Respondents, on behalf of all persons involuntarily confined in
the forensic unit of a Missouri state hospital, brought suit in
Federal District Court against petitioner hospital officials,
challenging the constitutionality of treatment and conditions at
the hospital. The District Court, after a trial, found
constitutional violations in five of the six general areas of
treatment. Subsequently, respondents filed a request for attorney's
fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that, in federal civil rights
actions, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." After determining that respondents were
prevailing parties under § 1988 even though they had not succeeded
on every claim, the District Court refused to eliminate from the
attorney's fees award the hours spent by respondents' attorneys on
the unsuccessful claims, finding that the significant extent of the
relief clearly justified the award of a reasonable attorney's fee.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The District Court did not properly consider the
relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the
attorney's fee award. The extent of a plaintiff's success is a
crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an attorney's
fee award under § 1988. Where the plaintiff failed to prevail on a
claim unrelated to the successful claims, the hours spent on the
unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of
a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a
plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his
attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not
adopt each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only
limited success, the court should award only that amount of fees
that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained. Pp.
461 U. S.
429-440.
664 F.2d 294, vacated and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and WHITE, REHNQUIST and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J.,
filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
461 U. S. 440.
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
461 U. S.
441.
Page 461 U. S. 426
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that, in federal civil rights
actions, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." The issue in this case is whether a partially
prevailing plaintiff may recover an attorney's fee for legal
services on unsuccessful claims.
I
A
Respondents brought this lawsuit on behalf of all persons
involuntarily confined at the Forensic Unit of the Fulton State
Hospital in Fulton, Mo. The Forensic Unit consists of two
residential buildings for housing patients who are dangerous to
themselves or others. Maximum-security patients are housed in the
Marion O. Biggs Building for the Criminally Insane. The rest of the
patients reside in the less restrictive Rehabilitation Unit.
In 1972, respondents filed a three-count complaint in the
District Court for the Western District of Missouri against
petitioners, who are officials at the Forensic Unit and members of
the Missouri Mental Health Commission. Count I challenged the
constitutionality of treatment and conditions at the Forensic Unit.
Count II challenged the placement of patients in the Biggs Building
without procedural due process. Count III sought compensation for
patients who performed institution-maintaining labor.
Count II was resolved by a consent decree in December, 1973.
Count III largely was mooted in August, 1974, when
Page 461 U. S. 427
petitioners began compensating patients for labor pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq. In
April, 1975, respondents voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit and
filed a new two-count complaint. Count I again related to the
constitutionality of treatment and conditions at the Forensic Unit.
Count II sought damages, based on the Thirteenth Amendment, for the
value of past patient labor. In July, 1976, respondents voluntarily
dismissed this backpay count. Finally, in August, 1977, respondents
filed an amended one-count complaint specifying the conditions that
allegedly violated their constitutional right to treatment.
In August, 1979, following a three-week trial, the District
Court held that an involuntarily committed patient has a
constitutional right to minimally adequate treatment. 476 F. Supp.
908, 915 (1979). The court then found constitutional violations in
five of six general areas: physical environment; individual
treatment plans; least restrictive environment; visitation,
telephone, and mail privileges; and seclusion and restraint.
[
Footnote 1] With respect to
staffing, the sixth general area,
Page 461 U. S. 428
the District Court found that the Forensic Unit's staffing
levels, which had increased during the litigation, were minimally
adequate.
Id. at 919-920. Petitioners did not appeal the
District Court's decision on the merits.
B
In February, 1980, respondents filed a request for attorney's
fees for the period from January, 1975, through the end of the
litigation. Their four attorneys claimed 2,985 hours worked and
sought payment at rates varying from $40 to $65 per hour. This
amounted to approximately $150,000. Respondents also requested that
the fee be enhanced by 30 to 50 percent, for a total award of
somewhere between $195,000 and $225,000. Petitioners opposed the
request on numerous grounds, including inclusion of hours spent in
pursuit of unsuccessful claims.
The District Court first determined that respondents were
prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 even though they had not
succeeded on every claim. It then refused to eliminate from the
award hours spent on unsuccessful claims:
"[Petitioners'] suggested method of calculating fees is based
strictly on a mathematical approach comparing the total number of
issues in the case with those actually prevailed upon. Under this
method, no consideration is given for the relative importance of
various issues, the interrelation of the issues, the difficulty in
identifying issues, or the extent to which a party may prevail on
various issues."
No. 75-CV-87-C, p. 7 (WD Mo., Jan. 23, 1981), Record 220.
Finding that respondents "have obtained relief of significant
import,"
id. at 231, the District Court awarded a fee of
$133,332.25. This award differed from the fee request in two
respects. First, the court reduced the number of hours claimed by
one attorney by 30 percent to account for his inexperience
Page 461 U. S. 429
and failure to keep contemporaneous records. Second, the court
declined to adopt an enhancement factor to increase the award.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed on the
basis of the District Court's memorandum opinion and order. 664
F.2d 294 (1981). We granted certiorari, 455 U.S. 988 (1982), and
now vacate and remand for further proceedings.
II
In
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U. S. 240
(1975), this Court reaffirmed the "American Rule" that each party
in a lawsuit ordinarily shall bear its own attorney's fees unless
there is express statutory authorization to the contrary. In
response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, authorizing the district courts to
award a reasonable attorney's fee to prevailing parties in civil
rights litigation. The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure "effective
access to the judicial process" for persons with civil rights
grievances. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976). Accordingly, a
prevailing plaintiff "
should ordinarily recover an attorney's
fee unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust.'" S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976) (quoting Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.
S. 400, 390 U. S. 402
(1968)). [Footnote 2]
The amount of the fee, of course, must be determined on the
facts of each case. On this issue, the House Report simply refers
to 12 factors set forth in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Page 461 U. S. 430
way Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (CA5 1974). [
Footnote 3] The Senate Report cites to
Johnson as well, and also refers to three District Court
decisions that "correctly applied" the 12 factors. [
Footnote 4] One of the factors in
Johnson, "the amount involved and the results obtained,"
indicates that the level of a plaintiff's success is relevant to
the amount of fees to be awarded. The importance of this
relationship is confirmed in varying degrees by the other cases
cited approvingly in the Senate Report.
In
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (ND
Cal.1974),
aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (CA9 1977),
rev'd on
other grounds, 436 U. S. 436 U.S.
547 (1978), the plaintiffs obtained a declaratory judgment, then
moved for a preliminary injunction. After the defendants promised
not to violate the judgment,
Page 461 U. S. 431
the motion was denied. The District Court awarded attorney's
fees for time spent pursuing this motion because the plaintiffs
"substantially advanced their clients' interests" by obtaining "a
significant concession from defendants as a result of their
motion." 64 F.R.D. at 684.
