies and agencies. The suit was filed with only 11 days left to
run on the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court
eventually ruled that the suit could not proceed as a class action,
and eight days after this ruling, a number of putative class
members moved to intervene. This Court ruled that the motions to
intervene were not time-barred. The Court reasoned that, unless the
filing of a class action tolled the statute of limitations,
potential class members would be induced to file motions to
intervene or to join in order to protect themselves against the
possibility that certification would be denied. 414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 553.
The principal purposes of the class action procedure -- promotion
of efficiency and economy of litigation -- would thereby be
frustrated.
Ibid. To protect the policies behind the class
action procedure, the Court held that
"the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable
statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who
would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as
a class action."
Id. at
414 U. S.
554.
Petitioner asserts that the rule of
American Pipe was
limited to intervenors, and does not toll the statute of
limitations for class members who file actions of their own.
[
Footnote 3] Petitioner
Page 462 U. S. 350
relies on the Court's statement in
American Pipe
that
"the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running
of the statute for all purported members of the class
who make
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit
inappropriate for class action status."
Id. at
414 U. S. 553
(emphasis added). While
American Pipe concerned only
intervenors, we conclude that the holding of that case is not to be
read so narrowly. The filing of a class action tolls the statute of
limitations "as to all asserted members of the class,"
id.
at
414 U. S. 554,
not just as to intervenors.
The
American Pipe Court recognized that, unless the
statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of the class
action, class members would not be able to rely on the existence of
the suit to protect their rights. Only by intervening or taking
other action prior to the running of the statute of limitations
would they be able to ensure that their rights would not be lost in
the event that class certification was denied. Much the same
inefficiencies would ensue if
American Pipe's tolling rule
were limited to permitting putative class members to intervene
after the denial of class certification. There are many reasons why
a class member, after the denial of class certification, might
prefer to bring an individual suit, rather than intervene. The
forum in which the class action is pending might be an inconvenient
one, for example, or the class member might not wish to share
control over the litigation with other plaintiffs once the
economies of a class action were no longer available. Moreover,
permission to intervene might be refused for reasons wholly
unrelated to the merits of the claim. [
Footnote 4] A putative class member who fears that
class
Page 462 U. S. 351
certification may be denied would have every incentive to file a
separate action prior to the expiration of his own period of
limitations. The result would be a needless multiplicity of actions
-- precisely the situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
and the tolling rule of
American Pipe were designed to
avoid.
B
Failure to apply
American Pipe to class members filing
separate actions also would be inconsistent with the Court's
reliance on
American Pipe in
Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156
(1974). In
Eisen, the Court held that Rule 23(c)(2)
required individual notice to absent class members, so that each
class member could decide whether to "opt out" of the class, and
thereby preserve his right to pursue his own lawsuit. 417 U.S. at
417 U. S. 176.
The named plaintiff in
Eisen argued that such notice would
be fruitless, because the statute of limitations had long since run
on the claims of absent class members. This argument, said the
Court, was
"disposed of by our recent decision in
American Pipe .
. . which established that commencement of a class action tolls the
applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the
class."
Id. at
417 U. S. 176,
n. 13.
If
American Pipe's tolling rule applies only to
intervenors, this reference to
American Pipe is misplaced,
and makes no sense.
Eisen's notice requirement was
intended to inform the class member that he could "preserve his
opportunity to press his claim
separately" by opting out
of the class. 417 U.S. at
417 U. S. 176
(emphasis added). But a class member would be unable to "press his
claim separately" if the limitations period had expired while the
class action was pending. The
Eisen Court recognized this
difficulty, but concluded that the right to opt out and press a
separate claim remained meaningful
Page 462 U. S. 352
because the filing of the class action tolled the statute of
limitations under the rule of
American Pipe. 417 U.S. at
417 U. S. 176,
n. 13. If
American Pipe were limited to intervenors, it
would not serve the purpose assigned to it by
Eisen; no
class member would opt out simply to intervene. Thus, the
Eisen Court necessarily read
American Pipe as we
read it today, to apply to class members who choose to file
separate suits. [
Footnote
5]
C
The Court noted in
American Pipe that a tolling rule
for class actions is not inconsistent with the purposes served by
statutes of limitations. 414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 554.
Limitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of
adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their
rights,
see Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.
S. 250,
449 U. S.
256-257 (1980);
American Pipe, 414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 561
(concurring opinion);
Burnett v. New York Central R. Co.,
380 U. S. 424,
380 U. S. 428
(1965), but these ends are met when a class action is commenced.
Class members who do not file suit while the class action is
pending cannot be accused of sleeping on their rights; Rule 23 both
permits and encourages class members
Page 462 U. S. 353
to rely on the named plaintiffs to press their claims. And a
class complaint
"notifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims
being brought against them, but also of the number and generic
identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the
judgment."
American Pipe, 414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 555;
see United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.
S. 385,
432 U. S. 395
(1977). The defendant will be aware of the need to preserve
evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of
the class. Tolling the statute of limitations thus creates no
potential for unfair surprise, regardless of the method class
members choose to enforce their rights upon denial of class
certification.
Restricting the rule of
American Pipe to intervenors
might reduce the number of individual lawsuits filed against a
particular defendant but, as discussed above, this decrease in
litigation would be counterbalanced by an increase in protective
filings in all class actions. Moreover, although a defendant may
prefer not to defend against multiple actions in multiple forums
once a class has been decertified, this is not an interest that
statutes of limitations are designed to protect.
