Part B of the Medicare program under the Social Security Act
provides federally subsidized insurance against the cost of certain
physician services, outpatient physical therapy, X-rays, laboratory
tests, and certain other medical and health care. The Secretary of
Health and Human Services is authorized to contract with private
insurance carriers to administer the payment of Part B claims. If
the carrier refuses on the Secretary's behalf to pay a portion of a
claim, the claimant is entitled to a "review determination," based
on the submission of written evidence and arguments, and, if the
amount in dispute is $100 or more, a still-dissatisfied claimant
then has a right to an oral hearing, at which an officer chosen by
the carrier presides. The statute and regulations make no further
provision for review of the hearing officer's decision. After
decisions by hearing officers were rendered against them, appellee
claimants sued in Federal District Court to challenge the
constitutional adequacy of the hearings afforded to them. The court
held that the hearing procedures violated appellees' rights to due
process insofar as the final, unappealable decision regarding their
claims was made by carrier appointees, that due process required
additional safeguards to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation
of Part B benefits, and that appellees were entitled to a
de
novo hearing conducted by an administrative law judge of the
Social Security Administration.
Held: The hearing procedures in question do not violate
due process requirements. Pp.
456 U. S.
195-200.
(a) While due process demands impartiality on the part of those
who function in a quasi-judicial capacity, such as the hearing
officers involved in this case, there is a presumption that these
officers are unbiased. This presumption can be rebutted by a
showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason for
disqualification. But the factual findings here disclose no
disqualifying interest. The officers' connection with the private
insurance carriers would be relevant only if the carriers
themselves are biased or interested, and there is no basis in the
record for such a conclusion. The carriers pay Part B claims from
federal, not their own, funds, the hearing officers' salaries are
paid by the Federal Government, and the carriers operate under
contracts requiring compliance with standards prescribed by the
statute and the Secretary. In
Page 456 U. S. 189
the absence of proof of financial interest on the carriers'
part, there is no basis for assuming a derivative bias among their
hearing officers. Pp.
456 U. S.
195-197.
(b) Nor does the record support the contention that accuracy of
Part B decisionmaking may suffer because the carriers appoint
unqualified hearing officers, and that thus additional procedures
would reduce the risk of erroneous decisions. Pp.
456 U. S.
198-200.
503 F.
Supp. 409, reversed and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether Congress, consistently with the
requirements of due process, may provide that hearings on disputed
claims for certain Medicare payments be held by private insurance
carriers without a further right of appeal.
I
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1395
et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV),
commonly known as the Medicare program, is administered by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services. It consists of two parts.
Part A, which is not at issue in this case, provides insurance
against the cost of institutional health services, such as hospital
and nursing home fees. §§ 1396c-1395i-2 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).
Part B is entitled "Supplementary
Page 456 U. S. 190
Medical Insurance Benefits for the Aged and Disabled." It covers
a portion (typically 80%) of the cost of certain physician
services, outpatient physical therapy, X-rays, laboratory tests,
and other medical and health care.
See §§ 1395k, 13951,
and 1395x(s) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Only persons 65 or older or
disabled may enroll, and eligibility does not depend on financial
need. Part B is financed by the Federal Supplementary Medical
Insurance Trust Fund.
See § 1395t (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).
This Trust Fund, in turn, is funded by appropriations from the
Treasury, together with monthly premiums paid by the individuals
who choose voluntarily to enroll in the Part B program.
See §§ 1395j, 1395r, and 1395w (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).
Part B consequently resembles a private medical insurance program
that is subsidized in major part by the Federal Government.
Part B is a social program of substantial dimensions. More than
27 million individuals presently participate, and the Secretary
pays out more than $10 billion in benefits annually. Brief for
Appellant 9. In 1980, 158 million Part B claims were processed.
Ibid. In order to make the administration of this sweeping
program more efficient, Congress authorized the Secretary to
contract with private insurance carriers to administer on his
behalf the payment of qualifying Part B claims.
See 42
U.S.C. § 1395u (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). (In this case, for
instance, the private carriers that performed these tasks in
California for the Secretary were Blue Shield of California and the
Occidental Insurance Co.) The congressional design was to take
advantage of such insurance carriers' "great experience in
reimbursing physicians." H.R.Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
46 (1965).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(a); S.Rep. No. 404,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1965).
The Secretary pays the participating carriers' costs of claims
administration.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(c). In return, the
carriers act as the Secretary's agents.
See 42 CFR §
421.5(b) (1980). They review and pay Part B claims for the
Page 456 U. S. 191
Secretary according to a precisely specified process.
