Upon a jury trial in a Connecticut state court, respondent was
convicted of all the charges under a multicount information,
including charges of attempted murder and robbery. The trial
court's general instructions to the jury included an instruction
that
"a person's intention may be inferred from his conduct and every
person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary
consequences of his act."
In specific instructions on the elements of each crime, the
charge as to attempted murder again referred to a conclusive
presumption of intent, but the instructions on robbery did not
contain any further discussion of intent. While respondent's appeal
was pending, this Court decided
Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U. S. 510,
which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was violated by a jury instruction that "the law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,"
because a reasonable juror might have viewed it as creating a
conclusive presumption of intent or as shifting the burden of proof
as to intent.
Sandstrom left open the question whether, if
a jury is so instructed, the error can ever be harmless.
Thereafter, the Connecticut Supreme Court, while affirming
respondent's convictions on other counts in the information,
reversed his convictions for attempted murder and robbery. Without
discussing the State's argument that the
Sandstrom
violation was harmless, the court concluded that the
unconstitutional "conclusive presumption" language in the general
instructions was not cured by the specific instructions on
attempted murder and robbery.
Held: The judgment is affirmed. 185 Conn.163, 440 A.2d
858, affirmed.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, and
JUSTICE MARSHALL, concluded that the instructional error deprived
respondent of "constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error,"
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18,
386 U. S. 23. No
matter how strong the prosecution's evidence, a reviewing court
cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that a
Sandstrom
error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. A trial judge may
not direct a jury to return a guilty verdict regardless of how
overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction, and a
conclusive presumption on the issue of intent is the functional
equivalent of a directed verdict on that issue. Respondent's jurors
reasonably could have
Page 460 U. S. 74
interpreted the instructions as requiring a conclusive
presumption on the issue of intent, an element of the crimes
charged, leading them to ignore the evidence -- including evidence
relating to respondent's apparent defense that he intended to
borrow, rather than steal, the victim's car, and that he did not
intend to kill the victim -- in finding that the State had proved
respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If so, a reviewing
court cannot hold that the error did not contribute to the verdict,
since the fact that the reviewing court may view the evidence of
intent as overwhelming is irrelevant. While there may be rare
situations in which the reviewing court can be confident that a
Sandstrom error did not play any role in the jury's
verdict -- such as where, by raising a particular defense or by his
other actions, the defendant himself has taken the issue of intent
from the jury -- such an exception, regardless of its boundaries,
does not apply here. Pp.
460 U. S.
81-88.
JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that no federal question was raised by
the Connecticut Supreme Court's refusal to consider whether the
Sandstrom error here was harmless, and that therefore the
writ of certiorari should simply be dismissed. However, because a
fifth vote was necessary to authorize the entry of a Court
judgment, he joined the disposition allowing the Connecticut
Supreme Court's judgment to stand. Pp.
460 U. S.
88-90.
BLACKMUN, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered
an opinion, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
460 U. S. 88.
BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
460 U. S. 90.
POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and
REHNQUIST and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
post, p.
460 U. S.
90.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, and
JUSTICE MARSHALL joined.
In
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.
S. 510 (1979), this Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by a jury
instruction that "the law presumes
Page 460 U. S. 75
that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts."
Id. at
442 U. S. 512.
We expressly left open in that case the question whether, if a jury
is so instructed, the error can ever be harmless.
Id. at
442 U. S.
526-527. Since
Sandstrom, courts have taken
different approaches to the harmless error problem. [
Footnote 1] We therefore granted certiorari
in this litigation to resolve the conflict. 455 U.S. 937
(1982).
I
A
Respondent Lindsay B. Johnson was accused in a four-count
information of attempted murder, kidnaping in the second degree,
robbery in the first degree, and sexual assault in the first
degree. His jury trial in Connecticut Superior Court concluded with
a verdict of guilty on all counts.
The evidence at trial revealed the following sequence of events:
at approximately 11 p.m. on December 20, 1975, respondent and three
male companions were in an automobile
Page 460 U. S. 76
in Norwalk, Conn. A young woman who had lost her way stopped her
car and asked them for directions. Respondent offered to ride with
her to show her the way. She agreed, and the two drove off.
Respondent's companions followed in the other car.
When the woman reached a location familiar to her, she stopped
and waited for respondent to get out of the car. Instead,
respondent pulled her over to the passenger side of the car, and
one of his companions entered on the other side and started to
drive. The woman was told that the men needed a car. Shortly
thereafter, the second car was abandoned, and its two occupants got
into the woman's car. The four men verbally abused her, threatened
her with bodily harm, displayed a knife, and told her that the
driver had a gun. The group stopped again in Norwalk to pick up a
fifth man. During still another stop, one of the men placed a fully
loaded, semiautomatic rifle in the trunk. When the woman asked the
group to take the car and leave her alone, they replied that she
would be given money and left near her home at the end of the
evening.
The men then drove the car eastward on the Connecticut Turnpike
to New Haven. Respondent, who is black, remarked that he had "never
had a white woman before." Tr. 50, 262. The group arrived in New
Haven in the early morning, and stopped for gas. Respondent then
directed the driver to a large apartment complex, where he pulled
the woman from the car and into a lavatory on the first floor of
the building. There, all five men sexually assaulted her.
When the woman was returned to the car, respondent bound her
hands with telephone cord. Respondent told her that she would be
left with a dime near a telephone booth so she could call home
while they made their getaway. After directing the driver to a
bridge, respondent pulled the woman out of the car and forced her
to run with him to the middle of the bridge. They struggled and
respondent threw her over the railing. She landed on a large pipe
but jumped
Page 460 U. S. 77
into the river when she saw respondent pursuing her. She then
eluded respondent by hiding under the bridge; she was able to untie
her hands. She remained hidden for a while because she heard voices
shouting, but eventually she sought refuge from the cold. [
Footnote 2] Shortly after 4 a.m., the
residents of a nearby house admitted her when they heard her
moaning, "please let me in . . . they were trying to kill me."
Id. at 390.
Relying on information provided by the woman, police arrested
respondent and the other four men in Norwalk a few hours later. Two
days thereafter, the victim identified all five from an array of 15
photographs. She also identified respondent in court, [
Footnote 3] describing him as the most
vicious and violent of her assailants.
The defense theory, as indicated by the cross-examination of the
State's witnesses, [
Footnote 4]
apparently was that the woman had consented to travel with the
group and to have sex with them, and that respondent did not plan
to keep the woman's car or to kill her. For example, respondent's
attorney asked the woman whether any mention had been made of going
to a motel or having sex, whether she had consented to the sexual
acts, and whether any of the men had said that the car would be
returned in the morning with a full tank of gas. When the
Page 460 U. S. 78
woman stated that she was behind the wheel after the car became
stuck in a snowbank on the turnpike, counsel asked how many of the
men had got out of the car to push it or, indeed, whether all of
them had done so. Cross-examination also revealed that, when the
woman went to the hospital on December 21, she told the examining
physician that she had had sexual relations with her boyfriend the
previous morning. According to the doctor, this might have
accounted for sperm observed in gynecological tests. Finally,
police descriptions of the bridge were arguably contrary to the
victim's description of the area as "secluded."