In
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. � 9444 (CD
Cal.1974), the plaintiffs won an important judgment requiring the
Los Angeles County Fire Department to undertake an affirmative
action program for hiring minorities. In awarding attorney's fees
the District Court stated:
"It also is not legally relevant that plaintiffs' counsel
expended a certain limited amount of time pursuing certain issues
of fact and law that ultimately did not become litigated issues in
the case or upon which plaintiffs ultimately did not prevail. Since
plaintiffs prevailed on the merits and achieved excellent results
for the represented class, plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to an
award of fees for all time reasonably expended in pursuit of the
ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an attorney
traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time
reasonably expended on a matter."
Id. at 5049.
Similarly, the District Court in
Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483, 484
(WDNC 1975), based its fee award in part on a finding that "[t]he
results obtained were excellent and constituted the total
accomplishment of the aims of the suit," despite the plaintiffs'
losses on "certain minor contentions."
In each of these three cases, the plaintiffs obtained
essentially complete relief. The legislative history, therefore,
does not provide a definitive answer as to the proper standard for
setting a fee award where the plaintiff has achieved only limited
success. Consistent with the legislative history, Courts of Appeals
generally have recognized the relevance of the results obtained to
the amount of a fee award. They
Page 461 U. S. 432
have adopted varying standards, however, for applying this
principle in cases where the plaintiff did not succeed on all
claims asserted. [
Footnote
5]
In this case, petitioners contend that
"an award of attorney's fees must be proportioned to be
consistent with the extent to which a plaintiff has prevailed, and
only time reasonably expended in support of successful claims
should be compensated."
Brief for Petitioners 24. Respondents agree that a plaintiff's
success is relevant, but propose a less stringent standard focusing
on "whether the time spent prosecuting [an unsuccessful] claim in
any way contributed to the ultimate results achieved." Brief for
Respondents 46. Both parties acknowledge the discretion of the
district court in this area. We take this opportunity to clarify
the proper relationship of the results obtained to an award of
attorney's fees. [
Footnote
6]
Page 461 U. S. 433
III
A
A plaintiff must be a "prevailing party" to recover an
attorney's fee under § 1988. [
Footnote 7] The standard for making this threshold
determination has been framed in various ways. A typical
formulation is that
"plaintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties' for
attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue
in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought
in bringing suit."
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-279 (CA1 1978).
[
Footnote 8] This is a generous
formulation that brings the plaintiff only across the statutory
threshold. It remains for the district court to determine what fee
is "reasonable."
The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation
provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of
the value of a lawyer's services. The party seeking an award of
fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates
claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the
district court may reduce the award accordingly.
Page 461 U. S. 434
The district court also should exclude from this initial fee
calculation hours that were not "reasonably expended." S.Rep. No.
94-1011, p. 6 (1976). Cases may be overstaffed, and the skill and
experience of lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the prevailing party
should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours
that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a
lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such
hours from his fee submission.
"In the private sector, 'billing judgment' is an important
component in fee-setting. It is no less important here. Hours that
are not properly billed to one's
client also are not
properly billed to one's
adversary pursuant to statutory
authority."
Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 401, 641
F.2d 880, 891 (1980) (en banc) (emphasis in original).
B
The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not
end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead
the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including
the important factor of the "results obtained." [
Footnote 9] This factor is particularly
crucial where a plaintiff is deemed "prevailing" even though he
succeeded on only some of his claims for relief. In this situation,
two questions must be addressed. First, did the plaintiff fail to
prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he
succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success
that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for
making a fee award?
In some cases, a plaintiff may present in one lawsuit distinctly
different claims for relief that are based on different facts and
legal theories. In such a suit, even where the
Page 461 U. S. 435
claims are brought against the same defendants -- often an
institution and its officers, as in this case -- counsel's work on
one claim will be unrelated to his work on another claim.
Accordingly, work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have
been "expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved."
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. at 5049. The
congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires
that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised
in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for
services on the unsuccessful claim. [
Footnote 10]
It may well be that cases involving such unrelated claims are
unlikely to arise with great frequency. Many civil rights cases
will present only a single claim. In other cases, the plaintiff's
claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will be
based on related legal theories. Much of counsel's time will be
devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult
to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a
lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead,
the district court should focus on the significance of the overall
relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours
reasonably expended on the litigation.
Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney
should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will
encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and
indeed, in some cases of exceptional success, an enhanced award may
be justified. In these circumstances, the fee award should not be
reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every
contention raised in the lawsuit.
See Davis v. County of Los
Angeles, supra, at 5049. Litigants in good faith may raise
alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court's
rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a
sufficient reason for reducing a fee. The result is what matters.
[
Footnote 11]
Page 461 U. S. 436
If, on the other hand, a plaintiff has achieved only partial or
limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an
excessive amount. This will be true even where the plaintiff's
claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.
Congress has not authorized an award of fees whenever it was
reasonable for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or whenever
conscientious counsel tried the case with devotion and skill.
Again, the most critical factor is the degree of success
obtained.
Application of this principle is particularly important in
complex civil rights litigation involving numerous challenges to
institutional practices or conditions. This type of litigation is
lengthy, and demands many hours of lawyers' services. Although the
plaintiff often may succeed in identifying some unlawful practices
or conditions, the range of possible success is vast. That the
plaintiff is a "prevailing party" therefore may say little about
whether the expenditure of counsel's time was reasonable in
relation to the success achieved. In this case, for example, the
District Court's award of fees based on 2,557 hours worked may have
been reasonable in light of the substantial relief obtained. But
had respondents prevailed on only one of their six general claims,
for example the claim that petitioners' visitation, mail, and
telephone policies were overly restrictive,
see n 1,
supra, a fee award based
on the claimed hours clearly would have been excessive.
There is no precise rule or formula for making these
determinations. The district court may attempt to identify specific
hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce
Page 461 U. S. 437
the award to account for the limited success. The court
necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment. This
discretion, however, must be exercised in light of the
considerations we have identified.
C
A request for attorney's fees should not result in a second
major litigation. Ideally, of course, litigants will settle the
amount of a fee. Where settlement is not possible, the fee
applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award
and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.
The applicant should exercise "billing judgment" with respect to
hours worked,
see supra at
461 U. S. 434,
and should maintain billing time records in a manner that will
enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims. [
Footnote 12]
We reemphasize that the district court has discretion in
determining the amount of a fee award. This is appropriate in view
of the district court's superior understanding of the litigation
and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what
essentially are factual matters. It remains important, however, for
the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of
its reasons for the fee award. When an adjustment is requested on
the basis of either the exceptional or limited nature of the relief
obtained by the plaintiff, the district court should make clear
that it has considered the relationship between the amount of the
fee awarded and the results obtained.