See 42 CFR part 405, subpart H (1980). Once the carrier
has been billed for a particular service, it decides initially
whether the services were medically necessary, whether the charges
are reasonable, and whether the claim is otherwise covered by Part
B.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); 42
CFR § 405.803(b) (1980). If it determines that the claim meets all
these criteria, the carrier pays the claim out of the Government's
Trust Fund -- not out of its own pocket.
See 42 U.S.C. §§
1395u(a)(1), 1395u(b)(3), and 1395u(c) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).
Should the carrier refuse on behalf of the Secretary to pay a
portion of the claim, the claimant has one or more opportunities to
appeal. First, all claimants are entitled to a "review
determination," in which they may submit written evidence and
arguments of fact and law. A carrier employee, other than the
initial decisionmaker, will review the written record
de
novo and affirm or adjust the original determination. 42 CFR
§§ 405.807-405.812 (1980);
McClure v.
Harris, 503 F.
Supp. 409, 411 (ND Cal.1980). If the amount in dispute is $100
or more, a still-dissatisfied claimant then has a right to an oral
hearing.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C); 42 CFR §§
405.820-405.860 (1980). An officer chosen by the carrier presides
over this hearing. § 405.823. The hearing officers "do not
participate personally, prior to the hearing [stage], in any case
[that] they adjudicate." 503 F. Supp. at 414.
See 42 CFR §
405.824 (1980).
Hearing officers receive evidence and hear arguments pertinent
to the matters at issue. § 405.830. As soon as practicable
thereafter, they must render written decisions based on the record.
§ 405.834. Neither the statute nor the regulations make provision
for further review of the hearing officer's decision. [
Footnote 1]
See United States v.
Erika, Inc., post, p.
456
U. S. 201.
Page 456 U. S. 192
II
This case arose as a result of decisions by hearing officers
against three claimants. [
Footnote
2] The claimants, here appellees, sued to challenge the
constitutional adequacy of the hearings afforded them. The District
Court for the Northern District of California certified appellees
as representatives of a nationwide class of individuals whose
claims had been denied by carrier-appointed hearing officers. 503
F. Supp. at 412-414. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
court concluded that the Part B hearing procedures violated
appellees' right to due process "insofar as the final, unappealable
decision regarding claims disputes is made by carrier appointees. .
. ."
Id. at 418.
The court reached its conclusion of unconstitutionality by
alternative lines of argument. The first rested upon the principle
that tribunals must be impartial. The court thought that the
impartiality of the carrier's hearing officers was compromised by
their "prior involvement and pecuniary interest."
Id. at
414. "Pecuniary interest" was shown, the District Court said, by
the fact that
"their incomes as hearing officers are entirely dependent upon
the carrier's decisions regarding whether, and how often, to call
upon their services. [
Footnote
3]"
Id. at 415. Respecting "prior involvement," the
Page 456 U. S. 193
court acknowledged that hearing officers
personally had
not been previously involved in the cases they decided. But it
noted that hearing officers
"are appointed by, and serve at the will of, the carrier [that]
has not only participated in the prior stages of each case, but has
twice denied the claims [that] are the subject of the hearing,"
and that five out of seven of Blue Shield's past and present
hearing officers "are former
or current Blue Shield
employees." [
Footnote 4]
Id. at 414. (Emphasis in original.)
See also 42
CFR § 405.824 (1980). The District Court thought these links
between the carriers and their hearing officers sufficient to
create a constitutionally intolerable risk of hearing officer bias
against claimants.
The District Court's alternative reasoning assessed the costs
and benefits of affording claimants a hearing before one of the
Secretary's administrative law judges, "either subsequent to or
substituting for the hearing conducted by a carrier appointee." 503
F. Supp. at 415. The court noted that
Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U. S. 319,
424 U. S. 335
(1976), makes three factors relevant to such an inquiry:
"First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest,
Page 456 U. S. 194
including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail."
Considering the first
Mathews factor, the court listed
three considerations tending to show that the private interest at
stake was not overwhelming. [
Footnote 5] The court then stated, however, that "it
cannot be gainsaid" that denial of a Medicare beneficiary's claim
to reimbursement may impose "considerable hardship." 503 F. Supp.
at 416.
As to the second
Mathews factor of risk of erroneous
deprivation and the probable value of added process, the District
Court found the record "inconclusive." 503 F. Supp. at 416. The
court cited statistics showing that the two available Part B appeal
procedures frequently result in reversal of the carriers' original
disposition. [
Footnote 6] But
it criticized these statistics for failing to distinguish between
partial and total reversals. The court stated that hearing officers
were required neither to receive training nor to satisfy "threshold
criteria, such as having a law degree."
