Petitioner, a nonprofit membership corporation with over 90,000
members drawn from all fields of mechanical engineering,
promulgates codes for areas of engineering and industry. Much of
its work is done through volunteers from industry and government.
The codes, while only advisory, have a powerful economic influence,
many of them being incorporated by reference in federal regulations
and state and local laws. Respondent marketed a safety device for
use in water boilers and secured a customer that previously had
purchased the competing product of McDonnell & Miller, Inc.
(M&M). One of M&M's officials, a vice-president (James),
was vice-chairman of petitioner's subcommittee that drafted,
revised, and interpreted the segment of petitioner's code governing
the safety device in question. Subsequently, he and other M&M
officials met with the subcommittee's chairman (Hardin). As a
result, M&M sent a letter to petitioner asking whether a safety
device with a feature such as one contained in respondent's device
satisfied the pertinent code requirements. The letter was referred
to Hardin, as chairman of the subcommittee, and ultimately an
"unofficial response" was issued, prepared by Hardin but mailed on
petitioner's stationery over the signature of one of petitioner's
full-time employees. The response, in effect, declared respondent's
product unsafe. Thereafter, M&M's salesmen used the
subcommittee's response to discourage customers from buying
respondent's product. Respondent subsequently sought a correction
from petitioner of the unofficial response; respondent continued to
suffer market resistance after the pertinent committee replied.
After James' part in the drafting of the original letter of inquiry
became public, respondent filed suit in Federal District Court
against petitioner (and others who settled), alleging violation of
the Sherman Act. The trial court rejected respondent's request for
jury instructions that petitioner could be held liable for its
agents' conduct if they acted within the scope of their apparent
authority. Instead, the jury was instructed that petitioner could
be held liable only if it had ratified its agents' actions or if
the agents had acted in pursuit of petitioner's interests. The jury
nonetheless returned a verdict for respondent. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, concluding that petitioner could be held liable if its
agents had
Page 456 U. S. 557
acted within the scope of their apparent authority, and that
thus the charge was more favorable to petitioner than the law
required.
Held: Petitioner is civilly liable under the antitrust
laws for the antitrust violations of its agents committed with
apparent authority. Pp.
456 U. S.
565-576.
(a) Under general rules of agency law, principals are liable
when their agents act with apparent authority and commit torts
analogous to the antitrust violation presented here. An agent who
appears to have authority to make statements for his principal
gives to his statements the weight of the principal's reputation --
in this case, the weight of petitioner's acknowledged expertise in
boiler safety. Pp.
456 U. S.
565-570.
(b) Petitioner's liability under a theory of apparent authority
is consistent with the congressional intent behind the antitrust
laws to encourage competition. Petitioner wields great power in the
Nation's economy, and when it cloaks its subcommittee officials
with the authority of its reputation, it permits those agents to
affect the destinies of businesses, and thus gives them the power
-- as illustrated by the facts of this case -- to frustrate
competition in the marketplace. A rule that imposes liability on
the standard-setting organization -- which is best situated to
prevent antitrust violations through the abuse of its reputation --
is most faithful to the congressional intent that the private right
of action deter antitrust violations. On the other hand, a
ratification rule would have anticompetitive effects, encouraging
petitioner to do as little as possible to oversee its agents, since
it could avoid liability by ensuring that it remained ignorant of
its agents' conduct. And a rule whereby petitioner would not be
liable unless its agents acted with an intent to benefit petitioner
would be irrelevant to the antitrust laws' purposes. The
anticompetitive practices of petitioner's agents are repugnant to
the antitrust laws even if the agents act without any intent to aid
petitioner, and petitioner should be encouraged to eliminate the
anticompetitive practices of all its agents acting with apparent
authority, especially those who use their positions in petitioner
solely for their own benefit or the benefit of their employers. Pp.
456 U. S.
570-574.
(c) Application of the theory of apparent authority is not
improper on the asserted ground that treble damages for antitrust
violations are punitive, and that, under traditional agency law,
the courts do not employ apparent authority to impose punitive
damages upon a principal for the acts of its agents. Since treble
damages also serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and
of compensating victims, it is in accord with both the purposes of
the antitrust laws and principles of agency law to hold petitioner
liable for the acts of agents committed with apparent authority.
Nor does the fact that petitioner is a nonprofit organization
Page 456 U. S. 558
weaken the force of the antitrust and agency principles that
indicate that it should be liable for respondent's antitrust
injuries. Pp.
456 U. S.
574-576.
635 F.2d 118, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BURGER,
C.J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post,
p.
456 U. S. 578.
POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined,
post, p.
456 U. S.
578.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc.
(ASME), is a nonprofit membership corporation organized in 1880
under the laws of the State of New York. This case presents the
important issue of the Society's civil liability under the
antitrust laws for acts of its agents performed
Page 456 U. S. 559
with apparent authority. Because the judgment of the Court of
Appeals upholding civil liability is consistent with the central
purposes of the antitrust laws, we affirm that judgment.
I
ASME has over 90,000 members drawn from all fields of mechanical
engineering. It has an annual operating budget of over $12 million.
It employs a full-time staff, but much of its work is done through
volunteers from industry and government. The Society engages in a
number of activities, such as publishing a mechanical engineering
magazine and conducting educational and research programs.
In addition, ASME promulgates and publishes over 400 separate
codes and standards for areas of engineering and industry. These
codes, while only advisory, have a powerful influence: federal
regulations have incorporated many of them by reference, as have
the laws of most States, the ordinances of major cities, and the
laws of all the Provinces of Canada.
See Brief for
Petitioner 2. Obviously, if a manufacturer's product cannot satisfy
the applicable ASME code, it is at a great disadvantage in the
marketplace.
Among ASME's many sets of standards is its Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code. This set, like ASME's other codes, is very important
in the affected industry; it has been adopted by 46 States and all
but one of the Canadian Provinces.
See id. at 5. Section
IV of the code sets forth standards for components of heating
boilers, including "low-water fuel cutoffs." If the water in a
boiler drops below a level sufficient to moderate the boiler's
temperature, the boiler can "dry fire," or even explode. A
low-water fuel cutoff does what its name implies: when the water in
the boiler falls below a certain level, the device blocks the flow
of fuel to the boiler before the water level reaches a dangerously
low point. To prevent dry firing and boiler explosions, � HG-605 of
Section IV provides that each boiler
"shall have an automatic low-water fuel cutoff so located as to
automatically cut
Page 456 U. S. 560
off the fuel supply when the surface of the water falls to the
lowest visible part of the water gage glass."
Plaintiff's Exhibit 30A.
See 635 F.2d 118, 121 (CA2
1980).
For some decades, McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M&M), has
dominated the market for low-water fuel cutoffs. But in the
mid-1960's, respondent Hydrolevel Corporation entered the low-water
fuel cutoff market with a different version of this device. The
relevant distinction, for the purposes of this case, was that
Hydrolevel's fuel cutoff, unlike M&M's, included a time delay.
[
Footnote 1]
In early 1971, Hydrolevel secured an important customer.
Brooklyn Union Gas Company, which had purchased M&M's product
for several years, decided to switch to Hydrolevel's probe. Not
surprisingly, M&M was concerned.
Because of its involvement in ASME, M&M was in an
advantageous position to react to Hydrolevel's challenge. ASME's
governing body had delegated the interpretation, formulation, and
revision of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code to a Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Committee.
See App. 120. That committee,
in turn, had authorized subcommittees to respond to public
inquiries about the interpretation of the code. An M&M
vice-president, John W. James, was vice chairman of the
subcommittee which drafted, revised, and interpreted Section IV,
the segment of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code governing
low-water fuel cutoffs.
After Hydrolevel obtained the Brooklyn Union Gas account, James
and other M&M officials met with T. R. Hardin,
Page 456 U. S. 561
the chairman of the Section IV subcommittee. [
Footnote 2] The participants at the meeting
planned a course of action. They decided to send an inquiry to
ASME's Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee asking whether a fuel
cutoff with a time delay would satisfy the requirements of � HG-605
of Section IV. James and Hardin, as vice chairman and chairman,
respectively, of the relevant subcommittee, cooperated in drafting
a letter, one they thought would elicit a negative response.
The letter was mailed over the name of Eugene Mitchell, an
M&M vice-president, to W. Bradford Hoyt, secretary of the
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee and a full-time ASME employee.
App. 62. Following ASME's standard routine, Hoyt referred the
letter to Hardin, as chairman of the subcommittee. Under the
procedures of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee, the
subcommittee chairman -- Hardin -- could draft a response to a
public inquiry without referring it to the entire subcommittee if
he treated it as an "unofficial communication."
As a result, Hardin, one of the very authors of the inquiry,
prepared the response.
Id. at 63. Although he retained
control over the inquiry by treating the response as "unofficial,"
the response was signed by Hoyt, secretary of the Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Committee, and it was sent out on April 29, 1971,
on ASME stationery.