Page 461 U. S. 438
IV
In this case, the District Court began by finding that
"[t]he relief [respondents] obtained at trial was substantial,
and certainly entitles them to be considered prevailing . . . ,
without the need of examining those issues disposed of prior to
trial in order to determine which went in [respondents']
favor."
Record 219. It then declined to divide the hours worked between
winning and losing claims, stating that this fails to consider
"the relative importance of various issues, the interrelation of
the issues, the difficulty in identifying issues, or the extent to
which a party may prevail on various issues."
Id. at 220. Finally, the court assessed the "amount
involved/ results obtained," and declared:
"Not only should [respondents] be considered prevailing parties,
they are parties who have obtained relief of significant import.
[Respondents'] relief affects not only them, but also numerous
other institutionalized patients similarly situated. The extent of
this relief clearly justifies the award of a reasonable attorney's
fee."
Id. at 231.
These findings represent a commendable effort to explain the fee
award. Given the interrelated nature of the facts and legal
theories in this case, the District Court did not err in refusing
to apportion the fee award mechanically on the basis of
respondents' success or failure on particular issues. [
Footnote 13] And given the findings
with respect to the level of respondents' success, the District
Court's award may be consistent with our holding today.
We are unable to affirm the decisions below, however, because
the District Court's opinion did not properly consider the
relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the
fee award. [
Footnote 14] The
court's finding that "the [significant]
Page 461 U. S. 439
extent of the relief clearly justifies the award of a reasonable
attorney's fee" does not answer the question of what is
"reasonable" in light of that level of success. [
Footnote 15] We
Page 461 U. S. 440
emphasize that the inquiry does not end with a finding that the
plaintiff obtained significant relief. A reduced fee award is
appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in
comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.
V
We hold that the extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial
factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Where the plaintiff has failed to
prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his
successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should
be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a
lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won
substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced
simply because the district court did not adopt each contention
raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the
district court should award only that amount of fees that is
reasonable in relation to the results obtained. On remand, the
District Court should determine the proper amount of the attorney's
fee award in light of these standards.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Under "physical environment," the court found that certain
physical aspects of the Biggs Building were not minimally adequate.
475 F. Supp. at 916-919.
Under "individual treatment plans," the court found that the
existing plans were adequate, but that the long delay in
preparation of initial plans after patients were admitted and the
lack of regular review of the plans operated to deny patients
minimally adequate plans.
Id. at 921-922.
Under "least restrictive environment," the court found
unconstitutional the delay in transfer of patients from the Biggs
Building to the Rehabilitation Unit following a determination that
they no longer needed maximum security confinement.
Id. at
922-923.
Under "visitation, telephone and mail," the court found that the
visitation and telephone policies at the Biggs Building were so
restrictive that they constituted punishment, and therefore
violated patients' due process rights.
Id. at 923-925.
Under "seclusion and restraint," the court rejected respondents'
claim that patients were given excessive medication as a form of
behavior control. The court then found that petitioners' practices
regarding seclusion and physical restraint were not minimally
adequate.
Id. at 925-928.
[
Footnote 2]
A prevailing defendant may recover an attorney's fee only where
the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or
embarrass the defendant.
See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 7
(1976);
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.
S. 412,
434 U. S. 421
(1978) ("[A] district court may, in its discretion, award
attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon
a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad
faith").
[
Footnote 3]
The 12 factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability"
of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 488
F.2d at 717-719. These factors derive directly from the American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary
Rule 2-106 (1980).
[
Footnote 4]
"It is intended that the amount of fees awarded . . . be
governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of
equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases[,] and
not be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in
nature. The appropriate standards,
see Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974), are correctly
applied in such cases as
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64
F.R.D. 680 (ND Cal.1974);
Davis v. County of Los Angeles,
8 E.P.D. � 9444 (CD Cal.1974); and
Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483 (WDNC
1975). These cases have resulted in fees which are adequate to
attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to
attorneys. In computing the fee, counsel for prevailing parties
should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a
fee-paying client, 'for all time reasonably expended on a matter.'
Davis, supra; Stanford Daily, supra, at 684."
S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976).
[
Footnote 5]
Some Courts of Appeals have stated flatly that plaintiffs should
not recover fees for any work on unsuccessful claims.
See,
e.g., Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 910, 914 (CA9 1982);
Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 579-581 (CA7 1980);
Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 486-487 (CA3 1978). Others
have suggested that prevailing plaintiffs generally should receive
a fee based on hours spent on all nonfrivolous claims.
See,
e.g., Sherkow v. Wisconsin, 630 F.2d 498, 504-505 (CA7 1980);
Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611
F.2d 624, 636 (CA6 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911
(1980);
Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 636-637 (CA8 1978).
Still other Courts of Appeals have held that recovery of a fee for
hours spent on unsuccessful claims depends upon the relationship of
those hours expended to the success achieved.
See, e.g.,
Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 401-402, n. 18,
641 F.2d 880, 891-892, n. 18 (1980) (en banc);
Jones v.
Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (CA5) (en banc),
cert.
dism'd, 453 U.S. 950 (1981);
Gurule v. Wilson, 635
F.2d 782, 794 (CA10 1980) (opinion on rehearing);
Lamphere v.
Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (CA1 1979).
[
Footnote 6]
The parties disagree as to the results obtained in this case.
Petitioners believe that respondents "prevailed only to an
extremely limited degree." Brief for Petitioners 22. Respondents
contend that they "prevailed on practically every claim advanced."
Brief for Respondents 23. As discussed in
461 U.
S. infra, we leave this dispute for the
District Court on remand.
[
Footnote 7]
As we noted in
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.
S. 754,
446 U. S. 758,
n. 4 (1980) (per curiam),
"[t]he provision for counsel fees in § 1988 was patterned upon
the attorney's fees provisions contained in Titles II and VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) and
2000e-5(k), and § 402 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,
42 U.S.C. § 19731(e)."
The legislative history of § 1988 indicates that Congress
intended that "the standards for awarding fees be generally the
same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."
S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976). The standards set forth in this
opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has
authorized an award of fees to a "prevailing party."
[
Footnote 8]
See also Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 521 (CA7
1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981);
Sethy v.
Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897-898 (CA9 1979)
(per curiam).
Cf. Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 669
(CA5 1981) ("[T]he proper focus is whether the plaintiff has been
successful on the central issue as exhibited by the fact that he
has acquired the primary relief sought").
[
Footnote 9]
The district court also may consider other factors identified in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
717-719 (CA5 1974), though it should note that many of these
factors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of
hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.
See
Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 400, 641 F.2d 880,
890 (1980) (en banc).