Cf. Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U. S. 463,
369 U. S. 467
(1962). Other avenues exist by which the burdens of multiple
lawsuits may be avoided; the defendant may seek consolidation in
appropriate cases,
see Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 42(a); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404 (change of venue), and multidistrict proceedings may be
available if suits have been brought in different jurisdictions,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1407. [
Footnote 6]
III
We conclude, as did the Court in
American Pipe,
that
"the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable
statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who
would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue
Page 462 U. S. 354
as a class action."
414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 554.
Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled
for all members of the putative class until class certification is
denied. At that point, class members may choose to file their own
suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action.
In this case, respondent clearly would have been a party in
Pendleton if that suit had been permitted to continue as a
class action. The filing of the
Pendleton action thus
tolled the statute of limitations for respondent and other members
of the
Pendleton class. Since respondent did not receive
his Notice of Right to Sue until after the
Pendleton
action was filed, he retained a full 90 days in which to bring suit
after class certification was denied. Respondent's suit was thus
timely filed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The named plaintiffs in
Pendleton later settled their
claims, and their action was dismissed with prejudice. Respondent
Parker, as permitted by
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U. S. 385,
432 U. S.
392-395 (1977), then intervened in that lawsuit for the
limited purpose of appealing the denial of class certification. He
failed, however, to take a timely appeal.
[
Footnote 2]
See Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617 (CA9 1982),
cert. pending, No. 82-650;
Stull v. Bayard, 561
F.2d 429, 433 (CA2 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035
(1978);
Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 783 (CA2
1977).
[
Footnote 3]
Petitioner also argues that
American Pipe does not
apply in Title VII actions, because the time limit contained in §
706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), is jurisdictional, and may
not be tolled. This argument is foreclosed by the Court's decisions
in
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.
S. 385,
455 U. S. 398
(1982), and
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.
S. 807,
447 U. S. 811,
and n. 9 (1980).
[
Footnote 4]
Putative class members frequently are not entitled to intervene
as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), and
permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)
may be denied in the discretion of the District Court.
American
Pipe, 414 U.S. at
414 U. S.
559-560;
id. at
414 U. S. 562
(concurring opinion);
see Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519,
331 U. S.
524-525 (1947). In exercising its discretion, the
district court considers "whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties," Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 24(b), and a court could conclude that
undue delay or prejudice would result if many class members were
brought in as plaintiffs upon the denial of class certification.
Thus, permissive intervention well may be an uncertain prospect for
members of a proposed class.
[
Footnote 5]
Several Members of the Court have indicated that
American
Pipe's tolling rule can apply to class members who file
individual suits, as well as to those who seek to intervene.
See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.
S. 454,
421 U. S.
474-475 (1975) (MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas and
BRENNAN, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In
American Pipe, we held that initiation of a timely class
action tolled the running of the limitation period as to individual
members of the class, enabling them to institute separate actions
after the District Court found class action an inappropriate
mechanism for the litigation");
United Airlines, Inc. v.
McDonald, 432 U.S. at
432 U. S. 402 (POWELL, J., joined by BURGER, C.J., and
WHITE, J., dissenting) ("Under
American Pipe, the filing
of a class action complaint tolls the statute of limitations until
the District Court makes a decision regarding class status. If
class status is denied, . . . the statute of limitations begins to
run again as to class members excluded from the class. In order to
protect their rights, such individuals must seek to intervene in
the individual action (or possibly file an action of their own)
before the time remaining in the limitations period expires").
[
Footnote 6]
Petitioner's complaints about the burden of defending multiple
suits ring particularly hollow in this case, since petitioner
opposed respondent's efforts to consolidate his action with
Pendleton.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE O'CONNOR
join, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion. It seems important to reiterate the
view expressed by JUSTICE BLACKMUN in
American Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538
(1974). He wrote that our decision
"must not be regarded as encouragement to lawyers in a case of
this kind to frame their pleadings as a class action,
intentionally, to attract and save members of the purported class
who have slept on their rights."
Id. at
414 U. S. 561
(concurring opinion). The tolling rule of
American Pipe is
a generous one, inviting abuse. It preserves for class members a
range of options pending a decision on class certification. The
rule should not be read, however, as leaving a plaintiff free to
raise different or peripheral claims following denial of class
status.
In
American Pipe, we noted that a class suit
"notifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims
being brought against them but also of the number and generic
identities of the potential plaintiffs who participate in the
judgment.
Page 462 U. S. 355
Within the period set by the statute of limitations, the
defendants have the essential information necessary to determine
both the subject matter and size of the prospective
litigation."
Id. at
415 U. S. 555.
When thus notified, the defendant normally is not prejudiced by
tolling of the statute of limitations. It is important to make
certain, however, that
American Pipe is not abused by the
assertion of claims that differ from those raised in the original
class suit. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN noted, a district court should deny
intervention under Rule 24(b) to "preserve a defendant whole
against prejudice arising from claims for which he has received no
prior notice."
Id. at
414 U. S. 562
(concurring opinion). Similarly, when a plaintiff invokes
American Pipe in support of a separate lawsuit, the
district court should take care to ensure that the suit raises
claims that "concern the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as
the subject matter of the original class suit," so that "the
defendant will not be prejudiced."
Ibid. Claims as to
which the defendant was not fairly placed on notice by the class
suit are not protected under
American Pipe, and are barred
by the statute of limitations.
In this case, it is undisputed that the
Pendleton class
suit notified petitioner of respondent's claims. The statute of
limitations therefore was tolled under
American Pipe as to
those claims.