A section (§ 309.515, subd. 1(b)) of Minnesota's charitable
solicitations Act provides that only those religious organizations
that receive more than half of their total contributions from
members or affiliated organizations are exempt from the
registration and reporting requirements of the Act. The individual
appellees, claiming to be followers of the tenets of appellee
Unification Church (later joined as a plaintiff) brought suit in
Federal District Court seeking a declaration that the statute, on
its face and as applied to them, violated,
inter alia, the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and also seeking
injunctive relief. After obtaining a preliminary injunction,
appellees moved for summary judgment. Upon finding that the
"overbreadth" doctrine gave appellees standing to challenge the
statute, the Magistrate to whom the action had been transferred
held that the application of the statute to religious organizations
violated the Establishment Clause, and therefore recommended
declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. The District Court,
accepting this recommendation, entered summary judgment for
appellees. The Court of Appeals affirmed on both the standing issue
and on the merits. But the court, disagreeing with the District
Court's conclusion that appellees and others should enjoy the
religious organization exemption from the Act merely by claiming to
be such organizations, held that proof of religious organization
status was required in order to gain the exemption, and left the
question of appellees' status "open . . . for further development."
Accordingly, the court vacated the District Court's judgment and
remanded for entry of a modified injunction and further
proceedings.
Held:
1. Appellees have Art. III standing to raise their Establishment
Clause claims. The State attempted to use § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s
fifty percent rule to compel the Unification Church to register and
report under the Act. The fact that the fifty percent rule only
applies to religious organizations compels the conclusion that, at
least for purposes of this suit challenging that application,
appellee Unification Church is a religious organization within the
meaning of the Act. The controversy between
Page 456 U. S. 229
the parties is not rendered any less concrete by the fact that
appellants, in the course of this litigation, have changed their
position to contend that the Unification Church is not a religious
organization within the meaning of the Act, and that therefore it
would not be entitled to an exemption under § 309.515, subd. 1(b)
even if the fifty percent rule were declared unconstitutional. This
is so because the threatened application of § 309.515, subd. 1(b),
and its fifty percent rule to appellees amounts to a distinct and
palpable injury to them, in that it disables them from soliciting
contributions in Minnesota unless they comply with the registration
and reporting requirements of the Act. Moreover, there is a causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.
The fact that appellees have not yet shown an entitlement to a
permanent injunction barring the State from subjecting them to the
Act's registration and reporting requirements does not detract from
the palpability of the particular and discrete injury caused to
appellees. Pp.
456 U. S.
238-244.
2. Section 309.515, subd. 1(b), in setting up precisely the sort
of official denominational preference forbidden by the First
Amendment, violates the Establishment Clause. Pp.
456 U. S.
244-255.
(a) Since the challenged statute grants denominational
preferences, it must be treated as suspect, and strict scrutiny
must be applied in adjudging its constitutionality. Pp.
456 U. S.
244-246.
(b) Assuming,
arguendo, that appellants' asserted
interest in preventing fraudulent solicitations is a "compelling"
interest, appellants have nevertheless failed to demonstrate that §
309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule is "closely fitted" to
that interest. Appellants' argument to the contrary is based on
three premises: (1) that members of a religious organization can
and will exercise supervision and control over the solicitation
activities of the organization when membership contributions exceed
fifty percent; (2) that membership control, assuming its existence,
is an adequate safeguard against abusive solicitations of the
public; and (3) that the need for public disclosure rises in
proportion with the percentage of nonmember contributions. There is
no substantial support in the record for any of these premises. Pp.
456 U. S.
246-251.
(c) Where the principal effect of § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty
percent rule is to impose the Act's registration and reporting
requirements on some religious organizations but not on others, the
"risk of politicizing religion" inhering in the statute is obvious.
Pp.
456 U. S.
251-255.
637 F.2d 562, affirmed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J.,
filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
456 U. S. 256.
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
Page 456 U. S. 230
which REHNQUIST, J., joined,
post, p.
456 U.S. 258. REHNQUIST, J., filed a
dissenting opinion in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE and O'CONNOR,
JJ., joined,
post, p.
456 U. S.
264.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question presented by this appeal is whether a
Minnesota statute, imposing certain registration and reporting
requirements upon only those religious organizations that solicit
more than fifty percent of their funds from nonmembers,
discriminates against such organizations in violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. [
Footnote 1]
I
Appellants are John R. Larson, Commissioner of Securities, and
Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, of the State of Minnesota. They
are, by virtue of their offices, responsible for the implementation
and enforcement of the Minnesota charitable solicitations Act,
Minn.Stat. §§ 309.50-309.61 (1969 and Supp.1982). This Act, in
effect since 1961, provides for a system of registration and
disclosure respecting
Page 456 U. S. 231
charitable organizations, and is designed to protect the
contributing public and charitable beneficiaries against fraudulent
practices in the solicitation of contributions for purportedly
charitable purposes. A charitable organization subject to the Act
must register with the Minnesota Department of Commerce before it
may solicit contributions within the State. § 309.52. With certain
specified exceptions, all charitable organizations registering
under § 309.52 must file an extensive annual report with the
Department, detailing,
inter alia, their total receipts
and income from all sources, their costs of management,
fundraising, and public education, and their transfers of property
or funds out of the State, along with a description of the
recipients and purposes of those transfers. § 309.53. The
Department is authorized by the Act to deny or withdraw the
registration of any charitable organization if the Department finds
that it would be in "the public interest" to do so and if the
organization is found to have engaged in fraudulent, deceptive, or
dishonest practices. § 309.532, subd. 1 (Supp.1982). Further, a
charitable organization is deemed ineligible to maintain its
registration under the Act if it expends or agrees to expend an
"unreasonable amount" for management, general, and fundraising
costs, with those costs being presumed unreasonable if they exceed
thirty percent of the organization's total income and revenue. §
309.555, subd. 1a (Supp.1982).
From 1961 until 1978, all "religious organizations" were
exempted from the requirements of the Act. [
Footnote 2] But effective March 29, 1978, the Minnesota
Legislature amended the Act so as to include a "fifty percent rule"
in the exemption provision covering religious organizations. §
309.515, subd. 1(b). This fifty percent rule provided that only
those religious organizations that received more than half of their
total contributions
Page 456 U. S. 232
from members or affiliated organizations would remain exempt
from the registration and reporting requirements of the Act. 1978
Minn. Laws, ch. 601, § 5. [
Footnote
3]
Shortly after the enactment of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), the
Department notified appellee Holy Spirit Association for the
Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) that it was
required to register under the Act because of the newly enacted
provision. [
Footnote 4]
Appellees Valente, Barber, Haft, and Korman, claiming to be
followers of the tenets of the Unification
Page 456 U. S. 233
Church, responded by bringing the present action in the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota. Appellees
sought a declaration that the Act, on its face and as applied to
them through § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule,
constituted an abridgment of their First Amendment rights of
expression and free exercise of religion, as well as a denial of
their right to equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment; [
Footnote
5] appellees also sought
Page 456 U. S. 234
temporary and permanent injunctive relief. Appellee Unification
Church was later joined as a plaintiff by stipulation of the
parties, and the action was transferred to a United States
Magistrate.
After obtaining a preliminary injunction, [
Footnote 6] appellees moved for summary judgment.
Appellees' evidentiary support for this motion included a
"declaration" of appellee Haft, which described in some detail the
origin, "religious principles," and practices of the Unification
Church. App. A-7 - A-14. The declaration stated that among the
activities emphasized by the Church were "door-to-door and
public-place proselytizing and solicitation of funds to support the
Church,"
id. at A, and that the application of the Act to
the Church through § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule would
deny its members their "religious freedom,"
id. at A-14.
Appellees also argued that, by discriminating among religious
organizations, § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule violated
the Establishment Clause.
Appellants replied that the Act did not infringe appellees'
freedom to exercise their religious beliefs. Appellants sought to
distinguish the present case from
Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U. S. 105
(1943), where this Court invalidated a municipal ordinance that had
required the licensing of Jehovah's Witnesses who solicited
donations in exchange for
Page 456 U. S. 235
religious literature, by arguing that, unlike the activities of
the petitioners in
Murdock, appellees' solicitations bore
no substantial relationship to any religious expression, and that
they were therefore outside the protection of the First Amendment.
[
Footnote 7] Appellants also
contended that the Act did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Finally, appellants argued that appellees were not entitled to
challenge the Act until they had demonstrated that the Unification
Church was a religion and that its fundraising activities were a
religious practice.
The Magistrate determined, however, that it was not necessary
for him to resolve the questions of whether the Unification Church
was a religion and whether appellees' activities were religiously
motivated in order to reach the merits of appellees' claims.
Rather, he found that the "overbreadth" doctrine gave appellees
standing to challenge the Act's constitutionality. On the merits,
the Magistrate held that the Act was facially unconstitutional with
respect to religious organizations, and was therefore entirely void
as to such organizations, because § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty
percent rule failed the second of the three Establishment Clause
"tests" set forth by this Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U. S. 602,
403 U. S.
612-613 (1971). [
Footnote 8] The Magistrate also held on due
Page 456 U. S. 236
process grounds that certain provisions of the Act were
unconstitutional as applied to any groups or persons claiming the
religious organization exemption from the Act. The Magistrate
therefore recommended,
inter alia, that appellees be
granted the declarative and permanent injunctive relief that they
had sought -- namely, a declaration that the Act was
unconstitutional as applied to religious organizations and their
members, and an injunction against enforcement of the Act as to any
religious organization. Accepting these recommendations, the
District Court entered summary judgment in favor of appellees on
these issues. [
Footnote 9]
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 637 F.2d 562 (1981).
On the issue of standing, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court's application of the overbreadth doctrine, citing
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment,
444 U. S. 620,
444 U. S. 634
(1980), for
Page 456 U. S. 237
the proposition that
"a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may
nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially
abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the
court."