[
Footnote 10]
If the unsuccessful claim is frivolous, the defendant may
recover attorney's fees incurred in responding to it.
See
n 2,
supra.
[
Footnote 11]
We agree with the District Court's rejection of "a mathematical
approach comparing the total number of issues in the case with
those actually prevailed upon."
"Record 220. Such a ratio provides little aid in determining
what is a reasonable fee in light of all the relevant factors. Nor
is it necessarily significant that a prevailing plaintiff did not
receive all the relief requested. For example, a plaintiff who
failed to recover damages but obtained injunctive relief, or vice
versa, may recover a fee award based on all hours reasonably
expended if the relief obtained justified that expenditure of
attorney time."
[
Footnote 12]
We recognize that there is no certain method of determining when
claims are "related" or "unrelated." Plaintiff's counsel, of
course, is not required to record in great detail how each minute
of his time was expended. But at least counsel should identify the
general subject matter of his time expenditures.
See Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (CA1 1978) ("As for the future, we
would not view with sympathy any claim that a district court abused
its discretion in awarding unreasonably low attorney's fees in a
suit in which plaintiffs were only partially successful if
counsel's records do not provide a proper basis for determining how
much time was spent on particular claims").
[
Footnote 13]
In addition, the District Court properly considered the
reasonableness of the hours expended, and reduced the hours of one
attorney by 30 percent to account for his inexperience and failure
to keep contemporaneous time records.
[
Footnote 14]
The District Court expressly relied on
Brown v. Bathke,
588 F.2d 634 (CA8 1978), a case we believe understates the
significance of the results obtained. In that case a fired
schoolteacher had sought reinstatement, lost wages, $25,000 in
damages, and expungement of derogatory material from her employment
record. She obtained lost wages and the requested expungement, but
not reinstatement or damages. The District Court awarded attorney's
fees for the hours that it estimated the plaintiff's attorney had
spent on the particular legal issue on which relief had been
granted. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It stated that the results
obtained may be considered, but that this factor should not "be
given such weight that it reduces the fee awarded to a prevailing
party below the
reasonable attorney's fee' authorized by the
Act." Id. at 637. The court determined that the
unsuccessful issues that had been raised by the plaintiff were not
frivolous, and then remanded the case to the District Court.
Id. at 638.
Our holding today differs at least in emphasis from that of the
Eighth Circuit in
Brown. We hold that the extent of a
plaintiff's success is a crucial factor that the district courts
should consider carefully in determining the amount of fees to be
awarded. In
Brown, the plaintiff had lost on the major
issue of reinstatement. The District Court found that she had
"
obtained only a minor part of the relief she sought.'"
Id. at 636. In remanding, the Eighth Circuit implied that
the District Court should not withhold fees for work on
unsuccessful claims unless those claims were frivolous. Today we
hold otherwise. It certainly was well within the Brown
District Court's discretion to make a limited fee award in light of
the "minor" relief obtained.
[
Footnote 15]
The dissent errs in suggesting that the District Court's opinion
would have been acceptable if merely a single word had been
changed.
See post at
461 U. S. 451.
We note, for example, that the District Court did not determine
whether petitioners' unilateral increase in staff levels was a
result of the litigation. Petitioners asserted that 70-80% of the
attorney time in the case was spent on the question of staffing
levels at the Forensic Unit. Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Request for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Expenses and
Costs 30. If this is true, and if respondents' lawsuit was not a
catalyst for the staffing increases, then respondents' failure to
prevail on their challenge to the staffing levels would be material
in determining whether an award based on over 2,500 hours expended
was justifiable in light of respondents' actual success. The
District Court's failure to consider this issue would not have been
obviated by a mere conclusory statement that this fee was
reasonable in light of the success obtained.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.
I read the Court's opinion as requiring that, when a lawyer
seeks to have his adversary pay the fees of the prevailing party,
the lawyer must provide detailed records of the time and services
for which fees are sought. It would be inconceivable that the
prevailing party should not be required to establish at least as
much to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as a lawyer would be
required to show if his own client challenged the fees. A district
judge may not, in my view, authorize the payment of attorney's fees
unless the
Page 461 U. S. 441
attorney involved has established by clear and convincing
evidence the time and effort claimed and shown that the time
expended was necessary to achieve the results obtained.
A claim for legal services presented by the prevailing party to
the losing party pursuant to § 1988 presents quite a different
situation from a bill that a lawyer presents to his own client. In
the latter case, the attorney and client have presumably built up a
relationship of mutual trust and respect; the client has confidence
that his lawyer has exercised the appropriate "billing judgment,"
ante at
461 U. S. 434,
and unless challenged by the client, the billing does not need the
kind of extensive documentation necessary for a payment under §
1988. That statute requires the losing party in a civil rights
action to bear the cost of his adversary's attorney, and there is,
of course, no relationship of trust and confidence between the
adverse parties. As a result, the party who seeks payment must keep
records in sufficient detail that a neutral judge can make a fair
evaluation of the time expended, the nature and need for the
service, and the reasonable fees to be allowed.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
The Court today holds that "the extent of a plaintiff's success
is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988."
Ante at
461 U. S. 440.
I agree with the Court's carefully worded statement because it is
fully consistent with the purpose of § 1988 as well as the
interpretation of that statute reached by the Courts of Appeals. I
also agree that plaintiffs may receive attorney's fees for cases in
which "
they succeed on any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing
suit,'" ante at 461 U. S. 433,
quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-279 (CA1
1978), and that plaintiffs may receive fees for all hours
reasonably spent litigating
Page 461 U. S. 442
a case even if they do not prevail on every claim or legal
theory,
see ante at
461 U. S.
434-435.
Regretfully, however, I do not join the Court's opinion. In
restating general principles of the law of attorney's fees, the
Court omits a number of elements crucial to the calculation of
attorney's fees under § 1988. A court that did not take account of
those additional elements in evaluating a claim for attorney's fees
would entirely fail to perform the task Congress has entrusted to
it, a task that Congress -- I think rightly -- has deemed crucial
to the vindication of individuals' rights in a society where access
to justice so often requires the services of a lawyer.
Furthermore, whether one considers all the relevant factors or
merely the relationship of fees to results obtained, the District
Court in this case awarded a fee that was well within the court's
zone of discretion under § 1988, and it explained the amount of the
fee meticulously. The Court admits as much.
See ante at
461 U. S. 438.
Vacating a fee award such as this and remanding for further
explanation can serve only as an invitation to losing defendants to
engage in what must be one of the least socially productive types
of litigation imaginable: appeals from awards of attorney's fees,
after the merits of a case have been concluded, when the appeals
are not likely to affect the amount of the final fee. Such appeals,
which greatly increase the costs to plaintiffs of vindicating their
rights, frustrate the purposes of § 1988. Where, as here, a
district court has awarded a fee that comes within the range of
possible fees that the facts, history, and results of the case
permit, the appellate court has a duty to affirm the award
promptly.