Id. at 64. Predictably, Hardin's
prepared answer, utilized verbatim in the Hoyt letter, condemned
fuel cutoffs that incorporated a time delay:
"A low-water fuel cut-off is considered strictly as a safety
device, and not as some kind of an operating control. Assuming that
the water gage glass is located in accordance with the requirements
of Par. HG-602(b), it is the intent of Par. HG-605(a) that the
low-water fuel
Page 456 U. S. 562
cut-off operate immediately and positively when the boiler water
level falls to the lowest visible part of the water gage
glass."
"There are many and varied designs of heating boilers. If a time
delay feature were incorporated in a low-water fuel cut-off, there
would be no positive assurance that the boiler water level would
not fall to a dangerous point during a time delay period."
Ibid.
As the Court of Appeals in this case observed, the second
paragraph of the response does not follow from the first:
"If the cut-off is positioned sufficiently above the lowest
permissible water level, a cut-off with a time-delay could assure,
even allowing for the delay, that the fuel supply would stop by the
time the water fell to the lowest visible part of the water-gauge
glass."
635 F.2d at 122-123. Hoyt signed and mailed the response without
checking its accuracy.
See App. 124-126.
As anticipated, M&M seized upon this interpretation of
Section IV to discourage customers from buying Hydrolevel's
product. It instructed its salesmen to tell potential customers
that Hydrolevel's fuel cutoff failed to satisfy ASME's code.
See 635 F.2d at 123. And M&M's employees did, in fact,
carry the message of the subcommittee's response to customers
interested in buying fuel cutoffs. Thus, M&M successfully used
its position within ASME in an effort to thwart Hydrolevel's
competitive challenge.
Several months later, Hydrolevel learned of the subcommittee
interpretation from a former customer. Hydrolevel wrote ASME for a
copy of the April 29 response. On February 8, 1972, over the
signature of the assistant secretary of the Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Committee, ASME sent Hydrolevel a letter quoting the two
paragraphs of the April 29 interpretation of Section IV. App.
66-67.
On March 23, Hydrolevel's president wrote Hoyt and demanded that
ASME cure the effect of the April 29 letter by sending a correction
to whomever might have received it.
Page 456 U. S. 563
Id. at 68-73. Hoyt placed Hydrolevel's complaint on the
agenda for the meetings of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee
and Subcommittee to be held on May 4 and 5.
On May 4, the subcommittee voted to confirm the intent of the
first quoted paragraph of the April 29 letter. James, by then the
chairman of the subcommittee, reported this recommendation to the
committee on May 5.
Id. at 82. Thereafter, the committee
designated two persons to propose a response to Hydrolevel.
Id. at 83. In the end, on June 9, the committee mailed
Hydrolevel a reply that "confirmed the intent" of the April 29
letter.
Id. at 84. [
Footnote 3] The committee's letter further advised that
there was
"no intent in Section IV to prohibit the use of low water fuel
cutoffs having time delays in order to meet the requirements of
Par. HG-605(a). This paragraph relates itself to Par. HG-602(b),
which specifically delineates the location of the lowest visible
part of the water gage glass."
Ibid. The committee concluded the letter with a warning
paragraph suggested by James,
see id. at 111-112:
"If a means for retarding control action is incorporated in a
low-water fuel cutoff, the termination of the retard function must
operate to cutoff the fuel supply before the boiler water level
falls below the visible part of the water gage glass."
Id. at 84.
After this response to its complaint, Hydrolevel continued to
suffer from market resistance. Two years later, the Wall Street
Journal published an article describing Hydrolevel's predicament in
trying to sell a fuel cutoff that many in the industry thought to
be in violation of ASME's code. Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1974,
p. 44, col. 1; App. 998. Reacting
Page 456 U. S. 564
to this story, ASME's Professional Practice Committee opened an
investigation. It never discovered that James had been involved
with the original inquiry. In a resolution reporting the results of
its investigation, the committee decided that all ASME officials
had acted properly. Further, the Professional Practice Committee
"commend[ed] [James] for conducting himself in a forthright
manner."
Id. at 104.
Subsequently, James' part in drafting the original letter of
inquiry became public because of his testimony in March, 1975,
before a Senate Subcommittee.
See Voluntary Industrial
Standards: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 18199 (1975) (testimony of John W. James of M&M (ITT));
see also id. at 171-185 (testimony of Eugene Mitchell,
Manager of Original Equipment Sales, ITT Fluid Handling Division).
Within a few months, Hydrolevel filed suit against ITT, ASME, and
Hartford in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. Hydrolevel alleged that the defendants'
actions had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1
and 2. App. 11. Prior to trial, Hydrolevel sold all its assets,
except this suit, for salvage value. Ultimately, ITT and Hartford
settled.
The lawsuit proceeded to trial against ASME, as the remaining
defendant. Hydrolevel requested the trial court to instruct the
jury that ASME could be held liable under the antitrust laws for
its agents' conduct if the agents acted within the scope of their
apparent authority.
See id. at 59. The District Court,
however, rejected this approach and, instead, at ASME's suggestion,
charged the jury that ASME could be held liable only if it had
ratified its agents' actions or if the agents had acted in pursuit
of ASME's interests. The District Court explained to the jury:
"If the officers or agents act on behalf of interests adverse to
the corporation or acted for their own economic benefit or the
benefit of another person or corporation,
Page 456 U. S. 565
and this action was not ratified or adopted by the defendant
[ASME], their misconduct cannot be considered that of the
corporation with which they are associated."
Id. at 49. The jury, nonetheless, returned a verdict
for Hydrolevel.
Before the Court of Appeals, the parties disputed the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict based on the
District Court's instruction.
See 635 F.2d at 125. But the
Court of Appeals chose not to decide whether the evidence was
sufficient to demonstrate that ASME had ratified its agents'
actions or that the agents had acted to advance ASME's interests.
Instead, after surveying the law of agency and the policies
underlying the antitrust laws, the Court of Appeals concluded that
ASME could be held liable if its agents had acted within the scope
of their apparent authority.
Id. at 124-127. Since,
therefore, the District Court had delivered "a charge that was more
favorable to the defendant than the law requires,"
id. at
127, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on liability, that
is, the jury's finding that ASME was liable under § 1 of the
Sherman Act for its agents' actions. [
Footnote 4]
Because the Court of Appeals' decision presents an important
issue concerning the interpretation of the antitrust laws, we
granted certiorari. 452 U.S. 937 (1981).
II
A
As the Court of Appeals observed, under general rules of agency
law, principals are liable when their agents act with
Page 456 U. S. 566
apparent authority [
Footnote
5] and commit torts analogous to the antitrust violation
presented by this case.
See generally 10 W. Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations � 4886, pp. 400-401
(rev. ed.1978); W. Seavey, Law of Agency § 92 (1964). For instance,
a principal is liable for an agent's fraud though the agent acts
solely to benefit himself, if the agent acts with apparent
authority.
See, e.g., Standard Surety & Casualty Co. v.
Plantsville Nat. Bank, 158 F.2d 422 (CA2 1946),
cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 812 (1947). Similarly, a principal is liable
for an agent's misrepresentations that cause pecuniary loss to a
third party when the agent acts within the scope of his apparent
authority. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 249, 262 (1957)
(Restatement);
see Rutherford v. Rideout
Bank, 11 Cal. 2d
479, 80 P.2d 978 (1938). Also, if an agent is guilty of
defamation, the principal is liable so long as the agent was
apparently authorized to make the defamatory statement. Restatement
§§ 247, 254. Finally, a principal is responsible if an agent,
acting with apparent authority, tortiously injures the business
relations of a third person.
Id. § 248 and Comment
b, p. 548.
Under an apparent authority theory,
"[l]iability is based upon the fact that the agent's position
facilitates the consummation of the fraud, in that, from the point
of view of the third person, the transaction seems regular on its
face, and the agent appears to be acting in the ordinary course of
the business confided to him."
Id. § 261, Comment
a, p. 571.
See Record
v. Wagner, 100 N.H. 419, 128 A.2d 921 (1957). As with the
April 29 letter issued by the Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Subcommittee, the injurious statements are "effective, in part at
least, because of the personality of the one
Page 456 U. S. 567
publishing it." Restatement § 247, Comment
c, p. 545.
In other words, "one who appears to have authority to make
statements for the [principal] gives to his statements the weight
of the [principal's] reputation,"
ibid. -- in this case,
the weight of ASME's acknowledged expertise in boiler safety.
See generally W. Prosser, Law of Torts 467 (4th
ed.1971).
ASME's system of codes and interpretative advice would not be
effective if the statements of its agents did not carry with them
the assurance that persons in the affected industries could
reasonably rely upon their apparent trustworthiness. Behind the
principal's liability under an apparent authority theory, then, is
"business expediency -- the desire that third persons should be
given reasonable protection in dealing with agents." Restatement §
262, Comment
a, p. 572.
See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 153 F.2d 767 (CA2 1946). The apparent authority theory
thus benefits both ASME and the public whom ASME attempts to serve
through its codes:
"It is . . . for the ultimate interest of persons employing
agents, as well as for the benefit of the public, that persons
dealing with agents should be able to rely upon apparently true
statements by agents who are purporting to act and are apparently
acting in the interests of the principal."