637 F.2d at 564-565. On the merits, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's holding that the "inexplicable
religious classification" embodied in the fifty percent rule of §
309.515, subd. 1(b), violated the Establishment Clause. [
Footnote 10]
Id. at
565-570. Applying the Minnesota rule of severability, the Court of
Appeals also held that § 309.515, subd. 1(b), as a whole should not
be stricken from the Act, but rather that the fifty percent rule
should be stricken from § 309.515, subd. 1(b).
Id. at 570.
But the court disagreed with the District Court's conclusion that
appellees and others should enjoy the religious organization
exemption from the Act merely by claiming to be such organizations:
the court held that proof of religious organization status was
required in order to gain the exemption, and left the question of
appellees' status "open . . . for further development."
Id. at 570-571. The Court of Appeals accordingly vacated
the judgment of the District Court and remanded the action for
entry of a modified injunction and for further appropriate
proceedings.
Id. at 571. [
Footnote 11] We noted probable jurisdiction. 452 U.S. 904
(1981).
Page 456 U. S. 238
II
Appellants argue that appellees are not entitled to be heard on
their Establishment Clause claims. Their rationale for this
argument has shifted, however, as this litigation has progressed.
Appellants' position in the courts below was that the Unification
Church was not a religion, and, more importantly, that appellees'
solicitations were not connected with any religious purpose. From
these premises, appellants concluded that appellees were not
entitled to raise their Establishment Clause claims until they had
demonstrated that their activities were within the protection of
that Clause. The courts below rejected this conclusion, instead
applying the overbreadth doctrine in order to allow appellees to
raise their Establishment Clause claims. In this Court, appellants
have taken an entirely new tack. They now argue that the
Unification Church is not a "religious organization" within the
meaning of Minnesota's charitable solicitations Act, and that the
Church therefore would not be entitled to an exemption under §
309.515, subd. 1(b), even if the fifty percent rule were declared
unconstitutional. From this new premise, appellants conclude that
the courts below erred in invalidating § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s
fifty percent rule without first requiring appellees to demonstrate
that they would have been able to maintain their exempt status but
for that rule, and thus that its adoption had caused them injury in
fact. We have considered both of appellants' rationales, and hold
that neither of them has merit.
"The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties
seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction have 'alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
Page 456 U. S. 239
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.'"
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
438 U. S. 59,
438 U. S. 72
(1978), quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.
S. 186,
369 U. S. 204
(1962). This requirement of a "personal stake" must consist of "a
distinct and palpable injury . . .' to the plaintiff," Duke
Power Co., supra at 438 U. S. 72,
quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490,
422 U. S. 501
(1975), and "a `fairly traceable' causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct," Duke Power Co.,
supra at 438 U. S. 72,
quoting Arlinton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252,
429 U. S. 261
(1977). Application of these constitutional standards to the record
before us and the factual findings of the District Court convince
us that the Art. III requirements for standing are plainly met by
appellees.
Appellants argue in this Court that the Unification Church is
not a "religious organization" within the meaning of the Act, and
therefore that appellees cannot demonstrate injury in fact. We note
at the outset, however, that, in the years before 1978, the Act
contained a general exemption provision for all religious
organizations, and that, during those years, the Unification Church
was not required by the State to register and report under the Act.
It was only in 1978, shortly after the addition of the fifty
percent rule to the religious organization exemption, that the
State first attempted to impose the requirements of the Act upon
the Unification Church. And when the State made this attempt, it
deliberately chose to do so in express and exclusive reliance upon
the newly enacted fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b).
See n 4,
supra. [
Footnote
12] The present suit was initiated by appellees in direct
response to that attempt by the State to force the Church's
registration. It is thus plain that appellants'
Page 456 U. S. 240
stated rationale for the application of the Act to appellees was
that § 309.515, subd. 1(b),
did apply to the Unification
Church. [
Footnote 13] But §
309.515, subd. 1(b), by its terms, applies only to religious
organizations. It follows, therefore, that an essential premise of
the State's attempt to require the Unification Church to register
under the Act by virtue of the fifty percent rule in § 309.515,
subd. 1(b), is that the Church is a religious organization. It is
logically untenable for the State to take the position that the
Church is not such an organization, because that position destroys
an essential premise of the exercise of statutory authority at
issue in this suit.
In the courts below, the State joined issue precisely on the
premise that the fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), was
sufficient authority, in itself, to compel appellees' registration.
The adoption of that premise precludes the position
Page 456 U. S. 241
that the Church is not a religious organization. And it remains
entirely clear that, if we were to uphold the constitutionality of
the fifty percent rule, the State would, without more, insist upon
the Church's registration. In this Court, the State has changed its
position, and purports to find independent bases for denying the
Church an exemption from the Act. Considering the development of
this case in the courts below, and recognizing the premise inherent
in the State's attempt to apply the fifty percent rule to
appellees, we do not think that the State's change of position
renders the controversy between these parties any less concrete.
The fact that appellants chose to apply § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and
its fifty percent rule as the sole statutory authority requiring
the Church to register under the Act compels the conclusion that,
at least for purposes of this suit challenging that State
application, the Church is indeed a religious organization within
the meaning of the Act.
With respect to the question of injury in fact, we again take as
the starting point of our analysis the fact that the State
attempted to use § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule in
order to compel the Unification Church to register and report under
the Act. That attempted use of the fifty percent rule as the
State's instrument of compulsion necessarily gives appellees
standing to challenge the constitutional validity of the rule. The
threatened application of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and its fifty
percent rule to the Church surely amounts to a distinct and
palpable injury to appellees: it disables them from soliciting
contributions in the State of Minnesota unless the Church complies
with registration and reporting requirements that are hardly
de
minimis. [
Footnote 14]
Just as surely, there is a fairly traceable causal connection
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct -- here,
between the claimed disabling and the threatened application of §
309.515, subd. 1(b), and its fifty percent rule.
Page 456 U. S. 242
Of course, the Church cannot be assured of a continued religious
organization exemption even in the absence of the fifty percent
rule.
See n 30,
infra. Appellees have not yet shown an entitlement to the
entirety of the broad injunctive relief that they sought in the
District Court -- namely, a permanent injunction barring the State
from subjecting the Church to the registration and reporting
requirements of the Act. But that fact by no means detracts from
the palpability of the particular and discrete injury caused to
appellees by the State's threatened application of § 309.515, subd.
1(b)'s fifty percent rule.
See Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at
429 U. S.
261-262. The Church may indeed be compelled, ultimately,
to register under the Act on some ground other than the fifty
percent rule, and while this fact does affect the nature of the
relief that can properly be granted to appellees on the present
record, it does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear the
present case.
Cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 U. S. 274,
429 U. S. 287
(1977). In sum, contrary to appellants' suggestion, appellees have
clearly demonstrated injury in fact.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent attacks appellees' Art. III standing
by arguing that appellees "have failed to show that a favorable
decision of this Court will redress the injuries of which they
complain."
Post at
456 U. S. 270.
This argument follows naturally from the dissent's premise that the
only meaningful relief that can be given to appellees is a total
exemption from the requirements of the Act.
See post at
456 U. S. 264,
456 U. S. 265,
456 U. S. 270.
But the argument, like the premise, is incorrect. This litigation
began after the State attempted to compel the Church to register
and report under the Act solely on the authority of § 309.515,
subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule. If that rule is declared
unconstitutional, as appellees have requested, then the Church
cannot be required to register and report under the Act by virtue
of that rule. Since that rule was the sole basis for the State's
attempt to compel registration that gave
Page 456 U. S. 243
rise to the present suit, a discrete injury of which appellees
now complain will indeed be completely redressed by a favorable
decision of this Court.
Furthermore, if the fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b),
is declared unconstitutional, then the Church cannot be compelled
to register and report under the Act unless the Church is
determined not to be a religious organization. And, as the Court of
Appeals below observed:
"[A] considerable burden is on the state in questioning a claim
of a religious nature. Strict or narrow construction of a statutory
exemption for religious organizations is not favored.
Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249
F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir.1957, Burger, J.)."
637 F.2d at 570. At the very least, then, a declaration that §
309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule is unconstitutional would
put the State to the task of demonstrating that the Unification
Church is not a religious organization within the meaning of the
Act -- and such a task is surely more burdensome than that of
demonstrating that the Church's proportion of nonmember
contributions exceeds fifty percent. Thus, appellees will be given
substantial and meaningful relief by a favorable decision of this
Court. [
Footnote 15]
Page 456 U. S. 244
Since we conclude that appellees have established Art. III
standing, we turn to the merits of the case. [
Footnote 16]
III
A
The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.
Before the Revolution, religious establishments of differing
denominations were common throughout the Colonies. [
Footnote 17] But the Revolutionary
generation emphatically disclaimed that European legacy, and
"applied the logic of secular liberty to the condition of religion
and the churches." [
Footnote
18] If Parliament had lacked the authority to tax unrepresented
colonists, then by the same token the newly independent States
should be powerless to tax their citizens for the support of a
denomination to which they did not belong. [
Footnote 19] The
Page 456 U. S. 245
force of this reasoning led to the abolition of most
denominational establishments at the state level by the 1780's,
[
Footnote 20] and led
ultimately to the inclusion of the Establishment Clause in the
First Amendment in 1791. [
Footnote 21]
This constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is
inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the Free
Exercise Clause. Madison once noted:
"Security for civil rights must be the same as that for
religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity
of interests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.
[
Footnote 22]"
Madison's vision -- freedom for all religion being guaranteed by
free competition between religions -- naturally assumed that every
denomination would be equally at liberty to exercise and propagate
its beliefs. But such equality would be impossible in an atmosphere
of official denominational preference. Free exercise thus can be
guaranteed only when legislators -- and voters -- are required to
accord to their own religions the very same treatment given to
small, new, or unpopular denominations. As Justice Jackson noted in
another context,
"there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of
law which officials would impose upon a minority
Page 456 U. S. 246
must be imposed generally."
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.