B
The trial court's charge to the jury began with general
instructions on applicable principles of law. The jury was told to
accept the court's pronouncements of the law, but to be the sole
judge of the facts. The court explained the presumption of
innocence and the State's burden of proving the existence of every
element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The court
then described intent as
"a question of fact that is solely within your province as
jurors. However, you should be aware of a rule of law that will be
helpful to you, and that is that a person's intention may be
inferred from his conduct, and every person is conclusively
presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his
act."
App. 22A-23A.
The court then gave specific instructions on the elements of
each crime. With respect to attempted murder, the court again spoke
of a conclusive presumption. [
Footnote 5] The charge on
Page 460 U. S. 79
kidnaping in the second degree, on the other hand, referred to
intent as "very largely a matter of inference." [
Footnote 6] The instructions on robbery in
the first degree and sexual assault in the first degree did not
contain any further discussion of intent. The charge concluded with
a reminder as to the State's burden of proof and the jury's duty to
base its verdict on the evidence presented and on the law given by
the court.
C
Respondent filed a timely appeal in December, 1976, but, because
of problems with the reporter in obtaining a complete transcript,
the appeal was not briefed and argued until February, 1981. In the
interim, this Court decided
Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U. S. 510
(1979). Respondent argued on appeal that the "conclusively
presumed" language in the jury instructions on intent rendered the
instructions unconstitutional under
Sandstrom. [
Footnote 7] The State argued that the
error, if any, was harmless.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed respondent's
convictions for kidnaping and sexual assault, but reversed
Page 460 U. S. 80
the convictions for attempted murder and robbery on the basis of
the instructions regarding intent. [
Footnote 8] 185 Conn.163, 440 A.2d 858 (1981). In
accordance with
Sandstrom, the court analyzed the charge
as a whole to determine how the jury might have interpreted it; the
court balanced other portions of the charge against the challenged
language, essentially to determine whether "the ailing instruction,
by itself, so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process."
Cupp v. Naughten,
414 U. S. 141,
414 U. S. 147
(1973). The court first found that the general instructions were
infirm, because the inferential language in that portion of the
charge was not "sufficient to prevent the jury from interpreting
the [conclusive] presumption in the way it was expressed to them."
185 Conn. at 171, 440 A.2d at 863. The court then turned to the
specific instructions "to determine whether the
Sandstrom
error in the general instructions was repeated, incorporated, or
possibly cured by the specific language used."
Id. at 172,
440 A.2d at 863.
The specific instruction on attempted murder had repeated the
erroneous presumption language, so the court reversed respondent's
conviction on that count.
Id. at 173, 440 A.2d at 863. The
kidnaping instruction, however, had been couched in the permissive
language of inference. Finding that this language had a
"significant curative effect,"
id. at 174, 440 A.2d at
864, the court affirmed respondent's kidnaping conviction. With
respect to the robbery count, the court refused to assume that the
jury had applied the permissive inferences contained in the
instruction on kidnaping, rather than the conclusive presumption
earlier described as applicable to all the offenses. It thus
reversed that conviction.
Id. at 174-176, 440 A.2d at
864-865. Finally, the
Page 460 U. S. 81
court upheld respondent's conviction for sexual assault; it
ruled that sexual assault was not a specific-intent crime, and thus
that the jury was not influenced by the erroneous general
instruction.
Id. at 176, 440 A.2d at 865.
The court did not discuss the State's argument that the
Sandstrom violation was harmless, seemingly relying on its
recent decision in
State v. Truppi, 182 Conn. 449, 438
A.2d 712 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981).
[
Footnote 9] In its petition
for certiorari, the State claimed that the
Sandstrom error
should have been analyzed for harmlessness under
Chapman v.
California, 386 U. S. 18
(1967). [
Footnote 10]
II
A
In
Chapman, this Court noted that "there are some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error."
Id. at
386 U. S. 23,
and n. 8 (citing
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.
S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel);
Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560
(1958) (coerced confession);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.
S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge)). Resolving the question
reserved three years earlier in
Fahy v. Connecticut,
375 U. S. 85,
375 U. S. 86
(1963), the Court held that some constitutional errors may be
considered harmless
Page 460 U. S. 82
if the beneficiary of the error "prove[s] beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 24.
See also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.
S. 371 (1972);
Harrington v. California,
395 U. S. 250
(1969).
Chapman continued a trend away from the practice of
appellate courts in this country and in England of "revers[ing]
judgments for the most trivial errors." R. Traynor, The Riddle of
Harmless Error 13 (1970) (hereafter Traynor). Even with the
enactment of harmless error statutes designed to eliminate
reversals based on technical errors, [
Footnote 11] it was assumed well into this century that
"automatic reversal was required in any case involving the
violation of a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." Note,
Harmless Error: The Need for a Uniform Standard, 53 St. John's
L.Rev. 541, 544 (1979). Before that assumption was altered in
Chapman, however, the Court had decided certain cases that
remain instructive here.
In
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.
S. 607 (1946), the jury returned a guilty verdict just
five minutes after receiving a supplemental instruction containing
an improper presumption. This Court reversed the conviction, noting
that to
"say that the lay jury will know enough to disregard the judge's
bad law if in fact he misguides them . . . would transfer to the
jury the judge's function in giving the law, and transfer to the
appellate court the jury's function of measuring the evidence by
appropriate legal yardsticks."
Id. at
326 U. S.
613-614. The Court rejected the Government's contention
that the error was harmless in view of the abundant evidence on the
issue in question, stating:
"This is to disregard the vital fact that, for seven hours, the
jury was unable to find guilt in the light of the main
Page 460 U. S. 83
charge, but reached a verdict of guilty under the conspiracy
count five minutes after their inquiry was answered by an untenable
legal proposition. It would indeed be a long jump at guessing to be
confident that the jury did not rely on the erroneous 'presumption'
given them as a guide. . . . [T]he question is not whether guilt
may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has been found by a
jury according to the procedure and standards appropriate for
criminal trials in the federal courts."
Id. at
326 U. S.
614.