Restatement § 262, Comment
a, p. 572.
The apparent authority theory has long been the settled rule in
the federal system.
See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
153 F.2d at 759. In
Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific R.
Co., 130 U. S. 416
(1889), the Court held that an employer was not liable for the
fraud of his agent when the employer could derive no benefit from
the agent's fraud. But
Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line R.
Co., 278 U. S. 349
(1929), discarded that rule. In
Gleason, a railroad's
employee sought to enrich himself by defrauding a customer of the
railroad through a forged bill of lading. The Court of Appeals had
absolved the railroad from liability because the employee
perpetrated the fraud solely for his own benefit. But this Court
reversed,
Page 456 U. S. 568
overruling
Friedlander. 278 U.S. at
278 U. S. 357.
Noting that "there was . . . no want of authority in the agent,"
id. at
278 U. S. 355,
the Court held the railroad liable despite the agent's desire to
benefit only himself. It explained that
"few doctrines of the law are more firmly established or more in
harmony with accepted notions of social policy than that of the
liability of the principal without fault of his own."
Id. at
278 U. S.
356.
In a wide variety of areas, the federal courts, like this Court
in
Gleason, have imposed liability upon principals for the
misdeeds of agents acting with apparent authority.
See, e.g.,
Dark v. United States, 641 F.2d 805 (CA9 1981) (federal tax
liability);
National Acceptance Co. v. Coal Producers
Assn., 604 F.2d 540 (CA7 1979) (common law fraud);
Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (CA6 1976) (federal
securities fraud);
United States v. Sanchez, 521 F.2d 244
(CA5 1975) (bail bond fraud),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817
(1976);
Kerbs v. Fall River Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 731
(CA10 1974) (federal securities fraud);
Gilmore v. Constitution
Life Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 1344 (CA10 1974) (common law fraud).
[
Footnote 6]
Page 456 U. S. 569
In the past, the Court has refused to permit broad common law
barriers to relief to constrict the antitrust private right of
action.
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U. S. 134
(1968). It stated there that "the purposes of the antitrust laws
are best served by insuring that the private action will be an
ever-present threat" to deter antitrust violation.
Id. at
392 U. S. 139.
In
Perma Life Mufflers, the Court honored that purpose by
denying defendants the right to invoke a common law defense (the
doctrine of
in pari delicto) that was inconsistent with
the antitrust laws. In this case, we can honor the statutory
purpose best by interpreting the antitrust private cause of action
to be at least as broad as a plaintiff's right to sue for analogous
torts, absent indications that the antitrust laws are not intended
to reach so far.
See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630,
451 U. S. 639
(1981);
Perm Life
Page 456 U. S. 570
Mufflers, 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 138.
Our remaining inquiry, then, is whether ASME's liability under a
theory of apparent authority is consistent with the intent behind
the antitrust laws. [
Footnote
7]
B
We hold that the apparent authority theory is consistent with
the congressional intent to encourage competition. ASME wields
great power in the Nation's economy. Its codes and standards
influence the policies of numerous States and cities, and, as has
been said about "so-called voluntary standards" generally, its
interpretations of its guidelines "may result in economic
prosperity or economic failure, for a number of businesses of all
sizes throughout the country," as well as entire segments of an
industry. H.R.Rep. No.1981, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1968). ASME
can be said to be "in reality, an extragovernmental agency which
prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate
commerce."
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U. S. 457,
312 U. S. 465
(1941). When it cloaks its subcommittee officials with the
authority of its reputation,
Page 456 U. S. 571
ASME permits those agents to affect the destinies of businesses,
and thus gives them the power to frustrate competition in the
marketplace.
The facts of this case dramatically illustrate the power of
ASME's agents to restrain competition. M&M instigated the
submission of a single inquiry to an ASME subcommittee. For its
efforts, M&M secured a mere "unofficial" response authored by a
single ASME subcommittee chairman. Yet the force of ASME's
reputation is so great that M&M was able to use that one
"unofficial" response to injure seriously the business of a
competitor.
Furthermore, a standard-setting organization like ASME can be
rife with opportunities for anticompetitive activity. Many of
ASME's officials are associated with members of the industries
regulated by ASME's codes. Although undoubtedly most serve ASME
without concern for the interests of their corporate employers,
some may well view their positions with ASME, at least in part, as
an opportunity to benefit their employers. When the great influence
of ASME's reputation is placed at their disposal, the less
altruistic of ASME's agents have an opportunity to harm their
employers' competitors through manipulation of ASME's codes.
[
Footnote 8]
Again, the facts of this case are illustrative. Hardin was able
to issue an interpretation of ASME's Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code which, in effect, declared Hydrolevel's product unsafe.
Hardin's interpretation of the code was sent out
Page 456 U. S. 572
under Hoyt's name as secretary of the committee, though Hoyt
exercised only ministerial duties and played no role in confirming
the substance of the April 29, 1971, letter.
See App.
125-126. Thus, without any meaningful safeguards, [
Footnote 9] ASME entrusted the interpretation
of one of its codes to Hardin. As a result, M&M was able to use
ASME's reputation to hinder Hydrolevel's competitive threat.
A principal purpose of the antitrust private cause of action,
see 15 U.S.C. § 15, is, of course, to deter
anticompetitive practices.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of
India, 434 U. S. 308,
434 U. S. 314
(1978);
Perm Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 139;
see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.
S. 330,
442 U. S.
342-344 (1979). It is true that imposing liability on
ASME's agents themselves will have some deterrent effect, because
they will know that, if they violate the antitrust laws through
their participation in ASME, they risk the consequences of personal
civil liability. But if, in addition, ASME is civilly liable for
the antitrust violations of its agents acting with apparent
authority, it is much more likely that similar antitrust violations
will not occur in the future. "[P]ressure [will be] brought on [the
organization] to see to it that [its] agents abide by the law."
United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.
S. 121,
358 U. S. 126
(1958). Only ASME can take systematic steps to make improper
conduct on the part of all its agents unlikely, and the possibility
of civil liability will inevitably be a powerful incentive for ASME
to take those steps. [
Footnote
10] Thus, a rule that imposes liability on the
Page 456 U. S. 573
standard-setting organization -- which is best situated to
prevent antitrust violations through the abuse of its reputation --
is most faithful to the congressional intent that the private right
of action deter antitrust violations. [
Footnote 11]
The wisdom of the apparent authority rule becomes evident when
it is compared to the alternative approaches advanced by the
District Court's instructions to the jury,
see supra at
456 U. S.
564-565, and advocated by ASME. [
Footnote 12] First, ASME insists that it should
not be held liable unless it ratified the actions of its agents.
But a ratification rule would have anticompetitive effects,
directly contrary to the purposes of the antitrust laws. ASME could
avoid liability by ensuring that it remained ignorant of its
agents' conduct, and the antitrust laws would therefore encourage
ASME to do as little as possible to oversee its agents. Thus,
ASME's ratification theory would actually enhance the likelihood
that the Society's reputation would be used for anticompetitive
ends.
Second, ASME contends that it should not be held liable unless
its agents act with an intent to benefit the Society. This proposed
rule falls short, though, because it is simply irrelevant to the
purposes of the antitrust laws. Whether
Page 456 U. S. 574
they intend to benefit ASME or not, ASME's agents exercise
economic power because they act with the force of the Society's
reputation behind them. And, whether they act in part to benefit
ASME or solely to benefit themselves or their employers, ASME's
agents can have the same anticompetitive effects on the
marketplace. The anticompetitive practices of ASME's agents are
repugnant to the antitrust laws even if the agents act without any
intent to aid ASME, and ASME should be encouraged to eliminate the
anticompetitive practices of all its agents acting with apparent
authority, especially those who use their positions in ASME solely
for their own benefit or the benefit of their employers. [
Footnote 13]
C
Finally, ASME makes two additional arguments in an attempt to
avoid antitrust liability. It characterizes treble damages for
antitrust violations as punitive, and urges that,
Page 456 U. S. 575
under traditional agency law, the courts do not employ apparent
authority to impose punitive damages upon a principal for the acts
of its agents.
See Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v.
Prentice, 147 U. S. 101
(1893);
United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495
(CA5 1966);
see also Restatement § 217C. [
Footnote 14] It is true that antitrust
treble damages were designed in part to punish past violations of
the antitrust laws.
See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 639.
But treble damages were also designed to deter future antitrust
violations.
Ibid. Moreover, the antitrust private action
was created primarily as a remedy for the victims of antitrust
violations.
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U. S. 477,
429 U. S. 485
486 (1977);
see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U. S. 720,
431 U. S.
746-747 (1977). Treble damages "make the remedy
meaningful by counterbalancing
the difficulty of maintaining a
private suit'" under the antitrust laws. Brunswick Corp.,
supra, at 429 U. S. 486,
n. 10, quoting 21 Cong.Rec. 2456 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
Since treble damages serve as a means of deterring
Page 456 U. S. 576
antitrust violations and of compensating victims, it is in
accord with both the purposes of the antitrust laws and principles
of agency law to hold ASME liable for the acts of agents committed
with apparent authority.