S. 106,
336 U. S. 112
(1949) (concurring opinion).
Since
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 (1947), this Court has adhered to the principle,
clearly manifested in the history and logic of the Establishment
Clause, that no State can "pass laws which aid one religion" or
that "prefer one religion over another."
Id. at
330 U. S. 15.
This principle of denominational neutrality has been restated on
many occasions. In
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.
S. 306 (1952), we said that "[t]he government must be
neutral when it comes to competition between sects."
Id.
at
343 U. S. 314.
In
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (196),
we stated unambiguously:
"The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion. . . . The State may not adopt programs or
practices . . . which 'aid or oppose' any religion. . . . This
prohibition is absolute."
Id. at
393 U. S. 104,
393 U. S. 106,
citing
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203,
374 U. S. 225
(1963). And Justice Goldberg cogently articulated the relationship
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause when
he said that
"[t]he fullest realization of true religious liberty requires
that government . . . effect no favoritism among sects . . . and
that it work deterrence of no religious belief."
Abington School District, supra, at
374 U. S. 305.
In short, when we are presented with a state law granting a
denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the
law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its
constitutionality.
B
The fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), clearly grants
denominational preferences of the sort consistently and firmly
deprecated in our precedents. [
Footnote 23] Consequently,
Page 456 U. S. 247
that rule must be invalidated unless it is justified by a
compelling governmental interest,
cf. Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U. S. 263,
454 U. S.
269-270 (1981), and unless it is closely fitted to
further that interest,
Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U. S. 105,
319 U. S.
116-117 (1943). With that standard of review in mind, we
turn to an examination of the governmental interest asserted by
appellants.
Page 456 U. S. 248
Appellants assert, and we acknowledge, that the State of
Minnesota has a significant interest in protecting its citizens
from abusive practices in the solicitation of funds for charity,
and that this interest retains importance when the solicitation is
conducted by a religious organization. We thus agree with the Court
of Appeals, 637 F.2d at 567, that the Act, "viewed as a whole, has
a valid secular purpose," and we will therefore assume,
arguendo, that the Act generally is addressed to a
sufficiently "compelling" governmental interest. But our inquiry
must focus more narrowly, upon the distinctions drawn by § 309.515,
subd. 1(b), itself. Appellants must demonstrate that the challenged
fifty percent rule is closely fitted to further the interest that
it assertedly serves.
Appellants argue that § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s distinction
between contributions solicited from members and from nonmembers is
eminently sensible. They urge that members are reasonably assumed
to have significant control over the solicitation of contributions
from themselves to their organization, and over the expenditure of
the funds that they contribute, as well. Further, appellants note
that, as a matter of Minnesota law, members of organizations have
greater access than nonmembers to the financial records of the
organization. Appellants conclude:
"Where the safeguards of membership funding do not exist, the
need for public disclosure is obvious. . . ."
". . . As public contributions increase as a percentage of total
contributions, the need for public disclosure increases. . . . The
particular point at which public disclosure should be required . .
. is a determination for the legislature. In this case, the Act's
'majority' distinction is a compelling point, since it is at this
point that the organization becomes predominantly
public-funded."
Brief for Appellants 29.
We reject the argument, for it wholly fails to justify the only
aspect of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), under attack -- the selective
fifty percent rule. Appellants' argument is based on three distinct
premises: that members of a religious organization
Page 456 U. S. 249
can and will exercise supervision and control over the
organization's solicitation activities when membership
contributions exceed fifty percent; that membership control,
assuming its existence, is an adequate safeguard against abusive
solicitations of the public by the organization; and that the need
for public disclosure rises in proportion with the
percentage of nonmember contributions. Acceptance of all
three of these premises is necessary to appellants' conclusion, but
we find no substantial support for any of them in the record.
Regarding the first premise, there is simply nothing suggested
that would justify the assumption that a religious organization
will be supervised and controlled by its members simply because
they contribute more than half of the organization's solicited
income. Even were we able to accept appellants' doubtful assumption
that members will
supervise their religious organization
under such circumstances, [
Footnote 24] the record before us is wholly barren of
support for appellants' further assumption that members will
effectively
control the organization if they contribute
more than half of its solicited income. Appellants have offered no
evidence whatever that members of religious organizations
exempted
Page 456 U. S. 250
by § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule in fact control
their organizations. Indeed, the legislative history of § 309.515,
subd. 1(b), indicates precisely to the contrary. [
Footnote 25] In short, the first premise of
appellants' argument has no merit.
Nor do appellants offer any stronger justification for their
second premise -- that membership control is an adequate safeguard
against abusive solicitations of the public by the organization.
This premise runs directly contrary to the central thesis of the
entire Minnesota charitable solicitations Act -- namely, that
charitable organizations soliciting contributions from the public
cannot be relied upon to regulate themselves, and that state
regulation is accordingly necessary. [
Footnote 26] Appellants offer nothing to suggest why
religious organizations should be treated any differently in this
respect. And even if we were to assume that the members of
religious organizations have some incentive, absent in nonreligious
organizations, to protect the interests of nonmembers solicited by
the organization, appellants' premise would still
Page 456 U. S. 251
fail to justify the fifty percent rule: appellants offer no
reason why the members of religious organizations exempted under §
309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule should have any
greater incentive to protect nonmembers than the members
of nonexempted religious organizations have. Thus we also reject
appellants' second premise as without merit.
Finally, we find appellants' third premise -- that the need for
public disclosure rises in proportion with the
percentage
of nonmember contributions -- also without merit. The flaw in
appellants' reasoning here may be illustrated by the following
example. Church A raises $10 million, 20 percent from nonmembers.
Church B raises $50,000, 60 percent from nonmembers. Appellants
would argue that, although the public contributed $2 million to
Church A and only $30,000 to Church B, there is less need for
public disclosure with respect to Church A than with respect to
Church B. We disagree; the need for public disclosure more
plausibly rises in proportion with the
absolute amount,
rather than with the
percentage, of nonmember
contributions. [
Footnote 27]
The State of Minnesota has itself adopted this view elsewhere in §
309.515: with qualifications not relevant here, charitable
organizations that receive annual nonmember contributions of less
than $10,000 are exempted from the registration and reporting
requirements of the Act. § 309.515, subd. 1(a).
We accordingly conclude that appellants have failed to
demonstrate that the fifty percent rule in § 309.515, subd. 1(b),
is "closely fitted" to further a "compelling governmental
interest."
C
In
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602
(1971), we announced three "tests" that a statute must pass in
order to avoid the prohibition of the Establishment Clause.
Page 456 U. S. 252
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion,
Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U. S. 236,
392 U. S.
243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive governmental entanglement with religion.'
Walz [v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664,
397 U. S.
674 (1970)]."
Id. at
403 U. S.
612-613.
As our citations of
Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U. S. 236
(1968), and
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.
S. 664 (1970), indicated, the
Lemon v. Kurtzman
"tests" are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit
to
all religions, [
Footnote 28] and not to provisions, like § 309.515, subd.
1(b)'s fifty percent rule, that discriminate
among
religions. Although application of the
Lemon tests is not
necessary to the disposition of the case before us, those tests do
reflect the same concerns that warranted the application of strict
scrutiny to § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule. The Court
of Appeals found that rule to be invalid under the first two
Lemon tests. We view the third of those tests as most
directly implicated in the present case. Justice Harlan well
described the problems of entanglement in his separate opinion in
Walz, where he observed that governmental involvement in
programs concerning religion
"may be so direct or in such degree as to engender a risk of
politicizing religion. . . . [R]eligious groups inevitably
represent certain points of view, and not infrequently assert them
in the political arena, as evidenced by the continuing debate
respecting birth control and abortion laws. Yet history cautions
that political fragmentation on sectarian lines must be guarded
Page 456 U. S. 253
against. . . . [G]overnment participation in certain programs,
whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of
administration and planning, may escalate to the point of inviting
undue fragmentation."
397 U.S. at
397 U. S.
695.
The Minnesota statute challenged here is illustrative of this
danger. By their "very nature," the distinctions drawn by §
309.515, subd. 1(b), and its fifty percent rule "engender a risk of
politicizing religion" -- a risk, indeed, that has already been
substantially realized.
It is plain that the principal effect of the fifty percent rule
in § 309.515, subd. 1(b), is to impose the registration and
reporting requirements of the Act on some religious organizations
but not on others. It is also plain that, as the Court of Appeals
noted,
"[t]he benefit conferred [by exemption] constitutes a
substantial advantage; the burden of compliance with the Act is
certainly not
de minimis."
637 F.2d at 568. [
Footnote
29] We do not suggest that the burdens of compliance with the
Act would be intrinsically impermissible if they were imposed
evenhandedly. But this statute does not operate evenhandedly, nor
was it designed to do so: the fifty percent
Page 456 U. S. 254
rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), effects the
selective
legislative imposition of burdens and advantages upon particular
denominations. The "risk of politicizing religion" that inheres in
such legislation is obvious, and indeed is confirmed by the
provision's legislative history. For the history of § 309.515,
subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule demonstrates that the provision was
drafted with the explicit intention of including particular
religious denominations and excluding others. For example, the
second sentence of an early draft of § 309.515, subd. 1(b),
read:
"A religious society or organization which solicits from its
religious affiliates who are qualified under this subdivision and
who are represented in a body or convention
that elects and
controls the governing board of the religious society or
organization is exempt from the requirements of . . . Sections
309.52 and 309.53."
Minn.H. 1246, 1977-1978 Sess., § 4 (read Apr. 6, 1978). The
legislative history discloses that the legislators perceived that
the italicized language would bring a Roman Catholic Archdiocese
within the Act, that the legislators did not want the amendment to
have that effect, and that an amendment deleting the italicized
clause was passed in committee for the sole purpose of exempting
the Archdiocese from the provisions of the Act. Transcript of
Legislative Discussions of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), as set forth in
Declaration of Charles C. Hunter (on file in this Court) 8-9. On
the other hand, there were certain religious organizations that the
legislators did not want to exempt from the Act. One State Senator
explained that the fifty percent rule was
"an attempt to deal with the religious organizations which are
soliciting on the street and soliciting by direct mail, but who are
not substantial religious institutions in . . . our state."