The following year, the Court decided
Carpenters v. United
States, 330 U. S. 395
(1947). In that case the defendants, who were unions charged with
conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act, unsuccessfully had requested
an instruction that a union can be found guilty for its agents'
unlawful acts only if the union actually participated in,
authorized, or ratified the acts. This Court held that the
requested instruction correctly stated the law, and refused to find
the error harmless even though there was evidence showing the
unions' participation in the conspiracy:
"[A] judge may not direct a verdict of guilty, no matter how
conclusive the evidence. There is no way of knowing here whether
the jury's verdict was based on facts within the condemned
instructions . . . or on actual authorization or ratification of
such acts. . . . A failure to charge correctly is not harmless,
since the verdict might have resulted from the incorrect
instruction."
Id. at
330 U. S.
408-409 (footnotes omitted).
B
We agree with the State that, in light of
Chapman,
these cases cannot be read for the broad proposition that
instructional error of constitutional dimensions may never be
harmless. This is not to say, however, that any form of
instructional error should be analyzed for harmlessness. The
question here is whether a charge that might reasonably
Page 460 U. S. 84
have been interpreted to require a conclusive presumption on the
issue of intent may be considered harmless.
The Court consistently has held that
"a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of
conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a
verdict . . . regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may
point in that direction."
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.
S. 564,
430 U. S.
572-573 (1977);
see Carpenters v. United
States, 330 U.S. at
330 U. S. 408;
Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S.
51,
156 U. S. 105
(1895). And
Sandstrom makes it clear, we think, that a
conclusive presumption on the issue of intent is the functional
equivalent of a directed verdict on that issue.
In
Sandstrom, the jury was instructed that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts." 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 512.
We held that instruction unconstitutional because a reasonable
juror might have viewed it as creating a conclusive or
burden-shifting presumption on intent. Rather than evaluating the
evidence to determine if the State had overcome the presumption of
innocence and proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
had intended to kill, the jurors might have believed that, upon
finding certain preliminary facts, "they were directed to find
against defendant on the element of intent."
Id. at
442 U. S. 523.
[
Footnote 12]
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in holding the charge at issue
unconstitutional under
Sandstrom, found that respondent's
jurors, like
Sandstrom's, reasonably could have
interpreted the court's charge as a conclusive presumption on the
issue of intent. Such an interpretation would have led them to
ignore the evidence in finding that the State had proved respondent
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, the jury
conclusively could have presumed that respondent intended to kill
the victim once it found that the
Page 460 U. S. 85
natural consequence of his acts was to cause the victim's death.
The jury thus would have failed to consider whether there was any
evidence tending to cast doubt on this element of the crime of
attempted murder, such as the victim's own testimony that she had
been told she would be left near a phone booth at the end of the
evening.
Because a conclusive presumption eases the jury's task, "there
is no reason to believe the jury would have deliberately undertaken
the more difficult task" of evaluating the evidence of intent.
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 526,
n. 13;
see Note, Presumptive Intent Jury Instructions
After
Sandstrom, 1980 Wis.L.Rev. 366, 388. [
Footnote 13] Given the uncontroverted
evidence of respondent's participation in the events that occurred
on December 20 and 21, his most likely defense was that he intended
to borrow, rather than steal, the car, and that he did not intend
to kill the victim. The trial court's instruction removed this
defense from the jury, and directed it to find that the State had
proved the intent element of the offenses.
An erroneous presumption on a disputed element of the crime
renders irrelevant the evidence on the issue, because the jury may
have relied upon the presumption, rather than upon that evidence.
[
Footnote 14] If the jury
may have failed to consider
Page 460 U. S. 86
evidence of intent, a reviewing court cannot hold that the error
did not contribute to the verdict. The fact that the reviewing
court may view the evidence of intent as overwhelming is then
simply irrelevant. [
Footnote
15] To allow a reviewing court to perform the jury's function
of evaluating the evidence of intent, when the jury never may have
performed that function, would give too much weight to society's
interest in punishing the guilty and too little weight to the
method by which decisions of guilt are to be made. The Court, in
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. at
326 U. S.
614-615, stated: "All law is technical if viewed solely
from concern for punishing crime without heeding the mode by which
it is accomplished."
See County Court of Ulster County v.
Allen, 442 U. S. 140,
442 U. S. 160
(1979) ("[It is] irrelevant in analyzing a mandatory
presumption
Page 460 U. S. 87
. . . that there is ample evidence in the record other than the
presumption to support a conviction").
There may be rare situations in which the reviewing court can be
confident that a
Sandstrom error did not play any role in
the jury's verdict. For example, if the erroneous instruction was
given in connection with an offense for which the defendant was
acquitted, and if the instruction had no bearing on the offense for
which he was convicted, it would be appropriate to find the error
harmless.
See, e.g., Hearn v. James, 677 F.2d 841, 843
(CA11 1982);
State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d
604, 613 (N.D.1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002
(1981). In addition, a
Sandstrom error may be harmless if
the defendant conceded the issue of intent.
See, e.g.,
Krzeminski v. Perini, 614 F.2d 121, 125 (CA6),
cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 866 (1980).
See also Washington v.
Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 453-454 (CA2 1981),
cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982). In presenting a defense such as
alibi, insanity, or self-defense, a defendant may in some cases
admit that the act alleged by the prosecution was intentional,
thereby sufficiently reducing the likelihood that the jury applied
the erroneous instruction as to permit the appellate court to
consider the error harmless.
See Traynor 73. We leave it
to the lower courts to determine whether, by raising a particular
defense or by his other actions, a defendant himself has taken the
issue of intent away from the jury. [
Footnote 16]
Such an exception, regardless of its precise boundaries, does
not apply here. Respondent did not concede the issue of intent with
respect to either of the counts at issue. As noted above, the
instruction was not "so ill-suited to both the theory on which the
case was tried and the evidence that was presented,"
United
States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1145 (CA1 1981),
cert.
pending, No. 811392, that it can be deemed harmless. The
conclusive presumption the jury was
Page 460 U. S. 88
instructed to apply permitted the jury to convict respondent
without ever examining the evidence concerning an element of the
crimes charged. Such an error deprived respondent of
"constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error."
Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S.
23.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Several state and federal courts have assumed or held that
Sandstrom errors may well be harmless, and have then gone
on to decide whether the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.
See, e.g., Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1342-1343
(CA11 1982),
cert. pending, No. 82-5768;
Jacks v.
Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480, 487 (CA7 1981),
cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982);
People v. Wright, 408
Mich. 1, 30-32,
289 N.W.2d 1,
10-12 (1980);
State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481, 533-535,
608 P.2d 428, 458-459,
cert. denied, 449 U.
S. 1050 (1980). Other courts have taken a narrower view,
holding that whether an unconstitutional presumption is harmless
depends on whether intent was a disputed issue in the case.
See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120,
1144-1145 (CA1 1981),
cert. pending, No. 81-1392;
McGuinn v. Crist, 657 F.2d 1107, 1108-1109 (CA9 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982);
Washington v.
Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 453-454 (CA2 1981) (dictum),
cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982);
see also People v.
Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467, 477, 407 N.E.2d 430, 436 (1980)
(concurring opinion). Still other courts have suggested that
Sandstrom errors can never be harmless.
See, e.g.,
Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371, 1380 (CA5 1979);
State v. Truppi, 182 Conn. 449, 466, 438 A.2d 712, 721
(1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981).
See also
Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 131 (CA8 1981).
[
Footnote 2]
For the period between midnight and 4:30 a.m. on December 21,
the National Weather Service in Bridgeport reported an air
temperature range of 23�-28� F, a wind-chill factor of -10� F, and
a water temperature of 46� F. Approximately four inches of snow had
accumulated from a snowfall that began on December 20.
[
Footnote 3]
Respondent was tried alone. His companions were named in the
information as coparticipants, but pleaded guilty to various
charges before trial.
[
Footnote 4]
Respondent did not testify at his trial. The defense called one
witness, a detective who testified only about the accuracy of a
stenographic transcription of a taped interview of the victim. The
record does not reflect how the attorneys presented the facts to
the jury in summation. Pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 51-61
(Supp.1982), the arguments of counsel were not recorded.
[
Footnote 5]
The specific charge on attempted murder was:
"Now, [no] one can look into a man's mind and see what his
intention is. The only way to decide that question is to infer from
the accused's conduct in the light of the surrounding
circumstances. But as previously stated, every person is
conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary
consequences of his act."
App. 25A. The jury was told that, if it believed the victim's
testimony about respondent's conduct at the bridge, it might
"presume [respondent] intended what would be the natural and
necessary consequences of his actions, under the prevailing
circumstances and conditions; for example, the temperature of air
and water and the force used against her person."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 6]
Specifically, the court stated:
"I have already instructed you that what a man's intention has
been is necessarily very largely a matter of inference. . . . The
only way in which you can determine in a case such as this what a
man's intention was at any given time is by determining what his
conduct was and what the circumstances were surrounding that
conduct and from those infer what his intention was."
"As stated before, to draw such an inference is not only the
privilege but also the duty of a juror, provided, of course, the
inference to draw is a reasonable inference."
Id. at 28A.
[
Footnote 7]
Respondent also argued, unsuccessfully, that he was denied his
right to self-representation and that the trial judge failed
properly to instruct the jury on a defense to the kidnaping charge.
These issues are not now before us, because respondent's own
petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.
Johnson v.
Connecticut, 454 U.S. 1101 (1981).
[
Footnote 8]
Although respondent had not objected to the charge, the
Connecticut Supreme Court accepted the issue for resolution on the
merits under its "exceptional circumstances" rule expounded in
State v. Evans, 165 Conn.61, 69-70, 327 A.2d 576, 581
(1973). The decision on the merits is therefore properly before us.
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,
456 U. S. 135,
n. 44 (1982);
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,
442 U. S. 140,
442 U. S.
147-154 (1979).
[
Footnote 9]
In
Truppi, the court, citing
Chapman v.
California, 386 U. S. 18,
386 U. S. 23
(1967), held that infringements of the rights at issue in
Sandstrom can never be harmless, because those rights are
essential to a fair trial. 182 Conn. at 465, 438 A.2d at 721. That
conclusion was based on federal, rather than state, law. This Court
held in
Chapman that whether a federal constitutional
error can be harmless is a federal question. 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 21.
State courts, of course, are free to interpret their own
constitutions and laws to permit fewer applications of the harmless
error rule than does the Federal Constitution.
See PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74,
447 U. S. 81
(1980);
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714,
420 U. S. 719
(1975);
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S.
58,
386 U. S. 62
(1967). We do not read
Truppi, however, as having taken
this approach.
[
Footnote 10]
The State did not seek review of the Connecticut Supreme Court's
decision that the charge as a whole was unconstitutional under
Sandstrom. That issue, accordingly, is not before us.
[
Footnote 11]
The federal harmless error statute provides:
"On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case,
the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."
28 U.S.C. § 2111.
[
Footnote 12]
The Supreme Court of Montana, on the remand of
Sandstrom, found that the error was not harmless.
State v. Sandstrom, 184 Mont. 391, 603 P.2d 244
(1979).
[
Footnote 13]
"The pivotal concept of
Sandstrom is that the
possibility that the jury reached its decision in an
impermissible manner requires reversal even though the jury may
also have reached the same result in a constitutionally acceptable
fashion."
Schmolesky,
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen and
Sandstrom v. Montana: The Supreme Court Lends an Ear but
Turns its Face, 33 Rutgers L.Rev. 261, 272 (1981) (emphasis in
original);
see id. at 295, and n.193.
[
Footnote 14]
Chief Justice Traynor notes in his monograph on harmless
error:
"In the absence of definitive studies to the contrary, we must
assume that juries, for the most part, understand and faithfully
follow instructions. The concept of a fair trial encompasses a
decision by a tribunal that has understood and applied the law to
all material issues in the case."
Traynor 73-74 (footnote omitted). If a jury followed
instructions it reasonably interpreted as calling for a conclusive
presumption on the issue of intent, the jury would not consider the
evidence on that issue.
[
Footnote 15]
Apparently, the dissent believes that a jury first evaluates the
evidence of intent and then decides whether to apply the conclusive
presumption; it assumes that the jury turns to the presumption only
when the evidence is not overwhelming. Because we lack the
dissent's confidence in predicting the sequence of a jury's
deliberations, we find it impossible to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a conscientious jury, following its
instructions, will evaluate the evidence of intent and reach a
conclusion on that issue before considering the applicability of
the conclusive presumption about which it has been instructed. As
we note in the text, if the jury simply applies the presumption at
the point in its deliberations when it has determined that the
defendant committed the acts in question, it will have no need to
consider the evidence of intent.
JUSTICE POWELL's dissent suggests that, when "the character and
quality" of the defendant's acts "are themselves dispositive of
intent, the presumption becomes unnecessary to the jury's task of
finding intent."
Post at
460 U. S. 97.
See also post at
460 U. S. 101
("The jury, consistent with its instructions, could have regarded
these facts as dispositive of intent, and not relied on the
presumption"). We agree that the presumption was "unnecessary"
here, in the sense that the evidence was sufficient for a properly
instructed jury to find that respondent acted with the requisite
intent. A reviewing court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt, however, that the jury based its finding of intent on that
evidence. The jury might well have believed that respondent's acts,
as a matter of law, were accompanied by the requisite intent.
[
Footnote 16]
We note that a defendant in a criminal trial is justified, of
course, in defending solely in reliance on the presumption of his
innocence and the State's burden of proof.