I
In
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U. S. 240,
421 U. S. 269
(1975), this Court held that it was beyond the competence of judges
to "pick and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under which
they sue and to award fees in some cases but not in others."
Congress, however, has full authority to make such decisions, and
it responded to the challenge
Page 461 U. S. 443
of
Alyeska by doing the "picking and choosing" itself.
Its legislative solution legitimates the federal common law of
attorney's fees that had developed in the years before
Alyeska [
Footnote 2/1] by
specifying when and to whom fees are to be available. [
Footnote 2/2] Section 1988 manifests a
finely balanced congressional
Page 461 U. S. 444
purpose to provide plaintiffs asserting specified federal rights
with "fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but
which do not produce windfalls to attorneys." S.Rep. No. 94-1011,
p. 6 (1976) (hereinafter Senate Report);
cf. H.R.Rep. No.
94-1558, p. 9 (1976) (hereinafter House Report). [
Footnote 2/3] The Court today emphasizes those
aspects of judicial discretion necessary to prevent "windfalls,"
but lower courts must not forget the need to ensure that civil
rights plaintiffs with bona fide claims are able to find lawyers to
represent them.
In enacting § 1988, Congress rejected the traditional assumption
that private choices whether to litigate, compromise, or forgo a
potential claim will yield a socially desirable level of
enforcement as far as the enumerated civil rights statutes are
concerned. [
Footnote 2/4]
Page 461 U. S. 445
"All of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private
enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if
private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate
the important Congressional policies which these laws contain."
"In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen
who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which
to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert
their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's
fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens
must recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in
court."
Senate Report 2.
See House Report 1-3. [
Footnote 2/5] Congress could, of course, have
provided public funds or Government attorneys for litigating
private civil rights claims, but it chose to "limi[t] the growth of
the enforcement bureaucracy," Senate Report 4, by continuing
Page 461 U. S. 446
to rely on the private bar [
Footnote
2/6] and by making defendants bear the full burden of paying
for enforcement of their civil rights obligations. [
Footnote 2/7]
Yet Congress also took steps to ensure that § 1988 did not
become a "relief fund for lawyers." 122 Cong.Rec. 33314 (1976)
(remarks of Sen. Kennedy). First, it limited fee awards to
"prevailing" plaintiffs, rather than allowing fees for anyone who
litigated a bona fide claim in good faith,
see House
Report 6-8, and it expressly reaffirmed the common law doctrine
that attorney's fees could be awarded against plaintiffs who
litigated frivolous or vexatious claims,
see id. at 6-7;
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.
S. 412,
434 U. S.
416-417 (1978). It also left district courts with
discretion to set the precise award in individual cases and to deny
fees entirely in "special circumstances" when an award would be
"unjust," even if the plaintiff prevailed,
see Senate
Report 4; House Report 6;
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc., 390 U. S. 400,
390 U. S. 402
(1968) (per curiam).
"[A] key feature of the bill is its mandate that fees are only
to be allowed in the discretion of the court. Congress has passed
many statutes requiring that fees be awarded to a prevailing party.
Again, the Committee
Page 461 U. S. 447
adopted a more moderate approach here by leaving the matter to
the discretion of the judge, guided of course by the case law
interpreting similar attorney's fee provisions."
House Report 8 (footnote omitted).
At a number of points, the legislative history of § 1988 reveals
Congress' basic goal that attorneys should view civil rights cases
as essentially equivalent to other types of work they could do,
even though the monetary recoveries in civil rights cases (and
hence the funds out of which their clients would pay legal fees)
would seldom be equivalent to recoveries in most private law
litigation. Thus, the Senate Report specifies that fee awards under
§ 1988 should be equivalent to fees
"in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as
antitrust cases, and not be reduced because the rights involved may
be nonpecuniary in nature."
Senate Report 6. Furthermore,
"counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is
traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for
all time reasonably expended on a matter.'"
Ibid.
As nearly as possible, market standards should prevail, for that
is the best way of ensuring that competent counsel will be
available to all persons with bona fide civil rights claims. This
means that judges awarding fees must make certain that attorneys
are paid the full value that their efforts would receive on the
open market in non-civil-rights cases,
see generally Copeland
v. Marshall, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 400-410, 641 F.2d 880,
890-900 (1980) (en banc), both by awarding them market-rate fees,
id. at 409, 641 F.2d at 899, and by awarding fees only for
time reasonably expended,
id. at 391, 641 F.2d at 881. If
attorneys representing civil rights plaintiffs do not expect to
receive full compensation for their efforts when they are
successful, or if they feel they can "lard" winning cases with
additional work solely to augment their fees, the balance struck by
§ 1988 goes awry.
The Court accepts these principles today. As in litigation for
fee-paying clients, a certain amount of "billing judgment"
Page 461 U. S. 448
is appropriate, taking into account the fact that Congress did
not intend fees in civil rights cases, unlike most private law
litigation, to depend on obtaining relief with substantial monetary
value. Where plaintiffs prevail on some claims and lose on others,
the Court is correct in holding that the extent of their success is
an important factor for calculating fee awards. Any system for
awarding attorney's fees that did not take account of the
relationship between results and fees would fail to accomplish
Congress' goal of checking insubstantial litigation.
At the same time, however, courts should recognize that
reasonable counsel in a civil rights case, as in much litigation,
must often advance a number of related legal claims in order to
give plaintiffs the best possible chance of obtaining significant
relief. As the Court admits, "[s]uch a lawsuit cannot be viewed as
a series of discrete claims."
Ante at
461 U. S. 435.
And even where two claims apparently share no "common core of
facts" or related legal concepts,
see ibid., the actual
work performed by lawyers to develop the facts of both claims may
be closely intertwined. For instance, in taking a deposition of a
state official, plaintiffs' counsel may find it necessary to cover
a range of territory that includes both the successful and the
unsuccessful claims. It is sometimes virtually impossible to
determine how much time was devoted to one category or the other,
and the incremental time required to pursue both claims, rather
than just one, is likely to be small.
Furthermore, on many occasions, awarding counsel fees that
reflect the full market value of their time will require paying
more than their customary hourly rates. Most attorneys paid an
hourly rate expect to be paid promptly and without regard to
success or failure. Customary rates reflect those expectations.
Attorneys who take cases on contingency, thus deferring payment of
their fees until the case has ended and taking upon themselves the
risk that they will receive no payment at all, generally receive
far more in winning cases than they would if they charged an hourly
rate. The difference, however, reflects the time-value of money and
the
Page 461 U. S. 449
risk of nonrecovery usually borne by clients in cases where
lawyers are paid an hourly rate. Courts applying § 1988 must also
take account of the time-value of money and the fact that attorneys
can never be 100% certain they will win even the best case.