See Restatement § 217C, Comment
c, p. 474 (rule limiting principal's liability for
punitive damages does not apply to special statutes giving triple
damages).
In addition, ASME contends it should not bear the risk of loss
for antitrust violations committed by its agents acting with
apparent authority because it is a nonprofit organization, not a
business seeking profit. But it is beyond debate that nonprofit
organizations can be held liable under the antitrust laws.
See,
e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co., 364 U. S. 656
(1961);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S.
1 (1945). Although ASME may not operate for profit, it
does derive benefits from its codes, including the fees the Society
receives for its code-related publications and services, the
prestige the codes bring to the Society, the influence they permit
ASME to wield, and the aid the standards provide the profession of
mechanical engineering. Since the antitrust violation in this case
could not have occurred without ASME's codes and ASME's method of
administering them, it is not unfitting that ASME be liable for the
damages arising from that violation.
See W. Prosser, Law
of Torts 459 (4th ed.1971); W. Seavey, Law of Agency § 83 (1964).
Furthermore, as shown above, ASME is in the best position to take
precautions that will prevent future antitrust violations.
[
Footnote 15] Thus, the fact
that ASME is a nonprofit organization does not weaken the force of
the antitrust and agency principles that indicate that ASME should
be liable for Hydrolevel's antitrust injuries.
Page 456 U. S. 577
III
We need not delineate today the outer boundaries of the
antitrust liability of standard-setting organizations for the
actions of their agents committed with apparent authority. There is
no doubt here that Hardin acted within his apparent authority when
he answered an inquiry about ASME's Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
as the chairman of the relevant ASME subcommittee. And in this
case, we do not face a challenge to a good faith interpretation of
an ASME code reasonably supported by health or safety
considerations.
See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
373 U. S. 341
(1963). We have no difficulty in finding that this set of facts
falls well within the scope of ASME's liability on an apparent
authority theory.
When ASME's agents act in its name, they are able to affect the
lives of large numbers of people and the competitive fortunes of
businesses throughout the country. By holding ASME liable under the
antitrust laws for the antitrust violations of its agents committed
with apparent authority, we recognize the important role of ASME
and its agents in the economy, and we help to ensure that
standard-setting organizations will act with care when they permit
their agents to
Page 456 U. S. 578
speak for them. We thus make it less likely that competitive
challengers like Hydrolevel will be hindered by agents of
organizations like ASME in the future.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
M&M's fuel cutoff is a floating bulb that falls with the
boiler's water level. When the level reaches the critical point,
the bulb causes a switch to cut off the boiler's fuel supply.
Hydrolevel's product, in contrast, was an immovable probe inserted
in the side of the boiler; when the water level dropped below the
probe, the fuel supply was interrupted. Because water in a boiler
surges and bubbles, the level intermittently would seem to fall
slightly below the probe even though the overall level remained
safe. To prevent premature fuel cutoff because of these
intermittent fluctuations, Hydrolevel's probe included a time delay
that allowed the boiler to operate for a brief period after the
water level dropped beneath the probe.
[
Footnote 2]
Hardin was an executive vice-president of Hartford Steam Boiler
Inspection and Insurance Company. A controlling interest in
Hartford was owned by International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation, which acquired M&M within the year.
See
635 F.2d 118, 122, n. 2 (CA2 1980).
[
Footnote 3]
Actually, the committee "confirmed the intent" of ASME's
February 8, 1972, letter to Hydrolevel. That letter, however,
simply quoted the original April 29, 1971, response.
See
App. 66-67.
[
Footnote 4]
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court
after finding that the damages awarded Hydrolevel were excessive
and that the District Court had made errors in its calculation of
damages. 635 F.2d at 128-131. The damages issue is the subject of a
pending cross-petition for certiorari, No. 80-1771, filed April 22,
1981. Hydrolevel's damages arguments are not now before us, and we
express no opinion on that aspect of the Court of Appeals'
decision.
[
Footnote 5]
"Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations
of another person by transactions with third person, professedly as
agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the
other's manifestations to such third persons."
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8 (1957).
[
Footnote 6]
The dissent delves into the agency law of the late 19th century
and concludes that "it was far from clear" that a principal could
be held liable for the deliberate torts of his agent.
Post
at
456 U. S. 587.
But in fact, while there was a division of authority, many courts
had made it very clear that principals could be held liable for
torts analogous to the antitrust violations committed by ASME's
agents.
For instance, a treatise of that era noted that a "considerable
number of American courts" had held the principal liable for the
agent's fraud, though the agent acted solely for his own benefit,
and praised a leading opinion for its "singular ability and
lucidity." E. Huffcut, Elements of the Law of Agency § 155, p. 168
(1895). Indeed, the author commented that the cases holding a
principal liable when his agent acted with apparent authority and
for the agent's sole benefit were "too various to be referred to in
detail."
Id. § 157.
In holding a telegraph company liable for the fraud of its agent
committed solely for his personal benefit, one court summarized the
reasoning that became widespread during the last half of the 19th
century:
"Persons receiving dispatches in the usual course of business,
when there is nothing to excite suspicion, are entitled to rely
upon the presumption that the agents intrusted with the performance
of the business of the company have faithfully and honestly
discharged the duty owed by it to its patrons, and that they would
not knowingly send a false or forged message."
McCord v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Minn. 181, 185, 39
N.W. 315, 317 (1888).
See, e.g., Bank of Batavia v. New York,
L. E. & W. R. Co., 106 N.Y. 195, 12 N.E. 433 (1887).
Thus, based on the agency law of the late 19th century, there is
ample support for holding ASME liable, particularly since Congress
intended that the antitrust laws be given broad, remedial effect.
See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,
434 U. S. 308,
434 U. S.
312-313 (1978). But, as we have made clear before,
Victorian common law does not define the limits of the antitrust
private action.
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134
(1968) (refusing to apply the ancient defense of
in pari
delicto in antitrust cases). We look to the general principles
of the common law for guidance in deciding the scope of the
antitrust cause of action,
see National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679,
435 U. S. 688
(1978), but our decisions are determined by the congressional
intent that led to the enactment of the antitrust laws, a desire to
enhance competition,
see id. at
435 U. S. 688,
435 U. S. 691.
Here, general agency principles would lead to a finding of
liability if the violation in this case were a mere tort; and
imposing liability on ASME in accord with those common law
principles honors the congressional intent behind the antitrust
statutes.
[
Footnote 7]
Evidently, in recent years, no Court of Appeals other than the
Second Circuit has directly decided whether a principal can be held
liable for antitrust damages based on an apparent authority theory.
But cf. Truck Drivers' Local No. 421 v. United States, 128
F.2d 227 (CA8 1942). The dissent cites several cases, stating that
they appear to reject antitrust liability based on apparent
authority.
See post at
456 U. S.
581-582, and n. 6.
United States v. Cadillac Overall
Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (CA5),
cert. denied,
437 U.S. 903 (1978);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
467 F.2d 1000, 1004-1007 (CA9 1972),
cert. denied sub nom.
Western International Hotels Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973);
United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (CA3 1970),
cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971). A fair reading of those cases,
however, reveals that they did not discuss the merits of an
apparent authority theory of antitrust liability. The dissent then
dismisses other cases that also do not directly discuss the
validity of the apparent authority theory, but that contain
language approving apparent authority instructions,
see
post at
456 U. S.
583-584, n. 8.
United States v. Continental Group,
Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 468, n. 5 (CA3 1979),
cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980);
Continental Baking Co. v.
United State, 281 F.2d 137, 150-151 (CA6 1960).
[
Footnote 8]
For example, James' employer did not overlook his usefulness as
an ASME official. In November, 1973, even after the Hydrolevel
events had taken place, an M&M executive recommended that James
be retained by M&M. The recommendation stated:
"A major reason for the continued success at M&M is a result
of [James'] efforts and skill in influencing the various codemaking
bodies to 'legislate' in favor of M&M products. This has been a
planned strategy for the business under E. N. McDonnell, and
carried out with considerable success, as evidenced by the M&M
market penetration of 70 plus %."
App. 86. The writer emphasized a number of James' ASME
activities, including: "Member of main boiler and pressure code
committee" and "Chairman of the heating boiler sub-committee
(section 4)."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 9]
ASME suggests that Hardin's response did undergo a form of
committee review, because he sent copies to the chairman and vice
chairman of the full committee. Brief for Petitioner 8. But there
is no indication that those officers carefully scrutinized Hardin's
response. And certainly they will be encouraged to give responses a
closer look in the future if ASME is subject to antitrust liability
under an apparent authority theory.
[
Footnote 10]
Permitting private plaintiffs to sue defendants like ASME will
make that incentive especially powerful, because private suits are
an important element of the Nation's antitrust enforcement
effort:
"Congress created the treble damages remedy . . . precisely for
the purpose of encouraging
private challenges to antitrust
violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to
the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for
enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations."
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.
S. 330,
442 U. S. 344
(1979) (emphasis in original).
[
Footnote 11]
The apparent authority rule is also consistent with the
congressional desire that the antitrust laws sweep broadly.