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
If federal constitutional error occurs in a state criminal
trial, federal law places certain limits on the state appellate
court's disposition of the case. If the error is sufficiently
grievous, it must reverse. [
Footnote
2/1] If the error is less grievous, it also
must
reverse unless it declares its conviction beyond a reasonable doubt
that the federal error was harmless. [
Footnote 2/2] But federal law does not
require
a state appellate court to make a harmless error determination; it
merely
permits the state court to do so in appropriate
cases. [
Footnote 2/3] This is all
the Court held in
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S.
18 (1967).
Page 460 U. S. 89
In this case, the Connecticut prosecutor requested the
Connecticut Supreme Court to declare that the
Sandstrom
error was harmless, and that court refused to do so. That action
does not even raise a federal question. [
Footnote 2/4] I therefore would simply dismiss the writ
of certiorari. Because a fifth
Page 460 U. S. 90
vote is necessary to authorize the entry of a Court judgment,
however, I join the disposition which will allow the judgment of
the Connecticut Supreme Court to stand.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S.
18,
386 U. S. 23, n.
8 (1967).
[
Footnote 2/2]
The harmless error rule which may be applied when federal
constitutional error has been committed,
see Chapman v.
California, supra, is not to be confused with either the
federal harmless error rule that is applied in federal courts when
nonconstitutional error occurs,
see Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U. S. 750
(1946), or with a State's own harmless error rule applicable to
errors of state law,
see, e.g., Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-265
(1960).
[
Footnote 2/3]
I recognize that the State has argued in this Court that the
Federal Constitution
requires the Connecticut Supreme
Court to make a harmless error determination in every case
presenting a
Sandstrom issue. Pet. for Cert. 7; Tr. of
Oral Arg. 9-10. The following colloquy took place at oral
argument:
"[Petitioner]: It appears that the Connecticut Supreme Court, as
a matter of federal constitutional law, sometimes entertains the
instruction -- the challenge that the error was harmless -- and
sometimes it does not. The only stated position that the
Connecticut Supreme Court has given in this regard is the one in
State against Truppi, is that we sometimes apply the
harmless error rule. . . ."
"QUESTION: Well, is it your position that they must apply it in
every case?"
"[Petitioner]: No, Your Honor, my position is not that they must
apply the harmless error rule in every case, but if the prosecution
asks the Connecticut Supreme Court to review an error for its
harmlessness as a matter of federal constitutional law, that it
must at least use the harmless error test."
"QUESTION: Let me just state it to be sure I understand it
correctly. As a matter of federal constitutional law, a state
supreme court must entertain a harmless -- must make a harmless
error examination every time the prosecutor asks it to."
"[Petitioner]: In the context of an unconstitutional jury
instruction, yes."
This position is so clearly erroneous that it does not merit the
Court's review by writ of certiorari.
[
Footnote 2/4]
No federal question arises when a state court has decided for
itself that it will decline to apply the
Chapman harmless
error test at all once it has found
Sandstrom error. That
is all the Connecticut Supreme Court did in
State v.
Truppi, 182 Conn.449, 466, 438 A.2d 712, 721 (1980). After
discussing the guarantees afforded defendants by the reasonable
doubt standard, the court wrote: "Therefore, we decline to weigh
the evidence of guilt against the uncured damage done by the
harmful portion of the instructions." It cited two other State
Supreme Court cases which had followed a different practice, and
noted that this Court had denied certiorari in one of them.
Id. at 466, n. 12, 438 A.2d at 721, n. 12, citing
People v. Wright, 408 Mich. 1, 30-32,
289 N.W.2d 1,
10-11 (1980);
State v. Hamilton, 185 Mont. 522, 539-542,
605 P.2d 1121, 1131-1133,
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924
(1980). In my view, the state court reversed for its own reasons.
Neither in
Truppi nor in this case did it state or suggest
that federal constitutional law compelled automatic reversal.
Whether the Connecticut court's refusal to review the evidence
in this case was based on a decision to follow its earlier holding
in
Truppi or on its own conclusion that the error in the
case before it was not harmless, the holding does not even arguably
violate any federal rule.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE POWELL's dissenting opinion, and write separately
only to emphasize that the Court today does not adopt a rule of
automatic reversal for
Sandstrom error. Only four Justices
would adopt a rule requiring reversal for
Sandstrom error,
whether harmless or not, in all cases. Such a rule is contrary to
this Court's holding, with only one dissent, in
Chapman v.
California, 386 U. S. 18,
386 U. S. 21-22
(1967), which rejected a rule of automatic reversal for all
constitutional errors.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
Today a plurality of this Court finds that an instruction given
in violation of
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.
S. 510 (1979), cannot be considered harmless except in
certain "rare situations." The effect of the plurality's opinion,
if it became a binding holding of the Court, would be to create an
automatic reversal rule whenever a
Sandstrom-type
instruction is given, regardless of the conclusiveness of the
evidence of intent. In my view, this is serious error.
I
It is necessary to address the jurisdictional issue raised in
JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence before considering the plurality's
disposition of the merits. JUSTICE STEVENS would not reach the
merits, because the Connecticut Supreme Court, when requested to
determine whether the
Sandstrom error was harmless,
declined to do so. Accordingly, he concludes that no federal
question is presented. It is unclear whether he takes the view that
a state court may apply the federal harmless error rule to provide
a defendant with
greater protection than
Chapman v.
California, 386 U. S. 18
Page 460 U. S. 91
(1967), would require, or whether he finds that the State
Supreme Court's refusal to consider this question rests on an
independent and adequate state ground. In my opinion, each of these
views is erroneous.
The harmless error rule announced in
Chapman was
designed to establish the federal standard necessary "to protect
people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed
rights."
Id. at
386 U. S. 21. A
State, of course, may apply a more stringent
state
harmless error rule than
Chapman would require.
See
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S.
74,
447 U. S. 81
(1980).
"But . . . a State may not impose such greater restrictions as a
matter of
federal constitutional law when this Court
specifically refrains from imposing them."
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714,
420 U. S. 719
(1975) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, if Connecticut wishes
to impose a more stringent standard than the federal rule, it must
do so as a matter of state law.
An examination of Connecticut cases establishes that the State
has not taken this course. Connecticut has enacted a state harmless
error statute applicable only to errors of state law or procedure.
See Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-265 (1960);
State v.
L'Heureux, 166 Conn. 312, 323-324, 348 A.2d 578, 584 (1974).
The state rule is strikingly less stringent than the federal, since
it places the burden of proving that the error was "materially
injurious" on the party who claims the trial court erred.
Connecticut does not apply its state standard to federal
constitutional error. It applies instead a federal rule. As the
Connecticut Supreme Court explained in
State v. Coleman,
167 Conn.260, 355 A.2d 11 (1974):
"The usual rule is that the appellant bears the burden of
establishing that an error was 'materially injurious' to him.