Therefore, district courts should not end their fee inquiries
when they have multiplied a customary hourly rate times the
reasonable number of hours expended, and then checked the product
against the results obtained. They should also consider both delays
in payment and the prelitigation likelihood that the claims which
did in fact prevail would prevail. [
Footnote 2/8]
Copeland v. Marshall, supra, at
402-403, 641 F.2d at 892-893;
Northcross v. Board of Education
of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 638 (CA6 1979);
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (CA3 1976). These factors
are potentially relevant in every case. Even if the results
obtained do not justify awarding fees for all the hours spent on a
particular case, no fee is reasonable unless it would be adequate
to induce other attorneys to represent similarly situated clients
seeking relief comparable to that obtained in the case at hand.
II
Setting to one side theoretical issues about how district courts
should approach attorney's fees questions under
Page 461 U. S. 450
§ 1988, I fear the Court makes a serious error in vacating the
judgment in this case and remanding for further proceedings. There
is simply no reason for another round of litigation between these
parties, and the lower courts are in no need of guidance from
us.
A
The Court admits that the District Court made a "commendable
effort" to explain the fee award, and that the award "may be
consistent" with today's opinion.
Ante at
461 U. S. 438.
It professes to be "unable to affirm" solely because the District
Court's finding that "[t]he extent of this relief clearly justifies
the award of a reasonable attorney's fee," App. to Pet. for Cert.
A-16, is not accompanied by a further finding as to "what is
reasonable' in light of that level of success." Ante
at 461 U. S.
438-439.
Even if the District Court had been silent on the reasonableness
of the amount of its fee award, it would be difficult to imagine
why this Court would presume, as it apparently does, that a federal
judge had awarded an unreasonable fee without explaining how such a
result was compelled. In any event, the District Court stated
expressly:
"The Court concludes that, in this case, the entire award made
to plaintiffs constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee. No portion
of it can be characterized as a penalty or damage award against the
state of Missouri."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-11. The District Court also addressed
each of the factors mentioned in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (CA5 1974), discussed by the Court
ante at
461 U. S.
429-430, under the general rubric "Reasonableness of the
Fee." App. to Pet. for Cert. A A-18. It explained why it was not
enhancing respondents' fee to account for the uncertainty factor,
id. at A-15 - A-16, and it discounted one attorney's hours
by 30% to yield "a reasonable claim of time,"
id. at
Page 461 U. S. 451
A-13. The District Court had this to say under the subheading
"Amount Involved/Results Obtained":
"The significance of this case cannot be measured in terms of
dollars and cents. It involves the constitutional and civil rights
of the plaintiff class and resulted in a number of changes
regarding their conditions and treatment at the state hospital. Not
only should plaintiffs be considered prevailing parties, they are
parties who have obtained relief of significant import. Plaintiffs'
relief affects not only them, but also numerous other
institutionalized patients similarly situated. The extent of this
relief clearly justifies the award of a reasonable attorney's
fee."
Id. at A-16. It is clear from the context that the
District Court regarded the fee it was awarding as reasonable
compensation for the results obtained. Simply changing the word "a"
to "this," in the last sentence quoted, would provide the
additional finding the Court demands.
B
No more significant legal error requires today's judgment. The
Court notes that the District Court relied on
Brown v.
Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (CA8 1978), an opinion the "emphasis" of
which the Court regards as misplaced.
See ante at
461 U. S.
438-439, n. 14. What the Court finds suspicious in
Brown is the implication that a district court must award
attorney's fees for all work "reasonably calculated to advance a
client's interest,"
i.e., all nonfrivolous claims,
whenever the client satisfies the "prevailing party" test.
See 588 F.2d at 637-638. The District Court did not,
however, refer to the language criticized by the Court. Rather, it
cited a footnote in
Brown for the proposition that
"mechanical division of claimed hours . . . ignores the
interrelated nature of many prevailing and non-prevailing claims."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-7, citing 588 F.2d at 637, n. 5. The
remainder of the
Brown footnote
Page 461 U. S. 452
makes clear that the court was concerned with related legal
theories, only one of which ultimately becomes the basis for
relief. To that extent,
Brown is perfectly consistent with
today's opinion.
See ante at
461 U. S.
434-436, and n. 11. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in its brief, unpublished memorandum affirming the
District Court, did not cite
Brown at all. App. to Pet.
for Cert. A-1 - A-2.
Perhaps if the questionable language in
Brown were
being misapplied in other cases from the Eighth Circuit, or if
courts in some other circuit were misinterpreting § 1988 in light
of precedents with similar implications, today's result would have
some instructive value. But such is not the case. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has never applied
Brown in
the manner the Court fears. Rather, its published opinions
following
Brown have made clear that, although it is an
abuse of discretion to deny fees entirely to any plaintiff who has
crossed the "prevailing party" threshold, district courts should
consider the degree of plaintiffs' success in setting a fee award.
See, e.g., Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660
F.2d 1267, 1274 (1981);
United Handicapped Federation v.
Andre, 622 F.2d 342 (1980) (rejecting claim for over $200,000
in fees and setting $10,000 limit on award because of limited
success in case);
Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168, n.
9 (1980);
Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 594 F.2d 638,
642 (1979).
The law in other Circuits is substantially identical. Federal
Courts of Appeals have adopted a two-stage analysis, whereby
plaintiffs who obtain any significant relief are considered
"prevailing parties," and District Courts are directed to take into
consideration the overall degree of a plaintiff's success, and the
extent to which work on claims on which no relief was obtained
contributed to that success, in setting the exact amount of the
award due. The mere fact that plaintiffs do not prevail on every
claim does not preclude an award of fees for all work reasonably
performed, [
Footnote 2/9]but it is
rarely an
Page 461 U. S. 453
abuse of discretion to refuse to award fees for work done on
nonprevailing claims that are not closely related to the relief
obtained.
See, e.g., Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co.,
665 F.2d 149, 163-165 (CA7 1981);
Jones v. Diamond, 636
F.2d 1364, 1382 (CA5 1981) (en banc);
Lamphere v. Brown
University, 610 F.2d 46, 47 (CA1 1979);
EEOC v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 597 F.2d 251 (CA10 1979);
cf. Copeland v.
Marshall, 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 401-402, and n. 18, 641 F.2d at
891-892, and n. 18. Many of the same courts, however, have also
stressed Congress' clearly expressed intent that the apparent
monetary value of the relief obtained should not be the measure of
success in a civil rights case, and they have recognized that in
many cases various claims are essentially part and parcel of a
single attempt to establish and vindicate the plaintiffs' rights.