Congress extended antitrust liability to "[e]very person," 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and defined "person" to include corporations and
associations, 15 U.S.C. § 7.
[
Footnote 12]
ASME insists that the Court foreclosed imposition of civil
antitrust liability based on apparent authority in
Mine Workers
v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344
(1922), and
Coronado Coal Co. v. Mine Workers,
268 U. S. 295
(1925). Those cases, however, are not controlling here. The Court
expressly pointed out: "Here it is not a question . . . of holding
out an appearance of authority on which some third person acts."
259 U.S. at
259 U. S. 395;
268 U.S. at
268 U. S.
304-305. In fact, it noted:
"A corporation is responsible for the wrongs committed by its
agents in the course of its business, and this principle is
enforced against the contention that torts are
ultra vires
of the corporation."
259 U.S. at
259 U. S. 395;
268 U.S. at
268 U. S.
304.
[
Footnote 13]
The dissent argues, unconvincingly to us, that imposing
antitrust liability on ASME will not advance enforcement of the
antitrust laws.
The dissent claims that the apparent authority rule will
"encourag[e] plaintiffs to seek recovery from nonprofit
organizations, rather than from the commercial enterprises that
benefited from the violation."
Post at
456 U. S. 591.
Here, the dissent engages in "curious reasoning,"
see
ibid., because today's decision does not encourage a plaintiff
to sue any particular defendant to the exclusion of others; it
merely lists organizations like ASME among the possible defendants
in cases similar to this one. Indeed, although the litigation in
this case ended with ASME as the only remaining defendant, it seems
likely that, in general, a plaintiff will prefer to bring a
corporate defendant like M&M (ITT) before a jury, rather than a
nonprofit organization that understandably may appeal to a jury's
sympathies and that may not provide so deep a pocket as a
commercial enterprise.
In addition, the dissent insists that ASME and other such
organizations cannot take steps to reduce the likelihood that
antitrust violations like the one that occurred in this case will
take place in the future.
Post at
456 U. S.
591-592, n. 17. Evidently ASME does not agree, because
it has instituted new procedures specifically in response to this
suit.
See n 15,
infra. The dissent simply refuses to accept that ASME and
other such organizations can react to potential antitrust liability
by making their associations less subject to fraudulent
manipulation.
[
Footnote 14]
A majority of courts, however, have held corporations liable for
punitive damages imposed because of the acts of their agents, in
the absence of approval or ratification.
See W. Prosser,
Law of Torts 12 (4th ed.1971).
E.g., Kelite Products, Inc. v.
Binzel, 224 F.2d 131, 144 (CA5 1955) ("[T]he jury may, in its
discretion, assess punitive damages against a corporate defendant
for oppressive acts of its agent done in the course of his
employment, regardless of actual authority or ratification");
Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 143 Okla.
196, 200, 288 P. 309, 313 (1930) (holding corporate principal
liable for punitive damages, noting that "the legal malice of the
servant is the legal malice of the corporation"). In fact, the
Court may have departed from the trend of late 19th-century
decisions when it issued
Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v.
Prentice, 147 U. S. 101
(1893), requiring the principal's participation, approval, or
ratification.
See Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Holdfodt, 86
Ill. 455, 459 (1877) ("if the wrongful act of the agent is
perpetrated while ostensibly discharging duties within the scope of
the corporate purposes, the corporation may be liable to vindictive
damages");
see also Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74
Miss. 782, 803-805, 22 So. 53, 57-59 (1897);
Goddard v. Grand
Trunk R. Co., 57 Me. 202, 223-224 (1869).
[
Footnote 15]
Indeed, ASME has initiated procedures to protect against similar
misadventures in the future. After its experience with the
Hydrolevel affair, ASME began issuing a publication containing all
written technical inquiries pertaining to codes and their
interpretations, a publication available through subscription.
See ASME Court of Appeals Exhibit Volume, p. 110; App. in
Nos. 79-7254, 79-7260 (CA2), pp. 784 and 804. Apparently, ASME now
gives its interpretations close scrutiny through the publication
process. According to the publication's foreword, "[i]n some few
instances, a review of the interpretation revealed a need for
corrections of a technical nature." In those cases, ASME published
"a corrected interpretation . . . immediately after the original
reply."
See Interpretations, ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Foreword (No. 7: Replies to Technical Inquiries
January 1, 1980, through June 30, 1980). In addition, the readers
are advised that ASME may reconsider its interpretation "when or if
additional information is available which the inquirer believes
might affect the interpretation."
Ibid.
ASME's new procedure illustrates that the standard-setting
organization itself is in the best position to prevent antitrust
violations committed by its agents acting with apparent authority,
and therefore that the policies of antitrust and agency law call
for imposition of liability upon ASME.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment. However, I do not agree with the
reasoning that leads the Court to its conclusion. I agree with the
result reached, since petitioner permitted itself to be used to
further the scheme which caused injury to respondent. At no time
did petitioner disavow the challenged conduct of its members who
misused their positions in the Society. Under the instructions
approved by petitioner and given by the District Court, the jury
found that petitioner had "ratified or adopted" the conduct in
question.
* On that basis,
the judgment against petitioner should be affirmed, but no general
rule can appropriately be drawn from the Court's holding.
* The District Court instructed the jury that it could find
petitioner liable for the acts of its members only if they acted on
behalf of the corporation within the scope of their actual
authority or if the corporation thereafter ratified or adopted
their acts. Judge Weinstein refused to give the apparent authority
instruction proposed by respondent. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals did not rest on the narrow ratification theory underlying
the District Court judgment, but instead reached out to decide that
petitioner is liable for the acts of its members if those acts are
found to be within their apparent authority: the jury never found
liability on that theory, and the Court of Appeals went "out of
bounds." I regard that aspect of the Court of Appeals' opinion and
that part of the Court's opinion today as dictum not essential to
support the result reached.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST
join, dissenting.
The Court today adopts an unprecedented theory of antitrust
liability, one applied specifically to a nonprofit standard setting
association but a theory with undefined boundaries that could
encompass a broad spectrum of our country's nonprofit associations.
The theory, based on the agency concept of "apparent authority,"
would impose the potentially
Page 456 U. S. 579
crippling burden of treble damages. In this case, the Court
specifically holds that standard-setting organizations may be held
liable for the acts of their agents even though the organization
never ratified, authorized, or derived any benefit whatsoever from
the fraudulent activity of the agent and even though the agent
acted solely for his private employer's gain. In my view, such an
expansive rule of strict liability, at least as applied to
nonprofit organizations, is inconsistent with the weight of
precedent and the intent of Congress, unsupported by the rules of
agency law that the Court purports to apply, and irrelevant to the
achievement of the goals of the antitrust laws. Accordingly, I
dissent.
I
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) is a
nonprofit, tax-exempt, membership corporation with over 90,000
members. Among its many activities, ASME drafts over 400 codes and
standards. These codes have been developed through the voluntary
efforts of ASME's members, and are a valuable public service. The
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, relevant in this case, is some
18,000 pages in length. In addition to preparing codes and
standards, ASME members -- through committees -- perform the
further service of responding to public inquiries concerning
interpretation of the codes. Some measure of the extent of this
service can be gathered from the 20,0000,000 inquiries a year
received by the organization concerning just the Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code alone. As a result of a fraudulent answer
given by an ASME subcommittee chairman to one of these thousands of
inquiries, the entire organization has been exposed to potentially
crippling liability. [
Footnote
2/1]
Page 456 U. S. 580
Of course, nonprofit associations are subject to the antitrust
laws. The Court has so held on several occasions.
See Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773
(1975). [
Footnote 2/2] Yet the
Court also has noted that the antitrust laws need not be applied to
professional organizations in precisely the same manner as they are
applied to commercial enterprises. In
Goldfarb, supra, for
example, the Court recognized that
"[i]t would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions
as interchangeable with other business activities, and
automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts that
originated in other areas. [
Footnote
2/3]"
Id. at
421 U. S. 788,
n. 17. In view of this recognition, one would not have expected the
Court to take
Page 456 U. S. 581
the occasion of this case to promulgate an expansive rule of
antitrust liability not heretofore applied by it to a commercial
enterprise, much less to a nonprofit organization.
Indeed, the Court points to no case in which any court has held
the apparent authority theory of liability applicable in an
antitrust case. Nor does the Court cite a single decision in which
the apparent authority theory of liability has been applied in a
case involving treble or punitive damages and an agent who acts
without any intention of benefiting the principal. [
Footnote 2/4] In a word, the Court makes new law,
largely ignoring existing precedent.
In
Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.
S. 344 (1922), and
Coronado Coal Co. v. Mine
Workers, 268 U. S. 295
(1925), the Court held that the national union was not liable as
principal for the antitrust violations of the local union. The
Court was hesitant to impose treble damages liability on a
membership organization in the absence of clear evidence showing
ratification or authorization. [
Footnote 2/5] Even in the context
Page 456 U. S. 582
of commercial enterprises, the Courts of Appeals that have
considered the matter appear to reject antitrust liability upon
mere apparent authority. [
Footnote
2/6]
Moreover, the Court as much as concedes that an apparent
authority rule of liability has rarely, if ever, been used to
impose punitive damages upon the principal.