General Statutes § 52-265;
State v. L'Heureux, 166
Conn.312, 323, 348 A.2d 578. When, however, a federal
constitutional error has occurred, the burden shifts to the state,
and before the error can be held harmless, this court 'must be able
to declare a belief that
Page 460 U. S. 92
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Chapman v.
California, 386 U. S. 18,
386 U. S.
24 [1967],
see also State v. L'Heureux,
supra."
Id. at 278-279, 355 A.2d at 20 (footnote omitted). The
state court has adhered consistently to this distinction.
See,
e.g., State v. Cooper, 182 Conn.207, 212-213, 438 A.2d 418,
421 (1980);
State v. Ruth, 181 Conn.187, 196-197, 435 A.2d
3, 7-8 (1980);
Aillon v. State, 168 Conn.541, 547-548, 363
A.2d 49, 53 (1975).
As both the plurality opinion and JUSTICE STEVENS note, the
State Supreme Court did not address the State's argument in this
case that the
Sandstrom error was harmless. Its silence
was based apparently on its decision in
State v. Truppi,
182 Conn.449, 438 A.2d 712 (1980), where it held that
Sandstrom error may never be harmless.
Truppi
therefore must be examined to determine whether the State intended
to depart from its longstanding rule that it will apply a federal
test to federal error.
Truppi prefaced its discussion of harmless error with a
reference to the less demanding state harmless error rule.
See 182 Conn. at 465, 438 A.2d at 721. It then articulated
the two classes of error recognized by
Chapman, those
errors that can never be harmless and those that can. 182 Conn. at
465, 438 A.2d at 721 (citing
Chapman, supra, at
386 U. S. 23).
In its subsequent discussion,
Truppi contrasted federal
errors that "d[o] not significantly impair the truthfinding
function of the trial" with
Sandstrom error.
See
182 Conn. at 466, 438 A.2d at 721. It determined that the
instructional nature of a
Sandstrom error poses a risk
that the jury will fail to consider the evidence and deprives a
defendant of the protection afforded by requiring proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 182 Conn. at 466, 438 A.2d at 721. It is
in this context that
Truppi concludes "we decline to weigh
the evidence of guilt."
Ibid. It reasoned that to do so
would constitute an invasion of the jury's function by an
appellate
Page 460 U. S. 93
court.
Ibid. (citing
Bollenbach v. United
States, 326 U. S. 607,
326 U. S. 614
(1946)).
Thus, the Connecticut court in
Truppi appears to have
adopted -- as the federal rule -- the view that today's plurality
seems to favor:
Sandstrom error falls within that class of
federal errors that can never be harmless. [
Footnote 3/1] If one is to read
Truppi
otherwise, it is necessary to assume that Connecticut undertook an
unannounced departure from its longstanding practice of applying
the
Chapman rule to federal constitutional error. It also
would require this Court to assume that, having prefaced its
harmless error discussion with a reference to the less demanding
state standard, the
Truppi court then applied a more
stringent state harmless error rule than that announced in
Chapman. I decline to attribute such illogic to the
Connecticut Supreme Court, and agree with the plurality that
Connecticut was applying its perception of federal constitutional
law.
See ante at
460 U. S. 81, n.
9. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider the question
presented -- whether
Sandstrom error may be harmless.
II
In
Sandstrom, the trial court instructed the jury that
"[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences
of his voluntary acts." 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 513.
The Court held that, where intent is an essential element of the
crime, the giving of such an instruction is constitutional error.
As we noted, on finding only that
Sandstrom had caused the
victim's death and had acted voluntarily, the jurors
Page 460 U. S. 94
"could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find
against [the] defendant on the element of intent."
Id. at
442 U. S. 523.
Alternatively, an instruction that was viewed as shifting the
burden of persuasion to the defendant could lead to a similar
error. The jury
"could have concluded that upon proof by the State of the
slaying, and of additional facts not themselves establishing the
element of intent, the burden was shifted to the defendant to prove
that he lacked the requisite mental state. [
Footnote 3/2]"
Id. at
442 U. S.
524.
The plurality today goes much further. It interprets
Sandstrom as establishing that a conclusive presumption
instruction on the issue of intent is the "functional equivalent"
of a directed verdict on that issue.
See ante at
460 U. S. 84.
The plurality qualifies this categorical statement where "a
defendant himself has taken the issue away from the jury" --
i.e., it would view the error as harmless only where "the
defendant concede[s] the issue of intent."
Ante at
460 U. S. 87.
This is hardly an exception. Indeed, where intent to kill is
conceded -- as where self-defense is pleaded -- there would be no
occasion to give a
Sandstrom instruction. The effect of
the plurality's holding is that this type of instruction can never
be harmless.
III
In
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S.
18 (1967), the Court rejected the argument that "all
federal constitutional errors, regardless of the facts and
circumstances, must always be deemed harmful."
Id. at
386 U. S. 21. It
recognized that in the context of a particular case, some errors
have little, if any, likelihood of affecting the jury's verdict.
Accordingly, the proper inquiry is whether a court may say "beyond
a reasonable
Page 460 U. S. 95
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained."
Id. at
386 U. S. 24. In
applying
Chapman's test, a court must assess the effect of
the error in light of the facts of each case.
See Harrington v.
California, 395 U. S. 250,
395 U. S. 254
(1969). For it is only by assessing the weight of the evidence
against the defendant that the effect of the error on the jury's
verdict can be judged.
Ibid.
Today the plurality substantially limits
Chapman's
harmless error doctrine. It establishes a rule of automatic
reversal because of the difficulty in determining the effect of a
Sandstrom error on a jury's verdict. This difficulty, it
reasons, derives from the error's instructional nature,
particularly a perceived resemblance to a directed verdict.
See
ante at
460 U. S. 83-88.
The analogy the plurality draws, however, between a conclusive
Sandstrom instruction and a directed verdict is inapt. A
directed verdict removes an issue completely from the jury's
consideration. Such a presumption, by contrast, leaves the issue
ultimately to the jury. A trial court's instructions are not
limited to the presumption. A court also, as was done in this case,
will charge that the defendant is presumed innocent, and that the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the
crime -- including the element of intent.
See infra at
460 U. S. 101.
In the context of these instructions, the presumption provides the
jury only with one means by which the State's burden of persuasion
may be satisfied. [
Footnote 3/3]
See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at
Page 460 U. S. 96
442 U. S. 518,
n. 7. While a jury may rely on the presumption instruction as a
means of finding intent, there may be many cases in which the facts
and circumstances so conclusively establish this element that the
instruction is wholly superfluous.
The plurality seeks to justify its automatic reversal rule by
the view that a conclusive presumption permits a jury to convict a
defendant "without ever examining the evidence concerning an
element of the crimes charged."