Id. at 13. Another Senator said,
"what you're trying to get at here is the people that are
running around airports and running around streets and soliciting
people and you're trying to remove them from the exemption that
normally applies to religious organizations."
Id. at 14. Still another Senator, who apparently
Page 456 U. S. 255
had mixed feelings about the proposed provision, stated, "I'm
not sure why we're so hot to regulate the Moonies anyway."
Id. at 16.
In short, the fifty percent rule's capacity -- indeed, its
express design -- to burden or favor selected religious
denominations led the Minnesota Legislature to discuss the
characteristics of various sects with a view towards "religious
gerrymandering,"
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.
S. 437,
401 U. S. 452
(1971). As THE CHIEF JUSTICE stated in
Lemon, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
620:
"This kind of state inspection and evaluation of the religious
content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of
entanglement that the Constitution forbids. It is a relationship
pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction . . . of
churches."
IV
In sum, we conclude that the fifty percent rule of § 309.515,
subd. 1(b), is not closely fitted to the furtherance of any
compelling governmental interest asserted by appellants, and that
the provision therefore violates the Establishment Clause. Indeed,
we think that § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule sets up
precisely the sort of official denominational preference that the
Framers of the First Amendment forbade. Accordingly, we hold that
appellees cannot be compelled to register and report under the Act
on the strength of that provision. [
Footnote 30]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Page 456 U. S. 256
[
Footnote 1]
The Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion. . . ." It is applied to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296,
310 U. S. 303
(1940).
[
Footnote 2]
Section 309.51, subd. 1(a) (1969), repealed in 1973, provided in
pertinent part:
"[S]ections 309.50 to 309.61 shall not apply to any group or
association serving a bona fide religious purpose when the
solicitation is connected with such a religious purpose, nor shall
such sections apply when the solicitation for such a purpose is
conducted for the benefit of such a group or association. . .
."
Between 1973 and 1978, § 309.515, subd. 1, provided in pertinent
part:
"[S]ections 309.52 and 309.53 shall not apply to . . . :"
"
* * * *"
"(b) Any group or association serving a bona fide religious
purpose when the solicitation is connected with such a religious
purpose, nor shall such sections apply when the solicitation for
such a purpose is conducted for the benefit of such a group or
association by any other person with the consent of such group or
association. . . ."
[
Footnote 3]
The amended exemption provision read in relevant part:
"309.515 Exemptions"
"Subdivision 1. . . . [S]ections 309.52 and 309.53 shall not
apply to . . . :"
"
* * * *"
"(b) A religious society or organization which received more
than half of the contributions it received in the accounting year
last ended (1) from persons who are members of the organization; or
(2) from a parent organization or affiliated organization; or (3)
from a combination of the sources listed in clauses (1) and (2). A
religious society or organization which solicits from its religious
affiliates who are qualified under this subdivision and who are
represented in a body or convention is exempt from the requirements
of sections 309.52 and 309.53. The term 'member' shall not include
those persons who are granted a membership upon making a
contribution as a result of a solicitation."
[
Footnote 4]
This notice
"discussed the application of the amendments expanding the scope
of the charities law to religious organizations, explained the
registration procedure, enclosed the proper forms, and sought
[appellees'] compliance with the law."
Affidavit of Susan E. Fortney, Legal Assistant, Staff of
Attorney General of Minnesota, Nov. 2, 1978. The notice also
threatened legal action against the Church if it failed to comply.
The notice read in pertinent part as follows:
"During the recent Minnesota legislative session, a bill was
passed which changes the registration and reporting requirements
for charitable organizations which solicit funds in Minnesota. One
significant change was in the religious exemption which previously
exempted from registering and reporting any organization serving a
bona fide religious purpose."
"Minn.Stat. § 309.515, as found in chapter 601 of the 1978
Session Laws, provides that the religious exemption now applies to
religious groups or societies which receive more than half of its
contributions in the accounting year last ended from persons who
are members of the organization or from a parent organization or
affiliated organization. In other terms, a religious organization
which solicits more than half its funds from non-members must
register and report according to the provisions of the Minnesota
Charitable Solicitation Law."
"From the nature of your solicitation, it appears that Holy
Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity must
complete a Charitable Organization Registration Statement and
submit it to the Minnesota Department of Commerce. The Charitable
Organization Registration Statement must be accompanied with a
financial statement for the fiscal year last ended."
"I am enclosing the proper forms and an information sheet for
your use. Please be advised that the proper forms must be on file
with the Department of Commerce by September 30, 1978, or we will
consider taking legal action to ensure your compliance."
Affidavit of Susan E. Fortney,
supra, Exhibit A.
[
Footnote 5]
Appellees' complaint stated in pertinent part that the
"application of the statutes to itinerant missionaries whose
Churches are not established in Minnesota, but not to Churches with
substantial local membership, constitutes an unequal application of
the law."
App. A-5. The focus of this allegation was plainly the fifty
percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b).
[
Footnote 6]
Appellants responded to appellees' motion for a preliminary
injunction with a motion to dismiss. App. to Juris.Statement A-38.
They disputed appellees' claims on the merits, and also challenged
appellees' standing to raise their Establishment Clause claims,
arguing that the Unification Church was not a religion within the
meaning of that Clause.
Id. at A-44 - A-45. The Magistrate
made findings of fact that the Unification Church was a California
nonprofit religious corporation, and that it had been granted tax
exempt religious organization status by the United States Internal
Revenue Service and the State of Minnesota.
Id. at A-37.
These findings were later incorporated into the Magistrate's report
and recommendation on the motion for summary judgment.
Id.
at A-21. He declined, however, to rule on the issue of the
religious status of the Church.
Id. at A-47.
[
Footnote 7]
Appellants asserted that the central issue in the case was
"whether [appellees'] fund raising practices constitute expression
of religious beliefs within the protection of the First Amendment."
Defendants' Objections to Report and Recommendations of Magistrate
Robert Renner in No. Civ. 7853 (DC Minn.), p. 2. Appellants argued
that appellees' fundraising activities were not a form of religious
expression; they provided evidentiary support for this argument in
the form of numerous affidavits of persons claiming to be former
members of the Unification Church, who asserted that they had been
encouraged to engage in fundraising practices that were both
fraudulent and unrelated to any religious purpose.
[
Footnote 8]
That second test requires that the "principal or primary effect"
of the challenged statute "be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion." 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 612.
The Magistrate found that § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent
rule violated that requirement
"in that it inhibit[ed] religious organizations which receive[d]
more than half of their contributions from nonmembers, and thereby
enhance[d] religious organizations which receive[d] less than half
from non-members."
App. to Juris.Statement A-24.
[
Footnote 9]
The District Court's judgment provided:
"1. The Minnesota Charitable Solicitations Act, Minn.Stat. §
309.50
et seq., is unconstitutional as applied to
religious organizations and members thereof;"
"2. The Act is constitutional as applied to nonreligious
organizations and members thereof;"
"3. Sections 309.534, subd. 1(a), and 309.581 of the Act is
[
sic] unconstitutional as applied to persons claiming to
be religious organizations or members thereof;"
"4. The constitutionality of the application of section 309.532
[relating to denial, suspension, and revocation of licenses issued
under the Act] to [appellees] and others whose claims to a
religious exemption are challenged by the State is a nonjusticiable
issue;"
"5. [Appellant Larson] is permanently enjoined from enforcing
the Act as to any and all religious organizations;"
"6. [Appellant Larson] is permanently enjoined from utilizing
sections 309.534, subd. 1(a), and 309.581 to enforce the Act as
against [appellees] and other persons claiming to be religious
organizations or members thereof."
Id. at A-18 - A-19.
[
Footnote 10]
The Court of Appeals supported this conclusion on grounds
broader than those of the District Court. Whereas the District
Court had found § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule to
violate only the second of the
Lemon tests, the Court of
Appeals found the rule to violate the first of those tests as well.
637 F.2d at 567-568. The first
Lemon test provides that
"the statute must have a secular legislative purpose." 403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
612.
[
Footnote 11]
The Court of Appeals summarized its holdings as follows:
"[W]e agree with the district court's holding that [appellees]
have standing to challenge the classification made in the exemption
section of the Act, as it pertains to religious organizations; we
agree with the court's invalidation of the classification made in
that section; we agree that the exemption section should apply to
all religious organizations, subject to possible legislative
revision; we disagree with the conclusion that no part of the Act
may be applied to religious organizations, but leave open questions
of construction and validity for further development, including the
application of the Act to charitable organizations; and we disagree
with the conclusion that [appellees] and others claiming the
religious exemption should automatically enjoy such exemption, but
leave open the question of [appellees'] status for further
development."
637 F.2d at 571.
[
Footnote 12]
JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent suggests,
post at
456 U. S.
265-266, and n. 2, that our interpretation of the
State's grounds for application of the Act to appellees is
erroneous. But the letter quoted in
n 4,
supra, speaks for itself, and we reject the
novel suggestion that the contents of such a notification of
official enforcement action may be ignored by this Court depending
upon the state official who signs the notice.
[
Footnote 13]
The Department's attempt to apply the Act to appellees by means
of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), was consistent with the expectation,
evident in the legislative history of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), that
that provision's fifty percent rule would be applied to the
Unification Church in order to deny it continued exemption from the
requirements of the Act.