See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, supra; Gurule v. Wilson,
635 F.2d 782, 794 (CA10 1981) (as modified en banc);
Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (CA1 1978).
Evaluation of the interrelatedness of several claims within a
single lawsuit, and of the legal work done on those claims, is
Page 461 U. S. 454
most appropriately a task for the district court that heard and
decided the case, subject to appellate review for abuse of
discretion. As the Court implicitly recognizes, the case before us
manifests no clear abuse of discretion. Although plaintiffs
obtained only part of the specific injunctive relief they
requested, the District Court's opinion on the merits both
confirmed the existence of the constitutional right to minimally
adequate treatment they claimed, App. 173-179, and established
strict standards for staffing, treatment plans, and environment,
against which the future conduct of defendants and other state
mental health authorities will be measured,
id. at
188-195. To a large extent, the District Court's opinion fixed
plaintiffs' entitlement to improvements instituted by defendants
during the course of litigation.
See id. at 192-193
(treatment plans), 190-191 (staff);
compare Deposition of
H. Bratkowski 12-13, 39, reprinted in Brief in Opposition 8, n. 10,
12,
with App. 106-114, 120-121 (increase in staff during
litigation). It is thus entirely understandable that the District
Court considered respondents to have prevailed to an extent
justifying fees for all hours reasonably spent, subject to one
substantial reduction of over 300 hours for wasteful litigation
practices,
see ante at
461 U. S. 438,
n. 13.
C
To remain faithful to the legislative objectives of § 1988,
appellate courts, including this Court, should hesitate to prolong
litigation over attorney's fees after the merits of a case have
been concluded. Congress enacted § 1988 solely to make certain that
attorneys representing plaintiffs whose rights had been violated
could expect to be paid, not to spawn litigation, however
interesting, over which claims are "related" or what constitutes
optimal documentation for a fees request. Paragraph-by-paragraph
scrutiny of the explanations for specific exercises of the district
courts' broad discretion under § 1988 serves no productive purpose,
vindicates no
Page 461 U. S. 455
one's civil rights, and exacerbates the myriad problems of
crowded appellate dockets. [
Footnote
2/10]
If a district court has articulated a fair explanation for its
fee award in a given case, the court of appeals should not reverse
or remand the judgment unless the award is so low as to provide
clearly inadequate compensation to the attorneys on the case or so
high as to constitute an unmistakable windfall.
See, e.g.,
Gurule v. Wilson, supra, at 792;
Furtado v. Bishop,
635 F.2d 915, 923, n. 16 (CA1 1980). Any award that falls between
those rough poles substantially accomplishes Congress' objectives.
[
Footnote 2/11] More exacting
review, for which there is no clear mandate in the statute or its
legislative history, frustrates, rather than advances, the policies
of § 1988.
In systemic terms, attorney's fee appeals take up lawyers' and
judges' time that could more profitably be devoted to other cases,
including the substantive civil rights claims that § 1988 was meant
to facilitate. Regular appellate scrutiny of issues like those in
this case also generates a steady stream of opinions, each
requiring yet another to harmonize it with the one before or the
one after. Ultimately, § 1988's straightforward command is replaced
by a vast body of artificial, judge-made doctrine, with its own
arcane procedures, which, like a Frankenstein's monster, meanders
its well-intentioned way through the legal landscape, leaving waste
and confusion (not to mention circuit splits) in its wake. Within
the confines of
Page 461 U. S. 456
individual cases, from prevailing plaintiffs' point of view,
appellate litigation of attorney's fee issues increases the delay,
uncertainty, and expense of bringing a civil rights case, even
after the plaintiffs have won all the relief they deserve.
Defendants -- who generally have deeper pockets than plaintiffs or
their lawyers, and whose own lawyers may well be salaried, and thus
have lower opportunity costs than plaintiffs' counsel -- have much
to gain simply by dragging out litigation. The longer litigation
proceeds, with no prospect of improved results, the more pressure
plaintiffs and their attorneys may feel to compromise their claims
or simply to give up.
This case itself provides a perfect example. Petitioners, who
have little prospect of substantially reducing the amount of fees
they will ultimately have to pay, have managed to delay paying
respondents what they owe for over two years, after all other
litigation between them had ended, with further delay to come.
Respondents' attorneys can hardly be certain that they will ever be
compensated for their efforts here in defending a judgment that
five Justices find deficient only in minor respects. Apart from the
result in this case, the prospect of protracted appellate
litigation regarding attorney's fee awards to prevailing parties is
likely to discourage litigation by victims of other civil rights
violations in Missouri and elsewhere. The more obstacles that are
placed in the path of parties who have won significant relief and
then seek reasonable attorney's fees, the less likely lawyers will
be to undertake the risk of representing civil rights plaintiffs
seeking equivalent relief in other cases. It may well become
difficult for civil rights plaintiffs with less-than-certain
prospects for success to obtain attorneys. That would be an
anomalous result for judicial construction of a statute enacted "to
attract competent counsel in cases involving civil and
constitutional rights," House Report 9;
cf. Copeland v.
Marshall, 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 400, 641 F.2d at 890 (fee awards
intended to provide "an incentive to competent lawyers to undertake
Title VII work").
Page 461 U. S. 457
D
Few, if any, differences about the basic framework of attorney's
fees law under § 1988 divide the Court today. Apart from matters of
nuance and tone, largely tangential to the case at hand, I object
to only two aspects of today's judgment. First, I see no reason for
us to have devoted our scarce time to hearing this case, and I fear
that the sudden appearance of a new Supreme Court precedent in this
area will unjustifiably provoke new litigation and prolong old
litigation over attorney's fees. More fundamentally, the principles
that the Court and I share should have led us, once we had granted
a writ of certiorari, to affirm the judgment below. To that extent,
I dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See cases cited 421 U.S. at
421 U. S.
284-285 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
See also
S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976) ("This bill creates no startling
new remedy -- it only meets the technical requirements that the
Supreme Court has laid down if the Federal courts are to continue
the practice of awarding attorneys' fees which had been going on
for years prior to the Court's . . . decision").
[
Footnote 2/2]
Because of this selectivity, statutory attorney's fee remedies
such as those created by § 1988 and its analogues bear little
resemblance to either common law attorney's fee rule: the "American
Rule," under which the parties bear their own attorney's fees no
matter what the outcome of a case, or the "English Rule," under
which the losing party, whether plaintiff or defendant, pays the
winner's fees. They are far more like new causes of action tied to
specific rights than like background procedural rules governing any
and all litigation. This fundamental distinction has often been
ignored.
See ante at
461 U. S. 429;
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. at
421 U. S.
247.