Ante at
460 U. S. 88.
While this accurately describes the effect of a directed verdict,
it misperceives the way a presumption instruction, conclusive or
otherwise, functions. A presumption instruction informs the jury
that, once a party has proved A, the basic fact, the jury can or
must presume B, the presumed fact. [
Footnote 3/4] Contrary to the plurality's assumption, a
Sandstrom-type presumption does not operate independently
of the evidence. The jury must look to the evidence initially to
see if the basic facts have been proved before it can consider
whether it is appropriate to apply the presumption. In this case,
for example, the
Sandstrom instruction was that
"a person's intention may be inferred from his conduct, and
every person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and
necessary consequences of his act."
App. 23A. Thus, it was necessary for the jury
Page 460 U. S. 97
to look to the facts and circumstances to determine what
respondent did --
i.e., to consider the character and
quality of his acts -- before it could define the natural and
necessary consequences of those acts. If, however, these basic
facts are themselves dispositive of intent, the presumption becomes
unnecessary to the jury's task of finding intent. Because the
presumption does not remove the issue of intent from the jury's
consideration, it does not preclude a reviewing court from
determining whether the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." [
Footnote 3/5]
See
Chapman, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 24.
See also Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1342 (CA11
1982),
cert. pending, No. 82-5768;
Jacks v.
Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480, 487 (CA7 1981).
As indicated above, the effect of the plurality opinion is to
create an automatic reversal rule whenever a
Sandstrom
instruction is given, regardless of the conclusiveness of the
evidence of intent. [
Footnote 3/6]
In so doing, the plurality disregards the
Page 460 U. S. 98
reasoning underlying
Chapman's rejection of such a
rule. While agreeing that, in some circumstances, an error may be
so fundamental that reversal is mandatory, Justice Black, writing
for the Court, said:
"We are urged by petitioners to hold that all federal
constitutional errors, regardless of the facts and circumstances,
must always be deemed harmful. Such a holding, as petitioners
correctly point out, would require an
automatic reversal
of their convictions, and make further discussion unnecessary. We
decline to adopt any such rule."
386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 21-22
(emphasis added).
Chapman recognized that jury trials involve an infinite
variety of "facts and circumstances." It therefore is hardly in the
interest of a rational criminal justice system to adopt automatic
and absolute rules that deprive courts of perhaps the single most
important element of judging: the exercise of judicial discretion.
Yet this is precisely what the plurality's opinion does. Its
holding would require reversals of convictions
Page 460 U. S. 99
in many situations in which the defendant's actions establish
intent as conclusively as if it were unequivocally conceded. If,
for example, an execution-style slaying occurred, in which the
defendant tied up his victim and shot him repeatedly in the head,
it would be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the presence of a
conclusive presumption instruction would not have affected a jury's
finding of intent. [
Footnote 3/7]
The point is not that an execution-style slaying equals a
concession of intent. It is instead that the plurality's limitation
on the harmless error doctrine fails to recognize that the impact
of the presumption on the jury's verdict will vary with the facts
and circumstances of each case.
IV
Neither the respondent nor any of the four other participants in
these crimes testified at the trial. The State's evidence from the
victim, the people who sheltered her after she escaped, the police,
and the State's expert witnesses -- was uncontradicted. [
Footnote 3/8] Reviewing this testimony, the
Supreme
Page 460 U. S. 100
Court of Connecticut found that the jury "could reasonably have
found the following facts":
"On December 20, 1975, at approximately 10:30 p.m., the female
victim dropped her boyfriend off at the Norwalk railroad station
and started to return to her home in West Redding. Unfamiliar with
Norwalk, and in cold and snowy weather, the victim lost her way.
While still in Norwalk, she stopped her car and asked the occupants
of another automobile for directions. The defendant, one of the
four men in this automobile, offered to ride in her car to show her
the way to route 7. When her car arrived at route 7, the defendant
pulled the victim to the passenger side of the car and another man
from the second automobile entered the victim's car and drove it
away. The victim was told that the men needed a car. [
Footnote 3/9] She was threatened, at
various times, with bodily harm, was shown a knife, and was told
that there was a gun. Sometime later, while still in Norwalk, the
second car was abandoned and its other two occupants entered the
victim's car. At another stop, a fifth man was picked up.
Eventually, the car was driven on the Connecticut Turnpike toward
New Haven. Sometime in the early morning hours of December 21,
1975, the vehicle was stopped near an apartment building in the New
Haven area. The victim was forced into the building, where she was
sexually assaulted by all five men. When the victim was returned to
the car, her hands were bound with wire. The car was driven to a
bridge on the New Haven-West Haven line, where the defendant forced
the victim to run across the bridge. At about the midway point, she
and the defendant struggled and he threw her over the railing.
Initially she landed on a pipe outside of the railing, but jumped
into the river and
Page 460 U. S. 101
went under the water when the defendant pursued her. She managed
to elude him by hiding under the bridge. Sometime later, she made
her way to a nearby residence, from which the police were called.
The defendant and others were arrested in Norwalk between 5 and 6
a.m. the same morning in or near the victim's car."
185 Conn.163, 165-166, 440 A.2d 858, 860 (1981) (footnote
added).
On these facts, a reviewing court might well say beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury found the presumption unnecessary to
its task of determining intent. With respect to the charge of
robbery, the uncontradicted evidence was that respondent stated:
"We need a car, we are going to take your car. . . ." His actions
confirmed his unequivocal statements: he overpowered the woman,
took her car and never returned it. One would think that intent to
rob could not have been clearer. The evidence of respondent's
intent on the attempted murder charge could be viewed as only
marginally less compelling. Having participated in a gang-type rape
of this woman, respondent bound her hands with wire and threw her
into an icy river in the middle of December.
The jury, consistent with its instructions, could have regarded
these facts as dispositive of intent, and not relied on the
presumption. As indicated above, the court instructed the jury that
the State had the burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable
doubt. It stressed that
"[t]he State, in other words, can sustain the burden resting on
it only if the evidence before you establishes the existence of
every element constituting the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt."
App. 17A. Indeed, it prefaced the conclusive presumption
instruction by stating that intent is a question of fact solely
within the province of the jury. [
Footnote 3/10]
See id. at
Page 460 U. S. 102
22A-23A. Although the instructions left the issue of intent to
the jury, the plurality finds that neither we nor the state courts
may assess the effect of the presumption on the jury's verdict. It
imposes instead an automatic reversal rule that would be applicable
even when proof of intent to murder is established beyond any
doubt.
See 460 U.S.
73fn3/6|>n. 6,
supra. Such a rule is precisely what
Chapman rejected.