See infra at
456 U. S.
253-255.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent suggests,
post, at
456 U. S. 264,
that "the Act applies to appellees not by virtue of the
fifty
percent rule,' but by virtue of § 309.52." This suggestion misses
the point. Section 309.52 announces the Act's general registration
requirement for charitable organizations. In 1978, the State sought
to compel the Church to register and report under the Act, relying
upon § 309.515, subd. 1(b). The State might have chosen to rely
upon some other provision, e.g., § 309.515, subd. 1(a)(1),
which exempts charitable organizations receiving less than $10,000
annually from the public. Instead the State chose to rely upon §
309.515, subd. 1(b). Thus, if the Act applies to appellees, it of
course does so by the combined effect of § 309.52 and § 309.515,
subd. 1(b). In this attenuated sense, the Act does apply to
appellees "by virtue of § 309.52." But nevertheless the State
sought to impose the requirements of the Act upon appellees by only
one means out of the several available to it, and that means was §
309.515, subd. 1(b).
[
Footnote 14]
See supra at
456 U. S.
230-231; n. 29,
infra.
[
Footnote 15]
In reaching the conclusion that appellees' claims would not be
redressed by an affirmance of the decision below, JUSTICE
REHNQUIST's dissent reveals a draconic interpretation of the
redressability requirement that is justified by neither precedent
nor principle. The dissent appears to assume that, in order to
establish redressability, appellees must show that they are
certain, ultimately, to receive a religious organization exemption
from the registration and reporting requirements of the Act -- in
other words, that there is no other means by which the State can
compel appellees to register and report under the Act. We decline
to impose that burden upon litigants. As this Court has recognized,
"the relevant inquiry is whether . . . the plaintiff has shown
an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision."
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U. S. 26,
426 U. S. 38
(1976) (emphasis added);
accord, Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.
S. 252,
429 U. S. 262
(1977). In other words, a plaintiff satisfies the redressability
requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a
discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable
decision will relieve his every injury.
Cf. University of
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265,
438 U. S.
280-281, n. 14 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.)
[
Footnote 16]
Appellants contended below that appellees were not entitled to
raise their Establishment Clause claims until they had demonstrated
that their activities were within the protection of that Clause.
The courts below applied the overbreadth doctrine to reject this
contention, and appellants argue that those courts erred in doing
so. We have no need to address these matters. Appellees have made a
sufficiently strong demonstration that the Church is a religion to
overcome any prudential standing obstacles to consideration of
their Establishment Clause claim.
[
Footnote 17]
See S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America:
A History 67-453 (1970); L. Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom
71-90 (rev. ed.1967).
[
Footnote 18]
B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
265 (1967).
[
Footnote 19]
For example, according to John Adams, colonial Massachusetts
possessed "the most mild and equitable establishment of religion
that was known in the world, if indeed [it] could be called an
establishment." Quoted
id. at 248. But Baptists in
Massachusetts chafed under any form of establishment, and
Revolutionary pamphleteer John Allen expressed their views to the
members of the General Court of Massachusetts in his declamation,
The American Alarm, or the Bostonian Plea, for the Rights and
Liberties of the People:
"You tell your [colonial] governor that the Parliament of
England have no right to tax the Americans . . . because they are
not the representatives of America; and will you dare to tax the
Baptists for a religion they deny? Are you gentlemen their
representatives before GOD, to answer for their souls and
consciences any more than the representatives of England are the
representatives of America? . . . [I]f it be just in the General
Court to take away my sacred and spiritual rights and liberties of
conscience and my property with it, then it is surely right and
just in the British Parliament to take away by power and force my
civil rights and property without my consent; this reasoning,
gentlemen, I think is plain."
Quoted
id. at 267-268.
[
Footnote 20]
See Pfeffer,
supra, at 104-119.
[
Footnote 21]
Id. at 125-127.
[
Footnote 22]
The Federalist No. 51, p. 326 (H. Lodge ed.1908).
[
Footnote 23]
Appellants urge that § 309.515, subd. 1(b), does not grant such
preferences, but is merely "a law based upon secular criteria which
may not identically affect all religious organizations." Brief for
Appellants 20. They accordingly cite
McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U. S. 420
(1961), and cases following
Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U. S. 1 (1947),
for the proposition that a statute's "disparate impact among
religious organizations is constitutionally permissible when such
distinctions result from application of secular criteria." Brief
for Appellants 26. We reject the argument. Section 309.515, subd.
1(b), is not simply a facially neutral statute, the provisions of
which happen to have a "disparate impact" upon different religious
organizations. On the contrary, § 309.515, subd. 1(b), makes
explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious
organizations. We agree with the Court of Appeals' observation that
the provision effectively distinguishes between "well-established
churches" that have "achieved strong but not total financial
support from their members," on the one hand, and
"churches which are new and lacking in a constituency, or which,
as a matter of policy, may favor public solicitation over general
reliance on financial support from members,"
on the other hand. 637 F.2d at 566. This fundamental difference
between § 309.515, subd. 1(b), and the statutes involved in the
"disparate impact" cases cited by appellants renders those cases
wholly inapplicable here.
Appellants also argue that reversal of the Court of Appeals is
required by
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.
S. 437 (1971). In that case, we rejected an
Establishment Clause attack upon § 6(j) of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (1964 ed., Supp. V),
which afforded "conscientious objector" status to any person who,
"by reason of religious training and belief," was "conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form." 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 441.
Gillette is readily distinguishable from the present case.
Section 6(j) "focused on individual conscientious belief, not on
sectarian affiliation."
Id. at
401 U. S. 454.
Under § 6(j), conscientious objector status was available on an
equal basis to both the Quaker and the Roman Catholic, despite the
distinction drawn by the latter's church between "just" and
"unjust" wars,
see St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica,
Second Part, Part II, Question 40, Arts. 1, 4; St. Augustine, City
of God, Book XIX, Ch. 7. As we noted in
Gillette, the
"critical weakness of petitioners' establishment claim" arose "from
the fact that § 6(j), on its face, simply [did] not discriminate on
the basis of religious affiliation." 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 450.
In contrast, the statute challenged in the case before us focuses
precisely and solely upon religious organizations.
[
Footnote 24]
In support of their assumption of such supervision, appellants
cite Minn.Stat. § 317.28(2) (1969), which allows any member of a
domestic nonprofit corporation to "inspect all books and records
for any proper purpose at any reasonable time." But this provision
applies only to domestic nonprofit corporations; appellants have
made no showing that religious organizations incorporated in other
States operate under an analogous constraint. Further, in
Minnesota, even domestic religious organizations need not be
organized as nonprofit corporations -- they may also choose to
organize under Minn.Stat., ch. 315, governing "Religious
Associations," which has no provision analogous to § 317.28(2).
Moreover, even as to the religious organizations to which it
applies, § 317.28(2) obviously does not ensure that any member of a
religious organization will actually take advantage of the
supervision permitted by that provision. And finally, since §
317.28(2) applies irrespective of the percentage of membership
contributions, it cannot provide any justification at all for the
fifty percent rule in § 309.515, subd. 1(b). In sum, appellants'
assumption of membership supervision is purely conjectural.
[
Footnote 25]
An early draft of that provision allowed an exemption from the
Act only for a religious organization that solicited "substantially
more than half of the contributions it received . . . from persons
who have a right to vote as a member of the organization."
Minn.H. 1246, 1977-1978 Sess., § 4 (read Apr. 6, 1977). The
italicized language was later amended to read, "who are members."
Attachment to Minutes of Meeting of Commerce and Economic
Development Committee, Jan. 24, 1978. Since § 309.515, subd. 1(b),
as enacted deliberately omits membership voting rights as a
requirement for a religious organization's exemption, it clearly
permits religious organizations that are not subject to control by
their membership to be exempted from the Act. Of course, even if §
309.515, subd. 1(b), exempted only those religious organizations
with membership voting rights, the provision obviously would not
ensure that the membership actually exercised its voting rights so
as to control the organization in any effective manner.
[
Footnote 26]
This thesis is evident in the Act's treatment of nonreligious
organizations that might solicit within the State: with exceptions
not relevant here, such organizations are exempted from the
registration and reporting requirements of the Act only if their
solicitations of the public are
de minimis, § 309.515,
subds. 1(a)(1), (f), or if they are subject to independent state
regulation, § 309.515, subd. 1(c).
[
Footnote 27]
We do not suggest, however, that an exemption provision based
upon the absolute amount of nonmember contributions would
necessarily satisfy the standard set by the Establishment Clause
for laws granting denominational preferences.
[
Footnote 28]
Allen involved a state law requiring local public
school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students
in grades seven through twelve, including those in parochial
schools. 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 238.
Walz examined a state law granting property tax exemptions
to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for
religious worship. 397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 666.
And in
Lemon itself, the challenged state laws provided
aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools. 403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
606.
[
Footnote 29]
The registration statement required by § 309.52 calls for the
provision of a substantial amount of information, much of which
penetrates deeply into the internal affairs of the registering
organization. The organization must disclose the "[g]eneral
purposes for which contributions . . . will be used," the "[b]oard,
group or individual having final discretion as to the distribution
and use of contributions received," and "[s]uch other information
as the department may . . . require" -- and these are only three of
sixteen enumerated items of information required by the
registration statement. The annual report required by § 309.53 is
even more burdensome and intrusive. It must disclose "[t]otal
receipts and total income from all sources," the cost of
"management," "fund raising," and "public education," and a list of
"[f]unds or properties transferred out of state, with explanation
as to recipient and purpose," to name only a few. Further, a
religious organization that must register under the Act may have
its registration withdrawn at any time if the Department or the
Attorney General concludes that the religious organization is
spending "an unreasonable amount" for management, general, and
fund-raising costs. § 309.555.
[
Footnote 30]
In so holding, we by no means suggest that the State of
Minnesota must in all events allow appellees to remain exempt from
the provisions of the charitable solicitations Act. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that appellees and others claiming the
benefits of the religious organization exemption should not
automatically enjoy those benefits. 637 F.2d at 571. Rather, in
order to receive them, appellees may be required by the State to
prove that the Unification Church is a religious organization
within the meaning of the Act. Nothing in our opinion suggests that
appellants could not attempt to compel the Unification Church to
register under the Act as a charitable organization not entitled to
the religious organization exemption, and put the Church to the
proof of its bona fides as a religious organization. Further,
nothing in our opinion disables the State from denying exemption
from the Act, or from refusing registration and licensing under the
Act, to persons or organizations proved to have engaged in frauds
upon the public.