See ante at
456 U. S. 570,
n. 7. [
Footnote 2/7] Rather than
contest this well-established rule of
Page 456 U. S. 583
agency law, the Court argues that treble damages are not
punitive or, even if they are, the purposes of the antitrust laws
override this basic rule of the law of agency. In fact, the Court
often has characterized treble damages liability as punitive: "The
very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and
to deter future, unlawful conduct."
Texas Industries, Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630,
451 U. S. 639
(1981).
See P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law �
311b (1978) ("whether or not compensatory damages ever punish,
treble damages are indisputably punishment"). In the context of a
nonprofit tax-exempt organization, it would seem even clearer that
treble damages primarily punish, and are intended to do so. There
is no element of restitution here; ASME has derived no ill-gotten
gain from the misdeeds of its disloyal agent.
In short, the Court launches on an uncharted course. I know of
no antitrust decision that has imposed treble damages liability
upon a commercial enterprise, let alone a nonprofit organization,
solely on an apparent authority theory of liability. [
Footnote 2/8] The antitrust laws have been
effectively enforced for over 90 years without the need for such a
theory of liability. Indeed, the very facts of this case belie the
necessity
Page 456 U. S. 584
of simply creating a new theory of liability; the jury found
ASME liable not upon a theory of apparent authority, but upon the
traditional basis of ratification or authorization. The apparent
authority rationale was not even argued to the Second Circuit on
appeal. The Second Circuit, and now this Court, reach out
unnecessarily to embrace a dubious new doctrine. That the Court
chooses the case of a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization to
announce its new rule is particularly inappropriate. Nor can the
Court's decision be squared with the intent of Congress in enacting
the Sherman Act.
II
This case comes before us as an antitrust suit under the Sherman
Act. Our focus should be on the intent of Congress. [
Footnote 2/9]
See Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., supra, at
451 U. S. 639.
And that intent emerges clearly from the legislative history:
Page 456 U. S. 585
"[The Sherman Act] was enacted in the era of 'trusts' and of
'combinations' of businesses and of capital organized and directed
to control of the market by suppression of competition in the
marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of which
had become a matter of public concern. The end sought was the
prevention of restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise
prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of
purchasers or consumers of goods and services. . . ."
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.
S. 469,
310 U. S.
492-493 (1940).
Senator Sherman twice explained that his bill was directed at
anticompetitive
business activity, and not at voluntary
associations. In response to a request that the legislation be more
clearly tailored to "these great trusts, these great corporations,
these large moneyed institutions," Senator Sherman answered as
follows:
"The bill as reported contains three or four simple propositions
which relate only to contracts, combinations, agreements made with
a view and designed to carry out a certain purpose. . . . It does
not interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations .
. . to advance the interests of a particular trade or occupation. .
. . They are not business combinations. They do not deal with
contracts, agreements, etc. They have no connection with them."
21 Cong.Rec. 2562 (1890).
When Senator Hoar expressed the concern that the bill would
prohibit temperance organizations, and proposed an amendment to
exclude them from the bill, Senator Sherman spoke reassuringly:
"I have no objection to [this] amendment, but I do not see any
reason for putting in temperance societies any more than churches
or school-houses or any other kind of
Page 456 U. S. 586
moral or educational associations that may be organized. Such an
association is not in any sense a combination or arrangement made
to interfere with interstate commerce."
Id. at 2658.
This legislative history does not indicate that nonprofit
associations are exempt from the antitrust laws.
See Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773
(1975). But it does counsel against adopting a new rule of agency
law that extends the exposure of such organizations to potentially
destructive treble damages liability.
In addition to the legislative history, it is particularly
relevant -- in view of the Court's reliance on the modern law of
agency -- to consider the accepted law of agency as it existed at
the time the Sherman Act was passed. [
Footnote 2/10] It was clear under basic principles then
established that charitable organizations were not liable for the
torts of their agents. [
Footnote
2/11]
Page 456 U. S. 587
Whether a nonprofit, tax-exempt, public service association
would have been considered a "charity" is not clear, but one would
think that it well might have been. [
Footnote 2/12]
Moreover, under the laws of agency as known to the Congress that
passed the Sherman Act, it was far from clear -- even in cases
involving commercial enterprises -- that a principal could be held
liable for the deliberate torts of his agent. According to one
treatise of the time,
"[w]hile . . . it is well settled that the principal is liable
for the negligent act of his agent, committed in the course of his
employment, it has been held in many cases that he is not liable
for the agent's willful or malicious act."
F. Mechem, Law of Agency § 740 (1889) (hereafter Mechem).
[
Footnote 2/13] Indeed, the Court
acknowledges
Page 456 U. S. 588
this much when it notes that in
Friedlander v. Texas &
Pacific R. Co., 130 U. S. 416
(1889) -- decided the year before the Sherman Act was passed --
"the Court held that an employer was not liable for the fraud of
his agent when the employer could derive no benefit from the
agent's fraud."
Ante at
456 U. S. 567.
[
Footnote 2/14]
Finally, no principle of agency law was more firmly established
in 1890 -- or now, for that matter -- than that
punitive
damages are not awarded against a principal for the acts of an
agent acting only with apparent authority and without any intention
of benefiting the principal. Indeed, this Court
Page 456 U. S. 589
went further, holding more generally that
"'punitive or vindictive damages, or smart money, [are] not to
be allowed as against the principal unless the principal
participated in the wrongful act of the agent.'"
Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. at
147 U. S. 114,
quoting
Hagan v. Providence & Worcester R. Co., 3 R.I.
88, 91 (1854). [
Footnote
2/15]
Although an inquiry into the legislative history and the law of
agency is not conclusive, it does cast serious doubt on the Court's
choice of this case to promulgate a new rule of antitrust
liability. Whatever the merits of an apparent authority rule of
liability for commercial enterprises, in the case of a treble
damages action against a nonprofit organization, such a rule is
inconsistent with what appears to have been the intent of Congress
in enacting the Sherman Act.
Page 456 U. S. 590
III
The underlying theme of the Court's opinion seems to be that any
rule of agency law that widens the net of antitrust enforcement and
liability should be adopted. Yet the Court has never used such a
single-minded approach in the past. In
United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422
(1978), for example, the Court held that intent is a necessary
element of a criminal antitrust offense. The Court was unwilling to
assume that Congress had intended to create a strict liability
crime despite the potential increase in deterrence. Similarly, in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.
S. 720 (1977), the Court held that indirect purchasers
could not use a "pass-on" theory to recover treble damages from an
antitrust violator. The Court rejected the argument that the
antitrust laws would be more effective were the class of potential
plaintiffs widened. On the contrary,
"the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by
concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct
purchasers, rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially
affected by the overcharge to sue."
Id. at
431 U. S. 735.
Nor would the Court accept a rule that might permit both indirect
and direct purchasers to sue for the same overcharge. Such a rule
"would create a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants."
Id. at
431 U. S. 730.
Thus, the Court has adopted a more discerning approach to questions
of antitrust liability in the past -- an approach that considers
the fairness and appropriateness of a rule in addition to its
perceived potential for deterrence.
The Court argues that its expanded rule of liability furthers
effective antitrust enforcement. One may question whether a rule of
liability developed so late in the day and with so little support
in precedent can be described as necessary to antitrust
enforcement. When one considers further that the jury found ASME
liable under traditional principles, the need for an expanded rule
becomes even less credible. Nor does the Court explain how its rule
of apparent authority serves the purpose of effective antitrust
enforcement. The
Page 456 U. S. 591
primary beneficiary in this case was McDonnell & Miller, the
manufacturing company that arranged for the fraudulent ruling by
the ASME subcommittee chairman. The sole purpose of the fraud was
to disadvantage McDonnell & Miller's competitor. The focus of
Hydrolevel's attack, however, has been on ASME. [
Footnote 2/16] It is curious reasoning to argue,
as the Court does, that a rule that encourages plaintiffs to seek
recovery from nonprofit organizations, rather than from the
commercial enterprises that benefited from the violation, will
facilitate proper antitrust enforcement. [
Footnote 2/17]
Page 456 U. S. 592
In a more fundamental sense, the Court's assignment of liability
to ASME on a theory of apparent authority simply has no relevance
to the furtherance of the purposes of the antitrust laws. ASME is
not a competitor. The competition here was between McDonnell &
Miller, Inc., and Hydrolevel. Of course, if ASME ratifies the
fraudulent act of its agent, as the jury found, liability should
attach. But the Court has devised what amounts to a rule of strict
liability for voluntary associations in antitrust cases. Under the
Court's rule, ASME would be liable if an ASME building employee
pilfered ASME stationery and supplied it to McDonnell & Miller.