V
For the reasons stated, I think this Court properly could decide
the question of harmless error. Normally, however, this is a
question more appropriately left to the courts below. The
Connecticut Supreme Court did not address the question, nor has it
been briefed extensively here. There may be facts and circumstances
not apparent from the record before us. I therefore would reverse
the judgment and remand the case for consideration of whether the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
[
Footnote 3/1]
In determining whether the Connecticut Supreme Court was
applying federal or state law, it should be remembered that this
Court has never held that a
Sandstrom error inevitably
requires reversal.
See ante, p.
460 U. S. 88
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Indeed, rather than
foreclosing consideration of this federal issue, the
Sandstrom Court remanded to allow the state court to make
this determination initially.
See 442 U.S. at
442 U. S.
526-527. It would be consistent with our opinion in
Sandstrom for the Connecticut Supreme Court to have
undertaken this same federal inquiry.
[
Footnote 3/2]
Having found that the instruction violated due process,
Sandstrom noted, but left open, the question of whether
the error was harmless. It remanded for a determination of this
issue by the Montana Supreme Court.
See ibid. On remand,
the court determined that the error was not harmless.
See State
v. Sandstrom, 184 Mont. 391, 392-393, 603 P.2d 244, 245
(1979).
[
Footnote 3/3]
Because a presumption does not remove the issue of intent from
the jury's consideration, it is distinguishable from other
instructional errors that prevent a jury from considering an issue.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307,
443 U. S. 320,
n. 14 (1979) ("failure to instruct a jury on the necessity of proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt can never be harmless error");
Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.
S. 395,
330 U. S.
408-409 (1947) (failure to instruct jury on proper level
of review not harmless);
Weiler v. United States,
323 U. S. 606,
323 U. S.
610-611 (1945) (erroneous instruction that perjury could
be proved by uncorroborated oath of one witness not harmless). In
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.
S. 607 (1946), the Court found that the use of an
erroneous presumption was not harmless. In that case, however, the
jury had deliberated for seven hours. In response to a question
from the jury, the trial court delivered the erroneous presumption
instruction, and the jury returned a verdict in five minutes. This
Court rejected the argument that the error was harmless, not
because a presumption may never be harmless, but because the course
of events revealed graphically that the error had affected the
jury's verdict.
See id. at
326 U. S.
614.
[
Footnote 3/4]
Although the term "presumption" often is used to describe a wide
range of procedural effects, a presumption typically refers to an
evidentiary device that allows "the existence of one fact [to be]
presumed from another."
See Jeffries & Stephan,
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88
Yale L.J. 1325, 1335 (1979).
Sandstrom makes clear that
the instruction in that case functioned in this fashion. There we
observed that the presumption instruction allowed the jury to
conclude that the defendant possessed the requisite intent on the
basis of facts that would establish only criminal negligence.
See 442 U.S. at
442 U. S.
523-524.
[
Footnote 3/5]
In determining whether a
Sandstrom error was harmless,
the inquiry is not, as the plurality intimates, whether the
presumption was unnecessary to the jury's verdict "in the sense
that the evidence was sufficient for a properly instructed jury to
find that respondent acted with the requisite intent."
Ante at
460 U. S. 86, n.
15. Instead, the inquiry is whether the evidence was so dispositive
of intent that a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the
presumption.
See infra at
460 U. S.
101.
Despite this standard, the plurality reasons that the error
always is harmful, because it remains possible that a juror might
have relied on the unconstitutional presumption, rather than the
evidence. This argument begs the question. In every harmless error
case, there is always a possibility that the error affected the
jury's verdict. As has been noted:
"Obviously, there will be trials in which the evidence
supporting the inference to be drawn will be so persuasive that any
additional prompting procured by the [unconstitutional presumption]
must be regarded as inconsequential. In such cases, the validity of
the presumption will be regarded as irrelevant, because whatever
error it might embody can be regarded as harmless."
Jeffries & Stephan,
supra, at 1388, n. 192.
[
Footnote 3/6]
There is some facial ambivalence in the plurality opinion in
this respect, as it expresses the view that a
Sandstrom
error may be harmless where "the defendant concede[s] the issue of
intent."
Ante at
460 U. S. 87.
But the opinion leaves no doubt that it has established an
automatic rule of reversal. It concludes that
Sandstrom
error deprives a defendant of "
constitutional rights so basic
to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error.'" Ante at 460 U. S. 88
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 386 U. S.
23).
Chapman, however, makes clear that, although some
constitutional errors can never be treated as harmless, not "all
trial errors which violate the Constitution automatically call for
reversal."
Ibid. The question -- the one critical to the
decision of this case -- is in which category of error a
Sandstrom instruction falls. In my view, it is not the
type of error that invariably and "automatically" compels reversal.
This is what the plurality today finds, subject to the rare
situation in which the defendant "concedes" intent. The result of
its opinion is to create a class of cases in which courts are
deprived of their traditional discretion to see that both society
and the defendant are treated justly. A
Sandstrom error,
however, is not comparable to an instruction that can never be
harmless -- for example, an instruction that fails to inform the
jury that it must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
See 460 U.S.
73fn3/3|>n. 3,
supra. The question of intent is one
of fact and, as discussed in the above text, before a jury even
reaches the presumption instruction, it must find facts that are a
predicate for the presumption.
[
Footnote 3/7]
This hypothetical is not the unusual case. Numerous cases coming
to this Court illustrate the frequency with which cases arise in
which no rational person could doubt intent to murder. Although the
recent cases cited below did not involve a
Sandstrom
error, they illustrate factual situations in which the Court's
opinion would preclude the application of the harmless error
doctrine.
See, e.g., White v. State, 415 So. 2d
719, 720 (Fla.) (members of motorcycle gang stabbed woman 14
times and slit her throat twice),
cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1055 (1982);
Arango v. State, 411 So. 2d
172 (Fla.) (defendant beat victim with a blunt instrument,
wrapped a wire around his neck, stuffed a towel into his mouth, and
shot him twice in head),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1140
(1982);
State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d
1 (Mo.) (defendant strangled rape victim until his companion,
who was monitoring her pulse, told him it had ceased),
cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
There was no "concession" of intent to kill in any of these
cases. Yet intent in each is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. If a
Sandstrom instruction had been given in any of these
cases, the plurality opinion today would preclude consideration of
the harmless error doctrine.
[
Footnote 3/8]
The testimony of the only witness for respondent is irrelevant
to the issue of intent.
[
Footnote 3/9]
When respondent took the victim's automobile, he said: "We need
a car, we are going to take your car and you are going to come with
us." Tr. 37. He kept the car until he was arrested by the
police.
[
Footnote 3/10]
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the
Sandstrom
error was not cured by the remainder of the instructions.
See 185 Conn.163, 172-176, 440 A.2d 858, 863-865 (1981).
The correctness of that decision is not before us.