See § 309.515, subd. 3. We simply hold
that, because the fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b),
violates the Establishment Clause, appellees cannot be compelled to
register and report under the Act on the strength of that
provision.
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
As the Court points out,
ante at
456 U. S. 243,
invalidation of the 50-percent rule would require the State to
shoulder the considerable burden of demonstrating that the
Unification Church is not a religious organization if the State
persists in its attempt to require the Church to register and file
financial statements. The burden is considerable, because the
record already establishes a
prima facie case that the
Church is a religious organization, [
Footnote 2/1] and because a strict construction of a
statutory exemption for religious organizations is disfavored, and
may give rise to constitutional questions. [
Footnote 2/2] JUSTICE REHNQUIST therefore is plainly
wrong when he asserts in dissent that
"invalidation of the fifty percent rule will have absolutely no
effect on the Association's obligation to register and report as a
charitable organization under the Act."
Post at
456 U. S. 267,
n. 3 (emphasis in original). The 50-percent rule has caused
appellees a significant injury in fact, because it has
Page 456 U. S. 257
substituted a simple method of imposing registration and
reporting requirements for a more burdensome and less certain
method of accomplishing that result. I therefore agree with the
Court's conclusion that the appellees have standing to challenge
the 50-percent rule in this case.
The more difficult question for me is whether the Court's policy
of avoiding the premature adjudication of constitutional issues
[
Footnote 2/3] counsels
postponement of any decision on the validity of the 50-percent rule
until after the Unification Church's status as a religious
organization within the meaning of the Minnesota statute is finally
resolved. My difficulty stems from the fact that the trial and
resolution of the statutory issue will certainly generate
additional constitutional questions. [
Footnote 2/4] Therefore, it is clear that at least one
decision of constitutional moment is inevitable. [
Footnote 2/5] Under these circumstances, it seems
to me that reaching the merits is consistent with our "policy of
strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues,"
Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court, 331
Page 456 U. S. 258
U.S. 549,
331 U. S. 568.
Moreover, a resolution of the question that has been fully
considered by the District Court and by the Court of Appeals and
that has been fully briefed and argued in this Court is surely
consistent with the orderly administration of justice.
I agree with the Court's resolution of the Establishment Clause
issue. Accordingly, I join the Court's opinion.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Church has been incorporated in California as a religious
corporation, and has been treated as a religious organization for
tax purposes by the Federal Government and by the State of
Minnesota. App. to Juris.Statement A-37. The Church was treated as
a religious organization by the State prior to the enactment of the
50-percent rule in 1978. According to the Magistrate, the appellees
"have submitted substantial, although not uncontroverted, evidence
of the religious nature of the Unification Church and of their
solicitations."
Id. at A-23;
see id. at A 7.
[
Footnote 2/2]
See Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia,
101 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 373, 249 F.2d 127, 129 (1957) (Burger, J.)
("To construe exemptions so strictly that unorthodox or minority
forms of worship would be denied the exemption benefits granted to
those conforming to the majority beliefs might well raise
constitutional issues").
[
Footnote 2/3]
See generally Rescue Army v. Municipal Court,
331 U. S. 549,
331 U. S.
568-574;
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.
S. 288,
297 U. S.
346-348 (Brandeis, J., concurring). I have no
reservations about the wisdom or importance of this policy.
See, e.g., California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers'
Santa Ana Theater, 454 U. S. 90,
454 U. S. 94
(STEVENS, J., dissenting);
Minnick v. California Dept. of
Corrections, 452 U. S. 105;
University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.
S. 265,
438 U. S.
411-412 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
[
Footnote 2/4]
Even if we were to conclude that the constitutional standards
for resolving the statutory issue were perfectly clear, there is
nevertheless an important interest in avoiding litigation of issues
relating to church doctrine.
See United States v. Lee,
455 U. S. 252,
455 U. S. 263,
n. 2 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
Cf. NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Even if the District Court should find that the Church is not a
religious organization, I believe that it is fair to assume that
the Church would challenge that conclusion in this Court. I
recognize that it is also possible that ultimately we may be
required to confront both constitutional problems, but that
possibility is present whether we dismiss the appeal pending
resolution of the Church's status or we decide now the validity of
the 50-percent rule.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins,
dissenting.
I concur in the dissent of JUSTICE REHNQUIST with respect to
standing. I also dissent on the merits.
I
It will be helpful first to indicate what occurred in the lower
courts, and what the Court now proposes to do. Based on two reports
of a Magistrate, the District Court held unconstitutional the
Minnesota limitation denying an exemption to religious
organizations receiving less than 50 percent of their funding from
their own members. The Magistrate recommended this action on the
ground that the limitation could not pass muster under the second
criterion set down in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.
S. 602 (1971), for identifying an unconstitutional
establishment of religion -- that the principal or primary effect
of the statute is one that neither enhances nor inhibits religion.
The 50-percent limitation failed this test because it subjected
some churches to far more rigorous requirements than others, the
effect being to "severely inhibit plaintiff's religious
activities." App. to Juris.Statement A-63. This created a
preference offensive to the Establishment Clause.
Id. at
A-33. [
Footnote 3/1] The Magistrate
relied on the inhibiting effect of the 50-percent rule without
reference
Page 456 U. S. 259
to whether or not it was the principal or primary effect of the
limitation. In any event, the Magistrate recommended, and the
District Court agreed, that the exemption from registration be
extended to all religious organizations.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the
50-percent rule violated the Establishment Clause. Its ruling,
however, was on the ground that the limitation failed to satisfy
the first
Lemon criterion -- that the statute have a
secular, rather than a religious, purpose. The court conceded that
the Act as a whole had the valid secular purpose of preventing
fraudulent or deceptive practices in the solicitation of funds in
the name of charity. The court also thought freeing certain
organizations from regulation served a valid purpose because, for
those organizations, public disclosure of funding would not
significantly enhance the availability of information to
contributors. Patriotic and fraternal societies that limit
solicitation to voting members and certain charitable organizations
that do not solicit in excess of $10,000 annually from the public
fell into this category. But the court found no sound secular
legislative purpose for the 50-percent limitation with respect to
religious organizations, because it "appears to be designed to
shield favored sects, while continuing to burden other sects." 637
F.2d 562, 567. The challenged provision, the Court of Appeals
said,
"expressly separates two classes of religious organizations and
makes the separation for no valid secular purpose that has been
suggested by defendants. Inexplicable disparate treatment will not
generally be attributed to accident; it seems much more likely
that, at some stage of the legislative process, special solicitude
for particular religious organizations affected the choice of
statutory language. The resulting discrimination is
constitutionally invidious."
Id. at 568. The Court of Appeals went on to say that,
if it were necessary to apply the second part of the
Lemon
test, the provision would also fail to survive that examination,
because it advantaged some organizations and disadvantaged
others.
Page 456 U. S. 260
In this Court, the case is given still another treatment. The
Lemon v. Kurtzman tests are put aside because they are
applicable only to laws affording uniform benefit to all religions,
not to provisions that discriminate among religions. Rather, in
cases of denominational preference, the Court says that "our
precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we
apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality."
Ante at
456 U. S. 246.
The Court then invalidates the challenged limitation.
It does so by first declaring that the 50-percent rule makes
explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious
organizations. The State's submission that the 50-percent
limitation is a law based on secular criteria which happens not to
have an identical effect on all religious organizations is
rejected. The Court then holds that the challenged rule is not
closely fitted to serve any compelling state interest, and rejects
each of the reasons submitted by the State to demonstrate that the
distinction between contributions solicited from members and from
nonmembers is a sensible one. Among others, the Court rejects the
proposition that membership control is an adequate safeguard
against deceptive solicitations of the public. The ultimate
conclusion is that the exemption provision violates the
Establishment Clause.
II
I have several difficulties with this disposition of the case.
First, the Court employs a legal standard wholly different from
that applied in the courts below. The premise for the Court's
standard is that the challenged provision is a deliberate and
explicit legislative preference for some religious denominations
over others. But there was no such finding in the District Court.
That court proceeded under the second
Lemon test, and then
relied only on the disparate impact of the provision. There was no
finding of a discriminatory or preferential legislative purpose. If
this case is to be judged by a standard not employed by the courts
below, and if the
Page 456 U. S. 261
new standard involves factual issues or even mixed questions of
law and fact that have not been addressed by the District Court,
the Court should not itself purport to make these factual
determinations. It should remand to the District Court.
In this respect, it is no answer to say that the Court of
Appeals appeared to find, although rather tentatively, that the
state legislature had acted out of intentional denominational
preferences. That court was no more entitled to supply the missing
factual predicate for a different legal standard than is this
Court. It is worth noting that none of the Court of Appeals' judges
on the panel in this case is a resident of Minnesota.
Second, apparently realizing its lack of competence to judge the
purposes of the Minnesota Legislature other than by the words it
used, the Court disposes in a footnote of the State's claim that
the 50-percent rule is a neutral, secular criterion that has
disparate impact among religious organizations. The limitation, it
is said, "is not simply a facially neutral statute," but one that
makes "explicit and deliberate distinctions between different
religious organizations."
Ante at
456 U. S. 247,
n. 23. The rule itself, however, names no churches or denominations
that are entitled to or denied the exemption. It neither qualifies
nor disqualifies a church based on the kind or variety of its
religious belief. Some religions will qualify and some will not,
but this depends on the source of their contributions, not on their
brand of religion.