Similarly, if a private pharmaceutical school -- a tax-exempt
corporation like ASME -- released a study condemning a particular
drug, because a competing drug company had suborned the professor
who wrote the report, the Court's rule would subject the school to
the full brunt of treble damages.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires a contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The Court attaches liability
in this case on the dubious notion that ASME somehow has
"conspired" with McDonnell & Miller. Yet it stretches the
concept of vicarious liability beyond its rational limits to
conceive of Hardin and James as conspiring on behalf of ASME when
they acted solely for the benefit of McDonnell & Miller and
against the interests of ASME. [
Footnote 2/18] The Court simply opens new vistas in the
law of conspiracy and vicarious liability, as well as in the
imposition of the harsh penalty of treble damages.
Page 456 U. S. 593
Whatever the application of agency law in its traditional
setting, application of the most expansive rules of liability in
the context of antitrust treble damages and nonprofit, tax-exempt
associations threatens serious injustice and overdeterrence. There
is no way in which an association adequately can protect itself
from this sort of liability. There is no chain of delegated
authority, from stockholders through directors and officers, in the
typical voluntary association. The members of these associations
exercise a far less structured control than the stockholders and
directors of a commercial enterprise. Perhaps ASME will attempt to
protect itself by ceasing to respond to inquiries concerning its
codes. That hardly would contribute either to antitrust enforcement
or to the public welfare. And whereas a commercial enterprise may
have the resources to bear a treble damages award, the same cannot
be said of most nonprofit organizations. [
Footnote 2/19]
The Court is so zealous to impose treble damages liability that
it ignores a basic purpose of the Sherman Act: the preservation of
private action contributing to the public welfare.
See
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
Page 456 U. S. 594
at
438 U. S.
438-443. ASME industry standard-setting can have a
significant potential for consumer benefit: for example, its boiler
safety information can be expensive if consumers are forced to gain
it only by their own experience or by the creation of another
bureaucracy. The Court's policy discussion takes no account of this
potential cost. Rather, it appears to be so concerned with imposing
liability that it puts at risk much of the beneficial private
activity of the voluntary associations of our country.
How far the Court's holding extends is unclear. The Court
emphasizes that ASME is a standard-setting organization. Yet it
does not limit its rationale to these particular organizations. One
must be concerned whether the new doctrine and the sweep of the
Court's language will be read as exposing the array of nonprofit
associations -- professional, charitable, educational, and even
religious -- to a new theory of strict liability in treble
damages.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The District Court entered a judgment against ASME in an amount
in excess of $7 million -- a sum that would destroy many such
organizations. By contrast, McDonnell & Miller, Inc., and
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co., commercial
enterprises owned by International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.,
and the beneficiaries of the fraudulent conduct in this case, have
settled for $725,000 and $75,000 respectively. Curiously, the Court
speaks of the "wisdom" of a rule that encourages such an
inequitable result.
Ante at
456 U. S. 673.
The Court correctly notes that the Court of Appeals reversed the
damages award against ASME and remanded for a new estimation.
Perhaps the final award against ASME will be substantially less
than the $7.5 million judgment originally entered. Yet there is no
assurance of this.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Although associations now are viewed as being within the scope
of the antitrust laws, to my knowledge, this is the first case in
which the Court has held explicitly that a nonprofit, tax-exempt
association is subject to treble damages liability.
Cf.
Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After
Lafayette, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 435, 455 (1981) (footnote
omitted) ("[A]ntitrust liability does not necessarily call for a
damage remedy. . . . The Supreme Court may come to agree that
antitrust liability may vary according to the remedies
sought").
ASME refers to itself as a "society." I use the words
"organization" and "association" interchangeably to describe a
broad range of nonprofit, membership entities and tax-exempt
organizations.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Goldfarb
"properly left to the Court some flexibility in considering how
to apply traditional Sherman Act concepts to professions long
consigned to self-regulation."
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U. S. 679,
435 U. S. 699
(1978) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
See id. at
435 U. S. 701
(stressing the need for "elbowroom for realistic application of the
Sherman Act" to other than commercial enterprises).
[
Footnote 2/4]
The Court cites to several decisions,
ante at
456 U. S. 575,
n. 14, in which courts have levied punitive damages upon the
principal for the "unauthorized" acts of an agent. It is not clear
that any of these decisions holds the principal liable upon the
apparent authority of an agent acting without intent to benefit the
principal. None of them concerns the antitrust laws. None involves
a nonprofit entity.
[
Footnote 2/5]
"[A] trades-union . . . might be held liable . . . , but
certainly it must be clearly shown, in order to impose such a
liability on an association of 450,000 men, that what was done was
done by their agents in accordance with their fundamental agreement
of association."
Coronado Coal Co., 268 U.S. at
268 U. S. 304.
The Court refused to impose liability on the national union simply
because it had the authority to discipline the local.
See Mine
Workers, 259 U.S. at
259 U. S. 395.
Moreover, the Court indicated that this was not a case in which a
theory of apparent authority might be applied -- despite the
national union's power over the local and despite the support of
the strike by the president of the national union: "Here it is not
a question of contract or of holding out an appearance of authority
on which some third person acts."
Ibid. The majority
quotes this language,
see ante at
456 U. S. 573,
n. 12, but misses its point. The
Mine Workers Court well
could have characterized the case before it as involving an
exercise of apparent authority by the local union or the national
president; it refused to do so.
See Truck Drivers' Local No. 41
v. United States, 128 F.2d 227, 235 (CA8 1942) (viewing the
holding in
Mine Workers as rejecting an apparent authority
theory of antitrust liability).
[
Footnote 2/6]
See United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (CA3 1970);
United
States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090
(CA5 1978);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d
1000 (CA9 1972).
Accord, Truck Drivers' Local No. 421 v. United
States, supra, at 235 (union not liable for the antitrust
violations of a local division: "To bind the union in a situation
such as this, actual and authorized agency was necessary; mere
apparent authority would not be sufficient").
In
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., supra, for
example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled out
liability on apparent authority by requiring that the agent hold a
"purpose to benefit the corporation."
Id. at 1006, n. 4.
In light of the rule adopted by the Court today, it is ironic that
the Court of Appeals in
Hilton Hotels considered that its
rule of liability was actually a broad one. Although implicitly
rejecting a rule of apparent authority, the court held that a
corporation could be liable for the acts of its agents "even when
done against company orders."
Id. at 1004. The court
argued that such an expansive rule of liability was justified in
the case before it, involving a commercial enterprise, because the
Sherman Act was "primarily concerned with the activities of
business entities."
Ibid. A rule promoting corporate
liability was supported further by the consideration that antitrust
violations "are usually motivated by a desire to enhance profits,"
"involve basic policy decisions, and must be implemented over an
extended period of time," and, "if a violation of the Sherman Act
occurs, the corporation, and not the individual agents, will have
realized the profits from the illegal activity."
Id. at
1006. None of these considerations in support of a broad rule of
liability applies to the fraudulent, self-interested conduct of
ASME members in this case. Yet the Court adopts a rule of liability
far broader than that stated by the Ninth Circuit with such
care.
[
Footnote 2/7]
In
Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice,
147 U. S. 101,
147 U. S. 107
(1893), the Court held that
"[a] principal . . . cannot be held liable for exemplary or
punitive damages, merely by reason of wanton, oppressive or
malicious intent on the part of the agent."
In a generally similar context, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a principal was not subject to double
damages under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 231, for the fraud
of an agent acting without intent to benefit the principal.
See
United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 500 (1966)
("[T]he present action is not primarily one for the recovery of a
loss caused by an employee, but is one which, if successful, must
result in a recovery wholly out of proportion to actual loss. . . .
[T]he case calls for the application of the rule . . . that the
knowledge or guilty intent of an agent not acting with a purpose to
benefit his employer will not be imputed to the employer").
[
Footnote 2/8]
Hydrolevel argues that
Continental Baking Co. v. United
States, 281 F.2d 137, 150-151 (CA6 1960), and
United
States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 468, n. 5
(CA3 1979), support an apparent authority theory of liability in
antitrust cases. Yet in
Continental Baking, the court
endorsed an instruction that included an "apparent" authority
component on the theory that a corporation must "answer for [an
agent's] violations of law which inure to the corporation's
benefit." There was no such benefit in this case. Moreover, in
Continental Group, the court simply affirmed an apparent
authority instruction without comment, in a footnote, in a case
presenting many other issues. The agents in that case were clearly
acting for the benefit of their corporations, and the court may
have considered that the apparent authority instruction, if error,
was harmless.
In any event, the comparative paucity of authority on the
question of apparent authority liability in antitrust cases simply
underscores that the Court today is making new law. It also is
doing so needlessly as ASME was neither tried nor found liable on
the basis of apparent authority.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Relying on a novel public policy as to nonprofit associations,
the Court makes little effort to ascertain the intent of Congress
either through examining the legislative history or the common law
then existing. Indeed, the Court implies that the agency law of the
19th century and "Victorian" common law are irrelevant.
See
ante at
456 U. S.
568-569, n. 6. In seeking to understand the Sherman Act,
this Court frequently has found it necessary to "delve" into the
history of the common law, both "Victorian" and from earlier eras.
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.
1,
221 U. S. 51-62
(1911). The Civil Rights Acts of the 19th century were also the
work of a "Victorian" Congress, yet we have looked both to the
legislative history and to the common law when interpreting those
Acts.