Ibid. On this
basis, it held that "it must be assumed that additional safeguards
would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of Part B benefits."
Ibid.
On the final
Mathews factor involving the Government's
interest, the District Court noted that carriers processed 124
million Part B claims in 1978. 503 F. Supp. at 416. The court
stated that "[o]nly a fraction of those claimants pursue their
currently available appeal remedies," and that "there is no
indication that anything but an even smaller group of claimants
will actually pursue [an] additional remedy" of appeal
Page 456 U. S. 195
to the Secretary.
Ibid. Moreover, the court said, the
Secretary already maintained an appeal procedure using
administrative law judges for appeals by Part A claimants.
Increasing the number of claimants who could use this Part A
administrative appeal "would not be a cost-free change from the
status quo, but neither should it be a costly one."
Ibid.
Weighing the three
Mathews factors, the court concluded
that due process required additional procedural protection over
that presently found in the Part B hearing procedure. The court
ordered that the appellees were entitled to a
de novo
hearing of record conducted by an administrative law judge of the
Social Security Administration. [
Footnote 7] App. to Juris.Statement 36a. We noted probable
jurisdiction, 454 U.S. 890 (1981), and now reverse.
III
A
The hearing officers involved in this case serve in a
quasi-judicial capacity, similar in many respects to that of
administrative law judges. As this Court repeatedly has recognized,
due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function
in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities.
E.g., Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238,
446 U. S.
242-243, and n. 2 (1980). We must start, however, from
the presumption that the hearing officers who decide Part B claims
are unbiased.
See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S.
35,
421 U. S. 47
(1975);
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.
S. 409,
313 U. S. 421
(1941). This presumption can be rebutted by a showing of conflict
of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification.
[
Footnote 8]
See Gibson
Page 456 U. S. 196
v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564,
411 U. S.
578-579 (1973);
Ward v. Village of Monroeville,
409 U. S. 57,
409 U. S. 60
(1972).
See also In re Murchison, 349 U.
S. 133,
349 U. S. 136
(1955) ("to perform its high function in the best way,
justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice'") (quoting Offutt v.
United States, 348 U. S. 11,
348 U. S. 14
(1954)). But the burden of establishing a disqualifying interest
rests on the party making the assertion.
Fairly interpreted, the factual findings made in this case do
not reveal any disqualifying interest under the standard of our
cases. The District Court relied almost exclusively on generalized
assumptions of possible interest, placing special weight on the
various connections of the hearing officers with the private
insurance carriers. [
Footnote
9] The difficulty with this reasoning is that these connections
would be relevant only if the carriers themselves are biased or
interested. We find no basis in the record for reaching such a
conclusion. [
Footnote 10] As
previously noted, the carriers pay all Part B claims from federal,
and not their own, funds. Similarly, the salaries of the hearing
officers are paid by the Federal Government.
Cf.
Marshall
Page 456 U. S. 197
v. Jerrico, Inc., supra, at
446 U. S. 245,
446 U. S. 251.
Further, the carriers operate under contracts that require
compliance with standards prescribed by the statute and the
Secretary.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395u(a)(1)(A(B), 1395u(b)(3),
and 1395u(b)(4) (1976) ed. and Supp. IV); 42 CFR §§ 421.200,
421.202, and 421.205(a) (1980). In the absence of proof of
financial interest on the part of the carriers, there is no basis
for assuming a derivative bias among their hearing officers.
[
Footnote 11]
Page 456 U. S. 198
B
Appellees further argued, and the District Court agreed, that
due process requires an additional administrative or judicial
review by a Government rather than a carrier-appointed hearing
officer. Specifically, the District Court ruled that
"[e]xisting Part B procedures might remain intact so long as
aggrieved beneficiaries would be entitled to appeal carrier
appointees' decisions to Part A administrative law judges.
[
Footnote 12]"
503 F. Supp. at 417. In reaching this conclusion, the District
Court applied the familiar test prescribed in
Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 335.
See supra at
456 U. S.
193-195. We may assume that the District Court was
correct in viewing the private interest in Part B payments as
"considerable," though "not quite as precious as the right to
receive welfare or social security benefits." 503 F. Supp. at 416.
We likewise may assume, in considering the third
Mathews
factor, that the additional cost and inconvenience of providing
administrative law judges would not be unduly burdensome. [
Footnote 13]
We focus narrowly on the second
Mathews factor that
considers the risk of erroneous decision and the probable value, if
any, of the additional procedure. The District Court's reasoning on
this point consisted only of this sentence:
"In light of [appellees'] undisputed showing that
carrier-appointed hearing officers receive little or no formal
training, and are not required to satisfy any threshold
criteria
Page 456 U. S. 199
such as having a law degree, it must be assumed that additional
safeguards would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of Part B
benefits."