For certain rights selected by Congress, § 1988 facilitates
litigation by plaintiffs and encourages them to reject half-measure
compromises,
see New York Gaslight Club v. Carey,
447 U. S. 54,
447 U. S. 63
(1980);
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U. S. 400,
390 U. S. 402
(1968) (per curiam), while at the same time it gives defendants
strong incentives to avoid arguable civil rights violations in the
first place and to make concessions in hope of an early settlement,
see Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 407, 641
F.2d 880, 897 (1980) (en banc);
Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d
1302, 1307 (CA9 1980). Civil rights plaintiffs with meritorious
claims "appear before the court cloaked in a mantle of public
interest." H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 6 (1976) (citing
United
States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (CA3
1975)). Congress has granted them a statutory right to attorney's
fees in addition to any rights they have under fees rules of
general applicability.
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
supra, at
390 U. S. 402,
n. 4;
see Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.
S. 412,
434 U. S.
416-417 (1978). Both of the traditional rules reflect
the assumption that plaintiff and defendant approach litigation on
a more or less equal basis. They leave the parties to private,
essentially symmetrical calculations as to whether litigation --
including the attorney's fees it entails -- represents a better
investment than compromise and settlement or simply acceding to the
opposing party's demands. Of course, the parties approach those
calculations with different risk preferences and financial
positions, and the principal difference between the two rules is
that the English Rule, by enhancing the cost of losing after
litigation, gives the party with superior ability to undertake risk
more of a tactical advantage than does the American Rule. But -- in
theory, at least -- neither common law rule systematically favors
plaintiffs over defendants, or vice versa.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The portion of § 1988 at issue in this case states:
"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of [Title 42], title IX of Public
Law 92-318 . . . or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . .
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs."
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641.
Section 1988 was drafted based on Congress' experience with over 50
fee-shifting provisions in other statutes, dating back to
Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes,
see Senate
Report 3-4;
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society,
supra, at
421 U. S. 260,
n. 33.
[
Footnote 2/4]
For most private law claims, the public interest lies primarily
in providing a neutral, easily available forum for resolving the
dispute, and a plaintiff's choice to compromise a claim or to forgo
it altogether, based on his private calculation that what he stands
to gain does not justify the cost of pursuing his claim, is of
little public concern. But, in enacting § 1988, Congress determined
that the public as a whole has an interest in the vindication of
the rights conferred by the statutes enumerated in § 1988, over and
above the value of a civil rights remedy to a particular plaintiff.
Simply put, Congress decided that it would be better to have more
vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws than would result if
plaintiffs were left to finance their own cases.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Congress had other reasons as well to believe that civil rights
plaintiffs would often be unable to pay for the desirable level of
law enforcement themselves. Civil rights remedies often benefit a
large number of persons, many of them not involved in the
litigation, making it difficult both to evaluate what a particular
lawsuit is really worth to those who stand to gain from it and to
spread the costs of obtaining relief among them.
Cf. Hall v.
Cole, 412 U. S. 1,
412 U. S. 5-7
(1973);
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.
S. 375,
396 U. S. 396
(1970) (finding nonstatutory awards under traditional "common fund"
exception to the American Rule appropriate for this reason). This
problem is compounded by the facts that monetary damages are often
not an important part of the recovery sought under the statutes
enumerated in § 1988,
cf. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc., supra, at
390 U. S. 402,
and that doctrines of official immunity often limit the
availability of damages against governmental defendants,
see House Report 9, and n. 17.
[
Footnote 2/6]
This case reflects the fact that Congress has provided public
funding to some limited extent through a number of programs such as
the Legal Services Corporation: respondents' attorneys are
associated with Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, Inc. They may
not, however, use the money they receive from the Federal
Government for cases in which fees are available.
See 42
U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1). For purposes of § 1988, such attorneys should
be paid as if they were in private practice, in order both to avoid
windfalls to defendants and to free public resources for other
types of law enforcement.
See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U.S. at
447 U. S. 70, n.
9;
Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 409-410, 641
F.2d at 899-900;
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1248
(CA3 1977).
[
Footnote 2/7]
Congress' imposition of liability for attorney's fees under §
1988 also represents a decision to abrogate the sovereign immunity
of the States in order to accomplish the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
See Senate Report 5;
Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445
(1976);
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122,
448 U. S.
128-129 (1980).
[
Footnote 2/8]
Thus, the Court's opinion should not be read to imply that
"exceptional success" provides the only basis for awarding a fee
higher than the reasonable rate times the reasonable number of
hours.
See ante at
461 U. S. 435.
To the contrary, the Court expressly approves consideration of the
full range of
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714 (CA5 1974), factors.
See infra, at
461 U. S.
450-451. If the rate used in calculating the fee does
not already include some factor for risk or the time-value of
money, it ought to be enhanced by some percentage figure. By the
same token, attorneys need not obtain "excellent" results to merit
a fully compensatory fee,
see ante at
461 U. S. 435;
merely prevailing to some significant extent entitles them to full
compensation for the work reasonably required to obtain relief.
See infra at
461 U. S. 452,
and n. 9.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Both the Senate and House Reports make clear Congress'
conclusion that success on every claim is not necessary.
See
ante at
461 U. S.
430-431, and n. 4. In addition, in its discussion of
awards before final judgment, the Senate Report states:
"In appropriate circumstances, counsel fees under [§ 1988] may
be awarded
pendente lite. See Bradley v. School Board
of the City of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (1974). Such
awards are especially appropriate where a party has prevailed on an
important matter in the course of litigation,
even when he
ultimately does not prevail on all issues."
Senate Report 5 (emphasis added).
See also Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at
396 U. S. 392
(allowing fees
pendente lite in suit which "has not yet
produced, and may never produce, a monetary recovery," an issue
still to be tried).
The House Report notes that
"courts have also awarded counsel fees to a plaintiff who
successfully concludes a class action suit even though that
individual was not granted any relief."
House Report 8 (citing
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 433 F.2d 421 (CA8 1970), and
Reed v. Arlington Hotel
Co., 476 F.2d 721 (CA8 1973)). Note that, in
Reed,
the Court of Appeals awarded "reasonable attorney's fees, including
services for this appeal," although the appellant obtained no
significant relief at all on a major issue, either before the trial
court or on appeal.
See id. at 726.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Cf. Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights
Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 346, 352
(1980).
[
Footnote 2/11]
Congress having delegated responsibility for setting a
"reasonable" attorney's fee to the court that tried the case,
reviewing courts, as a matter of good judicial policy, should not
disturb the trial court's solution to the problem of balancing the
many factors involved unless the end product falls outside of a
rough "zone of reasonableness," or unless the explanation
articulated is patently inadequate.
Cf. Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U. S. 747,
390 U. S. 767
(1968).