See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.
S. 547 (1967).
[
Footnote 2/10]
In
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U. S. 630,
451 U. S. 644,
n. 17 (1981), the Court stated that the rules of common law in
effect at the time the Act was passed were relevant to an inquiry
into congressional intent:
"[I]t is clear that, when the Sherman Act was adopted, the
common law did not provide a right to contribution among
tortfeasors participating in proscribed conduct. One permissible,
though not mandatory, inference is that Congress relied on courts'
continuing to apply principles in effect at the time of
enactment."
The contemporary case law is relevant precisely because
"Congress . . . did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to
delineate the full meaning of the statute or its application in
concrete situations. The legislative history makes it perfectly
clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute's
broad mandate by drawing on common law tradition."
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. at
435 U. S.
688.
[
Footnote 2/11]
"Where a corporation or trustees are conducting a charity with
funds devoted to that purpose, the charitable organization is not
liable for the torts of its agents or servants, as"
"it would be against all law and all equity to take those trust
funds, so contributed for a special, charitable purpose, to
compensate injuries inflicted or occasioned by the negligence of
the agents or servants."
E. Huffcut, Elements of the Law of Agency 161, Pp. 176-177
(1895).
[
Footnote 2/12]
In describing the liability of the principal for the torts of
the agent, the First Restatement of Agency, published in 1933,
cautioned that it did not address "any limitations upon liability
because of . . . rules applicable to special classes, such as
charitable organizations." Restatement of Agency 458.
[
Footnote 2/13]
The complete statement of the rule by Mechem is as follows:
"While . . . it is well settled that the principal is liable for
the negligent act of his agent committed in the course of his
employment, it has been held in many cases that he is not liable
for the agent's willful or malicious act. . . ."
"The tendency of modern cases, however, is to attach less
importance to the intention of the agent and more to the question
whether the act was done within the scope of the agent's
employment; and it is believed that the true rule may be said to be
that the principal is responsible for the wilful or malicious acts
of his agent if they are done in the course of his employment and
within the scope of his authority,
but that the principal is
not liable for such acts, unless previously expressly authorized,
or subsequently ratified, when they are done outside of the course
of the agent's employment and beyond the scope of his authority, as
where the agent steps aside from his employment to gratify some
personal animosity or to give vent to some private feeling of his
own."
(Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)
Although the concept of within "scope of authority" is not
always easy to apply, it is beyond rational doubt that, in this
case, the fraudulent activity of Hardin and James, on behalf of
McDonnell & Miller, Inc., was not within the scope of any
authority of ASME. In addition, some courts have found that "[a]
purpose to benefit the corporation is necessary to bring the
agent's acts within the scope of his employment."
See United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d at 1006, n. 4. It is
just such a purpose that was lacking in this case. Indeed, the
"agents" in this case were not acting simply for their own
malicious purposes, they were acting on behalf of another principal
with interests inimical to those of ASME. It is far from clear
under principles of agency law that Hardin and James are properly
described as the "agents" of ASME when they act to serve a
different principal and without any intention of benefiting ASME.
See Mechem § 67 ("A person may act as agent of two or more
principals . . . if his duties to each are not such as to require .
. . incompatible things").
The Court suggests that there was a division among the state
courts on the question of the principal's liability for the
malicious acts of an agent.
See ante at
456 U. S.
568-569, n. 6. But there was no division in the federal
courts, the courts charged with enforcement of the Sherman Act. In
any event, surely the point is not whether every state court
recognized the rule stated by this Court in
Friedlander v.
Texas & Pacific R. Co., 130 U. S. 416
(1889). Rather, if there was any uncertainty as to the liability of
a commercial principal for the torts of an agent acting in the
course of employment, how much clearer must it be that a nonprofit
voluntary association would not have been held liable in treble
damages for the acts of an agent acting with apparent authority
only.
[
Footnote 2/14]
The Court notes that
Friedlander was later overruled by
Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 278 U.
S. 349 (1929). The relevance of this fact to Congress'
intentions is not clear to me. There is "no federal general common
law."
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64,
304 U. S. 78
(1938). There is no federal general law of agency. Rather we are
engaged here in an exercise in statutory construction.
Cf.
21 Cong.Rec. 3149 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Morgan) ("It is very true
that we use common law terms here and common law definitions in
order to define an offense which is, in itself, comparatively new,
but it is not a common law jurisdiction that we are conferring upon
the circuit courts of the United States," quoted in
Texas
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. at
451 U. S.
644).
[
Footnote 2/15]
The Court responds by citing to several
state law
decisions indicating that, in some States, a principal might have
been held liable in punitive damages for the acts of an agent.
See ante at
456 U. S. 575,
n. 14. I believe the Court overstates the extent to which
19th-century state courts imposed punitive damages on the principal
for the deliberate torts of an agent.
See Mechem § 751;
cf. Mayo Hotel Co. v. Dancier, 143 Okla. 196,
200, 288 P. 309, 312 (1930) ("There are . . . respectable
authorities, some of them recent ones, definitely holding that a
corporation cannot be subjected to exemplary damages because of the
malicious . . . acts of its agents and servants where such acts are
not authorized or afterwards ratified. . . . Many of the state
courts,
and a majority of the federal courts, expressly
adhere to that doctrine") (emphasis added). More significantly, the
Court does not make clear which, if any, of the state decisions it
relies upon held the principal liable for punitive damages upon the
apparent authority of an agent acting without any intention of
benefiting the principal. I had thought that this was the question
before us. And again the Court misses the basic point: if the rule
of liability adopted by the Court today would have seemed
questionable in 1890 even as applied to a commercial enterprise,
can there be any basis for believing that Congress intended such an
extreme rule of liability to be applied to voluntary, nonprofit
associations?
[
Footnote 2/16]
Damages were awarded against ASME in an amount of $7.5 million.
By contrast, McDonnell & Miller settled the suit for less than
a million dollars.
See 456
U.S. 556fn2/1|>n. 1,
supra. The majority's
contention that "a plaintiff will prefer to bring a corporate
defendant like M&M (ITT) before a jury,"
ante at
456 U. S. 574,
n. 13, is not borne out by this case. If the Court has some other
case in mind, it does not cite to it.
[
Footnote 2/17]
The Court's argument that the imposition of treble damages will
advance antitrust enforcement has a hollow ring in the context of a
membership, nonprofit organization. Organizations of this kind
normally function through committees composed -- as in this case --
of volunteers who are not employees, serve only at infrequent
intervals, and are virtually uncontrollable by what usually is a
small headquarters staff.
The Court suggests that voluntary organizations can "take steps
to reduce the likelihood that antitrust violations like the one
that occurred in this case will take place in the future."
Ibid. The Court then refers to "new procedures" adopted by
ASME, and criticizes my dissent for refusing
"to accept that ASME and other such organizations can react to
potential antitrust liability by making their associations less
subject to fraudulent manipulation."
Ibid. .
It would be enlightening if the Court would explain how such an
association can protect itself even from "mere tort" liability,
see ante at
456 U. S. 569,
n. 6, much less the treble damages liability imposed in this case,
in light of the Court's adoption of the apparent authority theory
of liability. Review procedures well may be helpful to prevent
mistakes made in good faith on behalf of an association. But no set
of rules and regulations, and no procedures however elaborate, can
protect adequately against fraud and disloyalty. In this case, for
example, if ASME had required approval by a review committee or
even by its governing body before the release of each of the
thousands of ruling letters, a member bent on fraud could forge
evidence or otherwise circumvent most safeguards. In practice, a
rule of apparent authority can be a rule of strict liability as the
Court today holds in this case. In the context of a loosely
structured, voluntary nonprofit association, it may be wholly
impractical to adopt any measures that will lessen substantially
the likelihood of liability, and if there is liability, the Court
also would impose punitive damages.
[
Footnote 2/18]
The intersection of the law of agency and vicarious liability
with the law of conspiracy makes this a complex case. Yet the Court
does not recognize this complexity. It so expands the concept of
vicarious liability as to leave little content, in this case, to
the requirement in § 1 of the Sherman Act that antitrust plaintiffs
demonstrate a contract, combination, or conspiracy. Indeed, the
Court never identifies who conspired with whom. Did James -- acting
for ASME -- conspire with Hardin -- acting for McDonnell &
Miller, Inc., and Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance
Co.? Or was it the other way around? Could it be said, under the
Court's theory, that James had conspired with himself -- as a
double agent -- thereby committing both of his "principals" to an
antitrust conspiracy? In my view, it makes more sense to view the
matter as a conspiracy between the agents of McDonnell &
Miller, Inc., and Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance
Co. The Court's theory makes possible ratification by ASME
irrelevant. In this light, ASME was as much a victim of this
conspiracy as Hydrolevel.
[
Footnote 2/19]
It is relevant to note that a nonprofit organization cannot
reduce the burden of a treble damages award by deducting the award
as a business expense.
See P. Areeda & D. Turner,
Antitrust Law § 311a (1978) ("treble damages are generally a
deductible business expense for federal income tax purposes").