503 F. Supp. at 416 (footnote omitted). Again, the record does
not support these conclusions. The Secretary has directed carriers
to select as a hearing officer
"'an attorney or other
qualified individual with the
ability to conduct formal hearings and with a general understanding
of medical matters and terminology. The [hearing officer] must have
a
thorough knowledge of the Medicare program and the
statutory authority and regulations upon which it is based, as well
as rulings, policy statements, and general instructions pertinent
to the Medicare Bureau.'"
App. 22, quoting Dept. of HEW, Medicare Part B Carriers Manual,
ch. VII, p. 121 (1980) (emphasis added).
The District Court did not identify any specific deficiencies in
the Secretary's selection criteria. By definition, a "qualified"
individual already possessing "ability" and "thorough knowledge"
would not require further training. The court's further general
concern that hearing officers "are not required to satisfy any
threshold criteria" overlooks the Secretary's quoted regulation.
[
Footnote 14] Moreover, the
District Court apparently gave no weight to the qualifications of
hearing officers about whom there is information in the record.
Their qualifications tend to undermine, rather than to support,
Page 456 U. S. 200
the contention that accuracy of Part B decisionmaking may suffer
by reason of carrier appointment of unqualified hearing officers.
[
Footnote 15]
"[D]ue Process is flexible, and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."
Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471,
408 U. S. 481
(1972). We have considered appellees' claims in light of the strong
presumption in favor of the validity of congressional action and
consistently with this Court's recognition of "congressional
solicitude for fair procedure. . . ."
Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682,
442 U. S. 693
(1979). Appellees simply have not shown that the procedures
prescribed by Congress and the Secretary are not fair, or that
different or additional procedures would reduce the risk of
erroneous deprivation of Part B benefits.
IV
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for judgment to be entered for the Secretary.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Hearing officers may decide to reopen proceedings under certain
circumstances.
See 42 CFR §§ 405.841-405.850 (1980).
[
Footnote 2]
Appellee William McClure was denied partial reimbursement for
the cost of an air ambulance to a specially equipped hospital. The
hearing officer determined that the air ambulance was necessary,
but that McClure could have been taken to a hospital closer to
home. Appellee Charles Shields was allowed reimbursement for a
cholecystectomy, but was denied reimbursement for an accompanying
appendectomy. The hearing officer reasoned that the appendectomy
was merely incidental to the cholecystectomy. Appellee "Ann Doe"
was denied reimbursement for the entire cost of a sex-change
operation. The hearing officer ruled that the operation was not
medically necessary.
[
Footnote 3]
The District Court recognized that hearing officer salaries are
paid from a federal fund, and not the carrier's resources.
McClure v. Harris, 503 F.
Supp. 409, 415 (1980).
[
Footnote 4]
In this connection, the court referred to the judicial canon
requiring a judge to disqualify himself from cases where a
"
lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during
such association as a lawyer concerning the matter.'" 503 F . Supp.
at 414-415, quoting Judicial Conference of the United States, Code
of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1)(b). The court found that
application to hearing officers of standards more lax than those
applicable to the judiciary posed "a constitutionally unacceptable
risk of decisions tainted by bias." 503 F. Supp. at 415.
Additionally, the court thought it significant that "no
meaningful, specific selection criteria govern[ed] the appointment
of hearing officers," and that hearing officers were trained
largely by the carriers whose decisions they were called upon to
review.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 5]
"Eligibility for Part B Medicare benefits is not based on
financial need. Part B covers supplementary, rather than primary,
services. Denial of a particular claim in a particular case does
not deprive the claimant of reimbursement for other, covered,
medical expenses."
Id. at 416.
[
Footnote 6]
"[Appellant] establish[es] that, between 1975 and 1978, carriers
wholly or partially reversed, upon 'review determination,' their
initial determinations in 51-57 percent of the cases considered. Of
the adverse determination decisions brought before hearing
officers, 42-51 percent of the carriers' decisions were reversed in
whole or in part."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 7]
The court added that appellees "are not entitled to further
appeal or review of the Administrative Law Judge's decision." App.
to Juris.Statement 36a.
[
Footnote 8]
The Secretary's regulations provide for the disqualification of
hearing officers for prejudice and other reasons.