To say that the rule, on its face, represents an explicit and
deliberate preference for some religious beliefs over others is not
credible. The Court offers no support for this assertion other than
to agree with the Court of Appeals that the limitation might burden
the less well organized denominations. This conclusion, itself, is
a product of assumption and speculation. It is contrary to what the
State insists is readily evident from a list of those charitable
organizations that have registered under the Act and of those that
are exempt. It is claimed that both categories include not only
well-established,
Page 456 U. S. 262
but also not so well-established, organizations. The Court
appears to concede that the Minnesota law at issue does not
constitute an establishment of religion merely because it has a
disparate impact. An intentional preference must be expressed. To
find that intention on the face of the provision at issue here
seems to me to be patently wrong.
Third, I cannot join the Court's easy rejection of the State's
submission that a valid secular purpose justifies basing the
exemption on the percentage of external funding. Like the Court of
Appeals, the majority accepts the prevention of fraudulent
solicitation as a valid, even compelling, secular interest. Hence,
charities, including religious organizations, may be required to
register if the State chooses to insist. But here the State has
excused those classes of charities it thought had adequate
substitute safeguards or for some other reason had reduced the risk
which is being guarded against. Among those exempted are various
patriotic and fraternal organizations that depend only on their
members for contributions. The Court of Appeals did not question
the validity of this exemption, because of the built-in safeguards
of membership funding. The Court of Appeals, however, would not
extend the same reasoning to permit the State to exempt religious
organizations receiving more than half of their contributions from
their members while denying exemption to those who rely on the
public to a greater extent. This Court, preferring its own judgment
of the realities of fundraising by religious organizations to that
of the state legislature, also rejects the State's submission that
organizations depending on their members for more than half of
their funds do not pose the same degree of danger as other
religious organizations. In the course of doing so, the Court
expressly disagrees with the notion that members in general can be
relied upon to control their organizations. [
Footnote 3/2]
Page 456 U. S. 263
I do not share the Court's view of our omniscience. The State
has the same interest in requiring registration by organizations
soliciting most of their funds from the public as it would have in
requiring any charitable organization to register, including a
religious organization, if it wants to solicit funds. And if the
State determines that its interest in preventing fraud does not
extend to those who do not raise a majority of their funds from the
public, its interest in imposing the requirement on others is not
thereby reduced in the least. Furthermore, as the State suggests,
the legislature thought it made good sense, and the courts,
including this one, should not so readily disagree.
Fourth, and finally, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
and the District Court that the exemption must be extended to all
religious organizations. The Court of Appeals noted that the
exemption provision, so construed, could be said to prefer
religious organizations over nonreligious organizations, and hence
amount to an establishment of religion. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals did not further address the question, and the Court says
nothing of it now. Arguably, however, there is a more evident
secular reason for exempting religious organizations who rely on
their members to a great extent than there is to exempt all
religious organizations, including those who raise all or nearly
all of their funds from the public.
Without an adequate factual basis, the majority concludes that
the provision in question deliberately prefers some religious
denominations to others. Without an adequate factual basis, it
rejects the justifications offered by the State. It reaches its
conclusions by applying a legal standard different from that
considered by either of the courts below.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Page 456 U. S. 264
[
Footnote 3/1]
The Magistrate also recommended, and the District Court agreed,
that all of the registration provisions applicable to religious
organizations be enjoined as prior restraints offensive to the
First Amendment. App. to Juris.Statement A-33. The Court of Appeals
did not agree in this respect.
[
Footnote 3/2]
This observation would appear to call into question the
exemption of charitable organizations raising all of their funds
from their members: since members cannot be relied upon to control
their organization's fundraising activities so as to prevent fraud,
why should those organizations be entitled to an exemption when
others are not?
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE,
and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
From the earliest days of the Republic it has been recognized
that "[t]his Court is without power to give advisory opinions.
Hayburn's Case,
2 Dall. 409 [(1792)]."
Alabama State Federation of Labor v.
McAdory, 325 U. S. 450,
325 U. S. 461
(1945). The logical corollary of this limitation has been the
Court's
"long . . . considered practice not to decide abstract,
hypothetical or contingent questions, or to decide any
constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its
decision."
Ibid. (citations omitted). Such fundamental principles
notwithstanding, the Court today delivers what is, at best, an
advisory constitutional pronouncement. The advisory character of
the pronouncement is all but conceded by the Court itself when it
acknowledges, in the closing footnote of its opinion, that
appellees must still "prove that the Unification Church is a
religious organization within the meaning of the Act" before they
can avail themselves of the Court's extension of the exemption
contained in the Minnesota statute. Because I find the Court's
standing analysis wholly unconvincing, I respectfully dissent.
I
456 U. S. 515,
subd. 1(b), of the Minnesota Charitable Solicitations Act (Act)
because they have "plainly met" the case-or-controversy
requirements of Art. III.
Ante at
456 U. S. 239.
This conclusion is wrong. Its error can best be demonstrated by
first reviewing three factual aspects of the case which are either
misstated or disregarded in the Court's opinion.
First, the Act applies to appellees not by virtue of the "fifty
percent rule," but by virtue of § 309.52. That provision requires
"charitable organizations" to register with the Securities and Real
Estate Division of the Minnesota Department of Commerce. The Holy
Spirit Association for the
Page 456 U. S. 265
Unification of World Christianity (Association) constitutes such
a "charitable organization" because it "engages in or purports to
engage in solicitation" for a "religious . . . purpose." § 309.50,
subds. 3 and 4 (Supp.1982). Only after an organization is brought
within the coverage of the Act by § 309.52 does the question of
exemption arise. The exemption provided by the fifty percent rule
of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), one of several exemptions within the Act,
applies only to "religious organizations." Thus, unless the
Association is a "religious organization" within the meaning of the
Act, the fifty percent rule has absolutely nothing to do with the
Association's duty to register and report as a "charitable
organization" soliciting funds in Minnesota. This more than
semantic distinction apparently is misunderstood by the Court, for
it repeatedly asserts that the Association is required to register
"under the Act
by virtue of the fifty percent rule in §
309.515, subd. 1(b)."
Ante at 240 (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 4/1]
Second, the State's effort to enforce the Act against the
Association was based upon the Association's status as a
"charitable organization" within the meaning of § 309.52. The State
initially sought registration from the Association by letter:
"From the nature of your solicitation, it appears that [the
Association] must complete a Charitable Organization Registration
Statement and submit it to the Minnesota Department of
Commerce."
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Susan
Page 456 U. S. 266
E. Fortney, Legal Assistant, Staff of Attorney General of
Minnesota, Nov. 2, 1978 (Fortney Affidavit). When the Association
failed to register within the allotted time, the State commenced
"routine enforcement procedures," Fortney Affidavit, at 2, by
filing a complaint in Minnesota state court. The complaint alleges
that "charitable organizations" are required by § 309.52 to
register with the State, that the Association comes within the §
309.50, subd. 4, definition of "charitable organizations," and
that
"[t]he [Association] has failed to file a registration statement
and financial information with the Minnesota Department of
Commerce, resulting in a violation of Minn.Stat. § 309.52."
Exhibit F to Fortney Affidavit at 3. [
Footnote 4/2] This complaint, which never once mentions
the fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), nor characterizes
the Association as a "religious organization," is still pending in
Minnesota District Court, having been stayed by stipulation of the
parties to this lawsuit. Because today's decision does nothing to
impair the statutory basis of the complaint, or the State's reason
for filing it, the State may proceed with its enforcement action
before the ink on this Court's judgment is dry. [
Footnote 4/3]
Page 456 U. S. 267
Third, appellees have never proved, and the lower courts have
never found, that the Association is a "religious organization" for
purposes of the fifty percent rule. The District Court expressly
declined to make such a finding -- "This court is not presently in
a position to rule whether the [Association] is, in fact, a
religious organization within the Act," App. to Juris.Statement
A-47 -- and the Court of Appeals was content to decide the case
despite the presence of this "
unresolved factual dispute
concerning the true character of [appellees'] organization,'" 637
F.2d 562, 565 (CA8 1981) (quoting Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.
S. 620, 444 U. S. 633
(1980)). The absence of such a finding is significant, for it is by
no means clear that the Association would constitute a "religious
organization" for purposes of the § 309.515, subd. 1(b), exemption.
The appellees' assertion in the District Court that their actions
were religious was "directly contradict[ed]" by a "heavy
testimonial barrage against the [Association's] claim that it is a
religion." App. to Juris.Statement A-46. [Footnote 4/4]
Page 456 U. S. 268
II
The Court's opinion recognizes that the proper standing of
appellees in this case is a constitutional prerequisite to the
exercise of our Art. III power.
See ante at
456 U. S.
238-239. To invoke that power, appellees must satisfy
Art. III's case-or-controversy requirement by showing that the have
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, consisting of a
distinct and palpable injury.
Ibid. See also Gladstone,
Page 456 U. S. 269
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S.
91,
441 U. S. 99
(1979);
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, 438 U. S. 59,
438 U. S. 72
(1978). I do not disagree with the Court's conclusion that the
threatened application of the Act to appellees constitutes injury
in fact.
But injury in fact is not the only requirement of Art. III. The
appellees must also show that their injury "fairly can be traced to
the challenged action of the defendant."
Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S.
26,
426 U. S. 41
(1976). The Court purports to find such causation by use of the
following sophism:
"there is a fairly traceable causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct -- here, between the
claimed disabling and the threatened application of § 309.515,
subd. 1(b), and its fifty percent rule."
Ante at
456 U. S.
241.
As was demonstrated above, the statute and the State require the
Association to register because it is a "charitable organization"
under § 309.52, not because of the fifty percent requirement
contained in the exemption for religious organizations. Indeed, at
this point in the litigation, the fifty percent rule is entirely
inapplicable to appellees, because they have not shown that the
Association is a "religious organization." Therefore, any injury to
appellees resulting from the registration and reporting
requirements is caused by § 309.52, not, as the Court concludes, by
"the . . . threatened application of § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty
percent rule."
Ante at
456 U. S. 242.
Having failed to establish that the fifty percent rule is causally
connected to their injury, appellees at this point lack standing to
challenge it.
The error of the Court's analysis is even more clearly
demonstrated by a closely related and equally essential requirement
of Art. III. In addition to demonstrating an injury which is caused
by the challenged provision, appellees must show "that the exercise
of the Court's remedial powers would redress the claimed injuries."
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
supra, at
438 U. S. 74.
The importance
Page 456 U. S. 270
of redressability, an aspect of standing which has been
recognized repeatedly by this Court, [
Footnote 4/5] is of constitutional dimension:
"[W]hen a plaintiff's standing is brought into issue the
relevant inquiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim,
the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision. Absent such a showing, exercise
of its power by a federal court would be gratuitous, and thus
inconsistent with the Art. III limitation."
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra,
at
426 U. S.
38.
Appellees have failed to show that a favorable decision of this
Court will redress the injuries of which they complain. By
affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court today
extends the exemption of § 309.515, subd. 1(b), to all "religious
organizations" soliciting funds in Minnesota.
See 637 F.2d
at 569-570. But because appellees have not shown that the
Association is a "religious organization" under that provision,
they have not shown that they will be entitled to this newly
expanded exemption. [
Footnote 4/6]
This uncertainty is expressly recognized by the Court:
Page 456 U. S. 271
"We agree with the Court of Appeals that appellees and others
claiming the benefits of the religious organization exemption
should not automatically enjoy those benefits. Rather, in order to
receive them, appellees may be required by the State to prove that
the Unification Church is a religious organization within the
meaning of the Act."
Ante at
456 U. S. 255,
n. 30 (citation omitted). [
Footnote
4/7] If the appellees fail in this proof -- a distinct
possibility given the State's "heavy testimonial barrage against
[the Association's] claim that it is a religion," App. to
Juris.Statement A-46 -- this Court will have rendered a purely
advisory opinion. In so doing, it will have struck down a state
statute at the behest of a party without standing, contrary to the
undeviating teaching of the cases previously cited. Those cases, I
believe, require remand for a determination of whether the
Association is a "religious organization" as that term is used in
the Minnesota statute.
III
There can be no doubt about the impropriety of the Court's
action this day.
"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in
the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not
to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such
adjudication is unavoidable."
Spector
Motor
Page 456 U. S. 272
Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.
S. 101,
323 U. S. 105
(1944). Nowhere does this doctrine have more force than in cases
such as this one, where the defect is a possible lack of Art. III
jurisdiction due to want of standing on the part of the party which
seeks the adjudication.
"'Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established
practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the
constitutionality of [legislative Acts] unless obliged to do so in
the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question
is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.'"
Blair v. United States, 250 U.
S. 273,
250 U. S. 279
(1919), quoted in
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.
S. 288,
297 U. S. 341
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The existence of injury in fact
does not, alone, suffice to establish such an interest.
"The necessity that the plaintiff who seeks to invoke judicial
power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Art. III
requirement. A federal court cannot ignore this requirement without
overstepping its assigned role in our system of adjudicating only
actual cases and controversies."
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
at
426 U. S.
39.
IV
In sum, the Court errs when it finds that appellees have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 309.515, subd.
1(b). Although injured, to be sure, appellees have not demonstrated
that their injury was caused by the fifty percent rule or will be
redressed by its invalidation. This is not to say that appellees
can never prove causation or redressability, only that they have
not done so at this point. The case should be remanded to permit
such proof. Until such time as the requirements of Art. III clearly
have been satisfied, this Court should refrain from rendering
significant constitutional decisions.
[
Footnote 4/1]
The examples of this error by the Court are numerous. The Court
speaks of the Act "as applied to [appellees]
through §
309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule,"
ante at
456 U. S. 233
(emphasis added), "the application of the Act to the Church
through § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule,"
ante at
456 U. S. 234
(emphasis added), the State's attempt to enforce the Act against
the appellees "in express and exclusive reliance upon the newly
enacted fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd. 1(b),"
ante
at
456 U. S. 239,
and the State's "attemp[t] to use § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty
percent rule in order to compel the Unification Church to register
and report under the Act,"
ante at
456 U. S. 241.
In addition, the Court holds that, because the fifty percent rule
is unconstitutional, the "appellees cannot be compelled to register
and report under the Act
on the strength of that
provision,"
ante at
456 U. S. 255
(emphasis added).
[
Footnote 4/2]
The Court errs when it concludes that the basis for the State's
enforcement action was the fifty percent rule of § 309.515, subd.
1(b).
See ante at
456 U. S. 232,
456 U. S. 241.
The Court bases this conclusion on a letter to the Association from
Legal Assistant Fortney which referred to the fifty percent rule
while informing the Association of its obligation to register under
the Act.
See ante at
456 U. S.
232-233, n. 4. The Court apparently concludes from this
letter that it was the fifty percent rule which motivated the State
to seek registration from the Association. Certainly the imprecise
implications of a letter from a Legal Assistant in the Attorney
General's Office do not establish the motive behind the State's
enforcement action. More importantly, the reason for the State's
action was expressly alleged in the enforcement complaint: the
Association is a charitable organization soliciting funds in
Minnesota.
See Exhibit F to Fortney Affidavit. Even if the
State had been motivated by the narrowing of the religious
organization exemption, however, that would not alter the legal
basis for enforcement of the statute against appellees or the
analysis of appellees' standing before this Court.
[
Footnote 4/3]
It is not surprising that the Court's opinion never once
mentions this enforcement complaint. That the complaint is pending
in the Minnesota District Court, and that it relies entirely upon
the Association's status as a "charitable organization" within the
meaning of § 309.52, altogether refute the Court's assertion that
the fifty percent "rule was the sole basis for the State's attempt
to compel registration," and the consequent conclusion that
invalidation of the rule will mean that "the Church cannot be
required to register and report under the Act."
Ante at
456 U. S. 242.
As has already been demonstrated, invalidation of the fifty percent
rule will have absolutely no effect on the Association's obligation
to register and report as a
charitable organization under
the Act.
See supra at
456 U. S.
265-266. Indeed, the Court's decision today will not
even require the State to amend its complaint before proceeding
with its enforcement action.
[
Footnote 4/4]
Apparently forgetting that our role does not include finding
facts, the Court finds itself "compel[led]" to conclude that "the
Church is indeed a religious organization within the meaning of the
Act."
Ante at
456 U. S. 241.
The Court's compulsion to disregard its purely appellate function
is caused not by evidence adduced in the District Court, but by the
faulty premise which underlies the Court's entire standing
analysis: that "appellants chose to apply 309.515, subd. 1(b), and
its fifty percent rule as the sole statutory authority requiring
the Church to register under the Act."
Ibid. The utter
error of that premise has already been demonstrated.
See
supra at
456 U. S.
264-265. But even if one accepts the premise that the
State acted because it considered the Association to be a
"religious organization" for purposes of the fifty percent rule,
that premise cannot properly lead to the conclusion that the
Association is,
in fact, such an organization. Factual
determinations of that sort are to be made by state courts
construing the Minnesota statute, not by attorneys in the Minnesota
Attorney General's office. And if the Court is saying that the
Attorney General has "admitted" by its enforcement action that the
Association is a "religious organization" within the meaning of the
Act, it has ventured into a realm of state evidentiary law in which
it has no competence and no business. It is worth noting that even
the Court of Appeals did not take such liberties with the record.
It held that the
"'bare assertion . . . , without the production of any evidence
. . . , is simply not sufficient to sustain [an] assertion that
[the Unification Church] is a religious organization.'"
637 F.2d 562, 570 (CA8 1981) (quoting
United States v.
Berg, 636 F.2d 203, 205 (CA8 1980)).
Even more questionable than this finding of fact is the judicial
wizardry by which the Court shifts the state-created burden of
proof. The Court concludes, without citation to supporting
authority, that
"a declaration that § 309.515, subd. 1(b)'s fifty percent rule
is unconstitutional would put the State to the task of
demonstrating that the Unification Church is
not a
religious organization within the meaning of the Act."
Ante at
456 U. S. 243
(emphasis added). This conclusion directly conflicts with the
Minnesota statute, which requires registration and reporting under
the Act if the State demonstrates that an organization is
"charitable" within the meaning of § 309.52.
See supra at
456 U. S.
265-266. It then becomes incumbent on the organization
to show that it qualifies for one of the Act's several exemptions
-- in this case, to show that it is a "religious organization"
within the meaning of § 309.515, subd. 1(b). The Court cannot
change this state regulatory scheme by judicial fiat, and does so
only in a transparent attempt to manufacture redressability where
none exists.
See infra at
456 U.S. 269-271.
[
Footnote 4/5]
See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, 454 U.
S. 464,
454 U. S. 472
(1981);
Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation,
454 U. S. 151,
454 U. S. 161
(1981);
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U. S. 91,
441 U. S. 100
(1979);
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, 438 U.S. at
438 U. S. 74,
75, n. 20;
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252,
429 U. S. 262
(1977);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490,
422 U. S. 504,
507-508 (1975);
Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.
S. 614,
410 U. S.
618(1973).
[
Footnote 4/6]
The Court attempts to finesse this fact by stating:
"[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he
shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to
himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve
his
every injury."
Ante at
456 U. S. 244,
n. 15 (emphasis in original). True though this statement may be,
appellees have failed to demonstrate that a favorable decision in
this Court will relieve any injury. The Court's decision does not
alter the statutory requirement that the Association register under
the Act, and expands an exemption from which appellees can benefit
only when they prove that the Association is a "religious
organization" within the meaning of the Act.
[
Footnote 4/7]
At another point in its opinion, the Court acknowledges:
"Of course, the Church cannot be assured of a continued
religious organization exemption even in the absence of the fifty
percent rule. . . . But that fact by no means detracts from the
palpability of [appellees' injury.]"
Ante at
456 U. S. 242
(citation omitted).
I agree that the uncertainty as to whether this decision will
benefit appellees does not detract from the "palpability" of their
injury. As shown in the text, however, it detracts totally from
their ability to demonstrate the essential Art. III requirements of
causation and redressability.