See 42
CFR § 405.824 (1980); App. 23-25. Appellees neither sought to
disqualify their hearing officers nor presently make claims of
actual bias. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34 (argument of counsel for
appellees).
[
Footnote 9]
Before this Court, appellees urge that the Secretary himself is
biased in favor of inadequate Part B awards. They attempt to
document this assertion -- not mentioned by the District Court --
by relying on the fact that the Secretary both has helped carriers
identify medical providers who allegedly bill for more services
than are medically necessary and has warned carriers to control
overutilization of medical services.
See Brief for
Appellees 17-18.
This action by the Secretary is irrelevant. It simply shows that
he takes seriously his statutory duty to ensure that only
qualifying Part B claims are paid.
See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(a) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); 42 CFR § 405.803(b) (1980). It
does not establish that the Secretary has sought to discourage
payment of Part B claims that
do meet Part B requirements.
Such an effort would violate Congress' direction. Absent evidence,
it cannot be presumed.
[
Footnote 10]
Similarly, appellees adduced no evidence to support their
assertion that, for reasons of psychology, institutional loyalty,
or carrier coercion, hearing officers would be reluctant to differ
with carrier determinations. Such assertions require substantiation
before they can provide a foundation for invalidating an Act of
Congress.
[
Footnote 11]
The District Court's analogy to judicial canons,
see
n 4,
supra, is not
apt. The fact that a hearing officer is or was a carrier employee
does not create a risk of partiality analogous to that possibly
arising from the professional relationship between a judge and a
former partner or associate.
We simply have no reason to doubt that hearing officers will do
their best to obey the Secretary's instruction manual:
"The individual selected to act in the capacity of [hearing
officer] must not have been involved in any way with the
determination in question, and neither have advised nor given
consultation on any request for payment which is a basis for the
hearing. Since the hearings are of a nonadversary nature, be
particularly responsive to the needs of unrepresented parties and
protect the claimant's rights, even if the claimant is represented
by counsel. The parties' interests must be safeguarded to the full
extent of their rights; in like manner, the government's interest
must be protected."
"The [hearing officer] should conduct the hearing with dignity
and exercise necessary control and order. . . . The [hearing
officer] must make independent and impartial decisions, write clear
and concise statements of facts and law, secure facts from
individuals without causing unnecessary friction, and be objective
and free of any influence which might affect impartial judgment as
to the facts, while being particularly patient with older persons
and those with physical or mental impairments."
"
* * * *"
"The [hearing officer] must be cognizant of the informal nature
of a Part B hearing. . . . The hearing is nonadversary in nature,
in that neither the carrier nor the Medicare Bureau is in
opposition to the party, but is interested only in seeing that a
proper decision is made."
App. 22, 31-32, quoting Dept. of HEW, Medicare Part B Carriers
Manual, ch. XII, pp. 12-21, 12-29 (1980).
Cf. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U. S. 389,
402 U. S. 403
(1971) ("congressional plan" is that social security administrative
system will operate essentially "as an adjudicator, and not as an
advocate or adversary").
[
Footnote 12]
The claim determination and appeal process available for Part A
claims differs from the Part B procedure.
See generally 42
CFR part 405, subpart G (1980), as amended, 45 Fed.Reg. 73932-73933
(1980).
See also United States v. Erika, Inc.,post, at
456 U. S.
206-207, and nn. 8 and 9.
[
Footnote 13]
No authoritative factual findings were made, and perhaps this
conclusion would have been difficult to prove. It is known that, in
1980, about 158 million Part B claims -- up from 124 million in
1978 -- were filed. Even though the additional review would be
available only for disputes in excess of $100, a small percentage
of the number of claims would be large in terms of number of
cases.
[
Footnote 14]
The District Court's opinion may be read as requiring that
hearing officers always be attorneys. Our cases, however, make
clear that due process does not make such a uniform requirement.
See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480,
445 U. S. 499
(1980) (POWELL, J., concurring in part);
Parham v. J. R.,
442 U. S. 584,
442 U. S. 607
(1979);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.
S. 471,
408 U. S. 486,
408 U. S. 489
(1972).
Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254,
397 U. S. 271
(1970). Neither the District Court in its opinion nor the appellees
before us make a particularized showing of the additional value of
a law degree in the Part B context.
[
Footnote 15]
The record contains information on nine hearing officers. Two
were retired administrative law judges with 15 to 18 years of
judging experience, five had extensive experience in medicine or
medical insurance, one had been a practicing attorney for 20 years,
and one was an attorney with 42 years' experience in the insurance
industry who was self-employed as an insurance adjuster. Record,
App. to Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 626, 661-662,
682-685.